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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
David Stevens 
University of Baltimore 
Stephen A. Wandner 
Urban Institute and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Michael Wiseman 
George Washington University 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) are essential threads in the social safety 
net for working Americans. These programs were particularly impor-
tant during and immediately after the Great Recession.1 Many work-
ers lost their jobs, collected UI benefits, and often also received SNAP
benefits. At the same time, many persons in low-income households 
already receiving SNAP lost their jobs and applied for UI benefits. 
Annual SNAP benefit payments reached roughly the same scale as 
the total of all state regular UI benefit payments in the period: nearly 
$80 billion was paid in regular UI benefits during calendar year 2009, 
while just over $76 billion in SNAP benefits was paid out in 2013.2 
Both SNAP and UI responded quickly to soaring unemployment, as 
the numbers of annual SNAP recipients rose from 20 million to 50 
million and the numbers of annual UI beneficiaries increased from 10 
million to 20 million during the recession. 
Many households received benefits from both SNAP and UI dur-
ing this period, but little is known about the extent of program inter-
action. Understanding how these programs worked together in the 
1 
  
 
 
2 O’Leary et al. 
crisis is necessary for improving policies to address hardship when 
economic difficulties reemerge. While the two programs have previ-
ously been studied separately, this is the first study to use administra-
tive data to look at how these two programs worked together during a 
period of crisis in the economy and the labor market. 
This book is based on analyses of SNAP and UI program benefit 
receipt around the time of the Great Recession in six states—Flor-
ida, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas.3 These six 
states span the full range of labor market experience during the Great 
Recession. Michigan, with an unemployment rate above 7 percent, 
had still not recovered from the early 2000s recession by December 
2007, when the economic decline commenced. At the other extreme, 
Maryland started the recession in a strong position and was only 
mildly affected by the economic downturn. Missouri closely matched 
the pattern of decline and recovery seen in national averages, and 
the three large states of Florida, Georgia, and Texas all started the 
Great Recession in strong economic positions, but all three saw rapid 
declines in economic activity. 
The six states also present a diversity of policy contexts. While 
access to SNAP benefits is governed by federal laws and regulations, 
SNAP recipiency rates differ significantly across the six states, 
suggesting differences in state program administration. Similarly, 
state laws and regulations governing UI eligibility and benefits 
encompass a broad range of policy principles, particularly for lower-
level earners who might turn to SNAP after job loss. Additionally, 
data available for analysis allowed us to examine program changes 
in Florida and Georgia, where there was declining UI generosity, as 
benefits were reduced during the economic recovery. Our analysis of 
SNAP in Texas examined the state’s policy choice not to fully expand 
eligibility in all the ways permitted by federal recession recovery 
legislation. Together, the six states provide a rich context for learning 
about interactions in SNAP and UI program use. 
The state analyses were done using data from before, during, 
and after the Great Recession. The state studies were not restricted 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and Overview 3 
to a common limited range of data available in all states, because 
more information was available for some states than others, and all 
available data were used to examine the SNAP-UI interaction. For 
example, the Maryland, Georgia, and Texas studies all have a long-
enough time frame to distinguish between the early postrecession 
“jobless recovery” phase and the later more robust recovery period. 
Furthermore, while the universe of all SNAP recipient households 
was available for all states, only the Michigan analysis used the uni-
verse of all UI applicants, including those who were denied benefits. 
For most of the states, UI benefit information was available only for 
SNAP households. 
Evidence from the state studies shows that joint usage of SNAP
and UI is significant even in good economic times, and that joint 
usage dramatically increased during the Great Recession. The rate of 
long-term joblessness increased, and even with substantial temporary 
extensions in the potential duration of UI benefits, many workers and 
households suffered food insecurity and turned to SNAP. Addition-
ally, low-income working households already receiving SNAP often 
turned to UI following job loss. Averaged across the six states studied, 
UI receipt among SNAP households ranged from 4.5 percent in 2006 
to 11.3 percent in 2009. Among UI beneficiaries in Michigan, 7.5 per-
cent were also receiving SNAP at the time of UI application in 2006, 
and that recipiency doubled to 15.0 percent by 2010. 
While in good economic times there tends to be a smaller overlap 
between the two programs in benefit receipt, the level of program 
interaction is noteworthy at all times. SNAP is available only to eli-
gible low-income households, while UI provides temporary benefits 
during involuntary unemployment to workers with strong labor-force 
attachments and solid earnings histories. 
Data for analysis were drawn from the years before, during, and 
after the Great Recession—although the precise time periods differed 
across the six states. This book distills the evidence about how the UI 
and SNAP programs worked individually and how they overlapped 
and complemented each other. Changes in the parameters of one pro-
  
 
 
   
 
4 O’Leary et al. 
gram may have unintended impacts on the other program. Therefore, 
the new findings about the recession and postrecession interactions 
of UI and SNAP participation presented in this book have immedi-
ate relevance for public policy formation and program administration. 
This introductory chapter proceeds with brief overviews of the UI 
and SNAP programs and an outline of the way eligibility rules permit 
the programs to interact. (More detailed examinations of the UI and 
SNAP programs are given in Chapters 2 and 3.) It continues with a 
general description of the data available for research and the national 
context for our state studies. Next, there is a description of the data 
available for the separate studies, along with contrasts drawn between 
these various data, followed by a graphical review of the extent of 
SNAP and UI program use and interaction in the study states. Finally, 
we present important results from each of the six state studies and 
offer some summary comments. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMS 
Unemployment Insurance 
UI is a federal-state program under which states determine most 
of the rules for eligibility and the levels and duration of benefits. UI is 
designed to pay temporary weekly benefits to individual experienced 
workers unemployed through no fault of their own, usually because 
of layoffs. In many states, UI benefit levels approximate half of an 
unemployed worker’s prior wage up to a maximum weekly amount 
set by the state. For the year ending December 2018, the U.S. aver-
age weekly benefit amount was $356. In good economic times, UI 
beneficiaries receive only “regular” benefits, for which the maxi-
mum potential duration of benefit receipt is usually 26 weeks in most 
states. During recessions, additional benefit programs may be avail-
able. These include the permanent Extended Benefits (EB) Program, 
which generally pays up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits “trig-
  
Introduction and Overview 5 
gered” by specified levels of either state-insured employment or total 
unemployment. During most recessions, Congress enacts temporary 
emergency programs on top of EB. These temporary programs have 
had a variety of names, but recently they have been called Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC). During and after the Great 
Recession, there were brief periods during which UI recipients in 
some states could receive up to 99 total combined weeks of regular 
UI, EB, and EUC. At any given time, the potential duration of benefits 
available to individuals depends on state and federal law and the level 
of unemployment in the state. 
UI recipients are required to search for work. They are aided in 
that search by the provision of reemployment services by the state 
Employment Service agency. Longer durations of benefits during 
recessions give UI beneficiaries more time to search for and find jobs. 
During the Great Recession, exhaustion of entitlement to UI bene-
fits increased sharply, even though EB and EUC were available. As 
a result, many UI recipients became eligible for SNAP. Chapter 2 
describes the UI program in greater detail. 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
SNAP is designed to add food purchasing power to an eligible 
household’s budget to improve the household’s food security. Access 
to SNAP benefits starts with an evaluation of a household’s eligibil-
ity, based on income limits that increase with the number of eligible 
household members. These income limits take into account a handful 
of specific deductions, such as for housing costs and child care. Some 
states also impose specific asset limits, and some counties require sin-
gle adults to look for work in order to receive benefits for more than 
three months. Initial household eligibility is usually set for a fixed 
period. This duration can be as long as one year for single adults or 
families and two years for elderly or disabled beneficiaries, although 
some states set shorter periods. For many households, reporting on 
basic eligibility conditions is required after half of the initial eligibil-
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
6 O’Leary et al. 
ity period, or any time there is a nontrivial change in income or assets. 
Once the initial eligibility period expires, households must complete 
the full recertification process again. As long as the household-size 
specific eligibility criteria remain satisfied during reporting and recer-
tification, regular monthly SNAP benefits can continue uninterrupted. 
The additional spending power provided by SNAP is restricted to 
food purchases. In contrast, federal and state UI laws place no restric-
tions on how UI cash benefits can be used or shared with others. For 
SNAP, in addition to being restricted to food purchases, there are 
limitations on the types of food SNAP can be used to buy—and the 
diversity of allowable items has changed over the years. Furthermore, 
a SNAP benefit amount cannot be transferred to anyone who is not 
a defined countable member of the recipient household. The SNAP
program is fully explained in Chapter 3. 
SNAP-UI Interaction 
SNAP and UI affect the household budget very differently. SNAP
is paid monthly, while UI is paid weekly. For a household that quali-
fies for both SNAP and UI, benefits in a month will usually be higher 
for UI than for SNAP. This stems from the different missions of the 
two programs—SNAP supplements food-purchasing power for low-
income households, and the benefit can only be spent on food at 
authorized retailers, while UI aims to maintain socially adequate con-
sumption by unemployed labor-force members and provides general 
purchasing power. Importantly, in determining SNAP eligibility, UI 
benefits are considered part of household income; but in determining 
UI eligibility, SNAP benefits are not considered. 
Eligibility for SNAP requires net household income to be less 
than 130 percent of the federal poverty level for a given household 
size, and the monthly benefit amount can be lower than the federally 
determined maximum, depending on the level of net income, which 
has allowances for housing costs, child care costs, and the household 
contribution to food costs (see examples in Appendix 1A). UI eligi-
  
 
	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction and Overview 7 
bility is not limited by the individual worker’s usual income level 
or the economic activity of any other household members. Rather, 
UI depends only on two things: 1) prior earnings as a measure of 
workforce attachment and 2) the reason for the individual worker’s 
job separation. UI benefit amounts increase with the level of prior 
earnings up to a state-determined maximum weekly benefit amount 
(WBA). 
Within limits, both SNAP and UI can be received in periods when 
there are also earnings or other nonlabor income. However, added 
income may reduce benefit payments from both programs. The rates 
of reductions in program benefits resulting from additional income 
are referred to as effective marginal tax rates. We explain these rates 
for SNAP and UI first separately and then together, accounting for 
program interactions. It is important to note that as nonlabor income, 
UI benefits affect the SNAP amount differently than an equivalent 
amount of wage income earned through work. 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates in SNAP 
The monthly household SNAP benefit will decline with increased 
labor income at a rate of 24 percent, while added nonlabor income–– 
like UI––will reduce SNAP benefits by 30 percent. These different 
effective marginal tax rates on income result from SNAP beneficiary 
households being expected to spend 30 percent of their net income 
on food—that is, 30 cents of each added dollar of nonlabor income. 
However, only 24 cents of each added dollar earned by work is to be 
spent on food, because labor earnings are given a 20 percent deduc-
tion before net income is determined for SNAP eligibility. 
Over somewhat higher levels of income, the two effective mar-
ginal tax rates on SNAP each rise by half, to 36 and 45 percent for 
income from labor and nonlabor sources. These higher effective 
marginal tax rates come into force above the income level at which 
actual shelter costs minus half of SNAP countable income equal the 
maximum allowable shelter deduction. As income rises, the effect of 
 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
8 O’Leary et al. 
housing-cost deductions on effective marginal tax rates declines. The 
jump to a higher effective marginal tax rate through SNAP occurs at 
a lower level of gross nonlabor income than labor income, because 
nonlabor income is not given the 20 percent earnings deduction. 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates in UI 
Once initially eligible for weekly UI benefits, nonlabor income 
such as SNAP does not affect the weekly UI benefit paid. The full 
entitled UI weekly benefit amount when someone is involuntarily 
unemployed is based on prior earnings, and that amount is paid unless 
there are labor earnings reported for a week of benefits claimed. All 
states have a definition of earnings that qualify for a partial UI pay-
ment. Many states have only an initial earnings disregard amount, 
after which earnings reduce benefits dollar for dollar.4 Five of our 
study states have only initial UI earnings disregards. The initial earn-
ings disregards in Georgia and Maryland are $50, in Florida $58, in 
Missouri 20 percent of the WBA, and in Texas 25 percent of the WBA. 
Several states have both an initial earnings disregard and a benefit 
reduction rate of less than 100 percent on earnings above the disre-
gard. Michigan does not have an initial earnings disregard but reduces 
UI benefits by 50 cents for every dollar of earnings reported up to the 
WBA, beyond which the benefit reduction rate is 100 percent. 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates Combining SNAP and UI 
Both SNAP and UI require that beneficiaries actively seek work 
and accept suitable work offered to them. Increasing income from 
work can affect benefits from both SNAP and UI, and the combined 
effective marginal tax rates on earnings can vary widely and encom-
pass a range from 0 to 100 percent.5 Over no range of earnings is the 
combined SNAP and UI effective marginal tax rate either less than 
zero or greater than 100 percent. 
For a Michigan UI beneficiary, when labor earnings increase, the 
marginal tax rate on UI benefits is initially 50 percent and rises to 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Introduction and Overview 9 
100 percent when labor earnings reach the WBA. Over this range of 
earnings for a Michigan UI recipient who is also eligible for SNAP
and who is single with two children, the SNAP-UI effective marginal 
tax rate is 59 percent. This rate is the sum of a 50 percent reduction 
in UI benefits and a 9 percent reduction in SNAP benefits.6 As labor 
income continues to increase, the effective marginal tax rate on labor 
earnings next increases to 63.5 percent. This rate is the sum of a 50 
percent reduction in UI benefits and a 13.5 percent reduction in SNAP
benefits when the SNAP shelter-cost deduction begins to erode. As 
labor income rises past the WBA, the effective marginal tax rate on 
labor earnings rises to 91 percent. This rate is the sum of a 100 percent 
reduction in UI benefits and a 9 percent increase in SNAP benefits. 
This occurs as labor earnings are offset dollar for dollar by declines in 
nonlabor income from UI, so that one would expect a net change in 
income of zero. However, labor earnings receive a 20 percent deduc-
tion for SNAP determination, meaning that countable income falls 
and SNAP benefits rise.7 Michigan UI benefits end when labor earn-
ings reach 1.5 times the WBA, so that all household income above 
this level is only labor earnings. In our Michigan example, after UI 
ends and earnings continue to increase, the SNAP benefit reduction 
rate becomes 36 percent, and this is the effective marginal tax rate. As 
earnings increase, the monthly SNAP payment declines until SNAP
is zero when 30 percent of net monthly earnings equals the household 
full SNAP benefit. For earnings above this level, total income is equal 
to earnings, and neither SNAP nor UI benefits are received.8 
Among the five study states with only an initial earnings disre-
gard for UI, Texas provides a good example of effective marginal tax 
rates for SNAP-UI interaction because it has the biggest initial earn-
ings disregard (see Appendix 1A). The pattern of effective marginal 
tax rates in these five states depends on whether the beneficiary is 
normally a relatively low earner or high earner. 
A single parent with two children who normally works full time 
in Texas at a minimum-wage job and becomes involuntarily unem-
ployed could receive both UI and SNAP (see example in Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
 
10 O’Leary et al. 
1A). Earnings below 25 percent of the parent’s UI WBA would not 
affect either SNAP or UI benefits, but above that level UI is reduced 
dollar for dollar. Our simulation in Appendix 1A suggests that just 
before labor earnings reach the UI disregard, the effective marginal 
tax rate on labor earnings rises to 24 percent through a SNAP benefit 
reduction. Then, at slightly higher weekly earnings, UI benefits are 
reduced dollar for dollar, but SNAP is restored by 6 percent because 
nonlabor income is reduced as labor earnings increase, so the com-
bined effective marginal tax rate is 94 percent. The combined effec-
tive marginal tax rate rises to 100 percent once SNAP is restored to 
the full monthly entitled benefit and remains at 100 percent until 
earnings are 125 percent of the WBA. The marginal effective tax rate 
then falls to zero until labor earnings rise to the maximum allowed 
by SNAP, given the assumptions about housing, child care, and other 
expenses. Above that level, SNAP declines by 24 cents for each addi-
tional dollar earned. Then, as earnings rise and the housing allowance 
begins to erode, SNAP declines by 36 cents per dollar earned until the 
SNAP grant falls to zero. 
For a Texas example of a higher earner, consider a single par-
ent of two who normally works full time, earning double the mini-
mum wage. Both SNAP and UI would be payable when this person is 
involuntarily unemployed (Appendix 1A). As this worker gradually 
increases hourly earnings, the range of marginal effective tax rates 
would be limited to first 36, then 91, and finally 36 percent after UI 
entitlement ends, before falling to zero as SNAP entitlement ends. 
Large and Variable Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
Beneficiaries receiving both SNAP and UI at the same time face 
a large and widely varying range of marginal effective tax rates. 
Because of the different treatment of labor and nonlabor income in 
SNAP, additional earnings from work affect total household resources 
differently over different earnings ranges. 
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Other things being equal, because of the UI benefit reduction 
formula, joint SNAP-UI benefit receipt in Michigan reaches higher 
into the income distribution than in the other five states. The things 
held equal in this comparison include the household composition, the 
housing expense, and the level of base period earnings. Our discus-
sion of SNAP and UI benefit interactions abstracts from several fac-
tors, including state income taxes, payroll taxes for social insurance, 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit. The aggregate scales of simulta-
neous SNAP and UI receipt in the states studied in this book reflect 
not only the differing SNAP and UI program rules for each state, but 
also the levels of unemployment and opportunities for reemployment. 
In all six states studied for this book, the range of simultaneous 
SNAP and UI benefit receipt is longer for lower-wage earners than 
for higher-wage earners. As earnings recover from full unemploy-
ment, SNAP benefits end earlier than UI benefits for an adult who 
usually has higher wages, while UI benefits end earlier than SNAP
benefits for an adult who usually has lower earnings. This pattern is 
particularly pronounced in states having UI partial benefit formulas 
with only an earnings disregard and a 100 percent benefit reduction 
rate after the disregard. This is the case for most U.S. states, and for 
all the states studied in this book except Michigan. 
The examples discussed in this section describe the marginal 
effective tax rates an individual would face if his or her labor earn-
ings increased. A more practical interpretation is the array of mar-
ginal effective tax rates that the full range of program participants 
would encounter by having different income and earnings at the time 
of benefit determination. Furthermore, the amount of UI received can 
change from week to week depending on earnings, but the amount of 
monthly SNAP benefits is usually only recomputed every six months. 
Nonetheless, when considering the interaction of SNAP and UI, it is 
important to recognize that marginal effective tax rates on additional 
earnings can range between zero and 100 percent, depending on ini-
tial entitlements and current labor and nonlabor income. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
12 O’Leary et al. 
CONTEXT OF OUR ANALYSIS 
Two features distinguish the research presented in this book 
about interactions between SNAP and UI: 1) the data available for 
investigation and 2) the dramatic change in economic events during 
the period studied. To set the stage for our exposition, we describe 
the data used by our state research teams, then we present national- 
and state-specific descriptions of the labor market crises, the level of 
SNAP and UI program use, and the degree of program interaction. 
Data Coverage in the Six State Studies 
The data sets available for all six states each cover all 19 months 
of the Great Recession. The time period the data cover ranges before 
and after these core months, and the period covered differs among 
the states. Researchers for each state requested data covering the 
maximum period available around the Great Recession. Three main 
administrative data systems accessed in all states were these: 1) UI 
applications and benefit payments, 2) SNAP applications and benefit 
payments, and 3) UI quarterly wage records. The application data pro-
vide demographic and geographic characteristics, and the benefit pay-
ment data give the levels of support provided. The UI wage records 
provide quarterly earnings context to benefit receipt from both pro-
grams. The data provided by states differed greatly in variables pro-
vided and time period—the latter is summarized in Table 1.1. 
A key issue relating to the time period for the data is the fact that 
unemployment remained high well after the official end of the Great 
Recession in June 2009, and extended benefits remained in effect until 
the end of 2013. With currently available data, the effects of these 
and other postrecession changes in both the UI and SNAP programs 
can be observed in only a few of our study states. As a result, there 
are lessons that can be learned about the return to relative normality 
only if data are extended until 2014 and beyond. Three states examine 
SNAP and UI after 2013: 1) Georgia, with data into 2014 and 2015; 
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2) Maryland, with data through 2015; and 3) Texas, with data through 
2014. The Georgia analysis team is the only group that split the post– 
Great Recession period into a period of jobless recovery and a period 
of normal job recovery; the latter finally emerged in 2013 and 2014. 
Therefore, the Georgia investigation provides complete information 
about the SNAP and UI return to prerecession levels. 
Table 1.1  Data Coverage: Timing of SNAP and UI Data 
UI benefits UI wage records SNAP benefits 
State Begin date End date Begin date End date Begin date End date 
Florida July 2007 Apr 2012 2007 Q3 2012 Q2 July 2007 Apr 2012 
Georgia Jan 2006 Sept 2015 2006 Q1 2015 Q3 Oct 2004 July 2014 
Maryland Jan 2009 Dec 2015 2009 Q1 2015 Q4 Jan 2009 Dec 2015 
Michigan Jan 2001 Dec 2010 1997 Q3 2010 Q3 Jan 2006 Aug 2011 
Missouri July 2007 Dec 2011 2007 Q3 2011 Q4 July 2007 Dec 2012 
Texas Oct 2002 Apr 2014 2001 Q1 2014 Q3 Oct 2002 Sep 2014 
SOURCE: This table summarizes the differing time ranges of three categories of pro-
gram administrative data provided by state agencies to the research teams. 
Availability of UI Application Data 
Not all applicants for UI eventually receive UI benefits. Some 
applicants do not have enough recent prior earnings, so they are not 
monetarily eligible. Other applicants may have sufficient earnings, 
but they are found ineligible because of the nature of their job sep-
aration, especially if they quit rather than being laid off, in which 
case they are found “nonmonetarily ineligible” for UI benefits. These 
groups of applicants—eligible, monetarily ineligible, and nonmon-
etarily ineligible—have different economic and demographic charac-
teristics. As a result, we would expect each group to have a different 
experience with respect to whether they become SNAP participants. 
Among our six study states, only the Michigan team used UI appli-
cant data for analysis of UI and SNAP interactions. Researchers for 
most of the other states only had access to UI payment data among 
SNAP beneficiaries. Texas had a universe of UI payment data but not 
UI applicant data. 
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In Chapter 8, using Michigan data, Christopher J. O’Leary is able 
to show the effects of two things: 1) varying levels of prior earnings 
among unemployed workers who applied for UI and 2) the reason for 
their separation from employment. The analysis suggests that lower 
prior earnings are associated with a higher probability of receiving 
SNAP. O’Leary reports on the proportion of UI applicants who had 
SNAP before, at the time of, or after UI application and how those 
proportions differ by the degree of UI monetary and nonmonetary 
eligibility. He finds that UI applicants are most likely to receive SNAP
benefits if they had weak attachment to the labor force (i.e., found not 
to be monetarily eligible) or quit their job or were fired (i.e., found 
not to be nonmonetarily eligible). By contrast, UI applicants were 
least likely to collect SNAP if they collected UI benefits but did not 
exhaust their regular UI entitlement. 
Unemployment Rates and Program Benefit Receipt 
The core time frame for analysis of SNAP and UI interactions is 
from 2006 to 2010. This time frame includes several months before 
and after the official period of the Great Recession, defined as lasting 
from December 2007 to June 2009. Figure 1.1 charts the national 
annual average of monthly unemployment rates, measured on the 
right vertical axis, against the numbers of SNAP and UI recipients, 
measured on the left vertical axis. The graph shows unemployment 
declining gradually after the early 2000s to reach about 4.5 percent in 
2006, then rising dramatically to 9.6 percent in 2010. For every year 
displayed in the graph, SNAP had three to four times as many recipi-
ents as UI, and the numbers of benefit recipients in both programs fol-
low a pattern generally similar to the unemployment rate. However, 
the SNAP peak (47.6 million SNAP recipients in 2013) lags behind 
the unemployment peak by about four years, while the UI peak (19.9 
million UI beneficiaries in 2009) nearly coincides with the unemploy-
ment peak. 
Total nationwide expenditures on SNAP and regular UI are pre-
sented in Figure 1.2. The scale of the two programs is about the same. 
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Figure 1.1 SNAP Recipients, New UI Beneficiaries, and Unemployment 
Rate in the United States, 1997–2016 
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Figure 1.2 National Totals for SNAP and Regular UI Benefits, 
1997–2016 
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Expenditures for both programs were about $20 billion annually in 
1997. Regular state UI expenditures peaked at nearly $80 billion in 
2009, while SNAP spending reached just over $76 billion in 2013. 
Both programs appear to respond automatically to changes in unem-
ployment, but UI program expenditures respond much more quickly 
than SNAP, particularly in the downward direction after cyclical 
peaks in unemployment. 
Unemployment in our six study states follows the same general 
pattern as the national average, but there are important differences in 
the patterns among the states. Figure 1.3 shows that Michigan had 
not yet recovered from the early 2000s recession before the onset 
of the Great Recession in late 2007, and among our states Michigan 
reached the highest rate—nearly 14 percent on a seasonally adjusted 
basis in 2009. Unemployment in the five states except for Michigan 
had declined during the early 2000s to new minimums by 2007, and 
all these states later peaked again in 2010. Among the six states in this 
period, Michigan had the worst labor market experience, while Mary-
Figure 1.3  Annual Average Unemployment Rates by State from 
Seasonally Adjusted Monthly Data, Jan. 2000–Oct. 2017 
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land had the best. As shown in Figure 1.3, Maryland had the lowest 
peak unemployment at under 8 percent. 
To examine trends in SNAP beneficiaries over time, Figure 1.4 
sets January 2006 equal to one as the base period of an index to com-
pare all six states on the number of SNAP households. Between 2006 
and 2010, the biggest increases in the index are seen in Florida, where 
Figure 1.4  Monthly SNAP Households by State, 2006–2016, Indexed to 
January 2006 = 1.000 
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the index reaches 2.6, Maryland (2.2), and Georgia (2.0); Michigan, 
Texas, and Missouri showed smaller increases over the period. 
Figure 1.5 presents the counts of UI beneficiaries in each of the 
six states indexed to January 2006 equal to one. Over the period 
January 2006 to July 2009, this index shows that the number of UI 
beneficiaries increased the most in Florida (3.9). After starting at 
the highest unemployment rate in 2006 (Figure 1.3), Michigan (2.0) 
showed the smallest increase in UI beneficiaries over the same period.
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Figure 1.5 Monthly UI Beneficiaries by State, 2006–2010, Indexed to 
January 2006 = 1.000 
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By July 2009, the numbers of UI recipients in Georgia and Texas 
roughly tripled, while the increases in Maryland and Missouri more 
than doubled. 
Based on published federal reports, Figure 1.6 shows that SNAP
recipients, as percentages of state populations, increased in all study 
states from 2006 to 2010. The biggest relative increase over the 
period occurred in Florida, where the SNAP recipient rate rose from 7 
percent in 2006 to over 14 percent in 2010. Most of the states stayed 
in the same rank order over the entire period. The exception was 
Georgia, which moved from the fourth-highest to the second-highest 
percentage of SNAP recipiency. Among the six states, average annual 
SNAP receipt in the population rose from 9.4 percent in 2006 to 15.2 
percent in 2010. 
Figure 1.7 shows UI benefit recipiency from 2006 to 2010 as a 
percentage of state populations. Michigan’s rates were the highest; 
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Figure 1.6 SNAP Recipients as Shares of State Populations, Monthly 
Averages, 2006–2010 
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SOURCE: USDA (2017); U.S. Census Bureau (2017). 
they rose from 3.0 percent of the adult population in 2006 to about 5.5 
percent in 2009 before declining sharply to 3.5 percent in 2010. The 
population recipiency rate in the other five states followed the same 
pattern as in Michigan but was lower. In all years, the lowest rates 
occurred in Texas. The average rate across the six states ranged from 
1.4 percent in 2006 to 3.3 percent in the peak recipiency year of 2009. 
A commonly used measure of UI recipiency is beneficiaries as a 
percentage of all unemployed persons. By this measure, Figure 1.8 
shows that Michigan had the highest UI recipiency rate among the six 
states during the period of the Great Recession, although the Michi-
gan rate declined every year from 2006 on and dropped sharply in the 
first year of the economic recovery, as fewer newly laid-off workers 
applied for benefits. Over this period, Texas had the lowest recipiency 
rate. The average recipiency rate among the six states ranged from 
37.6 percent in 2006 to 43.8 percent in 2009. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
6%
0%
20 O’Leary et al. 
Figure 1.7 UI Recipients as Shares of State Populations Aged 18–64, 
Monthly Averages, 2006–2010 
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The joint program benefit receipt rate among six states from 2006 
to 2009, based on state administrative data, is shown in Figure 1.9. 
Among all SNAP recipients in each state, the percentage of those 
also receiving UI is charted in the figure. As UI receipt increased, 
the percentage of SNAP recipients also receiving UI increased every 
year in all five states over the period from 2006 to 2009. Michigan 
had the highest percentages from 2006 to 2008, with between 8 
and 11 percent of SNAP adult recipients receiving UI benefits too. 
Florida experienced the biggest increase from 2006 to 2009, as its UI 
recipient percentage rose from 3.5 to 13.5 percent among all SNAP
adult recipients. For the six states, the average percentage of UI 
recipients among adult SNAP recipients increased from 4.5 percent 
in 2006 to 11.3 percent in 2009. 
For Michigan, between the years 2006 and 2010, Figure 1.10 
summarizes the percentage of SNAP recipients among all UI benefi-
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Figure 1.8  UI Recipients as Shares of State Unemployed, Monthly 
Averages, 2006–2010 
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ciaries for different time periods relative to the UI application date. 
The solid line at the bottom shows that, in the month of UI applica-
tion in 2006, 7.5 percent of UI beneficiaries in Michigan were also in 
SNAP recipient households, and that this percentage increased each 
year, reaching 15 percent in 2010. The dotted line shows that for every 
year in the graph, the percentage of UI beneficiaries who had received 
SNAP in the 12 months prior to UI application was about 5 percent-
age points higher than the percentage receiving SNAP in the month of 
UI application. The percentage receiving SNAP within one year after 
UI application was about 10 percentage points higher than the rates 
of receipt at application for UI benefits, and within two years after 
UI application, the SNAP receipt rate was higher still, reaching 29 
percent in 2008.9 Essentially, the results show that about 10 percent 
of UI beneficiaries were receiving SNAP when they applied for UI. 
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Figure 1.9  Shares of SNAP Recipients Aged 18–64 with UI Receipt in 
the Same Month, by State 2006–2009 
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This is about 5 points lower than the percentage who received SNAP
in the year before UI application, and 10 and 15 points lower than the 
percentages of UI beneficiaries receiving SNAP within one and two 
years of UI application, respectively. What this means is that SNAP
receipt by UI beneficiaries was not insignificant, and it increased sub-
stantially during the Great Recession. 
LESSONS FROM PRIOR RESEARCH 
A review of the prior research on SNAP-UI program interaction 
is found in Chapter 4 as a prelude to the six state studies discussed 
in Chapters 5 through 10. It serves as a contrast to these later stud-
ies, in that the prior research was based mainly on general household 
survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) or the Survey 
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Figure 1.10 Shares of Michigan Regular UI Beneficiaries Aged 
18–64 Who Received SNAP before, during, and after UI 
Application 
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data. 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). These studies involved 
relatively small and geographically dispersed samples of SNAP and 
UI program participants. 
Evidence from prior studies suggests that the liberalization of 
SNAP policy since 2001 led to steady increases in SNAP partici-
pation. However, during the Great Recession, policy liberalization 
appears to have been less important in driving program participation 
than economic conditions. The surge in SNAP participation during 
the Great Recession built on a prerecession trend. The relaxation of 
strict time limits on SNAP beneficiaries who are able-bodied adults 
without dependents (ABAWDs) contributed to increased SNAP par-
ticipation in the Great Recession. SNAP also played a greater role in 
income support for UI recipients during the Great Recession than was 
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observed in the 2001 recession, and its importance increased with UI 
exhaustion. SNAP receipt surged with the rise in joblessness during 
the Great Recession, but the prior literature does not address the pat-
tern of SNAP receipt in a recovery. 
The previous studies informed the topic of joint benefit receipt 
but left many questions unanswered. The deeper analysis of SNAP
and UI usage in the six state studies in this book illuminates the previ-
ously documented recession trends and provides evidence on post-
recession outcomes. Brief summaries of the state studies are provided 
next, followed by a synthesis of the new evidence from these studies. 
LESSONS FROM THE SIX STATE STUDIES 
Florida 
The Great Recession induced significant changes in patterns of 
both SNAP and UI receipt in Florida. In Chapter 5, authors Colleen 
Heflin and Peter Mueser note that the share of SNAP recipients also 
receiving UI increased, and reliance on SNAP became secondary 
for many of these households. However, since UI eligibility rests on 
work history and employment separation status, many disadvantaged 
households receiving SNAP were not eligible for UI benefits. That the 
growth in the SNAP recipients was more than three times greater than 
the growth in the number of joint SNAP-UI recipients makes clear 
the significant limits to the cushion provided by UI to disadvantaged 
individuals facing economic distress. 
Evidence from Florida suggests important limitations to the role 
of UI in helping those at the bottom of the income distribution, most 
of whom weathered the recession with SNAP alone. Noteworthy 
results from the Florida analysis include the following: 
• SNAP and UI caseloads increased more dramatically in Flor-
ida than in the United States as a whole. 
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• The large growth in joint SNAP-UI receipt was driven mainly 
by increasing UI usage among new SNAP entrants. 
• The percentage of households consisting of able-bodied adults 
without dependents (ABAWDs) among all SNAP households 
in the Florida study group more than doubled during the Great 
Recession, from 20 percent to 42 percent. 
• Characteristics of households on SNAP changed dramatically 
as a result of the Great Recession: the proportions of male-
headed households and white households increased, while 
there were declines in the proportions of households with 
children, individuals with disabilities, and African Americans. 
• For households receiving them, UI benefits were of substan-
tially higher value than SNAP benefits, despite Florida’s low 
maximum UI benefit amount. 
Georgia 
In the Georgia evaluation, Chapter 6, authors Lakshmi Pandey, 
Peter Bluestone, Alex Hathaway, Sarah E. Larson, and Erdal Tekin 
used data spanning a longer time period than was available in most of 
the other study states. This allowed evaluation of recession impacts in 
the Great Recession as well as during the intermediate and protracted 
long-term recovery periods in Georgia. Trends in usage during the 
Great Recession were similar for both SNAP and UI, but SNAP was 
used by considerably more Georgians than UI. Joint SNAP-UI recipi-
ents represented only a small portion of the total SNAP population, 
but UI provided substantially larger benefits than SNAP. While UI 
and joint SNAP-UI participation quickly returned to prerecession lev-
els, SNAP participation remained elevated well above prerecession 
levels after the recession bottomed out. Several factors contributed 
to this pattern. 
First, UI benefits are available only for a limited time, while SNAP
benefits are normally not time limited. Second, in July 2012, Geor-
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gia reduced the maximum potential duration of UI benefits from 26 
weeks to a sliding scale ranging between 14 and 20 weeks, depending 
on the level of state unemployment. Third, in January 2014, extended 
and Emergency Unemployment Compensation for persons exhaust-
ing regular UI benefits expired. Finally, some job creation reduced the 
UI recipient population, but in some cases the new jobs paid less than 
recipients had earned before, leaving many still eligible for SNAP
benefits. Conclusions of the Georgia study included the following: 
• Joint SNAP-UI receipt was a small portion of total SNAP
receipt. 
• UI receipt and joint SNAP-UI receipt declined faster than 
SNAP-only receipt. 
• Older SNAP beneficiaries became a larger percentage of the 
SNAP population during the recession. 
• By 2015, the total SNAP recipient population had declined. 
• Older SNAP recipients remained a larger share of beneficia-
ries during the recovery. 
Given the evidence and change in the Georgia program environ-
ment, Chapter 6 authors Pandey et al. also offered speculation about 
what might happen in the next recession: 
• Many Georgians will return to UI and SNAP. 
• Shorter potential UI duration in Georgia will speed up the 
move from UI to SNAP. 
• There will be a larger reliance on SNAP than on UI. 
• More federal support through SNAP and EUC will be needed. 
Maryland 
The Great Recession was milder in Maryland than in other states. 
However, the state unemployment rate was around the national aver-
age during the recovery. The Maryland SNAP caseload increased 
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faster than the national caseload through 2015. This trend may reflect 
increased SNAP benefit amounts, relaxed eligibility conditions, and 
increased outreach efforts by the Maryland Department of Human 
Resources, say authors Ting Zhang, Susan Christiansen, and Jing Li 
in Chapter 7. 
The Maryland SNAP and UI beneficiary populations differed in 
postbenefit earning patterns. Less than half of the 950,000 adult SNAP
recipient households had income from employment after receiving 
benefits, compared to over 90 percent for UI households. Nonethe-
less, more than one-quarter of individuals who received some UI ben-
efits also received SNAP benefits, suggesting that they had either no 
job or a low-wage job that allowed eligibility for SNAP. 
Maryland households receiving both SNAP and UI were among 
the most disadvantaged. They qualified for weekly UI benefit 
amounts that were so low they could still qualify for SNAP. Adults 
in such households were more likely to be single, younger, female, to 
have children, to have completed only a secondary or lower educa-
tion level, to have low earnings, and to be minority and/or Hispanic. 
Among these households, average earnings were highest for the 31- 
to 45-year-old age group, but even for this group, average earnings 
were still below the federal poverty level for a household of two. 
On the other hand, those who received UI benefits before SNAP had 
higher average earnings levels and did not qualify for SNAP before 
exhausting their UI benefits. Some of the main results from the Mary-
land analysis were as follows: 
• Many UI benefit exhaustees drew SNAP benefits as a last 
resort. 
• Two years after starting SNAP benefits, only about one-
quarter of recipients reported earnings. 
• Two years after starting UI benefits, about one-third were em-
ployed and another one-third were receiving SNAP. 
• The Maryland SNAP population increased after the recession 
and remains stubbornly high. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
28 O’Leary et al. 
Michigan 
In the Michigan analysis, which forms Chapter 8, author Chris 
O’Leary focuses on rates of SNAP receipt among UI applicants 
between 2007 and 2010 by the degree of UI eligibility and the dura-
tion of UI receipt. In that period, the rates of SNAP receipt in the 
year before UI application were 20.2 percent among all UI applicants 
and 15.8 percent among all UI beneficiaries. Excluding those who 
received SNAP anytime in the year before UI application, average 
rates of SNAP receipt in the year after UI application were 13.0 per-
cent among all UI applicants and 11.1 percent among UI beneficia-
ries. Within two years after UI application, the SNAP receipt rates 
were about 5 percentage points higher in each category. 
Among UI beneficiaries, those who exhausted UI entitlement 
and got extended or emergency UI benefits had higher rates of SNAP
receipt than those who did not exhaust regular UI. From 2007 to 
2010, the rates of SNAP receipt among UI applicants increased by 50 
percent in the year before UI application, 80 percent in the month of 
UI application, and 150 percent in the year after UI application. The 
biggest year-to-year increase for all measures was from 2009 to 2010. 
In models controlling for UI eligibility, entitlement, and other observ-
able variables, O’Leary observed the following: 
• There were no differences between urban and rural areas in 
rates of SNAP receipt among UI beneficiaries. 
• SNAP receipt rates among UI beneficiaries decreased with 
increasing tenure in the prior job, with age of the beneficiary, 
and with prior earnings level as measured by the UI weekly 
benefit amount (WBA). 
• In Michigan, 28.1 percent of those who received SNAP within 
a three-year period around their UI application qualified for 
the state maximum UI weekly benefit amount. 
• SNAP usage among Michigan UI beneficiaries reached well 
up into the income distribution during the Great Recession. 
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Simple unadjusted comparisons between UI beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries suggest that being a UI beneficiary reduces the rate 
of flow into SNAP receipt by about 6 percentage points. Controlling 
for differences in observable characteristics, the estimated reduction 
is about 3 percentage points. 
Effective as of January 2012, the maximum potential UI dura-
tion in Michigan was cut from 26 to 20 weeks. Simulations estimated 
that this cut in UI duration would increase SNAP receipt by 2.6 per-
centage points within two years of UI application. Consequently, any 
effect of UI reducing the flow into SNAP would be diminished. This 
suggests that federal responsibilities for income replacement through 
SNAP would increase relative to the state employer-financed respon-
sibilities through UI. However, recent federal cuts to SNAP mean that 
the program will not address needs of the unemployed at the same 
level as during the Great Recession. 
Missouri 
In Missouri, the onset of the Great Recession induced expected 
changes in the size and character of the SNAP and UI caseloads, but 
during the subsequent recovery, the return to prior patterns has been 
uneven. Even during the recession, most Missouri SNAP recipients 
retained strong connections to the labor market. And while the reces-
sion led to a dramatic growth in the overlap of SNAP and UI, the 
programs fell far short of providing a meaningful social safety net 
in the face of financial hardship caused by the economic downturn. 
Following are some lessons from the Missouri analysis, put forth by 
authors Heflin and Mueser in Chapter 9. 
• The recession led to a dramatic increase in the joint use of 
SNAP and UI. 
• The percentage of SNAP households receiving UI increased 
from 3 percent to over 10 percent. 
• The percentage of UI recipients receiving SNAP increased 
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from around 20 percent to nearly 25 percent as the number of 
UI recipients tripled. 
• The characteristics of SNAP recipients in Missouri changed in 
expected ways because of the recession, but we do not observe 
a return to the prior characteristics in the period of recovery. 
• Most Missouri SNAP recipients aged 18–64 were strongly 
connected to the labor market. 
• The SNAP and UI programs fell short of being a complete 
social safety net for Missouri families during the economic 
downturn. 
• Although UI provided important benefits to many families 
receiving SNAP, a large share of families facing financial 
hardship during the economic downturn relied exclusively on 
SNAP. 
Texas 
The Texas research examined SNAP and UI and discovered 
four benefit receipt patterns encompassing the years of the Great 
Recession: 
1) UI-only recipients had the highest earnings and best 
recovery. 
2) UI-before-SNAP beneficiaries had prior earnings nearly as 
high but slower earnings recovery. 
3) SNAP-before-UI recipients had lower earnings and very 
slow earnings recovery. 
4) SNAP-only recipients had the lowest earnings and little 
recovery after program benefits. 
Chapter 10 authors Daniel Schroeder and Ashweeta Patnaik sug-
gest that small changes in the timing or sequencing of benefits have 
significantly different effects on reemployment and earnings suc-
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cess. The authors also found that program use in the jobless recovery 
period was more similar to the recession period than to the prereces-
sion period. Furthermore, they found that the absence of benefits in 
periods of hardship can severely hinder later employment and earn-
ings success. 
The Texas study also closely examined the Great Recession–era 
experience of SNAP beneficiaries who are ABAWDs. The ABAWD 
research focused on the limited pursuit by Texas of available federal 
waivers on the strict SNAP-benefit time limits for ABAWDs. The 
authors concluded the following three things: 1) hardship could have 
been reduced for ABAWDs, had waivers relaxed time limits; 2) addi-
tional federally funded SNAP payments would not have cost the state 
anything; and 3) SNAP and UI recipients recover prior earnings lev-
els faster when receiving benefits quickly from both programs upon 
experiencing job loss or other economic stress. Texas did not actu-
ally have a lower rate of ABAWDs than other states, but it did have 
shorter benefit durations among ABAWDs. Schroeder and Patnaik 
offered further policy guidance: 
• Policies should aim to explicitly link SNAP and UI more 
closely. 
• More joint benefit receipt is needed under recessionary 
conditions. 
• A jobless recovery period presents a policy context that is dis-
tinct from prerecession or expansionary periods. 
• Special services are needed for those who lag in earnings re-
covery during the early recovery. 
• States can avoid unnecessary hardship when federal funds are 
available. 
• Future research should further investigate evidence that hard-
ship is not a spur to success, but rather, it can delay employ-
ment and earnings recovery. 
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Synthesis of the State Lessons 
At the start of the Great Recession in late 2007, the labor markets 
in the six states varied. The labor market was worst in Michigan and 
best in Maryland. By the official end of the recession in June 2009, 
the economic collapse had ended in Michigan but was still slowly 
spiraling downward in Maryland. In all six states, the UI programs 
responded more quickly than SNAP, both when increasing payments 
during the decline and when scaling back in the recovery. Changes in 
the numbers of recipients were particularly dramatic for UI in Florida, 
and they were somewhat weaker for SNAP in Texas. 
The number of UI recipients increased and decreased quickly 
between 2007 and 2010 in all six study states. However, starting in 
2007, the number of SNAP beneficiary households increased rela-
tively slowly, finally peaking between 2013 and 2015 in these states. 
The numbers of joint SNAP-UI recipients also started to rise by 2007 
in all six study states and, like UI, joint SNAP-UI receipt peaked 
more quickly than SNAP-only receipt. The general time pattern of 
joint usage in all states was similar. Florida had the biggest rise in 
UI receipt among SNAP beneficiaries, with the rate rising from 3.5 
percent in 2006 to 13.5 percent in 2009. In Michigan, SNAP receipt 
among new UI beneficiaries rose from 7.5 to 15.0 percent over the 
period, with joint SNAP-UI rates being much higher within one and 
two years after UI application. 
Based on program design, UI provides more income support than 
SNAP. The average dollar value of UI benefits was more than three 
times the SNAP benefits per month, but as emphasized in the Texas 
analysis, the sequencing of SNAP and UI receipt mattered. People 
who received SNAP first and then UI tended to have lower usual 
earnings levels, and therefore they qualified for lower levels of UI 
benefits than people who got UI before SNAP. Most SNAP-recipient 
households had members who were attached to the labor force and 
had some quarterly earnings from work, but, as seen in Florida and 
Georgia, those earnings tended to be very low. Job loss often created 
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severe hardship for households receiving SNAP only or SNAP before 
UI, because with low weekly benefit amounts, the added income from 
UI for these households tended to be very low. The growth in the 
number of SNAP-UI joint recipients came mostly from people who 
received UI first—individuals with relatively strong attachment to the 
labor force whose households became eligible for SNAP only after 
they lost their jobs and their wage income. 
The six state studies revealed varied information about the char-
acteristics of joint SNAP-UI recipients. The analysis from Maryland 
indicated that SNAP-UI recipients were most likely to be young, 
female, minority, single with children, and with high school or less 
schooling. Evidence from participant inflow in Florida indicated 
the characteristics of joint recipients were changing, as the increase 
in joint SNAP-UI recipients came mostly from male-headed white 
households, leading to declines in the percentage of joint program 
beneficiaries with children, those with disabilities, and those who 
were African American. Controlling for observable characteristics, 
the Michigan analysis indicated no difference in the rate of SNAP-UI 
receipt in urban or rural households but found higher levels of SNAP-
UI receipt associated with higher job tenure, age, prior earnings, and 
more recent prior SNAP receipt. Also in Michigan, 28.1 percent of 
SNAP-UI beneficiaries received the maximum state UI weekly ben-
efit amount. Additionally, Georgia provided evidence that, for older 
recipients, SNAP became particularly important in the midst of the 
recession and during both the early and late stages of the economic 
recovery. 
This study provides limited information about the postrecession 
period. However, Georgia, Maryland, and Texas had longer postre-
cession data for analysis, and these study teams identified two post-
recession phases. The first phase, called jobless recovery, was much 
like the recession phase, and both of these were distinct from the 
late-stage recovery. By the late-stage recovery, the characteristics 
of SNAP and UI program participants had returned to prerecession 
profiles. Authors of the Texas and Florida chapters both highlighted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 O’Leary et al. 
the important group of ABAWDs. In Florida, these households more 
than doubled, from 20 percent to 42 percent of the SNAP population, 
while in Texas the ABAWD group of SNAP recipients increased by 
only 5 percent. Schroeder and Patnaik attribute this to a decision by 
state program administrators not to apply for available federal waiv-
ers that would have relaxed time restrictions on SNAP durations for 
ABAWDs. The importance of this missed opportunity is highlighted 
by the Texas evidence that increased economic hardship can delay 
reemployment. Indeed, early and adequate interventions greatly ben-
efit those most challenged in earnings recovery. Additionally, there is 
also some evidence from Michigan that among prior SNAP recipients 
who lost their jobs after leaving SNAP, receiving UI benefits reduced 
their chances of returning to SNAP, indicating that access to UI helps 
control SNAP benefit costs. Indeed, federally funded extended and 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation certainly reduced the flow 
from UI into SNAP. 
To reduce future UI costs, a small but significant number of states 
responded to the Great Recession by reducing the maximum duration 
of UI benefits. Led by Missouri in 2011, four of the six study states 
responded to UI benefit financing stress in the Great Recession by 
shortening the potential duration of regular UI benefits to less than 
the standard 26 weeks as a way of reducing or eliminating the need 
to raise UI taxes. Michigan shortened potential UI duration to 20 
weeks, and Florida and Georgia shortened the potential duration to 
a variable period of 20 or fewer weeks, depending on the severity 
of unemployment. The Michigan chapter estimates that shortening 
the potential duration of regular UI benefits from 26 to 20 weeks 
during the Great Recession would have increased the number of 
SNAP beneficiaries by 2.6 percentage points within two years of 
UI application. In this case, the state UI program benefit reductions 
generated spillover costs on federally funded SNAP benefits. 
Public policy designed to reduce UI benefit costs has gone beyond 
reducing the maximum duration of UI benefits. Since the Great Reces-
sion, the eligibility and generosity of SNAP have been reduced in 
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nearly a dozen states. The Michigan study estimated increased spill-
over into SNAP from reducing UI benefit adequacy, but this flow also 
might have been lower under stricter SNAP eligibility conditions. 
Nonetheless, the next downturn in the business cycle will come with 
job loss and economic hardship. The major public policy question for 
the future is, to what extent will the social safety net be strong enough 
to help workers and households survive and recover? 
CONCLUSION 
The six state studies show that a great deal can be learned about 
SNAP and UI, both separately and as they interact, by analyzing state 
program administrative data. The two programs are very different: 
they have different public policy goals, are designed to serve distinct 
populations, provide differing types of transfer payments, have dif-
ferent eligibility requirements, and offer benefits in differing amounts 
and durations. 
We learned that even in good economic times, some unemployed 
workers who are solidly in the middle class do not return to work 
before using up their entitlement to UI benefits, and some of these 
individuals experience economic losses that qualify them to receive 
SNAP benefits. Other workers in low-wage jobs with irregular hours 
and persistently low incomes regularly receive SNAP benefits and 
occasionally turn to UI. This is more likely to happen when job 
opportunities evaporate in severe recessions. While the overlap in 
benefit use from the two programs always exists, the overlap is much 
greater in recessionary times. 
Studying the period before, during, and after the Great Recession, 
we see that both programs were under great strain because unusually 
large numbers of individuals and families had inadequate incomes 
or were unemployed. Because of its severity and duration, the Great 
Recession was a real stress test for both programs. Nonetheless, both 
programs continued to have a significant welfare-improving effect on 
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households and individuals with respect to food security and income 
replacement. 
The state studies show that the degree of overlap in the popula-
tions served by the UI and SNAP programs during recessions depends 
on state and federal policy regarding each program. Three key factors 
are 1) state UI program generosity regarding eligibility requirements 
and the potential duration of UI benefits, 2) federal enactment of UI 
extended benefits programs, and 3) federal generosity in SNAP’s pro-
gram parameters. 
The interaction between SNAP and UI will continue in the future, 
and the interaction will increase with the severity of recessionary 
periods. From public policy and public administration perspectives 
for either program, it is important to take into consideration what hap-
pens in the other program. For example, if more states legislate reduc-
tions in the potential duration of regular UI benefits to less than 26 
weeks, more individuals will exhaust their entitlement to UI benefits, 
and more of these households will seek SNAP benefits. In recessions, 
increased access to EB benefits and enactment of EUC programs will 
delay some individuals’ exhaustion of benefits, and in some cases 
those individuals will find jobs before they exhaust their entitlement 
to UI, especially if robust publicly funded reemployment services are 
offered to unemployed workers who are permanently separated from 
their prior jobs. Thus, UI benefit extensions allow UI beneficiaries to 
apply for SNAP either later or not at all. 
For example, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis by 
Acs and Dahl (2010) finds that among households in 2009 with at 
least one member of the household unemployed, those receiving fed-
eral Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) after exhaust-
ing regular state UI benefits had a poverty rate of 19.6 percent, while 
the poverty rate of those same households would have been 24.3 per-
cent without EUC. Since the eligibility level for SNAP is 130 percent 
of the poverty level, in the absence of EUC the spillover from UI 
benefit exhaustion into SNAP could have been 5 percentage points 
higher among households experiencing unemployment. 
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Research presented in this volume shows the direct and large 
effects that SNAP and UI have on each other. Since all legislative 
proposals considered in Congress that involve new expenditures must 
be “scored” by the CBO for the likely net impact on the unified bud-
get of the government before Congressional action can take place, the 
interaction between SNAP and UI demonstrated in this book should 
be taken into consideration in making these scoring estimates.10
When new temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation pro-
grams are enacted during future recessions, Congress should reduce 
the budgetary cost estimates of the new UI legislation because of the 
expected reduction in SNAP costs that will result. 
PLAN FOR THE BOOK 
The rest of the book is divided into nine chapters. The next two 
chapters provide detailed backgrounds on the UI and SNAP pro-
grams. Chapter 4 provides a review of the previous research literature 
on SNAP and UI interactions. Chapters 5 through 10 present the six 
state studies in alphabetical order: Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Mich-
igan, Missouri, and Texas. The summary and conclusions to these 
state studies have been given in this introductory chapter. 
Notes 
1. The National Bureau of Economic Research’s recession dating com-
mittee designated December 2007 to June 2009 as the longest period 
of declining gross domestic product since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. As such, it has often been referred to as the “Great Recession.” 
2. Adding federally funded emergency extended and additional unemploy-
ment benefits to regular state UI resulted in the total reaching $151.8 
billion in 2010. The $76 billion for SNAP in 2013 does include the 
increased maximum allotments for households, which started on April 
1, 2009, and lasted until late 2013 because of provisions in Public Law 
111-5, known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
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3. Studies in the six states were conducted by teams of social scientists 
at public universities and nonprofit research organizations, supported 
by the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture and coordinated by the Jacob France Institute at the University of 
Baltimore. 
4. Examples are given in Appendix 1A for the effects of UI partial benefit 
systems in Michigan and Texas. The Michigan system is more compli-
cated than the Texas system, which has only an initial earnings disre-
gard. Michigan has no initial earnings disregard, and UI benefits are 
reduced by 50 cents of each dollar in earnings up to the full entitled 
WBA. Earnings above the WBA in Michigan reduce UI dollar for dollar 
until the beneficiary works his or her way off UI when earnings equal 
150 percent of the WBA. 
5. A full range of examples representative of our six study states are given 
in Appendix 1A. 
6. The effective SNAP tax rate is 0.09, resulting from the asymmetric 
treatment of the increase in labor earnings and the decrease in nonlabor 
UI income. Added labor earnings reduce SNAP by 24 percent after the 
20 percent labor earnings deduction and the 30 percent obligation for 
spending on food. However, the labor earnings gain reduces nonlabor 
(UI) income by 50 percent, and, given the 30 percent obligation for food 
expenditures, the SNAP tax rate with respect to labor income further 
declines by 0.15, from 0.24 to 0.09. 
7. When UI is replaced dollar for dollar by labor earnings and the SNAP
reduction rate is 45 percent, because countable income declines by 20 
percent of labor earnings, the effective marginal tax rate on SNAP ben-
efits is −9 percent (0.45 multiplied by −0.20). 
8. The effective marginal tax rates described in this paragraph are dis-
played graphically in Figure 1A.5 of Appendix 1A. 
9. The charted rate of SNAP receipt within two years after UI application 
in 2009 was based on data from only part of 2011, since the available 
Michigan SNAP receipt data ended in August 2011. 
10. See Wandner (2010), pp. 87–91, regarding federal budget scoring.
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Appendix 1A 
Simulation of SNAP-UI Interaction 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
To provide simulation examples of the interaction between Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits and unem-
ployment insurance (UI) benefits, we consider a low-income work-
ing family and determine its SNAP eligibility and monthly benefit 
amount. For this family, we then examine how SNAP benefits would 
change as labor earnings increase. We next consider the effect on 
SNAP benefits for this household when nonlabor income increases 
and everything else is held constant. After this, we examine how 
weekly UI benefits are determined, and how they change with addi-
tional earnings in the six states we study in this book. Finally, we 
examine how both SNAP and UI benefits would change if earnings 
gradually increased for a beneficiary of both programs. 
SNAP ELIGIBILITY AND MONTHLY BENEFITS 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is designed to 
improve food security among eligible households. To determine if a 
given family is eligible for SNAP benefits, SNAP administrators first 
evaluate a household’s monthly income and assets. Gross monthly 
income must be at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level, 
which depends on the household size. From usual gross monthly 
income, officials apply a standard deduction, which also depends on 
household size. Officials then apply a 20 percent earnings disregard 
and a series of specific deductions, including a child care expense 
deduction, a deduction for shelter expenses in excess of half of count-
41 
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able income, and a medical expenses deduction for elderly or disabled 
households.1 The household is expected to spend 30 percent of its 
own net monthly income on food. So from labor earnings, after the 
20 percent disregard, the obligation to spend 30 percent of the net on 
food means a 24 percent benefit reduction rate for additional labor 
income. 
Box 1A.1 provides an example of SNAP benefit determination 
for a household with one adult and two young dependent children.2 
The maximum monthly SNAP benefit for a three-person household in 
2018 is $504. The adult in this household is assumed to work 40 hours 
per week at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. While the 
adult is working full time, this family would receive $431 in monthly 
SNAP benefits.3 Details of this example are listed in the rows of Table 
1A.1. The second column of this table presents an example in which 
the adult in the hypothetical household earns the Michigan minimum 
wage of $9.25, but all other circumstances remain unchanged. In that 
case, the monthly household SNAP benefit would be $309. 
CHANGES IN SNAP MONTHLY BENEFITS AS LABOR
EARNINGS INCREASE 
Once initially SNAP eligible, in most states a household’s con-
tinued eligibility is subject to periodic redetermination based on the 
same initial eligibility conditions. As long as the household contin-
ues to satisfy these criteria, monthly SNAP benefits can continue. An 
example of how SNAP benefits would change for the hypothetical 
three-person family as monthly labor earnings increase is presented 
in the first column of Table 1A.2. This column shows that if the adult 
has no monthly earnings, the monthly SNAP benefit would be $504, 
and the SNAP benefit would remain unchanged as monthly income 
from labor earnings increased, until earnings reached $952. The third 
column shows the effective marginal tax rate on earnings in terms of 
the SNAP benefit reduction. The $100 increments obscure the pre-
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Box 1A.1 Determination of the SNAP Benefit Amount––
An Example 
Step 1 — Gross income: The federal minimum wage is currently $7.25 
per hour. Full-time work for 40 hours per week yields average monthly 
earnings of $1,256, since the average month has 4.3 weeks. 
Step 2 — Net income for shelter deduction: Begin with the gross 
monthly earnings of $1,256. Subtract the standard deduction for a 
three-person household ($160), the earnings deduction (20 percent 
times $1,256, or $251), and the child care deduction ($67). The result 
is $778 (Countable Income A). 
Step 3 — Shelter deduction: Begin with the shelter costs of $934. Sub-
tract half of Countable Income A (half of $778 is $389) for a result 
of $545. The shelter deduction is $535 because of the excess shelter 
deduction cap. 
Step 4 — Net income: Subtract the shelter deduction ($535) from 
Countable Income A ($778) for a result of $243. 
Step 5 — Family’s expected contribution toward food: 30 percent of 
the household’s net income ($286) is $73. 
Step 6 — SNAP benefit: The maximum benefit in 2018 for a family of 
three is $504. The maximum benefit minus the household contribution 
($504 minus $73) equals $431. 
Result––The family’s monthly SNAP benefit is $431. 
cise changes, but when earnings reach $952, SNAP declines by 24 
cents for each additional dollar earned. This tax rate becomes effec-
tive when countable income reaches the cap on shelter costs of $535. 
The 36 percent tax rate becomes effective when one-half of countable 
  	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
44 Table 1A.1 Summary of SNAP and UI Benefits for a Working or Unemployed Adult with Two Young Children and 
Various Wage Rates 
Working individuals Unemployed individuals 
Hourly wage ($) 7.25 9.25 7.25 9.25 13.00 16.55 
Usual weekly hours 40 40 40 40 40 40 
UI weekly benefit amount: 
WBA = 0.041 × HQ + DA ($6 × kids) ($) 165 208 287 362 
Hours per month (4.3 × weekly hours) 173 173 
Monthly gross earnings (if working) ($) 1,256 1,602 
Quarterly earnings (if working) ($) 3,768 4,807 
Monthly UI benefits = 4.3 × WBA ($) 711 893 1,234 1,557 
Standard deduction ($) 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Earnings deduction (20% of gross) ($) 251 320 0 0 0 0 
Child-care costs (kids = 2) ($) 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Countable income ($) 778 1,055 484 666 1,007 1,330 
Shelter costs ($) 934 934 934 934 934 934 
Half countable income ($) 389 527 242 333 504 665 
Shelter deduction (capped at $535) ($) 535 407 535 535 430 269 
Net income ($) 243 648 −51 131 577 1,061 
Family contribution (30% of net) ($) 73 195 −15 39 173 318 
Maximum SNAP benefit 
(persons = 3 = 1 adult + 2 kids) ($) 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Actual SNAP benefit ($) 431 309 504 465 331 186 
Total income (SNAP + UI + earnings) ($)  1,687 1,912 1,215 1,358 1,565 1,743 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and existing program parameters. 
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income plus the cap on the shelter-cost deduction reaches the actual 
shelter-cost amount. This happens in this case when earnings reach 
about $1,282 in SNAP, since after this point the housing allowance 
deduction begins to decline. As earnings continue to increase, SNAP
declines by 36 cents for each dollar increase in net income until 30 
percent of net income equals the maximum entitled monthly SNAP
benefit, at which point the monthly SNAP benefit is zero. In this case, 
this happens when labor earnings reach $2,463. 
CHANGES IN SNAP MONTHLY BENEFITS AS
NONLABOR INCOME INCREASES 
In contrast to the previous example of increasing labor income, 
increases in nonlabor income from any source are not reduced by the 
20 percent earnings deduction when determining countable income. 
Examples of nonlabor income include things like interest on savings 
deposits, rental income, stock dividends, and—most importantly for 
this appendix—money from transfer programs such as UI. The conse-
quence of the exemption of nonlabor income from the earnings deduc-
tion is that the household is expected to spend a full 30 cents of each 
dollar of nonlabor income on food. So in the case of our hypothetical 
household, after nonlabor income exceeds the sum of the standard 
deduction ($160), the child-care allowance ($67), and the cap on shel-
ter expenses ($535), then the marginal effective tax is 30 percent on 
nonlabor income above $762. The effective marginal tax rate on non-
labor income will jump to 45 percent when nonlabor income rises to 
a level at which half of countable income plus the maximum shelter 
deduction equals the actual shelter costs. In our example, that is when 
nonlabor income reaches about $1,022 and countable income is about 
$800. The 45 percent effective marginal tax rate reduces SNAP until 
nonlabor income rises to about $1,720, at which point the expected 
30 percent food expenditure from net income of $1,681 after the stan-
dard deduction and child-care costs is just equal (at $504.30) to the 
  	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
46 Table 1A.2 SNAP Monthly Benefit Amounts for a Three-Person Family with an Unemployed Adult Who Normally 
Works Full-Time at $9.25 Hourly, with and without Michigan UI Benefits as Earnings Increase 
Additional income without UI Additional income with UI benefits 
SNAP Marginal tax Total 
Monthly benefit SNAP tax rate Monthly Marginal SNAP benefit Marginal tax rate on income, 
earnings amount with respect UI benefit tax rate on UI after UI and rate on SNAP SNAP+UI earnings+ 
($) ($) to earnings ($) for earnings earnings ($) for earnings for earnings SNAP+UI ($) 
0 504 0.00 893 0.00 465 0.00  0.00 1,358 
100 504 0.00 843 0.50 456 0.09 0.59 1,399 
200 504 0.00 793 0.50 447 0.09 0.59 1,440 
300 504 0.00 743 0.50 438 0.09 0.59 1,481 
400 504 0.00 693 0.50 429 0.09 0.59 1,522 
500 504 0.00 643 0.50 417 0.12 0.62 1,560 
600 504 0.00 593 0.50 403 0.14 0.64 1,597 
700 504 0.00 543 0.50 390 0.14 0.64 1,633 
800 504 0.00 493 0.50 376 0.14 0.64 1,670 
900 504 0.00 440 0.53 365 0.12 0.65 1,704 
1,000 493 0.11 340 1.00 374 −0.09 0.91 1,713 
1,100 469 0.24 240 1.00 383 −0.09 0.91 1,722 
1,200 445 0.24 140 1.00 392 −0.09 0.91 1,731 
1,300 418 0.26 40 1.00 401 −0.09 0.91 1,740 
1,400 382 0.36 0 0.40 382 0.18 0.58 1,782 
1,500 346 0.36 0 0.00 346 0.36 0.36 1,846 
   47 
1,600 310 0.36 0 0.00 310 0.36 0.36 1,910 
1,700 274 0.36 0 0.00 274 0.36 0.36 1,974 
1,800 238 0.36 0 0.00 238 0.36 0.36 2,038 
1,900 202 0.36 0 0.00 202 0.36 0.36 2,102 
2,000 166 0.36 0 0.00 166 0.36 0.36 2,166 
2,100 130 0.36 0 0.00 130 0.36 0.36 2,230 
2,200 94 0.36 0 0.00 94 0.36 0.36 2,294 
2,300 58 0.36 0 0.00 58 0.36 0.36 2,358 
2,400 22 0.36 0 0.00 22 0.36 0.36 2,422 
2,500 0 0.22 0 0.00 0 0.22 0.22 2,500 
2,600 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 2,600 
NOTE: These examples illustrate the interaction between SNAP, UI, and earnings. The examples do not consider federal and state income 
taxes, payroll taxes, or the Earned Income Tax Credit. In some earnings ranges, because of the $100 increments in earnings simulated, these 
approximations miss the precise change points of tax rates. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and existing program parameters. 
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initial full SNAP monthly entitlement of $504 for our hypothetical 
household. 
The different effects of labor earnings and nonlabor earnings 
on SNAP benefits are summarized graphically for our hypothetical 
household in Figure 1A.1. This figure shows that SNAP benefits are 
not reduced until a higher level of labor earnings is reached compared 
to nonlabor earnings. The marginal effective tax rates on SNAP ben-
efits for the different types of income in our hypothetical household 
are shown in Figure 1A.2. The household is expected to spend 30 
percent of net income on food. For additional nonlabor income, the 
marginal effective tax rates are 30 and 45 percent, with the higher 
rate applicable after the shelter deduction is exhausted, and for labor 
income, the marginal effective tax rates are 24 and 36 percent because 
labor income is reduced by 20 percent by the earnings deduction. 
Figure 1A.1 SNAP Benefits with Increasing Labor or Nonlabor Income 
with $504 Initial Monthly SNAP Benefit 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and 
existing program parameters. 
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Figure 1A.2 SNAP Effective Marginal Tax Rates with Increasing Labor 
or Nonlabor Income with $504 Initial SNAP Benefit 
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existing program parameters. 
Determination of weekly unemployment benefits 
As an example of UI benefit determination, we start with the 
case of Michigan. While the Michigan minimum wage is higher, we 
include the federal minimum wage of $7.25 among the examples. 
The Michigan UI weekly benefit amount (WBA) is set at 4.1 percent 
of high-quarter earnings in the UI base period. The base period is 
the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters. We assume 
steady prior work without any quarterly variation in earnings. The 
right four columns in Table 1A.1 show UI benefit computations for 
an unemployed adult with two young children in Michigan for four 
increasing hourly wage rates. For earnings rates of $7.25, $9.25, 
$13.00, and $16.55, the WBA amounts would be $165, $208, $287, 
and $362, respectively. The last example is the maximum WBA paid 
in Michigan. The UI benefit formulas in the five other states studied in 
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this book are similar to Michigan’s in that they all are based on earn-
ings in the one or two highest-earnings quarters of the base period. 
EFFECT OF REPORTED EARNINGS ON WEEKLY
UI BENEFITS
All states allow at least some earnings during weeks for which 
UI benefits are paid. When less than the full WBA is paid, it is usu-
ally called partial UI benefits. For some benefits to be paid, all states 
require earnings to be less than the full UI weekly benefit amount. 
Most states, including five of the six studied in this book, have UI 
benefit rules that disregard some reported weekly earnings and reduce 
weekly benefits dollar for dollar above a set threshold of reported 
earnings. Michigan does not have an earnings disregard and instead 
reduces weekly UI benefits by 50 cents for every dollar of earnings 
reported on the continued claim form up to the WBA amount. After 
that point, weekly UI benefits are reduced dollar for dollar from the 
WBA until the benefit is zero—that is, when earnings reach 1.5 times 
the WBA. Therefore, the effective marginal tax rate on earnings for 
UI beneficiaries in Michigan is initially 50 percent, and then 100 per-
cent, until it falls to zero when the beneficiary works his or her way 
off UI. Figure 1A.3 depicts the levels of weekly UI and total income 
for increasing levels of additional reported earnings for an unem-
ployed Michigan adult who normally earns $9.25 hourly and has a 
WBA of $208. Usual weekly earnings for this person are $370. The 
50 percent effective marginal tax rate on UI benefits continues until 
earnings reach the WBA ($208). Earnings above that level reduce UI 
benefits dollar for dollar until weekly earnings are $312. Above this 
level, the adult has worked his or her way off UI. 
The algebra of partial UI weekly benefits depending on weekly 
labor earnings can be written as a negative income tax system with 
a guarantee amount, an earnings disregard, and a tax on earnings 
beyond the disregard. The algebra involves the following: 
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Figure 1A.3  Impact of Reported Earnings on the Michigan UI Weekly 
Benefit Amount for an Individual with a $208 WBA 
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E = weekly earnings 
R = the weekly earnings disregard 
t = the fraction of earnings deducted from benefits 
Y = total weekly income 
WBA = the weekly benefit amount 
With partial benefits under UI, total weekly income is 
Y = E + WBA − t × (E − R) , 
so that income while receiving UI reaches the highest level when 
Y* = E* = (WBA / t) + R . 
For Michigan, R = 0, and 
t = {0.5 | E ≤ WBA; 1.0 | WBA < E ≤ 1.5 × WBA}. 
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So income is maximum on UI when Y = WBA / 0.5; after that point, 
weekly benefits decline dollar for dollar with increasing earnings until 
the beneficiary works his or her way off UI beyond E = 1.5 × WBA. 
For Georgia, Maryland, Florida, Missouri, and Texas, the weekly 
UI earnings disregards are $50, $50, $58, 0.2 × WBA, and 0.25 × 
WBA, respectively, and t = {1 | E > R}, so that total weekly income 
while receiving UI reaches a maximum when E = R and continues at 
the level of Y = WBA + R until E > WBA + R. 
In principle, the SNAP system works the same way: the monthly 
benefit is SNAP(n), which depends on the number of beneficiaries 
in the household, n, and is reduced at rates ti depending on the level 
of monthly earnings Em . Different SNAP benefit reduction rates 
become effective at different levels of earnings, depending on the 
household size and other factors. For the three-person household in 
our example, the main other factors governing the SNAP amount are 
monthly housing cost subject to limits, child-care costs, the level of 
nonlabor income, and the requirement that 30 percent of net income 
must be spent on food. The SNAP benefit reduction rates (marginal 
effective tax rates) observed in our simulations are 0.24 and 0.36. 
These parameters guide our simulations of interaction between SNAP
and UI. There is an implicit level of earnings disregard R(n) for SNAP
that also depends on the household size. 
RECEIPT OF SNAP WHILE RECEIVING UI 
To link UI to SNAP, we compute monthly UI as 4.3 times the 
UI weekly benefit amount (WBA). We see in Table 1A.1 that hourly 
earnings at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 would result in Mich-
igan UI benefits of $711 per month, which would be low enough to 
yield the maximum SNAP benefit amount of $504 per month for a 
family with one unemployed UI beneficiary adult and two young chil-
dren.4 More accurately, at the Michigan minimum wage of $9.25, the 
monthly UI amount would be $893. If fully unemployed, our hypo-
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thetical household in Michigan could receive a monthly SNAP ben-
efit of $465 along with the $893 in UI. As shown in Table 1A.1, the 
$13.00-per-hour job would yield a UI WBA of $287 and a SNAP
monthly benefit amount of $331 when the person becomes unem-
ployed. Working 40 hours weekly at $16.55 is the minimum needed 
to qualify for the maximum UI WBA of $362 in Michigan. Unem-
ployment with a $362 WBA would yield a monthly SNAP benefit for 
this household of $186 without any other earnings. 
EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL LABOR EARNINGS WHILE
RECEIVING SNAP AND UI 
Table 1A.2 shows the interaction of SNAP and UI as labor earn-
ings increase for our hypothetical household. This household has 
two young children and one adult who normally works full-time at 
the Michigan minimum wage of $9.25 per hour. The first column 
in the table shows monthly earnings increasing in $100 increments. 
Columns 2 and 3 apply to a household with an unemployed adult 
without UI, and the remaining columns assume Michigan UI ben-
efit eligibility and receipt. Column 4 shows how monthly UI benefits 
would change with increases in monthly earnings. Column 5 shows 
the effective marginal tax on labor earnings through UI benefit reduc-
tions, column 6 shows changes in monthly SNAP benefits, column 
7 shows the effective marginal tax on labor earnings due to SNAP
benefit reductions, column 8 shows the total effective marginal tax 
on labor earnings through reductions in both UI and SNAP benefits, 
and column 9 shows the total income from earnings, SNAP, and UI. 
The first UI tax rate is 0.5, and it rises to 1.0 when labor earnings 
reach the monthly UI benefit amount. The first SNAP tax rate is 0.09. 
This rate results because added labor earnings reduce SNAP by 24 
percent after the 20 percent labor earnings deduction and 30 percent 
obligation for spending on food. However, effective earnings go up 
only by half since UI goes down by 50 percent, and there is a reduc-
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tion in nonlabor income from UI that is replaced by labor income. The 
labor income is given an earnings reduction; the UI benefit is less, and 
that is not given the earnings reduction. Figures in the second row of 
Table 1A.2 show that when labor income increases by $100, UI ben-
efits fall by $50 and SNAP falls by $9, so the total effective marginal 
tax rate is 59 percent, and the net gain to the household from a $100 
increase in labor earnings is $41. 
Continuing the UI and SNAP example in Table 1A.2, the effective 
marginal tax rate on labor earnings through SNAP rises to 0.135 when 
the shelter-cost deduction begins to erode after labor earnings exceed 
$652. Interestingly, the effective marginal tax rate on labor income 
through SNAP becomes −9 percent when labor earnings reach the 
monthly UI benefit amount and the Michigan UI benefit reduction 
rate is dollar for dollar. In this range of 100 percent UI benefit reduc-
tion, nonlabor income is effectively exchanged for labor income, 
which has a more favorable treatment in terms of SNAP, but the 
combined benefit reduction rate is 91 percent instead of 100 percent 
because SNAP payments actually increase. This pattern is displayed 
in Figure 1A.4, which shows the monthly SNAP payments plotted on 
the right-hand y axis, while monthly UI and total household income 
are plotted on the left-hand y axis. Michigan UI benefits end when 
labor earnings reach 1.5 times UI benefits, so all household income 
above this level represents labor earnings. After UI ends and earnings 
continue to increase, the SNAP benefit reduction rate rises to 36 per-
cent as the shelter deduction is eroded. SNAP benefits end when labor 
earnings rise above $2,463 per month. For earnings above this level, 
total income is equal to earnings. Again, this scenario ignores the fed-
eral and state income tax systems, payroll taxes for social insurance, 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit. The pattern of Michigan effective 
marginal tax rates on labor earnings for this hypothetical household is 
given in Figure 1A.5. 
The five other states studied in this book have earnings disre-
gards only for UI, followed by 100 percent benefit reduction rates 
for earnings above the disregard level. The disregards in Georgia and 
 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Introduction and Overview 55 
Figure 1A.4 Monthly UI and SNAP Benefits for an Unemployed 
Michigan Minimum-Wage Worker with Two Young 
Children as Earnings Increase 
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existing program parameters. 
Maryland are $50, in Florida $58 (the federal minimum hourly wage 
times eight), in Missouri 20 percent of the WBA, and in Texas 25 
percent of the WBA. The pattern of marginal benefit taxation in these 
states depends on whether the beneficiary is normally a relatively 
high earner or a low earner. 
Texas provides a good graphical example for these five states. 
Since Texas has the biggest UI earnings disregard (0.25 × WBA), it’s 
possible to see the pattern of marginal tax rates graphically. In Texas, 
the federal minimum wage of $7.25 is the effective rate, and someone 
who normally works 40 hours per week at that wage would qualify 
for a UI WBA of $151. For a single adult with two young dependent 
children and the usual expenses listed in Box 1A.1, when out of work, 
that person’s monthly SNAP payment would be $504 and the monthly 
UI would be $648. Figure 1A.6 shows the marginal tax rates for this 
Texan when earnings increase from zero. At $162 (0.25 × $648), the 
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Figure 1A.5  SNAP and UI Tax Rates with Respect to Earnings for a 
Michigan Minimum-Wage Worker ($9.25 hourly) with 
$465 Monthly SNAP and $893 Monthly UI Benefits 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and 
existing program parameters. 
tax on UI rises to 100 percent. As earnings increase, UI is reduced 
dollar for dollar until earnings reach $810 (1.25 × 648) monthly, at 
which point UI ends. Interestingly, before labor earnings reach the 
UI disregard of $162, the effective marginal tax rate on labor earn-
ings rises to 24 percent through a SNAP benefit reduction. The SNAP
reduction starts when UI is $648 and labor earnings are about $144. 
When labor earnings rise to $162 or slightly higher, the effective mar-
ginal tax rate drops to −6 percent as UI is reduced dollar for dollar in 
labor earnings, and SNAP benefits rise because UI (which is nonlabor 
income) is exchanged for labor earnings. As labor earnings continue 
to increase, monthly SNAP recovers to the full $504 entitled benefit 
until labor earnings reach $952. Above that level, SNAP declines by 
24 cents for each additional dollar earned. Then, starting at earnings 
of $1,340, SNAP declines by 36 cents per dollar earned until SNAP
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Figure 1A.6  SNAP and UI Tax Rates with Respect to Earnings for a 
Texas Minimum-Wage Worker ($7.25 hour) with a $648 
Monthly UI Benefit Amount and a $504 Monthly SNAP 
Benefit 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and 
existing program parameters. 
ends at earnings of $2,463. The changes in SNAP tax rates occur at 
the same earnings levels as the Michigan example, because for this 
particular low-income household, the reductions both follow the 
example given in Box 1A.1. 
Contrast the minimum-wage Texas earner to an adult earning 
$19.15 hourly. That hourly rate is sufficient to yield a 2018 UI WBA
in Texas of $395. If the household consists of this adult with two 
dependent children and the usual expenses assumed above, a totally 
unemployed adult would receive $122 in monthly SNAP payments, 
along with $1,700 in monthly UI.5 The pattern of SNAP and UI mar-
ginal tax rates is illustrated in Figure 1A.7. Starting from unemploy-
ment, any earnings would reduce SNAP by 36 cents for each dollar 
earned, and SNAP benefits would stop when labor earnings reached 
$339 (SNAP/0.36). As labor earnings continue to increase, UI bene-
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Figure 1A.7  SNAP and UI Tax Rates with Respect to Earnings for a 
Texas Wage Earner with a $395 Weekly Benefit Amount 
($1,700 monthly) and a $122 Monthly SNAP Benefit 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
Ta
x 
ra
te
 o
n 
ad
di
tio
na
l e
ar
ni
ng
s 
UI tax rate 
SNAP tax rate 
−-0.2 
0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500 2,750 
Monthly reported earnings 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on assumed household characteristics and 
existing program parameters. 
fits begin to fall, dollar for dollar, after $425 in earnings. Interestingly, 
as labor income rises and replaces nonlabor UI, the 20 percent SNAP
earnings deduction comes into play again when earnings top $780. 
From that level up to labor earnings of $2,125 (or 1.25 × $1,700), 
SNAP continues to rise, reaching the original entitlement of $122. 
For earnings beyond that level, SNAP starts declining at a rate of 36 
percent of additional labor earnings, and it reaches zero at earnings 
of $2,463. 
For an unemployed Texan with two young dependents and a 
usual full-time job at $13 per hour, when working off SNAP and UI 
from full unemployment, the patterns of income, benefits, and tax 
rates are depicted in Figure 1A.8. In this middle case, the SNAP and 
UI reductions happen in the same range of increasing earnings, and in 
this case SNAP receipt also can continue beyond the earnings range 
when UI benefits end. The three figures for Texas summarize the gen-
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Figure 1A.8 SNAP and UI Benefit Amounts and Tax Rates for Earnings 
by a Texas Wage Earner ($13.00 hourly) with a $363 
Monthly SNAP Benefit and a $270 UI WBA 
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eral pattern of interaction for SNAP and UI in the five study states 
other than Michigan. 
Appendix Notes 
I thank Ken Kline for excellent research assistance. For constructive com-
ments that improved accuracy and exposition of this appendix I thank Steve 
Wandner, Colin Gray, Michael Wiseman, Pauline Leung, Peter Mueser, and 
David Stevens. 
1. There are two types of shelter deductions: The capped shelter deduction 
is capped at $535 per month for households that do not include an elder, 
disabled adult, or disabled child, regardless of how high the shelter costs 
are. The uncapped shelter deduction applies if the household includes 
at least one person who is elderly (aged 60+) or is disabled; there is no 
limit or cap on the shelter costs that exceed 50 percent of net income. 
2. The example further assumes that no one in the household is either over 
age 60 or disabled. 
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3. This comes from https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/
a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits (Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities 2018). Countable income = 0.8 × gross income − stan-
dard deduction (persons) − child care (kids); net income = countable 
income − (shelter price − 0.5 × countable income); SNAP = SNAP
(number of persons) − (0.3 × net income). 
4. We leave the child-care expense in the SNAP computation to simplify 
comparisons, and because both UI and SNAP continuing eligibility 
require active search for work or employability development for most 
beneficiaries. 
5. A WBA of $395 would yield an annualized income rate of $20,540. The 
poverty threshold for a family of three is $20,780 for 2018, and 130 
percent is $27,014. So even a $395 WBA would not disqualify an unem-
ployed adult with two young children from getting SNAP payments. 
Appendix Reference 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 2018. A Quick Guide to SNAP Eli-
gibility and Benefits. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Pri-
orities. https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/a-quick-guide-to
-snap-eligibility-and-benefits (accessed August 13, 2018). 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The Unemployment Insurance 
Program and Its Relationship to 
the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program 
Stephen A. Wandner 
Urban Institute and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program’s parameters and the 
policy (set by both the federal and state governments) have a large 
impact on whether and when unemployed workers collect Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, administered 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. If UI beneficiaries receive 
adequate UI benefits up until the time they find new employment, 
they may not need to apply for SNAP. During the Great Recession, 
however, UI benefits did not last long enough for many beneficia-
ries to find jobs. The SNAP program experienced a large increase in 
participants during the Great Recession, and UI beneficiaries were 
a significant portion of the increase. The SNAP program is particu-
larly affected by the percentage of the unemployed who receive UI, 
the amount of UI benefits they receive each week, and the duration 
of UI benefits. The effect of the UI program on SNAP enrollment, 
however, varies between states because of differences in state UI laws 
and administration and because of the design of federal UI extension 
programs during periods of high unemployment. 
In addition, the public workforce system provides reemployment 
services to UI recipients. These services can help UI recipients return 
61 
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to work before they exhaust entitlement to all UI benefits. Research 
has shown that more intensive, in-person services make it more likely 
that UI beneficiaries will return to work before they exhaust their enti-
tlement to UI benefits, making it less likely that they will need SNAP
benefits. This chapter examines aspects of the UI program that affect 
the SNAP program and how the UI program during the study period 
changed because of public-policy decision making. 
The UI program is generally the first public workforce program 
to serve unemployed workers, and this was certainly true in the Great 
Recession. Unemployment increased dramatically in 2008, especially 
for dislocated workers who qualified for UI benefits. Workers usu-
ally applied for benefits by telephone or by computer. Nonetheless, in 
most states, workers applying for UI must register with the Employ-
ment Service for referral to jobs or receipt of reemployment services, 
and they may be asked to report to local workforce offices to have 
their UI eligibility reviewed or to receive reemployment services. 
The UI system pays partial, temporary benefits to unemployed 
workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own. These 
workers also must have recent and substantial experience in the labor 
market, through which they earned wages or salaries. Employers pay 
taxes into state accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund in the U.S. 
Treasury so that balances are available to make future UI benefit pay-
ments. The financing system is designed to build up funds during 
good times so that these funds are available to make payments during 
future periods of high unemployment. If state accounts become insol-
vent, the states can borrow from the federal government. Thus, bene-
fits are available to individual workers, and the UI system is designed 
to be part of the countercyclical fiscal system that leans against the 
forces of recession. 
UI benefits are large compared to SNAP benefits. UI benefit for-
mulas in most states are designed to replace approximately 50 percent 
of lost weekly wages up to a maximum benefit amount set by each 
state. UI benefits are paid to individuals based on their past earnings 
rather than to families based on need. As a result, the relative value 
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of UI benefits is much greater for a single SNAP recipient than for a 
larger family.
Table 2.1 shows that in 2009, the monthly value of SNAP ben-
efits was only 15 to 20 percent of the average monthly UI benefit 
for a one-person family, while the value rose to between 45 and 65 
percent for a family of four. It is worth noting that SNAP is relatively 
less valuable in Maryland and Michigan, states where UI provides for 
additional dependent allowances. Since SNAP is an antipoverty pro-
gram, the lower rows of Table 2.1 contrast household SNAP benefits 
to state minimum UI benefit amounts paid to some UI beneficiaries 
involved with SNAP. The SNAP benefits are much higher relative to 
minimum UI benefit amounts, particularly in Missouri, Florida, and 
Georgia, where UI minimums are very low and no dependent allow-
ances are paid. SNAP is relatively less valuable than minimum UI 
payments in Michigan because of a relatively high minimum weekly 
benefit amount (WBA) and a six-dollar-per-dependent additional UI 
payment per week. Only a small fraction of UI beneficiaries receive 
the minimum WBA, but joint UI and SNAP receipt is more likely 
for those at the minimum WBA because of their low recent earnings. 
To further contrast UI and SNAP benefit levels, we use program 
administrative data from Michigan. Table 2.2 shows the average 
WBAs of UI beneficiaries who applied in Michigan between Janu-
ary and August of 2009.1 A total of 427,266 applicants started new 
Michigan UI benefit years in this period. The minimum Michigan UI 
WBA in 2009 was $117, but the average WBA among all beneficia-
ries in this period was $316, while the state maximum was $362. The 
average UI WBA for those who also received SNAP in the 36-month 
period from 12 months before UI application until 24 months after 
was $284, compared to $329 for those who did not receive SNAP in 
that period. 
The average WBA for the UI-only group is not much higher than 
the average WBA for the group that also received SNAP, because the 
maximum WBA in Michigan is relatively low at $362. In this total 
sample of UI beneficiaries who applied between January and August 
  
 
 
 
64 Table 2.1  Value of SNAP Relative to Average and Minimum UI, by Family Size, 2009 
Florida Georgia Maryland Michigan Missouri Texas 
UI AWBA ($) 238 282 311 304 256 321 
UI AMBA ($) 1,022 1,213 1,373 1,307 1,103 1,380 
SNAP, 1 person—$200 0.196 0.165 0.146 0.153 0.181 0.145 
SNAP, 2 people—$367 0.359 0.303 0.261 0.275 0.333 0.266 
SNAP, 3 people—$526 0.515 0.434 0.365 0.387 0.477 0.381 
SNAP, 4 people—$668 0.654 0.551 0.453 0.483 0.606 0.484 
UI min. WBA ($) 32 44 25 117 30 58 
UI monthly min. WBA ($) 138 189 107 503 129 249 
SNAP, 1 person—$200 1.449 1.058 1.869 0.398 1.550 0.803 
SNAP, 2 people—$367 2.659 1.942 2.595 0.694 2.845 1.474 
SNAP, 3 people—$526 3.812 2.783 2.992 0.948 4.078 2.112 
SNAP, 4 people—$668 4.841 3.534 3.178 1.151 5.178 2.683 
NOTE: “AWBA” is the average weekly benefit amount, and “AMBA” is the average monthly benefit amount (AWBA × 4.3). Weekly additional 
UI allowances of $8 and $6 per dependent in Maryland and Michigan, respectively, are figured into the ratios. The monthly SNAP allotments 
are the maximum amounts by family size, including the 2009 increase provided for by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. These 
maximum SNAP amounts were available to households throughout the United States from April 1, 2009, through September 30, 2009. 
SOURCE: USDOL (2010); USDA (2019); authors’ computations. 
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Table 2.2 Comparison of Average UI Weekly Benefit Amounts (WBA) among Michigan UI Beneficiaries Involved with 
SNAP and All Other UI Beneficiaries, January–August 2009 
Both UI & SNAP receipt Only UI receipt UI WBA ratio 
Number of Average Number of Average Both UI & 
Time period relative to UI application persons UI WBA ($) persons UI WBA ($) SNAP/only UI 
12 months prior 59,872 270 367,394 324 0.833 
Month of UI application 43,753 270 383,513 321 0.842 
12 months after UI 94,593 282 332,673 326 0.866 
24 months after UI 118,036 285 309,230 328 0.867 
Anytime in 36 months 125,419 284 301,847 329 0.863 
SOURCE: Author’s computation from Michigan program administrative data. 
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2009, fully 60 percent were at the maximum WBA, including 68 per-
cent of those who did not receive SNAP and 40 percent of those who 
did. This is an impressive indicator of joint program use: 40 percent 
of UI beneficiaries who applied in the first nine months of 2009 and 
received SNAP within 36 months of their UI application qualified for 
the Michigan maximum UI WBA. 
The average WBA of $284 for UI beneficiaries who also received 
SNAP during the 36-month period around their UI application implies 
an average level of base period earnings at $27,707. This average 
income level was below the SNAP-qualifying level ($28,665) for a 
family of four in 2009 (HHS 2009). As a result, unemployed Michi-
gan workers who qualified for a UI WBA much greater than double 
the state minimum WBA of $117 would often still qualify for SNAP
if they were the only earner in a four-person household. Those who 
received SNAP before or in the same month as UI application had 
somewhat lower average WBAs ($270) than those who received 
SNAP within one ($282) or two ($285) years after application. In 
terms of understanding the relative importance of SNAP and UI to the 
household, the Michigan data suggest that contrasting SNAP with the 
UI average weekly benefit amount is a reasonable approach. This rule 
of thumb seems appropriate for the group of six states studied. How-
ever, it might be misleading in other states paying higher UI benefit 
amounts, where the average WBA of SNAP-involved UI beneficia-
ries is significantly lower than that for those not involved in SNAP. 
Regular UI benefits generally have been paid for up to 26 weeks 
so that the program operates as an automatic stabilizer for the U.S. 
economy. When there is a downturn in the economy, the amount of 
benefits paid out increases automatically because the UI program is 
a budgetary entitlement and is not subject to budget appropriations 
at either the state or federal level. As the U.S. economy moved into 
the Great Recession, unemployment rates—as measured both by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey (CPS) and by 
UI program enumerations—more than doubled in the period between 
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the cyclical unemployment low in 2007 and the cyclical unemploy-
ment highs in 2009 and 2010. 
State UI agencies responded quickly to the Great Recession, suc-
ceeding in determining program eligibility and making payments to 
a greatly increased flow of UI claimants. The regular UI program 
served nearly double the number of unemployed workers receiving 
first payments in 2009 compared to 2006. Because of longer durations 
of insured unemployment, the total amount of regular UI benefits paid 
out increased by 250 percent during this same interval. 
However, the severity of the Great Recession is not measured 
only by the increase in the number of workers falling into unemploy-
ment; it is also measured by how long workers remained unemployed. 
There was media attention on the enormous increase in the number 
of long-term unemployed—measured in the CPS as workers unem-
ployed for more than 26 weeks. This measure of long-term unem-
ployment corresponds to those insured workers who would have 
exhausted their entitlement to regular UI benefits. The great increase 
in durations of unemployment resulted in unprecedented numbers of 
UI beneficiaries who exhausted their entitlement to regular UI ben-
efits; their numbers rose from 2.6 million in 2007 to 7.0 million in 
2010 (Table 2.3). 
The basic 26-week regular UI program is considered to be ade-
quate during periods of low unemployment. Starting in the 1950s, 
however, Congress found regular UI to be inadequate when unem-
ployment rises and more workers exhaust their entitlement to all of 
their potential weeks of UI benefits. Congress reacted in 1958 and 
1961 by enacting temporary extended benefit programs to take care 
of a temporary need for additional UI benefits during a recession. In 
1970, Congress enacted a Permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program 
designed to eliminate the need for temporary extensions. In fact, the 
Permanent EB program recently became a second-level (or second-
tier) program, and Congress has enacted additional temporary third-
tier programs in response to recessions in 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 
  
68 Table 2.3  Unemployment Insurance First Payments, Exhaustions, and Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2007–2016 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Unemployment rates (%) 
CPS civilian 4.6 5.3 8.6 9.8 9.2 8.2 7.7 6.5 5.4 4.9 
Insured 1.9 2.2 4.1 3.7 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.6 
Program activity (millions) 
First payments 7.5 8.8 14.4 11.3 9.7 8.7 8.1 7.2 6.6 6.3 
Exhaustions of regular benefits 2.6 3.1 6.4 7.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.6 2.4 
Benefit payments ($ billions) 
Regular benefits 31.61 38.14 75.34 63.04 48.52 44.26 39.64 35.88 31.72 31.42 
Extended benefits (EB) 0.01 0.02 4.12 8.00 11.92 4.94 0.11 0.00 −0.03 0.04 
EUC08 0.00 3.55 32.66 72.09 52.66 39.58 25.43 4.84 −0.23 0.01 
Federal additional 0.00 0.00 6.48 11.71 1.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UCFE-UCX/trade 0.93 1.36 1.09 1.52 1.78 1.65 1.32 1.19 1.01 0.76 
Total benefit payments ($ billions) 32.55 43.05 119.69 156.37 116.80 90.43 66.50 41.91 32.46 32.24 
State tax collections ($ billions) 34.90 32.22 31.14 38.28 49.27 59.38 48.95 46.89 42.18 41.46 
NOTE: EUC08 is the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program that was first enacted in June 2008. It is called EUC08 to distinguish it 
from previous temporary emergency programs with the same name. UCFE and UCX are unemployment compensation for federal employees 
and for ex-service members, respectively. 
SOURCE: USDOL (2015c).  The sum of individual UI programs may not add up to the total for all programs because of rounding. 
  
The UI Program and Its Relationship to SNAP  69 
2002, and 2008. The temporary recessionary extensions beginning 
in 1971 resulted in much longer potential duration of benefits, but 
until 2009 the total potential duration of regular UI, EB, temporary, 
and emergency extensions was never greater than 72 weeks, and fre-
quently was not greater than 52 weeks (Isaacs and Whittaker 2011; 
Whittaker and Isaacs 2013). 
In 2008, Congress reacted to the enormous increase in long-term 
unemployment as it normally does in a recession: it created a tempo-
rary third-tier UI program—the Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation program (EUC08). It also took a further unprecedented step— 
it liberalized the Permanent Extended Benefit program by extending 
access to the program and the duration of benefits. Congress also 
transferred EB funding from the Unemployment Trust Fund to gen-
eral revenue, fully relieving state UI trust fund accounts of any fiscal 
responsibility for the program. 
Just as the Great Recession was unprecedented in its severity, 
the extension durations also were unprecedented. During the Great 
Recession, the combination of the three UI programs yielded a maxi-
mum potential duration of benefits that reached 99 weeks between 
November 2009 and September 2012. The EUC program ended in all 
states on January 1, 2014. 
Although state UI accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
are supposed to build up during nonrecessionary periods so that 
they can fund state regular UI benefits during recessions, during the 
2000s states were frequently unwilling to let their UI tax rates rise, 
so between 2005 and 2007 state UI tax collections barely exceeded 
the regular UI benefit payments. As a result, fund balances were not 
building up for the next recession. When the Great Recession began, 
regular UI benefit payments exploded, reaching $75 billion in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2009, while state UI tax collections responded slowly. In 
FY 2011, regular UI benefits payments were two-and-a-half times the 
amount of state collections. 
As a result, between July 2008 and June 2011, 36 states borrowed 
money from the U.S. Treasury. The Unemployment Trust Fund’s pos-
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itive net reserves, which had been $40 billion at the end of June 2008, 
dropped to −$25 billion by the end of June 2011, as 29 states plus the 
Virgin Islands were still in debt to the U.S. Treasury. The problem 
was particularly acute for seven states that each owed more than $2 
billion, including California, which owed more than $10 billion (Vro-
man 2011). On March 18, 2015—almost six years after the end of the 
recession—10 states still owed a total of $14.4 billion, but California 
accounted for more than half of that amount, at $9.0 billion (USDOL
2018). 
The slow recovery of Unemployment Trust Fund account bal-
ances calls into question the future financial health of the UI program. 
State workforce agencies must pay off their debts and build up their 
account balances through a combination of tax increases and ben-
efit reductions. This effort takes several years to accomplish and will 
be successful only if the United States does not experience another 
recession in the near future. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
included a variety of UI provisions that were designed to ease the 
problems of both unemployed persons and the financially strapped 
state UI programs. ARRA provisions went beyond merely extend-
ing the EUC08 program through December 26, 2009: the ARRA
also funded a temporary increase of $25 in the weekly UI benefit 
amounts, called Federal Additional Compensation. This was avail-
able to all unemployed workers participating in all UI programs, at a 
cost of $20.1 billion, for the period 2009–2011. Permanent Extended 
Benefits became 100 percent federally funded, and states could tem-
porarily ease EB eligibility requirements to expand the number of 
unemployed workers eligible for the benefits. These EB provisions 
cost the federal government $24.0 billion between 2009 and 2011. 
The taxation of UI benefits also was partially suspended. State UI 
agencies were given relief from the repayment and accrual of inter-
est on their outstanding federal loans. Furthermore, state UI agen-
cies received $500 million in additional UI administrative funds to 
respond to increased workloads. Finally, the UI modernization provi-
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sions, which changed and modernized state UI eligibility provisions, 
were enacted as part of ARRA (Shelton, Romig, and Whittaker 2009). 
REGULAR UI PROGRAM 
Eligibility for UI 
Each state determines its own UI eligibility conditions, but the 
process of making a determination is similar among the states. To be 
eligible for UI, an unemployed worker must meet both monetary and 
nonmonetary requirements. The nonmonetary requirements relate 
both to the reasons for job separation and to job search. Workers must 
have become unemployed through no fault of their own—generally, 
being laid off because there is insufficient work for them. Once they 
are initially eligible for UI, in order for them to continue to receive 
benefits they must be able, available, and actively seeking work, and 
they cannot refuse suitable work. 
Unemployed workers also must have sufficient recent work 
attachment, which is measured by examining earnings in a UI base 
period—generally the first four of the last five completed calendar 
quarters. Many states also provide for a more recent alternative base 
period, which workers with insufficient wages in the regular base 
period can use to qualify. In 2017, all of the study states had an alter-
native base period of the last four completed quarters except for Flor-
ida and Texas. The minimum wages needed to qualify for benefits 
are shown in Table 2.4, with Georgia having the lowest amount and 
Michigan having the highest. 
UI claimants who have sufficient wages in their base period 
receive a monetary determination of the weekly benefit amount they 
will receive and the maximum number of weeks for which they can 
draw benefits, yielding a maximum potential amount of benefits dur-
ing the benefit year they establish. The generosity of benefits var-
ies greatly across the country. Among the study states, Michigan and 
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Table 2.4  State Eligibility Conditions for Participating States, 2017 
Minimum Maximum 
wages needed weekly Maximum Minimum Maximum 
to qualify in benefit potential potential potential 
base period amount benefits duration, duration, 
State ($) ($) ($) in weeks in weeks 
Florida 3,400 275 6,325 9 12–23 
Georgia 1,760 330 6,600 6 14–20 
Maryland 1,800 430 11,180 26 26 
Michigan 5,180 362 7,240 14 20 
Missouri 2,250 320 6,400 8 20 
Texas 2,442 493 12,818 10 26 
SOURCE: USDOL (2014). 
Florida required the greatest amount of wages to qualify for benefits, 
while Georgia required the least. Texas had a maximum weekly ben-
efit amount and maximum potential benefits that were nearly 80 per-
cent greater than those in Florida. In addition, the potential duration 
of benefits in Maryland is uniform at 26 weeks for all beneficiaries. 
Florida and Georgia have maximum potential duration that depends 
on the state unemployment rate as measured by the CPS. For the five 
states excluding Maryland, the actual potential duration depends on 
base period earnings, with the minimum potential duration varying 
from a low of 6 weeks in Georgia to a high of 14 weeks in Michi-
gan. Higher weekly benefit amounts and longer durations of benefits 
increased the likelihood that workers would find jobs before they 
exhausted their entitlement to UI benefits, and higher amounts and 
longer durations decreased the likelihood that they would apply for 
SNAP. Other things being equal, applications for SNAP should have 
been earlier and greater in Florida than in Maryland or Texas, where 
UI is more generous. 
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DURATION OF BENEFITS 
Maximum Potential Duration 
At the beginning of the study period, all study states had maxi-
mum durations of 26 weeks. However, between 2010 and 2012, 
seven states reduced their weeks of benefit duration, and four of the 
study states were part of this group: Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and 
Missouri.2 
When the UI program began paying benefits in 1938, states gen-
erally set the maximum potential duration for regular UI at 15 weeks. 
The states felt constrained from making it longer because of concerns 
fostered by early actuarial studies of the program. After World War 
II, states gradually increased the potential duration, until by 1975 all 
states had maximum durations of 26 weeks or greater. For over 30 
years, all states sustained a consensus that they could afford to pay at 
least 26 weeks of regular UI benefits. 
During periods of high unemployment, if extended benefits are 
available in states, the reduced potential duration of regular UI ben-
efits in the seven states discussed above is likely to reduce the number 
of additional weeks of benefits available. Since the potential dura-
tion of EB benefits is 13 weeks, or 50 percent of regular duration, 
an individual eligible for 26 weeks of regular UI would receive 13 
weeks of EB, while an individual receiving 20 weeks of regular UI 
benefits would receive only 10 weeks of EB benefits, resulting in a 
total reduction of 9 weeks. The exhaustees of the two UI programs, 
thus, would run out of income support more than two months earlier 
than individuals in states with longer regular UI benefits. 
Duration and Exhaustion 
With state legislation providing for different maximum durations 
of benefits, the average potential duration for individuals will vary in 
response to the statutory limits, and average actual duration will be 
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lower than the average potential duration. Average potential duration 
varies greatly, depending on the maximum potential duration (which 
was reduced in Florida, Georgia, and Michigan) and whether duration 
is variable or uniform. As a result, Maryland and Texas have the high-
est average potential duration, while Florida and Georgia have the 
lowest. Similarly, Florida and Georgia have the lowest average actual 
duration (Table 2.5). 
UI Partial Benefits and SNAP 
Particularly relevant to simultaneous SNAP-UI receipt are the 
rules for partial weekly UI benefits—that is, payments less than the 
full UI weekly benefit amount for which entitlement is figured on base 
period earnings. As stated in the introductory chapter of this book, 
weekly earnings must be reported on continued claims for UI ben-
efits. All states permit some earnings during UI-compensable weeks. 
For example, Michigan makes a distinction between unemployed 
weeks without any earnings from work and underemployed weeks 
with some low level of earnings. All states compensate a week of 
underemployment if earnings are less than the full UI weekly benefit 
amount.3 Forty-five states have an initial earnings threshold, below 
which benefits are not reduced. Thirty-nine of these states reduce 
benefits dollar for dollar beyond the initial disregard, so that UI pay-
ments continue until earnings exceed the WBA plus the disregard. 
Six programs with an initial disregard reduce benefits for earnings 
beyond the disregard by a rate of less than one, so that in these pro-
grams UI payments can continue when earnings are higher than the 
WBA plus the disregard. Seven states have no initial earnings disre-
gard but reduce benefits by less than 100 percent of weekly earnings. 
Michigan is in this latter group. A graphical representation of the way 
that weekly income changes for a UI beneficiary in Michigan with 
increasing earnings is shown in Appendix Figure 1A.1, following 
Chapter 1. As discussed in Chapter 1, among the six states studied 
in this book, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, and Texas have 
  
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
The UI Program and Its Relationship to SNAP  75 
Table 2.5 UI Wage Replacement and Benefit Duration Measures, 2016 
Average 
potential 
Average 
actual Recipiency 
AWBA/ 
AWW 
duration 
(weeks) 
duration 
(weeks) 
Exhaustion 
rate 
rate 
% (rank) 
United States 0.337 23.0 15.5 36.9 31 
Florida 0.270 12.1 9.8 50.0 12 (50) 
Georgia 0.288 13.6 8.5 36.1 15 (47) 
Maryland 0.312 26.0 19.1 35.7 35 (19) 
Michigan 0.315 19.8 12.3 33.4 31 (28) 
Missouri 0.288 16.1 12.0 39.5 24 (33) 
Texas 0.383 22.3 16.7 46.7 33 (26) 
NOTE: Data are for both taxable and reimbursable employers. “AWBA” = average 
weekly benefit amount; “AWW” = average weekly rate. 
SOURCE: USDOL (2016). The total unemployment rate to determine the recipiency 
rate is from USDOL (2017b). All data are for 2016. 
initial UI disregards, with 100 percent effective marginal tax rates on 
benefits thereafter. 
In 2017, 8 percent of all weekly UI payments were less than the 
full WBA, and about 5 percent of UI compensation that was paid 
involved a reduced benefit due to reported weekly earnings (Figure 
2.1). These rates of partial UI are less than the peaks of 10 percent of 
total weeks and 7 percent of dollars of UI in 2011 during the Great 
Recession. However, the current rates are higher than the 6 percent 
of weeks and 4 percent of dollars seen in 1971, reflecting a secular 
increase in the rate of reported earnings during UI benefit receipt. 
Nonetheless, the rate of earnings during UI receipt is probably higher 
than shown in these figures. A large field experiment in Washington 
suggests that UI beneficiaries will report a higher share of earnings on 
weekly UI claims when partial benefit rules are relaxed, even if earn-
ings do not increase (O’Leary 1997), and the UI Benefits Accuracy 
Measurement quality control system identifies underreported weekly 
earnings as the second biggest factor in explaining UI overpayments. 
In fact, more than 30 percent of UI overpayments in 2016 were due to 
underreported earnings on weekly continued claims forms (USDOL
2017a). 
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Figure 2.1 UI Partial Benefit Payments: Weeks Paid and Dollars Paid as 
Percentage of U.S. Totals, 1971–2017 
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SOURCE: Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration. 
Regarding the relevance of changes in weekly earnings on the 
interaction between SNAP and UI, in practical terms, changes in 
earnings immediately affect UI payments, since they must be reported 
on continued claims, but changes in UI or weekly earnings do not 
immediately affect monthly SNAP payments. SNAP monthly benefit 
levels are based on recent and expected income and household cir-
cumstances at the time of application, and those computations are 
usually only validated in most states midway through the SNAP ben-
efit entitlement period. In the SNAP benefit computation, labor earn-
ings are treated more favorably than nonlabor income like transfer 
payments, which include UI. The SNAP benefit specialist would have 
to expect the income from UI to be established and likely to continue 
for it to figure into the SNAP monthly benefit amount. However, it 
should be noted that applicants for food assistance from SNAP or cash 
assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
are expected to exhaust all available sources of income before ben-
efits are determined. Available sources of income could include UI, 
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various types of Social Security benefits, and employment income. In 
fact, SNAP applicants are required to register for work search with 
the public employment service, accept any offer of suitable work, and 
take part in an employment and training program to which they are 
referred by the SNAP office (USDA 2018). 
WAGE REPLACEMENT RATES 
The extent to which lost wages are replaced by UI benefits is usu-
ally measured by dividing the average weekly benefit amount (AWBA) 
by the average weekly wage in covered employment (AWW), which 
is derived from the state UI wage records. Thus, the AWBA for UI 
recipients is compared to a different population—the AWW for all 
employed workers whose employment is covered by the UI program. 
There has been a secular decline in wage replacement rates over 
time. There also are differences in replacement rates by state. Florida 
has the lowest replacement rate, at 27.0 percent, among the study 
states in 2016, while Texas has the highest at 38.3 percent. 
UI RECIPIENCY RATES 
The recipiency rate is insured unemployment as a percentage of 
total unemployment. It is an overall measure of programmatic and 
economic factors that affect whether unemployed workers receive UI 
benefits. It encompasses both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility 
factors that determine whether individuals receive UI and how long 
they will receive UI benefits. 
Nationally, recipiency rates for the regular UI program have var-
ied from just less than 30 percent up to 50 percent. However, recipi-
ency rates vary greatly by state, and the differences are closely related 
to the benefit eligibility conditions and generosity of the state UI pro-
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gram. Among the study states, Florida and Georgia had the lowest 
recipiency rates, at 12 and 15 percent, respectively, in 2016, while 
Maryland and Texas had the highest, at 35 and 33 percent. 
BENEFIT FINANCING 
Although the UI program is designed to be self-financing and 
countercyclical, recently many states have not been willing to build 
up their trust fund balances in good times to be ready to self-finance 
much higher benefit payments during recessions. Instead, many states 
have maintained relatively low trust-fund balances and had to bor-
row from the federal government early in a recession. While the 
states have mostly paid back their borrowed amounts after the Great 
Recession, payback has been slow, and UI trust-fund balances have 
remained low years after the end of the recession. 
Table 2.6 shows the benefit-financing situation at the beginning 
of 2015. Tax rates were low in most states. Missouri had a zero mini-
mum rate, and Georgia and Michigan had near zero minimum tax 
rates. While all study states have kept their minimum rates low, only 
Florida and Georgia also have kept their maximum tax rates low: fed-
eral law requires that the maximum rate must be no lower than 5.4 
percent, and that is the rate these two states have chosen. 
Table 2.6  State Tax Provisions in Study States, 2015 
Minimum Taxable Average 
& maximum wage base Reserve high-cost 
State tax rates (%) ($) ratio multiple 
Florida 0.10/5.40 7,000 1.02 1.00 
Georgia 0.0125/5.40 9,500 0.79 0.80 
Maryland 0.30/7.50 8,500 0.96 0.80 
Michigan 0.00/6.30 9,000 1.86 0.86 
Missouri 0.00/9.75 13,000 0.68 0.60 
Texas 0.00/6.00 9,000 0.13 0.15 
SOURCE: USDOL (2015a,b). 
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Federal law also requires that the taxable wage base be at least 
$7,000. In 2016, the UI base is 6 percent of the Social Security tax-
able wage base of $118,500, even though the UI and Social Secu-
rity wage bases started at the same $3,000 level in the late 1930s. 
Florida maintains that low $7,000 taxable wage base, and other study 
states have made only limited increases on their own. This is despite 
research that shows that higher taxable wage bases are related to more 
solvent state UI trust-fund accounts. 
Measures of the adequacy of state reserves in the Unemployment 
Trust Fund are shown in Table 2.6. The reserve ratio is state trust 
reserves relative to total covered wages. The high-cost reserve mul-
tiple is a measure of current reserves to the reserve needed to fund the 
state program during a past year of high benefit payments. Reserves 
are low based on both of these measures. In the past, USDOL has 
advocated a reserve of 1.5. None of the study states have reserves 
anywhere near that level. 
Interestingly, Florida’s UI financial situation is as good as that of 
most of the other study states. This is despite its particularly low tax 
rates and a low tax base. Florida has been able to achieve its current 
benefit finance status by reducing UI benefits, as has been demon-
strated by its low maximum potential duration, replacement rate, and 
recipiency rate. 
The potential for UI tax systems in our six states to respond to 
changes in benefit charges is summarized in the financing parameters 
listed in Table 2.6. State tax collection began increasing in FY2010 
and continued to increase through FY2012. Starting in FY2011, state 
tax collections exceeded regular UI benefit payments, but collection 
declined beginning in FY2012. Thus, there was not a sustained period 
of building up the depleted trust fund reserves. 
Five-and-a-half years after the end of the Great Recession, states 
were still in a weak financial situation. As of the end of 2014, states’
accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund still owed the federal gov-
ernment $12.86 billion. Ten states were insolvent. Twenty-six states 
had estimated funding—based on a measure of highest past cost— 
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that would last less than one year, which is less than USDOL has 
determined to be sufficient to weather a future recession. Neverthe-
less, outstanding loans from the federal government were down sub-
stantially from $42.18 billion at the end of 2010 (USDOL 2015c). 
PERMANENT EXTENDED BENEFITS 
The permanent Extended Benefits (EB) program has been in place 
for 35 years. It usually provides up to 13 weeks of benefits over and 
above the regular UI program when unemployment rates meet certain 
levels (that is, the EB program “triggers on” at those levels). During 
the Great Recession, temporary federal legislation enabled states to 
increase the potential duration of the EB program by seven weeks, 
raising the total potential duration of benefits under the program to 20 
weeks for the period lasting from February 2009 to July 2012. 
Normally, the costs of the EB program are split between the 
states and the federal government, with each entity paying 50 percent 
from either the state account in the Unemployment Trust Fund or the 
Extended Unemployment Compensation account. During much of the 
recession, the federal government paid for 100 percent of EB costs. 
All of the study states except Maryland were eligible for 13 
weeks of EB for over three years, stretching the total to between 158 
and 168 weeks. Because Maryland did not enact an alternate trigger 
mechanism that used the CPS total unemployment rate instead of the 
insured unemployment rate, reaching the threshold that would trigger 
EB was much more difficult in Maryland, and the state qualified for 
only 29 weeks of EB. 
States could opt to have their UI beneficiaries be eligible for an 
additional seven weeks of EB during the federally legislated “high 
unemployment period.” Maryland was the only study state that did 
not choose the high unemployment period option, which would have 
allowed Maryland beneficiaries to draw 20 weeks rather than 13 
weeks of EB benefits. 
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Once the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 
(EUC08) program became effective, EB was paid after EUC, rather 
than after regular UI benefits. Normally the EB program is considered 
to be the “second tier” of benefits, paid immediately after regular UI. 
During and after the Great Recession, however, it became the third 
tier of UI, following EUC08. 
EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 program 
began paying benefits in July 2008; those benefits terminated on Janu-
ary 1, 2014.4 The program paid additional benefits to UI beneficiaries 
who exhausted all their regular UI benefits. At first, EUC provided 
13 weeks of benefits, but the program expanded, and eventually there 
were four tiers of benefits that paid as much as 53 weeks of benefits 
(Table 2.7). Congress was responding to the Great Recession, as it 
had to almost all prior recessions, by adding temporary emergency 
benefits to the permanent regular UI and EB programs. The differ-
ence was that the EUC program was longer than any past temporary 
emergency program, in response to a recession that was more severe 
than any in the post–World War II period. 
For the long-term unemployed, the effect of EUC was to greatly 
expand the number of weeks of UI receipt and to delay (or elimi-
Table 2.7  Weeks Payable under Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation, July 2008 through December 2013 
Effective dates Weeks payable 
7/2008–11/2008 Up to 13 
12/2008–10/2009 Up to 20 or 33 
11/2009–9/2012 Up to 20, 34, 47, or 53 
9/2012–1/2014 Up to 14, 28, 37, or 47 
SOURCE: USDOL (2017c); EUC trigger-summary spreadsheet from the team leader 
for reporting, Tom Stengle of the Office of Unemployment Insurance, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. 
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nate) the transition of UI recipients to SNAP beneficiaries. The pub-
lic policy goal of EUC was, by greatly extending benefits, to give 
UI beneficiaries more time to search for and find work before they 
exhausted all entitlement to UI benefits. In response to labor market 
conditions, there were a number of legislative expansions, extensions, 
and contractions of EUC that paid benefits between June 30, 2008, 
and January 1, 2014 (see Table 2.8). 
The key factors in when UI beneficiaries were likely to apply 
for SNAP during and after the Great Recession were the number of 
Table 2.8 Extended Benefits Weeks Paid, July 2008 to January 1, 2014 
Weeks of extended Weeks of high unemployment 
State benefits (EB) (13 Weeks) period (HUP) (20 weeks) 
Florida 168 161 
Georgia 165 158 
Maryland 29 0 
Michigan 160 145 
Missouri 163 153 
Texas 158 126 
SOURCE: EB trigger-summary spreadsheet from the team leader for reporting, Tom 
Stengle, Office of Unemployment Insurance, U.S. Department of Labor. 
weeks of eligibility for all UI programs and the number of “final” UI 
payments for workers. The UI program counts “final payments” from 
each UI program—regular UI, EB, and EUC. However, the final pay-
ment of interest from the perspective of potential SNAP applicants is 
the “final” final payment—the last payment that beneficiaries could 
receive from all UI programs for which they were eligible. 
WEEKS OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THE
REGULAR, EB, AND EUC PROGRAMS 
The potential duration of all UI benefits during the study period 
depended on the sum of the availability of all three UI programs: 
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• Regular UI benefits: The maximum potential duration for 
regular benefits was 26 weeks in all states during the Great 
Recession, but among the study states, it declined because 
of state legislation for Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Mis-
souri in 2011 and 2012. 
• Extended Benefits: These benefits were available only when 
states met the EB trigger thresholds and the maximum pay-
able period was either 13 or 20 weeks. 
• Emergency Unemployment Compensation: This was avail-
able from July 2008 through December 2013. The maximum 
potential benefits varied between 13 and 53 weeks, depend-
ing on the federal legislation in place and on the unemploy-
ment rate within individual states. 
Thus, the total weeks of potential benefits can be looked at as in 
Box 2.1, below: 
Box 2.1 Potential Weeks of Benefits, by Individual UI Program, 
June 2008 through December 2013 for the Study States 
Extended benefits (third tier) 
Up to 13 weeks of benefits for beneficiaries. 
Available in all study states for between 29 and 168 weeks. 
High unemployment period benefits (third tier) 
Increased potential EB benefits up to 20 weeks. 
Available in all study states, except Maryland, for 145 to 168 weeks. 
Emergency unemployment compensation (second tier) 
Available in all study states, providing up to between 13 and 53 weeks 
of benefits, depending on federal legislation and unemployment 
rate by state from July 2008 through December 2013. 
Regular UI (first tier) 
Twenty-six weeks’ maximum potential duration in all states, but 
reduced in Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Missouri (2011–2012). 
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Thus, although maximum benefit entitlement varied between 
2008 and 2013, the greatest amount of potential benefits a UI ben-
eficiary could have received was 99 weeks = 26 weeks of regular 
UI + 20 weeks of EB + 53 weeks of EUC. Given this total potential 
availability of UI benefits (Regular UI, EB, and EUC), we have con-
structed charts for the study states. Figure 2.3 presents the results for 
the state of Maryland for the period from July 2008 through 2013. 
Figure 2.2 shows that Maryland had maximum potential bene-
fits of 26 weeks throughout the period. In Maryland, EUC started in 
January 2009 and increased from one to two to three tiers by January 
2010. EUC declined after June 2012, then varied between two and 
three tiers until EUC ended nationally at the end of December 2013. 
Maryland had by far the shortest EB duration of any of the study 
states, with 29 weeks, during which UI beneficiaries could draw an 
Figure 2.2  Maryland: Maximum Weeks of UI Available: Regular, EUC, 
and EB 
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additional 13 weeks of benefits. Maryland did not qualify for the high 
unemployment period’s additional seven weeks of potential EB ben-
efits. In total, Maryland UI recipients received far less in benefits than 
recipients in the other study states. 
“Final” Final Payment 
The UI system measures final payments for regular UI, EB, and 
EUC, including each of the four tiers of EUC that existed between 
2009 and 2013, but this study is interested in “final” final payments, 
which is a count of the number of last UI payments that beneficia-
ries received by month. These UI beneficiaries could potentially have 
received all of their regular UI benefits and exhausted them, gone 
on to receive all of their EUC benefits (including up to four tiers of 
benefits), and then received all of their eligibility for EB benefits, 
including the extra high unemployment period of an additional seven 
weeks of benefits. 
Putting together all of these programs and then selecting the final 
payments from the last program for which the Maryland UI benefi-
ciaries were eligible month by month would allow us to develop a 
count of those who left the UI program and had no further eligibility 
for UI benefits. 
There are limitations, however, to any measure of individuals 
who received their “final” final payment, because there are cases in 
which these payments were not “final.” If any study state in which 
the individual received a last UI payment subsequently triggered onto 
a higher EUC tier or triggered onto EB, exhaustees might have been 
eligible for additional benefits. In that case, these former beneficia-
ries would have been contacted, asked to contact the UI program if 
they still were unemployed, received a benefit redetermination, and 
returned to the UI program. 
On the other hand, when a state triggered off EB or triggered 
down to a lesser number of EUC tiers, beneficiaries could be imme-
diately affected. Once the trigger change occurred, beneficiaries who 
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had received more than the new maximum number of weeks were 
immediately cut off from the program. 
Despite the fact that redeterminations occurred and individuals 
counted as “final” final exhaustees could return to the UI program— 
and be counted again as an exhaustee if they used all of their new 
entitlement to benefits—the above measure of “final” final payments 
is a reasonable approximation of the outflow of beneficiaries from the 
UI program, who were more likely to apply for SNAP at or after the 
time of their exiting the UI program, when they had lost UI benefits 
as a form of income support. 
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
Employment and reemployment services are needed by many UI 
beneficiaries to help them find employment before they exhaust all of 
their UI benefits. As permanently displaced workers, UI beneficiaries 
often have been employed at one job for a long time, so they tend 
to be unfamiliar with how to effectively search for work. Displaced 
workers are also likely to suffer large wage losses when they become 
reemployed (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993). Research has 
shown that comprehensive, staff-assisted reemployment services 
hasten their return to work. The key components of reemployment 
services are assessment, counseling, job matching and referral to job 
openings, job development, provision of labor market information, 
job clubs, and job search workshops. Job search workshops are effec-
tive if unemployed workers learn how to develop résumés, search for 
work using formal and informal search methods, and practice how 
to effectively participate in job interviews. Job search assistance is 
an employment service that trains workers, providing them with the 
skills to seek and obtain jobs. One review of publicly funded train-
ing found that reemployment services are the most effective form of 
short-term training (LaLonde 1995). 
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Most reemployment services are provided by the Employment 
Service, which routinely provides reemployment services to UI claim-
ants. The budget for the Employment Service has remained stagnant 
for many years and had declined in real terms to half of what it was 
in the mid-1980s. In addition, Reemployment Service Grants, which 
supplemented the Employment Service budget, were provided in the 
early 2000s but then lapsed. The American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 provided $400 million for reemployment services, 
of which $250 million went to Reemployment Services Grants and 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments, while $150 million went 
to the provision of other services by the Employment Service. This 
added funding was made available because of the great increase in the 
number of unemployed workers who needed assistance finding jobs 
during the Great Recession. As a result, many more displaced work-
ers were served during the second half of 2009 and through 2010, 
by which time the funds were exhausted. Those funds have not been 
replaced. 
GETTING READY FOR THE NEXT RECESSION 
The flow of UI recipients into SNAP is likely to be limited in 
the immediate future, but it could increase greatly during the next 
recession. 
Current state UI policy has an important bearing on how much 
UI funding will be available during the next recession. Low UI tax 
rates and low taxable wage bases make it less likely that states will 
have enough funds in their unemployment trust fund accounts to fully 
fund regular UI benefits or the state portion of EB. Inadequate fund-
ing would encourage states to reduce benefit payments, which can 
be accomplished by making it harder for potential beneficiaries to 
initially qualify for benefits. This can be done by holding down maxi-
mum weekly benefit levels and maximum potential durations of ben-
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efits. Seven states already reduced maximum potential durations in 
2011–2012, and similar pressure could lead to a repeat effort to hold 
down benefits, especially if states’ trust fund accounts again become 
insolvent. 
What things could be altered in the UI program that would reduce 
or delay the flow of UI recipients into SNAP during the next reces-
sion? Here is a list: 
State Benefit Financing 
• Higher taxable wage base 
• More responsive tax schedule 
State Benefit Payments 
• Less restrictive qualifications for benefits 
• Fewer disqualifications after initial benefit receipt 
• Higher maximum benefits 
• Maximum potential regular UI durations of 26 weeks or more 
• Uniform potential duration 
• Enacting or improving short-time compensation programs 
Federal Policy 
• Enactment of an indexed, higher UI-taxable wage base 
• Enactment of standards for regular UI eligibility, duration, 
and benefit levels 
• Prompt enactment of new EUC programs early in recessions 
• EUC durations that are appropriate to the severity of the 
recession 
• Increased funding for reemployment services grants 
• Improving funding of the Employment Service 
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Notes 
The opinions expressed herein are solely the authors’ and should not be attrib-
uted to the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or the Urban 
Institute. 
1. Since available administrative data end in August 2011, we can exam-
ine SNAP-UI involvement two years after UI application and one year 
before. 
2. The effective dates for the reductions in regular benefits were as follows: 
Florida, January 1, 2012; Georgia, July 1, 2012; Michigan, January 15, 
2012; and Missouri, April 17, 2011. Maximum potential eligibility in 
Florida and Georgia vary with the state unemployment rate (Robert 
Johnston of the Office of Unemployment Insurance, telephone conver-
sation with the author, March 30, 2015). 
3. Munts (1970) and Decker (1997) describe the workings of state UI par-
tial benefit systems. McCall (1996) estimates the effects of differing 
state rules on unemployment durations. 
4. Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 paid benefits to 
exhaustees of regular state UI with benefit years ending on or after May 
1, 2007. 
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Chapter 3 
The Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program 
Michael Wiseman 
George Washington University 
Transformation of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) into a near-
universal system of food-oriented income support, renamed (in 2008) 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), is arguably 
the most significant development in American social policy during 
the first decade of the new millennium. Three things were the primary 
drivers of the change: 1) contraction of traditional welfare assistance 
following the 1996 transformation of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), 2) progressive relaxation of federal eligibility requirements 
for food stamp receipt beginning in 2000, and 3) the demand for assis-
tance generated by the Great Recession of 2007–2009. 
A few statistics help illuminate the scale of the FSP to SNAP
evolution and concomitant reconfiguration of the nation’s safety net: 
In an average month of federal Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the FSP served 
about 6 percent of the U.S. population and 12 percent of all children. 
The annual cost (in 2016 dollars) was $23.2 billion, or 0.2 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP). By FY 2014, five years after the 
nominal end of the recession, 15 percent of the population and 28 
percent of children were participating in SNAP, and the annual cost 
had increased to over 0.4 percent of GDP. In contrast, during the same 
period, receipt of TANF cash benefits declined by 38 percent (despite 
population growth of 13 percent), and real state and federal TANF 
outlays for income support were down 43 percent (despite overall 
government outlay growth of 92 percent).1 
The use of supplemental in the new name for food stamps is 
important: the program is at least nominally intended to add to some-
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94 Wiseman 
thing else, not to serve alone as help of last resort. Thus, assessment 
and evaluation of SNAP as social assistance must include interaction 
with other income support programs, including unemployment insur-
ance (UI). The evolution of SNAP and the consequences for interac-
tion with UI are the subject of this chapter. The trajectory of SNAP
development has varied across states because of differences in state 
administrative strategies, exercise of various options, and economic 
circumstances. The preceding chapter on UI and this one on SNAP
set the stage, from a largely national perspective, for a more in-depth 
look at state projects in the remainder of the book. The chapters at the 
heart of the book provide detail on the interaction in the six states— 
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas—that are 
the focus of the underlying project. 
The base camp for this expedition is SNAP as it existed at the 
beginning of FY2009—10 months into the recession that began 
nationwide in December 2007 and three months after the first emer-
gency extension of unemployment compensation.2 The first section 
following this introduction provides an overview of the evolution 
in food stamp policy up to the FY2009 reference point. The second 
section details the system this history produced. The third section 
reviews the SNAP policy response to the recession and summarizes 
important subsequent developments. The fourth section looks at the 
consequences of the interaction of recession and policy for the SNAP
caseload. This section provides more detailed data on the overlap 
between UI and SNAP receipt, which is described briefly in Chapter 
1. The fifth section concludes with a preview of issues to be addressed 
in the literature review in Chapter 4, the subsequent state-specific 
chapters, and in the book’s final chapter. 
BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO 2009 
A bit of history is useful for understanding the state of SNAP in 
the midst of the recession and the role the program was to play as the 
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recession unfolded. As with any social assistance program, there are 
myriad details. What is important to this chapter and to this book is 
the evolution of the nature of the FSP-SNAP benefit, the eligibility 
standards for its receipt, and the roles of federal, state, and local gov-
ernment in its delivery. These dimensions all affect the complemen-
tarity of SNAP and UI. 
The First Food Stamp Program 
The program that was to become SNAP originated in the 1930s 
with efforts to support farm prices by federal purchase of excess 
commodities, followed by distribution to families in need.3 The com-
modities distribution program, administered by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) through the Federal Surplus Commodities 
Corporation (FSCC), was intended to increase farmer incomes. The 
FSCC determined what to purchase, and states distributed the pur-
chased goods to persons and administering institutions based on vari-
ous criteria. Although dealing with agricultural surplus by distribution 
to the needy was widely applauded, distribution of commodities out-
side the established commercial food retail network proved unwieldy 
and unpopular, particularly among food retailers. In response, a new 
system was devised to support distribution through the normal retail 
network and implemented as a pilot program in 1939 in Rochester, 
New York. 
Instead of commodities, participants in the new program gained 
the opportunity to buy vouchers for food purchases that were accepted 
as cash in grocery stores. The vouchers were formatted as stamps and 
came in two colors, orange and blue. Participants generally qualified 
by receiving some form of public assistance (including participation 
in Works Progress Administration employment), but some individu-
als and families not “on relief” also were certified for the benefit. 
Those deemed eligible were required to buy orange stamps with a 
total value equal to an estimate of “normal food purchases” for their 
household income and size—the rule of thumb was $1 per person 
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per week (Coppock 1947). Orange stamps cost recipients their face 
value. The benefit was that each allotment of orange stamps came 
with free blue stamps, generally having total face value equal to half 
the mandatory orange-stamp purchase. The blue stamps could be used 
on any commodity declared to be surplus in a monthly list published 
by the USDA. The lists were elaborate.4 The ingenious stamp format 
provided for fractional usage ($0.25) by stamp tear-off, and for gro-
cer reimbursement through submission to the managing government 
agency of cards affixed with stamps received. 
While widely lauded, the original Food Stamp Program was 
never specifically authorized by Congress. It existed as an administra-
tive response to the congressional mandate for finding use for surplus 
commodities. Once initiated, local government participation grew 
steadily, so that by early 1942, just three years after the pilot program, 
almost half of all counties in the country were reported to have a Food 
Stamp Program, and 60 percent of the U.S. population resided in cov-
ered areas (Coppock 1947). However, as the program expanded, so 
did the surrounding controversy. Pressures developed to add products 
to the surplus list, inconsistencies in administration and standards 
developed across states, fraud and abuse reports multiplied, questions 
arose about the actual impact on consumption, and participation in 
some adopting counties fell suspiciously below previous levels of 
surplus commodity use—suggesting that the purchase requirement 
created a barrier to access not present in direct commodity distribu-
tion. The program ended in March 1943 “since the conditions that 
brought the program into being—unmarketable food surpluses and 
widespread unemployment—no longer existed” (USDA 2014b, p. 1). 
Several features of the first Food Stamp Program are usefully 
highlighted as points of reference in considering subsequent program 
changes. 
First, the design focus was on promoting consumption of target 
commodities—“moving surplus commodities with special purpose 
money,” in the words of one administrator (Coppock 1947). This 
aspect was underscored by program operation through the USDA’s 
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Surplus Marketing Administration (SMA) rather than as part of the 
new welfare-oriented Federal Security Agency (which, like the Food 
Stamp Program, began in 1939). The required orange-stamp purchase 
was determined by a prediction of consumption in the absence of 
the subsidy, not by an estimate of need—the object was to push con-
sumption beyond the amount predicted. Since expected normal con-
sumption rose with income, in some instances better-off participants 
received more blue stamps than did those with lower incomes. Thus, 
from the beginning, Food Stamp Program benefits have been based 
on a prediction of income. 
Second, the orange-stamp purchase requirement meant that the 
program’s horizon, the time period to be covered by normal outlays, 
was of necessity brief. One could not ask families on relief to pre-
pay a year’s worth of consumption. The short horizon was consis-
tent with general relief practice for nonelderly individuals and their 
dependents. In principle, a short horizon also allowed rapid response 
to changes in people’s circumstances. 
Third, the actual impact of the program on consumption of tar-
get commodities and on food consumption generally was ambigu-
ous—depending in part on the amount of the required orange-stamp 
purchase and in part on the range of commodities on the blue-stamp 
list. It was possible for families to use the blue-stamp bonus to pay 
for some proportion of normal consumption of the surplus commodi-
ties, and to use the money released for other purposes—in most cases 
effectively rendering the orange/blue distinction meaningless. This 
uncertainty about the effect of food stamp programs on the behavior 
of recipients is a continuing theme of food stamp policy discussions 
(Hoynes, McGranahan, and Schanzenbach 2016). 
Fourth, location of the program in an agency of the USDA and 
the program’s association—however tenuous—with farm incomes 
would have lasting consequences for the political viability and resil-
ience of the program from 1939 to the present. 
A fifth and final point is that the food stamp system relied on state 
and local government for certification of eligibility and operations 
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management. The Surplus Marketing Administration never had more 
than 1,000 employees for a program that was, by early 1942, serving 
almost 5.5 million people (Coppock 1947). Combined with subdi-
vision of the SMA operation itself into four regions, the result was 
considerable variation at ground level in access, operational details, 
and management quality. While public support for food stamps as a 
relief effort was strong, the program placed considerable burden and 
temptation on state and local government. The burden was adminis-
tration, including the financial operations of selling and redeeming 
the stamps. The temptation was curtailment of other benefits, given 
that recipient families received surplus commodities. Among other 
things, substitution of food stamps for other relief led the SMA to 
establish an income floor for food stamp participation to constrain 
such efforts. Thus, from the beginning, predicting the consequence 
of food stamp policy has involved two mediating behaviors: The first 
is the choices made by state and local governments in creating the 
program as it is operated on the ground. The second is the response 
of potential recipients to the program as presented by their state and 
local governments. 
Food Stamps and the Great Society 
The Depression-era Food Stamp Program may have ceased oper-
ation in 1943, but it was not forgotten. The structure of the original 
program, as well as the problems encountered in its implementation, 
clearly influenced the shape of subsequent proposals. Restoration 
efforts began in earnest in the early 1950s, in response both to the 
reappearance of commodity surpluses and to the recession of 1953– 
1954. These efforts culminated in 1959 with congressional authoriza-
tion of a two-year trial of a new food stamp program to “promote the 
general welfare, raise the levels of health and of nourishment for per-
sons whose incomes prevent them from enjoying adequate diets, and 
dispose in a beneficial manner of [surplus] food commodities.”5 This 
citation of purpose is interesting in the primacy it attached to nutrition 
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and its relegation of disposal of surplus commodities to third priority. 
Reference to “incomes” and “persons” in the authorization provided 
opportunity for stand-alone eligibility determination independent of 
relief status. 
The Eisenhower administration did not pursue the opportunity for 
food stamp resurrection afforded by Congress. But less than two years 
later, on the day after his 1961 inauguration, President John F. Ken-
nedy issued an executive order initiating pilot food stamp projects. 
And through a determined effort by Kennedy’s successor, President 
Lyndon Johnson, the resurrection effort came to fruition in the Food 
Stamp Act of 1964.6 While nominally in the lineage of the 1939–1943 
experiment, the 1964 program—as part of Johnson’s “War on Pov-
erty”—was, in important ways, quite different. Instead of orange and 
blue stamps, the new program used a special script issued in vari-
ous “coupon” denominations. As with the orange stamps, participants 
were required to purchase a quantity of the coupons, but unlike in the 
original program, the purchase price was less than the face value of 
the coupons. The system thus delivered its benefit by making food 
cheaper. In the new program, the required coupon purchase was based 
not on estimates of “normal” outlays but on a minimal (“thrifty”) food 
budget established by the USDA that varied by family size. The price 
charged was determined by applicant income: higher-income house-
holds paid a larger proportion of the price of their purchase require-
ment; very-low-income households got the full allotment. The cou-
pons could be used for virtually any unprepared food, not just surplus 
commodities. 
The new law identified the FSP as a joint federal, state, and local 
operation, with the federal government paying a portion of adminis-
trative costs and all the benefit cost; the USDA remained at the helm of 
federal administration. Governments were given the option of operat-
ing either a commodities distribution program or food stamps within 
counties, but not both. State and local governments retained authority 
over eligibility requirements, “consistent with income standards used 
by [the] State [administering] agency in administration of its federally 
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aided public assistance programs” (Sec. 5[b]). “Such standards,” the 
law continued, “also shall place a limitation on the resources to be 
allowed eligible households.”7 The most important such “federally 
aided public assistance program” at the time was AFDC. Thus, while 
the new law extended the FSP’s benefits to families not receiving 
other assistance, it continued a link to eligibility standards used for 
AFDC. The food stamp law also followed the AFDC administrative 
model: states were required as a condition of participation to submit 
for approval by the USDA a plan for FSP operation that, among other 
things, set out eligibility standards in detail. 
Nixon’s Other Good Deed 
Implementation of the Food Stamp Act revealed many prob-
lems with the new law. President Nixon proposed various corrective 
actions in a message to Congress (Nixon 1969). The eventual outcome 
was a series of amendments passed in 1971.8 Among other things, 
the amendments gave the secretary of agriculture, “in consultation 
with the Secretary of HEW” (the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, now Health and Human Services), authority to estab-
lish uniform national resource and income eligibility standards for 
FSP recipients. The amendments also added a mild work test: “able-
bodied adult persons” without caregiving responsibilities and not in 
school or training were required to register for work at a federal or 
state employment office as a condition of FSP participation, and turn-
ing down a suitable job offer was made grounds for benefit exclusion. 
Considering FSP history and the ultimate consequences the changes 
would have, the structural changes signaled by the new rules were 
very significant. The Congressional Budget Office would later declare 
that “with the 1971 modifications, the Food Stamp Program became 
the first universal, national welfare program with national eligibility 
standards based on need and not particular household characteristics” 
(Hoagland 1977, p. 7). However, this development was largely missed 
by most contemporary observers because of another, more dramatic 
initiative, the Family Assistance Program (FAP). 
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The requirement that national standards for the FSP be set by 
the USDA in consultation with HEW reflected President Nixon’s 
intention, expressed in his initial proposal, to ensure “that the Food 
Stamp Program is complementary to a revised welfare program.” 
That “revised program” turned out to be FAP, first proposed in August 
1969. Over the subsequent two-and-a-half years, FAP went through 
various versions and protracted and contentious debate in two Con-
gresses. Ultimately, it failed. The core of the proposal was a simple 
“negative tax” transfer scheme, which provided a basic income ben-
efit that declined as household income increased. The benefit for a 
family of four with no other income was $1,600 per year. After a 
$600 allowance for work expenses, the payment declined by $0.50 
for every dollar of earnings beyond the $600. The “benefit reduc-
tion rate” was thus 0.5. The Family Assistance Program was intended 
to replace AFDC and possibly other means-tested benefits as well, 
although provision was made for states with higher AFDC benefits to 
supplement the FAP payment. The FAP benefit reduction rate was set 
lower than the benefit reduction rate applied in AFDC to reduce the 
work disincentives that such schemes were presumed to create. 
FAP’s critics focused on various features, including incentive 
problems in states with AFDC benefits higher than the FAP standard. 
A common liberal criticism was that the basic “guarantee” in the pro-
gram, the size of the grant for households with no other income, was 
too low—just $1,600 ($9,891 in 2016 dollars) a year for a family of 
four.9 While the base was indeed modest, the reduction of the benefit 
as earned income increased was scaled so that support was extended 
to working families with earnings as high as $3,800 ($23,491 in 2016 
dollars). Many of these families were ineligible for AFDC in some 
states because they included both parents and neither was disabled. In 
states that did provide aid to two-parent families, eligibility was lost 
if the “principal earner” was employed for more than 100 hours per 
month, regardless of income. 
FAP’s planners faced the classic problem with negative tax sys-
tems: if the benefit reduction rate was less than 100 percent (i.e., dol-
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lar for dollar), an increase in the basic benefit of a dollar moved the 
maximum income consistent with receiving benefits—the break-even 
point—up by more than a dollar. This increased the number of eli-
gible families. Thus, given the shape of the income distribution, the 
consequence for programs like FAP was that the effect of increasing 
the base benefit on costs and participation could be offset only by rais-
ing the benefit reduction rate (thus keeping the break-even the same, 
or even lowering it) and, in the process, presumably reducing work 
incentives. Compared to FAP, the food stamp reform had the politi-
cally advantageous element of stealth: it was never claimed that the 
program’s maximum benefit would meet all basic needs. Neverthe-
less, because of a low benefit-reduction rate, food stamps provided 
support for low-income working families—and reached beyond FAP
in providing benefits to households without children. Yet stamps 
could be promoted as aiding agriculture, without the political taint of 
being termed a “guaranteed income.” Thus, while between 1969 and 
1971 public attention may have focused on FAP, in the background 
the Nixon administration and its congressional allies laid the founda-
tion for the “universal, national welfare program” that 36 years later 
would become a key element in the nation’s response to the Great 
Recession. 
The Big Cash-Out Step, and Beyond 
Change continued. In 1973, Congress took another step in the 
direction of a universal benefit by requiring that food stamps be offered 
in all counties across the country by the following year. Structurally, 
the most important additional development in the 1970s occurred 
when the Food Stamp Act of 1977 eliminated the purchase require-
ment. After final implementation in 1979 of this “cash-out,” the Food 
Stamp benefit was delivered in coupons calculated based on house-
hold composition and income net of deductions. If 30 percent of the 
household income net of deductions was less than the Thrifty Food 
Plan, the difference was made up in a monthly coupon allocation. 
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The cash-out continued the gradual shift in FSP operation from 
targeting food consumption to more general income support. Food 
coupons could now be more readily substituted for food purchases 
that would have been made with cash, thereby releasing cash for other 
purposes. As McDonald (1977) points out in his landmark book Food, 
Stamps, and Income Maintenance, the cash-out change made food 
stamps look even more like the negative income tax (NIT) transfer 
program proposed by economist Milton Friedman. The NIT concept 
had been tested experimentally in various locations and was incor-
porated into the FAP proposal. But the differences were important. 
Unlike the Friedman proposal, the FSP was not a substitute for other 
means-tested benefits, nor was it ever integrated with the income tax 
code, and the horizon for eligibility assessment and benefit determi-
nation was a month, not a year. 
FSP participation increased rapidly following implementa-
tion of the 1977 reforms. As has happened frequently over the life 
of the program, Congress responded to the increase in participation 
with restrictions. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
restricted FSP eligibility to households with gross income of less 
than 130 percent of the applicable poverty guideline,10 regardless of 
deductions from income allowed by other parts of program law. The 
following year’s budget act added a second test that denied benefits 
to families with incomes that, after deductions, were greater than the 
applicable poverty guideline. Both these “gross” and “net” income 
restrictions served to curtail eligibility among families with earnings, 
since deductions principally apply to work expenses. 
Once again, the moves to FSP restriction were soon followed 
by liberalization. The Food Security Act of 1985 facilitated access 
to food stamps for households receiving cash assistance from AFDC 
or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) by establishing “categorical” 
FSP eligibility. Categorical eligibility meant that these households 
(and later, beneficiaries of state general assistance programs) were 
subject only to asset and income tests used for these programs—not 
to the sometimes more stringent food stamp requirements, including 
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the gross and net income limits. Expansion of categorical eligibility 
would eventually become an important factor in the growth of food 
stamp receipt in response to the Great Recession. 
A notable change began in 1988, with authorization of experimen-
tation with electronic benefit transfer (EBT) systems for FSP benefit 
delivery. This EBT innovation would ultimately lead to cessation of 
coupon use and a reduction in the social stigma that could result from 
people in line observing others paying with food stamps instead of 
their own money. The first year of the Clinton administration (1993) 
saw further adjustments in income deductions for benefit calculation 
and an increase in allowed “fair market values” for vehicles, both of 
which presumably facilitated access. 
Welfare Reform 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 (PRWORA) is known for replacing the AFDC pro-
gram with TANF (Haskins 2006). PRWORA also moved FSP policy 
in a more restrictive direction by tightening food stamp access in 
various ways, including elimination of assistance to most legal immi-
grants—a policy move that was substantially reversed by amend-
ments in 1997 and 1998. Two features of PRWORA would prove to 
be particularly significant for SNAP response to the Great Recession. 
One was a change in eligibility requirements for able-bodied adults 
without dependents (ABAWDs). The other, somewhat oddly, was an 
alteration in the federal-state fiscal relationship for financing cash 
assistance. 
Whereas prior law required only that unemployed ABAWDs reg-
ister for work and accept suitable job offers, PRWORA placed a time 
limit of 3 months of FSP eligibility out of every 36 months for those 
not employed for 20 hours or more per week or engaged in training. 
States could request a waiver of this requirement for ABAWDs liv-
ing in areas of high unemployment or job shortage. What counted as 
“high unemployment” or an insufficient number of jobs was deter-
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mined by regulation; one standard subsequently adopted by the Bush 
administration in 2001 for statewide waivers was that the state’s 
unemployment rate meet the criteria necessary to qualify for an addi-
tional 13 weeks of extended UI benefits (Bolen and Dean 2018). This 
was the first administrative connection made between the UI and 
SNAP systems. 
The ABAWD time limit poses a serious challenge for state pro-
gram agencies. Basic SNAP administration in 1996 was (and contin-
ues to be) month oriented. A person, ABAWD or not, is eligible for 
SNAP if income predicted for the coming month is below eligibility 
standards and if other requirements for current status are met. The 
PRWORA work requirement requires longitudinal data on recipi-
ents—it is no longer sufficient to know current status to determine 
eligibility; the examiner must have access to benefit history as well. 
Without careful programming, such data are beyond the capacity of 
most state food-stamp management systems. The result is consider-
able concern over the consequences of the rule for state error rates 
and, possibly, reluctance on the part of agency staff to pursue food 
stamp outreach to potential ABAWD recipients. 
The fiscal link created by PRWORA between TANF and FSP was 
most likely not intended by PRWORA’s authors. Understanding the 
link requires more detail on what PRWORA did to federal financing 
for state family assistance. AFDC was funded with a matching grant 
for state expenditures to provide cash assistance to needy families. 
The matching rate varied by per-capita state personal income. But 
for all states, at least half of all costs were covered by the federal 
government with an open-ended commitment because AFDC, as 
defined by approved state administration plans, was an entitlement: 
all eligible (according to the plan) families were guaranteed the ben-
efit. In contrast, TANF is funded by a fixed block grant and a state 
spending requirement (“maintenance of effort,” or MOE) based on 
nominal outlays in the years immediately prior to 1996. Compared 
to the former law, the new law raised the cost to states of adding 
families to the assistance rolls or providing more cash, and corre-
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spondingly increased the savings from keeping them off the rolls or 
lowering benefits. 
PRWORA did more than just raise the marginal cost to states of 
providing cash assistance. The new law expanded the uses to which 
federal TANF money and the required state MOE outlays could be 
put. Instead of being restricted generally to cash assistance, as had 
been the case under AFDC, TANF funds could now be used for 
any effort “reasonably calculated” to serve TANF’s four purposes: 
1) giving aid to families with children, 2) ending reliance on public 
assistance, 3) reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and 4) promot-
ing “the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.” These 
goals can cover a lot of government services—things like child-care 
assistance, child protective services, even marital counseling—that 
do not involve cash assistance at all. Given the wording of the law, it 
would appear that virtually any of the activities paid for with TANF 
funds and reasonably calculated to serve these purposes might create 
categorical eligibility for food stamps. If such TANF-funded services 
did not include an assets test for eligibility, or included one that was 
more lenient, then the conveyed categorical eligibility meant that the 
federal assets tests for the FSP were superseded. 
In response to state inquiry, the USDA issued regulations in 2000 
that confirmed potential categorical FSP eligibility for recipients 
of noncash services funded completely or substantially with TANF 
funds.11 In what amounted to a reversal of the trend toward federal-
ization of FSP eligibility requirements, PRWORA was interpreted as 
providing a great deal of latitude for state policy in determining who 
could receive food stamp benefits. TANF and general relief recipients 
retained the “traditional” categorical eligibility established in 1985. 
Beyond this, states could, under the new regulations, expand cate-
gorical eligibility through certain types of targeted programs, such as 
TANF-funded child care or counseling. This came to be called “nar-
row” expanded categorical eligibility (ECE). But the new regulations 
also allowed states essentially to extend categorical eligibility to any 
low-income household by delivering to some household members a 
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nominal service funded by TANF that served TANF objectives. The 
only significant constraint was that, if the service was directed at 
either reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancy or promoting two-parent 
families, categorical eligibility required that household gross income 
be less than 200 percent of the applicable poverty standard, although 
states could adopt more restrictive standards. The upshot was that 
even receipt of a brochure funded by TANF could establish categori-
cal eligibility and obviate FSP asset restrictions. States following this 
strategy are said to have established “broad-based categorical eligibil-
ity” (BBCE). 
In response to the USDA regulation, the number of states adopt-
ing some form of ECE grew rapidly, and the USDA’s Food and Nutri-
tion Service (FNS) struggled to keep up. The agency began regular 
publication of “State Options” reports tabulating state choices; how-
ever, detailing and categorizing proved difficult.12 For example, in 
its first report, a status report in April 2002, the FNS (USDA 2002) 
announced that 45 states had ECE, but it provided little informa-
tion about how such eligibility was conferred or its consequences 
for access. Over time, the agency has worked to improve accuracy 
and tighten definitions, eventually introducing in its ninth report 
(covering state policy choices as of November 2010) the distinction 
between “narrow” and “broad-based” ECE (USDA 2010). Obtaining 
reliable information on state procedures has complicated research on 
the effects of state policy choice. 
In 2000, Congress complemented the increase in state options 
for FSP eligibility created by PRWORA by allowing states to sub-
stitute the vehicle-value maximum applied in their TANF program 
for the federal standard, if the TANF standard was higher. The Farm 
Bill of 2002 continued expansion of access, and it made computation 
of net income for benefit assessment more generous by linking the 
base deductions to household size and by altering treatment of utility 
costs. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 rebranded 
FSP as SNAP, completed the elimination of coupons, and indexed the 
deductions. The combination of these tweaks and changes by states 
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continued movement of the program in the direction of a negative 
tax system, but the significant differences from the way such a sys-
tem was envisioned in the 1960s endured. The program retained a 
short (one-month) horizon for assessing income, and there was no 
integration of food stamp benefits with taxes, including the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). These differences and their consequences 
for interaction with UI become clearer when one looks more closely 
at SNAP operations. 
FOOD STAMPS IN 2009 
We are now at the 2009 base camp for studying the interaction of 
SNAP, UI, and the Great Recession. The description that follows cen-
ters on the state of SNAP in late calendar year 2008—the first quarter 
(Q1) of FY2009. Where age is relevant, the discussion focuses on 
households with at least one adult beneficiary aged 18 to 59; aged 60 
and older in Food Stamp regulations defines the elderly. The 18-to-
59 age group is closely aligned with analysis in the state chapters 
that follow in this book, although generally the state work extends to 
households with adults aged 60 to 64. 
Eligibility 
SNAP access begins with eligibility determination. Eligibility is 
determined on what is termed for the rest of this chapter a “unit” 
basis. By convention, SNAP units are called households, but this can 
be misleading when used in conjunction with the census and other 
sources that define households differently. In Census Bureau publica-
tions, for example, household refers to all persons living in a dwelling 
unit.13 Rather than looking only to common residence, the SNAP defi-
nition also looks at the pantry and stove, referring to groups of “indi-
viduals who share a residential unit and customarily purchase and 
prepare food together” (Gray 2014, p. 3). It is therefore possible for 
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a census household to include multiple SNAP units, although related 
persons are generally required to be considered one unit. 
Access to SNAP is virtually universal, excluding only certain 
felons, workers on strike, institutionalized individuals, some stu-
dents, undocumented immigrants, nonimmigrant visitors, and some 
noncitizens lawfully residing in the country as permanent residents 
(Gray 2014, p. 7). Among felons, Congress specifically excludes those 
“fleeing,” should they apply while on the lam. SNAP applications 
identify a head of household, who generally is also a member of the 
unit receiving benefits (exceptions are, in most cases, undocumented 
immigrants) (p. 31). 
Once the constitution of the unit is established, SNAP units are 
subject to assets and income tests before the benefit is computed. 
In the absence of overriding state policies (as will be detailed later, 
this is an important proviso), in FY2009, applicant units could have 
countable assets of no more than $2,000 (or $3,000 if at least one unit 
member is elderly or disabled) (Leftin, Gothro, and Eslami 2010). The 
core federal income tests refer to the gross and net income standards 
established in 1981–1982. Gross income is required to be less than 
130 percent of a variant of the federal poverty standard; net income 
cannot exceed 100 percent of the standard. The official poverty stan-
dard is based on annual income for a calendar year and is defined for 
families—“a householder and one or more people living in the same 
household who are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or 
adoption” (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). The administrative standard 
used for SNAP eligibility (the federal poverty guideline) over a fiscal 
year is based on a simplified estimate of the official poverty standard, 
translated into a monthly equivalent, for the preceding (and overlap-
ping) calendar year. 
Net income is gross income minus certain deductions. These 
include a standard fixed deduction that varies by household size, 
an earned income deduction of 20 percent, and deductions for cer-
tain costs related to medical care, child support, dependent care, and 
“excess shelter cost”—that is, rent or mortgage payments in excess 
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of half of net income before the housing-cost deduction is allowed 
(Leftin, Gothro, and Eslami 2010). The housing-expense deduction is 
capped for most households. For a recipient household of three with 
neither elderly nor disabled members, for example, the maximum 
excess housing-cost deduction in FY2009 was $446. 
The description of assets tests presented above is conditional 
on the “absence of overriding state policies.” As already discussed, 
beginning in 2000, overriding the statutory SNAP eligibility require-
ments gradually became near-universal state policy. By the end of 
FY2008, all states had eliminated or reduced restrictions on the 
value of vehicles. State adoption of some form of expanded categori-
cal eligibility is plotted in Figure 3.1. Initially, most states moved 
cautiously, extending categorical eligibility to households receiving 
certain specific benefits such as child-care assistance—this is “nar-
row” ECE. But, as the graph indicates, over the following years, most 
switched to BBCE.14 
Figure 3.1  Number of States with Expanded Categorical SNAP
Eligibility, by Type, 2001–2017 
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By FNS count, 40 states had some form of ECE in June 2009, 
including all six project states. Five more were added by the end of the 
fiscal year. Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, and Texas had established 
BBCE earlier than 2009. Florida implemented BBCE in July 2010, 
and Missouri offered only narrow ECE, based on receipt of child care, 
transportation, and other work-related program support (Trippe and 
Gillooly 2010, Appendix A). The point here is that Figure 3.1 may be 
somewhat misleading as to the timing of impact of state changes in 
access to SNAP, and that many of the states that were not counted as 
meeting the full BBCE standard of general relaxation or elimination 
of assets and income caps as of the first quarter of FY2009 may have 
been moving in that direction. On the other hand, some web-based 
federal information sources continued to cite assets restrictions even 
when they were circumvented by ECE artifice (Heflin, Mueser, and 
Cronin 2015). 
Benefits and the “Transfer Cross” 
Regardless of the route by which eligibility is achieved, the 
SNAP benefit is calculated using net income as defined by the pro-
gram. Ignoring for the moment deductions other than the fixed deduc-
tion applied to all, the SNAP benefit is computed as follows: First, the 
unit’s maximum benefit is determined based on its composition. The 
schedule of benefits for each fiscal year is based on a Thrifty Food 
Plan (TFP) budget developed by the USDA and published in June 
of the preceding year. The benefit is adjusted for inflation each year, 
using an index of change in the cost of TFP components. In 2009, 
the basic FSP benefit for a family of three was $463; for a family of 
four, $588. Second, net income is calculated. The unit’s payment is 
the difference between the maximum benefit and 30 percent of its 
net income. Thus, when income goes up, benefits go down, and vice 
versa. For the special case of a household with income only from 
earnings, the effective benefit reduction rate is $0.24 for each $1.00 of 
gross earnings beyond the fixed standard deduction ($144 in FY2009 
otal Income with Earnings 
Gross Own Income Limit 
Monthly Gross Own Income 
(Earnings) before Benefit 
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for a family of one to three). The reduction rate comes about through 
the interaction of the 20 percent work expense deduction and the 30 
percent of net income expenditure requirement: an additional $1.00 
of gross earnings leads to an increase of $0.80 in net income and an 
increase in expected food expenditures from the unit’s own income of 
0.3 × $0.80 = $0.24. The corresponding reduction in SNAP benefit is 
$0.24 (i.e., the benefit deduction per additional dollar earned). Other 
income is “taxed” (i.e., SNAP benefits are reduced) at $0.30 in SNAP
benefit-per-dollar amounts beyond the fixed standard deduction. UI 
benefits are “other income.” 
The benefit-income relationship is commonly summarized in a 
transfer cross diagram that relates total unit monthly income—own 
income plus the SNAP benefit—to the unit’s own income. Own here 
refers to income received by the household from sources other than 
SNAP. Figure 3.2 presents the SNAP transfer cross for a hypotheti-
Figure 3.2 SNAP Benefits and Income from Earnings, FY2009:1, 
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cal single-parent family with two children (called here the “reference 
family”) and no own income other than the parent’s earnings.15 The 
dashed line running from the lower-left-hand to the upper-right-
hand corner identifies points of equality between own income and 
total income (i.e., life without benefit). The distance between this 
equality line and total income is the benefit. Beyond the standard 
deduction ($144), benefits fall as earnings increase. In the single-
parent, two-child example shown, the maximum benefit is $463. Ben-
efits cease when gross monthly earnings reach $1,907 because of the 
gross income limit of 130 percent of the poverty line. For a family 
with two adults and two children, the maximum benefit is $588 and 
the overall schedule is higher. For a single individual, the maximum 
benefit is $176 and the overall schedule is lower. 
The vertical line with heavier dashes in the diagram identifies 
the level of gross earnings at which this household would, given the 
assumptions made about deductions and the absence of ECE, fail the 
gross-income eligibility test. This test—income must be less than 130 
percent of the federal poverty guideline—is, when applied, generally 
the binding constraint for households with earnings. The other test— 
net income must be less than the poverty guideline—is rarely binding 
for households with earnings because of work expense deductions. In 
the discussions that follow, the net income test generally appears only 
for households with income from sources other than earnings, includ-
ing UI. Households of one or two persons determined to be eligible 
for any benefit got at least a minimum allotment ($14 in FY2009); for 
the sake of simplicity, this is left off the graph. Oddly, no such floor is 
applied for larger households. 
Figure 3.2 is for income from earnings. As mentioned, income 
from other sources—notably, in the present context, UI—is treated 
slightly differently, because the 20 percent proportional allowance for 
work expenses does not apply. The result, illustrated in Figure 3.3, is 
a different benefit reduction rate and a different break-even point, but 
the form of the relationship between receipts and benefits remains 
much the same. The cutoff of benefits at income—$1,611 for the UI 
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Figure 3.3 SNAP Benefits and Own Income, FY2009:1, Reference 
Family with Income from Earnings versus Income from UI 
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SOURCE: Leftin et al. (2010). 
recipient household—results from application of the net income eli-
gibility test. 
The treatment of “unearned income” by SNAP is markedly dif-
ferent from that in other American transfer programs. In all state 
TANF programs, the marginal benefit reduction rate applied to UI is 
100 percent (in some, fixed deductions apply to small amounts). The 
same is true for Supplemental Security Income payments received 
by or on behalf of persons with disabilities and the elderly poor. And 
the EITC provides no benefit to UI recipients other than to partially 
offset the federal tax liability generated by earnings outside the period 
of unemployment. In contrast, SNAP supplements all cash benefits. 
Deductions Matter 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are abstract, and neither includes deductions 
beyond the 20 percent for work (in Figure 3.2) and the fixed standard 
deduction. In practice, the most common deduction is for “excess 
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shelter cost.” In FY2009, food stamp benefit calculation for 74 per-
cent of SNAP units with children and at least one adult aged 18 to 59 
included adjustment for excess shelter cost (Leftin et al. 2010). The 
excess shelter cost deduction (ESCD) works as follows: For benefit 
calculation, net income after all other deductions is reduced by the 
difference between a unit’s monthly rent/mortgage and half of that 
unit’s net income (Leftin, Gothro, and Eslami 2010). As a simplified 
example, if a unit has $1,000 in rental payments (including utilities) 
and $1,200 in monthly net income, its final net-income deduction 
would reflect an ESCD of $400 ($1,000 − [$1,200 ⸓ 2]). As already 
mentioned, the ESCD was capped at a maximum of $446 in FY2009. 
The cap is indexed to inflation and is not applied for units that include 
an elderly or disabled person. 
To see how this works, consider a specific case from the 2009 
SNAP quality control data for one of the project states, Michigan. The 
unit, called here “First Example Family,” includes two children and 
their mother. The mother works and earns $487 per month. Her rent 
is $483 (including utilities).16 She has no other income, and her net 
income (before the shelter deduction) is $246, calculated by subtract-
ing from $487 both her standard deduction ($144) and a 20 percent 
earnings deduction ($246 = $487 − $144 − [0.2 × $487]). Without 
allowance for excess housing costs, her SNAP benefit would be $389. 
However, her total housing plus utilities cost exceeds half her income 
by $360, before the housing deduction. Since this excess cost exceeds 
her net income, she receives the full food stamp benefit for a family 
of her size—$463. The maximum excess shelter-cost deduction appli-
cable to this example is $446, well above the First Example Fam-
ily’s $360 statutory excess housing expense. This example is charted 
in Figure 3.4 for a family with income only from earnings. At the 
mother’s reported earnings of $487 (marked in the graph), the SNAP
benefit is almost half of total income. 
Holding rent constant, should earnings increase beyond $487, 
eventually a level would be reached at which the shelter deduction no 
longer completely offsets net income. At this point, additional earn-
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Figure 3.4 SNAP Benefits, FY2009:1, with and without Shelter 
Deduction, Example Family 
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SOURCE: Calculated from parameters reported in Leftin et al. (2010) and sample 
data. 
ings reduce the food stamp benefit. The rate exceeds the simple case 
of $0.26 per dollar because additional earnings also reduce the extent 
to which housing costs are measured as “excess.” Indeed, every addi-
tional dollar of gross income reduces net income by $0.36. Eventu-
ally, earnings reach the point where the rent is no more than half of 
net income, and at this point the benefit reduction rate falls to $0.24. 
It is common for rents to absorb a sizable proportion of a SNAP
recipient’s family income. In such cases, the deduction may even 
continue up to the point where the unit fails the gross income test— 
that is, income from all sources exceeds 130 percent of the relevant 
poverty standard. We plot such a case, again from the 2009 quality-
control sample, in Figure 3.5. This “Second Example Family” is 
again a single adult/two children unit. But in this case, the household 
head reports gross earnings of $1,710 per month. Her rent is $767 per 
month, and as the unit head she is granted the $550 standard utility 
To
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
=
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
+
 b
en
ef
it 
($
) 
T
T
T tal i shelter deduction) 
T tal i no shelter deduction) 
Gross o i c e limit (GIL) 
onthl  g  own (earned) income 
Earnings, e  family 
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 
Total Income (with Shelter Deduction) 
otal Income (No Shelter Deduction) 
Gross Income Limit 
Monthly Gross Own (Earned) Income 
Second Example Family Earnings 
 
	 	 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 117 
Figure 3.5 The SNAP Transfer after BBCE Adoption, Second Example 
Family, FY2009:1 
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allowance for her state, bringing total shelter costs to $1,317. A shel-
ter cost of this magnitude would ensure the maximum SNAP benefit 
right up to the point where gross income equals 130 percent of the 
applicable poverty standard of $1,907, as depicted in Figure 3.5. 
The Effect of BBCE 
The excess shelter deduction example used for Figure 3.5 illus-
trates the public policy importance of state adoption of BBCE. With 
earnings of $1,710 and the assumed deductions other than the excess 
shelter cost deduction, this woman’s SNAP benefit would be $96. 
Addition of the excess shelter deduction raises the benefit to $230. 
Should the woman in this case increase her earnings to $1,906 (11.5 
percent), her shelter costs would still exceed half her income net of 
other deductions by more than the shelter deduction cap, so the ben-
efit falls by $0.24 per dollar of increased earnings, to $183. This is 
Total Income (with Shelter Deduction) 
otal Income (No Shelter Deduction) 
Gross Income Limit (Eliminated) 
Monthly Gross Own (Earned) Income 
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T
118 Wiseman 
where, without BBCE, the gross income test would bite. In principle, 
if the woman in this example increased income by one more dollar, 
to $1,907, she would lose her SNAP benefit in its entirety (i.e., a 100 
percent benefit reduction rate, known as the “cliff”), because $1,907 
is 130 percent of the poverty guideline for a family of three. 
BBCE changes this. Michigan was an early (2001) BBCE 
adopter, and this eliminated the net income test and raised the gross 
income test to 200 percent of the poverty guideline, or $2,933 per 
month in 2009.17 The SNAP recipient whose rent report was used for 
constructing Figure 3.5 would no longer face the cliff at $1,907 in 
monthly income should her earnings (or UI benefits) amount to more. 
Given her shelter costs, the post-BBCE transfer cross appears in Fig-
ure 3.6. Note the substantial increase in the range of earnings over 
which she is eligible for some benefit. The effect for UI is similar, but 
not as extreme. 
Figure 3.6 The SNAP Transfer after BBCE Adoption, Second Example 
Family, FY2009:1 
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The implication is that BBCE, the excess shelter allowance, and 
the standard utility allowance substantially increase the range of gross 
incomes consistent with SNAP eligibility, compared to what might be 
inferred from looking at the simple form of the system as illustrated 
by Figure 3.2 or common descriptions of the program (cf. Hoynes 
and Schanzenbach 2015). As noted, the same holds true qualitatively 
if income received is from UI. As has long been appreciated, a fam-
ily’s decision concerning the level of housing consumption is signifi-
cantly affected by long-term resources, not just current income. In 
a recession, families may find themselves in new income situations 
inadequate for sustaining their prerecession housing choices. Housing 
adjustment can be costly, however, and such costs multiply when the 
families affected are homeowners and the values of homes decline— 
a central feature of the Great Recession. It seems likely that in states 
like Michigan, which was an early adopter of BBCE, the excess shel-
ter cost deduction contributed to access to SNAP benefits by formerly 
middle-income families. 
State Motivation 
Much policy analysis is focused on the effect of transfer systems 
like SNAP on work incentives (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). 
This literature concerns the behavior of individuals given the avail-
ability of the system—whether they chose to take up benefits, and 
how the availability of such support affects decisions about labor 
supply, as well as other matters of social interest. In a federal sys-
tem, another behavioral response is also important in determining the 
ultimate effect of national policy. This is the response of state gov-
ernments in two areas: 1) choosing among options presented by the 
program’s design and 2) administering the system as defined by the 
options selected. 
The financing system for SNAP has particularly important impli-
cations for state strategy. The federal government pays for all ben-
efits, but states pay for approximately half of all administrative costs. 
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In consequence, there is little incentive to curtail receipt or to devote 
effort to improving precision in eligibility or benefit determination. 
The absence of such incentives is offset, of course, by a general sense 
of agency responsibility to taxpayers and by penalties generated by 
the federal auditing system. 
One consequence of the state contribution to administrative costs 
is heightened interest in methods for reducing such costs by simplify-
ing eligibility standards. Trends in reducing or eliminating restrictions 
on asset values, and in reducing frequency of income reassessment, 
undoubtedly reflect efforts to reduce barriers to SNAP access. At the 
same time, they also reflect state fiscal interests, because such changes 
reduce administrative costs and the risk of error in eligibility and ben-
efit determination. From an administrative standpoint alone, adoption 
of innovations like BBCE presents a strategic tradeoff. Such a change 
reduces administrative costs per case. But adoption of BBCE is likely 
to increase the caseload, thus raising administrative costs. Many other 
areas of SNAP policy embody similar strategic conflicts. 
Back to FAP 
As has been pointed out, the various versions of Figure 3.2 look 
very much like textbook diagrams of a “negative tax” transfer sys-
tem. The zero-income benefit, or guarantee, is set by the Thrifty Food 
Plan; and benefits decline with income until a “break-even” point is 
reached—just as the Nixon administration’s FAP intended. It is thus 
interesting to compare SNAP 2009 to FAP. Figure 3.7 replicates Fig-
ure 3.2 and adds a calculation of the FAP benefit schedule, as trans-
formed from annual to monthly terms and from 1970 to 2009 val-
ues. The comparison indicates that, while the base guarantee for FAP
was (in 2009 dollars) greater than the 2009 SNAP benefit, for three-
person families with earnings greater than roughly $995 per month 
the SNAP benefit is larger, and the crossover would occur at a lower 
earnings level were excess shelter costs included. Given the impor-
tance attached by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and others to FAP
Gross Earnings plus FAP 
Gross Earnings plus SNAP 
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Monthly Gross Own (Earned) Income 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program  121 
Figure 3.7 FY2009:1 SNAP Benefits and the Nixon FAP, Reference 
Family 
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0 
Monthly gross own (earned) income ($) 
SOURCE: SNAP data from Leftin et al. (2010). FAP parameters from Moynihan 
(1973). 
and other negative tax schemes as vehicles for support of working 
families, this outcome is quite striking. In a sense, it is the “stealth” 
FSP/SNAP that has delivered the family assistance the architects 
of FAP were seeking but failed to achieve. Moreover, by reaching 
beyond families with children, SNAP covers more of the population 
than those targeted by FAP. 
We can never know, of course, how the world would have been 
different had FAP become law. The relationship between FAP and 
food stamps was never resolved; it is possible that food stamps would 
have been preserved and would have operated alongside FAP, thereby 
raising total benefits and the rate at which total benefits were with-
drawn as earnings increased. There is no reason to believe FAP ben-
efits would have been sustained in real terms, as was presumed in 
Figure 3.7, although (as illustrated by Figure 3.6) adding excess shel-
ter costs and other deductions has increased the SNAP benefit, and it 
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is possible that a similar political dynamic would have sustained or 
increased FAP. It is also unclear how FAP would have treated income 
from UI benefits, although the logic of the FAP proposal suggests 
that, beyond the initial disregard, benefits would have been reduced 
dollar for dollar by UI payments. 
While relevant to appreciating what SNAP has become, the NIT
connection can be misleading, given the concerns of the present vol-
ume. The transfer crosses in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 are static. The 
emphasis is on the depicted transfer program as income support, pro-
ducing a floor on family resources. It answers the question, “If I have 
this much in income, what do I get?” Contrast this with the UI ques-
tion, “If I lose income because I lose my job, what do I get, and for 
how long?” As the preceding chapter indicates, for UI, policy changes 
in response to the Great Recession had little effect on initial access 
to UI given job loss, but much consequence for potential duration 
of benefits. For SNAP, changes in policy in the period leading up 
to and through the Great Recession changed access by eliminating 
restrictions on assets and expanding the range of income, including 
income from UI, as is consistent with benefit receipt. These develop-
ments presumably increased the share of all households eligible for 
SNAP, and over time the expansion in the eligible population would 
be expected to increase the number of households that apply for, and 
receive, the benefit. This take-up could in many cases be precipitated 
by unemployment. But what happens afterwards? Does SNAP receipt 
endure? 
POLICY EVOLUTION 
In the first year of the Great Recession, the national unemploy-
ment rate rose by 2.3 percentage points, reaching 7.3 percent by the 
twelfth month. The initial focus of the Bush administration’s policy 
was on stabilizing the financial sector; the major social policy ini-
tiative, described in Chapter 2, was a federally financed extension 
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of unemployment benefits (EUC08) beginning in June 2008. Further 
social policy response did not occur until the inauguration of a new 
administration, in January 2009. The centerpiece of that response was 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), passed by 
Congress and signed by the president in April 2009. ARRA broke 
new ground by explicitly manipulating SNAP for a countercyclical 
purpose. 
ARRA 
ARRA made two important changes to SNAP. The first affected 
benefit amounts and, in combination with BBCE, expanded the range 
of incomes at which households would be eligible for some SNAP
benefit. The second substantially reduced work requirements for job-
less ABAWDs. 
The new law increased maximum allotments for each household 
size to 113.6 percent of the benefit initially established for FY2009. 
For the reference family of three with no net income, for example, the 
benefit amount increased from $463 to $526. This benefit increment 
applied regardless of actual benefit paid, so for households receiving 
less than the maximum benefit because of other incomes, the propor-
tionate increase in payment could substantially exceed 13.6 percent. 
Figure 3.8 adds the post-ARRA benefit to the baseline example 
depicted in Figure 3.2. Note that ARRA itself did not eliminate the 
gross income test, so in principle the change did not alter the range 
of earnings consistent with benefit receipt. However, for states with 
BBCE, the range of eligibility for the benefit expanded beyond the 
limit. The mechanics of benefit calculation imply that a change in 
the base benefit translates (because of the variable deduction) into a 
larger move in the maximum benefit consistent with eligibility if no 
gross- or net-income constraint is applied. 
The BBCE effect is illustrated in Figure 3.9. Here the gross 
income limit is retained for reference, but the gross income with 
SNAP lines is extended to the point at which the benefit falls to zero, 
Gross Earnings plus SNAP, Post-ARRA 
Gross Earnings plus SNAP, Pre-ARRA 
Gross Income Limit 
Monthly Gross Own (Earned) Income 
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Figure 3.8 FY2009 SNAP Benefits before and after the ARRA, 
Reference Family 
2,500 
2,000 
1,500 
1,000 
500 
0 
Monthly gross own (earned) income ($) 
SOURCE: Leftin et al. (2010). 
as would be the case for states that set the gross income test at the 
maximum level permitted—200 percent of the poverty standard or, in 
the case of the reference family, $1,907 × 2 = $3,814. An addition of 
$68 to the example family’s base SNAP benefit pushes the break-even 
from $2,209 to $2,372 for households with earnings. In January 2009, 
19 states had BBCE; by January 2010, the number had increased to 27 
(Trippe and Gillooly 2010, Appendix A). Adoption of BBCE was not 
part of ARRA, but it likely enhanced ARRA’s effects. FNS promoted 
BBCE to help families and reduce administration costs (Trippe and 
Gillooly 2010). 
Figure 3.9 shows the outcome for a household with only earnings. 
For households reliant on UI, the effect is similar but smaller. Whereas 
for earnings every dollar in additional ARRA benefits increased the 
break-even by $4.16, for households with UI the increase dropped to 
$3.33. Not all states with BBCE were as generous as Michigan; some 
imposed a lower gross-income restriction (Trippe and Gillooly 2010, 
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Figure 3.9 FY2009 SNAP Benefits before and after the ARRA, with 
BBCE, Sample Family 
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SOURCE: Leftin et al. (2010). 
Table 2). However, only two (Minnesota and Texas) retained asset 
tests, and in both cases the asset restrictions were less severe than the 
core federal SNAP requirement. 
The second ARRA change made more childless adults eligible 
for SNAP. As mentioned above, before ARRA, able-bodied childless 
adults not complying with SNAP work requirements were generally 
limited to receiving SNAP for 3 months out of any 36-month period 
unless the state had obtained a waiver based on high unemployment 
or depressed labor markets. The ARRA gave all states a waiver for 
the remainder of FY2009, with an option of continuing this exemp-
tion through the end of FY2010. In fact, as is discussed below, the 
ABAWD waiver would endure in various forms well beyond FY2010. 
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Life after ARRA 
Under the original ARRA legislation, SNAP benefit levels would 
have remained at the fixed elevated levels (based on the 2008 Thrifty 
Food Plan) until inflation caused the regular benefit calculation to 
catch up. At that point, maximum benefit levels would again be based 
on 100 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan of the previous year, as had 
been the case prior to the ARRA increase. On the assumption of a 
2 percent rate of food cost inflation, this convergence would have 
occurred in six or seven years (roughly in 2016). However, because 
of legislation passed in 2010, the elevated SNAP benefit levels ended 
on October 31, 2013. The maximum benefit level then returned to 100 
percent of the Thrifty Food Plan value of the previous June, result-
ing in a decline in payments for most families. For a family of three, 
the maximum monthly allotment fell from $526 to $497 (Dean and 
Rosenbaum 2013). 
The Agricultural Act of 2014 reauthorized SNAP. This new 
farm bill kept the program’s basic eligibility guidelines in place but 
amended the criteria under which SNAP units qualify for a standard 
utility cost deduction. The bill included funding for major state exper-
iments with employment and training initiatives for SNAP recipients. 
Ten such state experiments were in at least the planning stages by 
Spring 2015, and all were underway by the end of FY2016 (USDA
2016b). Of these, only two were targeted specifically at ABAWDs; 
most included all SNAP participants required by law to register for 
work. 
The ABAWD waivers endured past the official end of the reces-
sion because unemployment did. By early 2012, 46 states still met 
the extended UI benefit “trigger” criterion for an ABAWD time-limit 
waiver (USDA 2012). Thereafter, continuing recovery led to contrac-
tion of eligibility, so that by the beginning of FY2017 only 11 states 
(including Michigan) continued to have a statewide exemption from 
the ABAWD time limit. Twenty-six (including Georgia and Mary-
land) had waivers for substate areas; 16 (including Florida, Missouri, 
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and Texas) had no time-limit waiver at all (USDA 2016a). Evaluation 
of the impact of time-limit reimposition is complicated by lack of 
information on timing and state administrative adjustment to the rule 
requirements. 
As of the beginning of FY2017, most other recession-related 
changes in federal policy and state responses remained in effect 
(USDA 2017b). Forty states had broad-based categorical eligibility 
and eliminated the net income test for benefit eligibility. Among the 
six project states, only Missouri retained narrow categorical eligi-
bility. Thirty-two states exempted all vehicles from asset tests; the 
remainder exempted at least one.18 
In sum, beginning in 2000, federal legislation and progressive 
extension of categorical eligibility by states increased access to food 
stamp/SNAP benefits for families with children. ARRA increased 
the size of the benefit for all eligible families and allowed all states 
to waive time limits on SNAP benefits for adult recipients without 
children. These changes reduced barriers to, and increased incen-
tives for, SNAP application by households receiving UI payments. 
The changes positioned SNAP to become a major contributor to the 
public response to income decline brought about by the Great Reces-
sion. While some retrenchment has occurred with respect to ABAWD 
access, SNAP remains much different, and much more liberal in oper-
ation, than in 2000. 
CASELOAD EVOLUTION 
The story told so far describes the supply of assistance. The 
outcome (program take-up and expenditures) is the product of two 
things: 1) the character of state management as it evolved in response 
to changes in federal law and 2) family response to the program as 
delivered. 
US SNAP Caseload (Left Axis) 
US Unemployment Rate (Right Axis) 
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Caseload Development 
The policy developments after 2000, the Great Recession, and 
ARRA transformed the Food Stamp Program, leading to a caseload 
expansion that has proven remarkably persistent. 
Figure 3.10 plots the monthly national SNAP caseload and sea-
sonally adjusted unemployment rate from FY1996 through FY2016. 
The trend in unemployment is dominated by what might be termed 
the “Lesser Recession” of 2001 and the Great Recession. The entire 
time range is usefully divided into four phases. The first is the post-
PRWORA decline, which was associated with TANF caseload con-
traction. The second is the long expansion from 2001 through 2007, 
which occurred as states promoted SNAP access. The third is the 
surge from 2008 through 2012, which is associated with the Great 
Recession and its aftermath. Finally, there is a leveling off—but little 
decline—beginning in 2013, as the caseload stabilized. This was fol-
Figure 3.10 The SNAP Caseload, FY1995–FY2016 
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lowed by a significant decline in 2015–2016 as the time limits on 
participation of unemployed ABAWDs were reinstated. 
National SNAP data emphasize current case and recipient counts. 
However, FNS has long conducted, in collaboration with states, 
a sampling of SNAP cases for quality control. Conducted by state 
SNAP agencies following a federal protocol, this quality-control 
sample is designed to produce estimates of state error rates in SNAP
eligibility assessment and benefits determination.19 It is also used to 
provide detail on caseload composition. Most of the information is 
collected from direct review of case files, but some participant inter-
views occur for verification purposes. Sampling is done continuously 
throughout the year, so that the resulting accumulation supports esti-
mates of characteristics of SNAP recipient units and participants in an 
average month. The data are systematically reviewed and cleaned by 
an experienced contractor. While procedures have altered somewhat 
over time, the changes have not significantly impaired the utility of 
the sample for cross-year and cross-state comparisons. The result is 
an analytic administrative data set on participants that is substantially 
better than anything available for other national social assistance pro-
grams such as TANF, SSI, or the EITC. 
Of course, the quality-control data have shortcomings. One is the 
absence of longitudinal information: each observation records the sta-
tus of a case at a particular month in time—virtually no information 
is included on case history. Another is that nothing is subsequently 
added to the one-month quality-control “snapshots” to identify case 
disposition thereafter. Given the orientation of SNAP toward a unit’s 
status in the current month, collection of such data is not warranted 
for administrative purposes. However, quality-control sample records 
do include a variable identifying the most recent administrative action 
for a case and the elapsed time since that action occurred. As a result, 
it is possible to estimate for any month the proportion of units that 
are “new,” meaning that the most recent action was opening. This 
sample-based estimate, applied to administrative counts of open 
cases, provides an estimate of the total number of new cases in the 
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month. With this estimate of openings in hand, an inventory identity 
plus monthly data on total participant cases can be used to calculate 
the number of cases open in the preceding month that subsequently 
closed. If the caseload is growing, openings must exceed closings. 
But the same caseload trend can be produced by a variety of combina-
tions of these components, so something can be learned from looking 
at the components of the change. 
Figure 3.11 plots SNAP openings (called accessions) and clos-
ings (called terminations) since roughly the beginning of the second 
phase of caseload expansion. Because the monthly estimates, based 
on small samples, are very noisy, the flows presented are quarterly 
averages of monthly flows. Several features of SNAP dynamics are 
evident in the graph. Both accession and termination flows are sub-
stantial. Over the entire interval, accessions average about 975,000 
cases and terminations about 897,000 cases per month. Expressed as 
a proportion of the caseload, accessions average 7.2 percent and ter-
Figure 3.11 State SNAP Caseloads, FY 2004–-FY2016 
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minations 6.6 percent. Second, the caseload surge that began with the 
Great Recession was the product of an increase in accessions cou-
pled with a near-fixed quarterly rate of closures. Third, by 2012 the 
monthly flow of cases both on and off was roughly 75 percent greater 
than was typical in 2007. Absent other changes, the implication is 
that state administrative costs were now substantially greater—which 
probably contributed to state enthusiasm for simplification of eligibil-
ity determination and review.20 
The States 
As is virtually always the case, the trends in national aggregates 
are the summation of quite different experiences across states. This 
variation is illustrated by SNAP caseloads in the six project states. 
To assist in trend comparison, Figure 3.12 presents caseload trends 
for all project states and the United States, normalized on the aver-
Figure 3.12  State SNAP Caseloads, FY 2004–FY2016 
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age monthly caseload in 2007. Missouri has clearly pursued a more 
restrictive SNAP policy than has Florida. By 2013, caseload growth 
had stabilized in all project states except Maryland.21 
Participation 
Growth in state SNAP caseloads can result from several things. 
The simplest is growth in population. Another is expansion of eli-
gibility within a given population when income loss or change in 
requirements increases the proportion of the population eligible for 
benefits. The third is an increase in take-up of benefits within the eli-
gible population. 
In principle, estimating SNAP participation is straightforward. 
One begins with a sample of households that includes sufficient 
demographic and financial data to identify those eligible for program 
participation and those currently participating. The participation rate 
is then the ratio of actual recipients to those estimated to be eligible. 
The analysis presumably would also provide an estimate of the share 
of total recipients receiving benefits in error. Such calculations could 
be done based on either units or people. An alternative is to com-
pare administrative data on receipt (i.e., not from totals inferred from 
sample data) to sample-based estimates of eligibility. 
In practice, of course, there are many roadblocks to such esti-
mation, because no available data source is perfectly suited to the 
task. SNAP eligibility is determined monthly, yet most major national 
household surveys do not collect monthly income data. In addition, 
the sample frame for most surveys consists of household (i.e., hous-
ing) units, “places intended for occupancy as separate living quar-
ters.” But, as already noted, households can contain multiple potential 
SNAP units, and the eligibility of individuals can depend on the unit to 
which they are assigned. Making such judgments using demographic 
data from surveys is problematic at best. SNAP receipt appears to be 
significantly underreported in many surveys, so estimates generally 
use administrative totals for the participation. While use of adminis-
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trative data for case counts circumvents the underreporting of partici-
pation, the estimation of participation is still clouded by uncertainty 
about the accuracy of household income reporting. 
Not to be daunted, the FNS annually publishes estimates of rates 
of SNAP participation by eligible persons. The estimates are done by 
a contractor, Mathematica Policy Research (MPR), using household 
data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS-ASEC). Around March of each year, 
CPS-ASEC collects data on household composition and incomes for 
the previous calendar year. MPR translates these data into estimates 
of the number of months families and other potential recipient units 
within the household were eligible for SNAP receipt. Administrative 
totals are compared to the CPS-based count of persons judged eligi-
ble, and from this comparison is derived a general participation rate. 
This is complemented with an estimate of the participation rate for 
potentially eligible budget units that report earnings—the “working 
poor.” 
MPR’s annual estimates are summarized in Figure 3.13. There 
have been changes in estimation methodology over time, and some 
of the difference between the participation estimates for earlier and 
those for later years may be attributable to such adjustments and not 
to genuine changes in actual rates of take-up. Nevertheless, the gen-
eral upward trend in participation rate is likely real. However mea-
sured, participation in SNAP is far higher than estimates for SSI and 
TANF. The Urban Institute estimates that in 2011, only about one-
third of families nominally eligible for TANF benefits under the rules 
applicable in their states of residence received TANF support, com-
pared to upwards of three-quarters for SNAP.22 
Sample sizes for states in the CPS are in many instances too 
small to support meaningful state-level estimates of participation. To 
address this problem, the agency produces estimates of the number 
of eligible household units (and individuals in eligible household 
units) by combining CPS data with estimates of potential eligibles 
derived from other states.23 Table 3.1 shows estimated participation 
All Eligible People 
All Eligible People in 'Working Poor' Households 
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Figure 3.13  Estimated Participation of SNAP Eligibles, 2000–2014 
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SOURCE: Eslami 2015; Wolkwitz 2007; Leftin, Eslami, and Strayer 2011;
Cunnyngham 2017. 
rates for the project states as well as for the United States for three 
years that overlap the general project window of interest. By 2011, 
five of the six project states had higher estimated participation than 
did the United States as a whole (Texas was the exception). But these 
estimates are subject to substantial sampling error. MPR estimates 
that the only statistically significant differences in 2011 (at the 0.10 
level) are for Texas (the estimate for which was significantly lower 
than for the other project states) and Michigan (significantly higher) 
(USDA 2014a). MPR caps the estimates produced by its procedure 
at 100 percent; as indicated, this occurs for Missouri in 2007 and for 
Michigan in 2011, 2013, and 2014. 
The Characteristics of SNAP Units 
The caseload growth evident for the country in Figure 3.10 and 
for project states in Figure 3.12 has been accompanied by important 
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Table 3.1  Estimated State SNAP Participation Rates, All Eligible 
Individuals: Selected Years 
2003 2007 2010 2013 2014 
Florida 0.48 0.57 0.74 0.93 0.90 
Georgia 0.64 0.63 0.75 0.93 0.89 
Maryland 0.49 0.59 0.67 0.90 0.97 
Michigan 0.63 0.89 0.94 1.00 1.00 
Missouri 0.77 1.00 0.86 0.93 0.86 
Texas 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.77 0.73 
United States 0.56 0.69 0.72 0.85 0.83 
SOURCE: Mathematica Policy Research. 
changes in the demographic makeup of the SNAP caseload. The most 
significant alteration lies in the growing share of the caseload attribut-
able to households with working-age adults without children, many 
of whom would be, in the absence of rule suspension, subject to ben-
efit limitation if neither at work nor in a training program. 
The upward trend in childless cases is evident in Table 3.2, which 
shows the composition of food stamp/SNAP households in various 
years. Over the 12-year span, the division of cases between those with 
only children, those with only elderly (aged 60 and older), and those 
that include at least one adult participant aged 18 to 59 has changed 
remarkably little. But within the “with working-age adults” group, 
the share of cases with children among all SNAP cases has declined 
by 10 percentage points. Judged by the diversity evident in the table, 
the combination of extended categorical eligibility, ABAWD waivers, 
and the Great Recession moved SNAP even closer to being the “uni-
versal, national welfare program” the CBO predicted 40 years ago. 
ABAWDs and the Like 
The work requirement applied to ABAWDs (unless waived) is 
restricted to adults aged 18 to 49, while Table 3.2 follows common 
FNS practice of labeling ages 8 to 59 as “working age.” Table 3.3 
elaborates on the FY2013 data from Table 3.2 to identify the subset 
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Table 3.2  Estimated Proportion of SNAP Monthly Caseload by Unit 
Composition: Selected Years 2003–2015 
2003 2007 2010 2013 2015 
Total cases (thousands) 8,971 11,563 18,369 22,802 22,293 
Child only 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Elderly only 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.18 
Units with adult(s) 18–59 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.76 
With children 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.36 
Without children 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.40 
“Other” units 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.25 
With adult 18–59 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.17 
NOTE: “Child only,” “Elderly only,” and “Units with adult(s) 18–59” categories are 
mutually exclusive. “Other units” are the subset of “Units with adult(s) 18–59 without 
children” that also do not include any elderly or disabled individuals. The “Elderly 
only” category includes a small number of cases (less than 1 percent) with children. 
SOURCE: SNAP annual QC data; author’s tabulation.
of the “Other” category that includes adults aged 18 to 49 and counts 
the adults. The units and adults that meet this restriction are termed 
apparent ABAWDs and abbreviated as AABAWDs—adults aged 18 
to 49 who are living with no children, report no disabilities them-
selves, and live with no other disabled adults or any elderly person.24 
By this definition, 17 percent of SNAP units in FY2013 included 
adults who would be subject to the ABAWD time limit if unemployed 
and not in training and if living in states or counties without time-
limit exemption. This is the bottom line of the table. 
We can drill further. The count of persons aged 18 to 49 in this 
“bottom line” group is 4.6 million (the others are aged 50 to 59). These 
AABAWDS would be excluded from SNAP access only if they are 
employed fewer than 20 hours a week and have been receiving SNAP
for more than three months during the past three years. The quality-
control data do not include the information necessary to fully apply 
this definition. We can assess the proportion employed or reported to 
be engaged in training. In FY2013, 68 percent of the AABAWDs, 3.1 
million adults, were listed as neither employed for at least 20 hours 
a week nor engaged in training. At best, this number gives a sense of 
  
 
 
   
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program  137 
Table 3.3  Looking for ABAWDs, FY2013 
Adults Share of 
Units Share of 18–59 adults 
(thousands) units (thousands) 18–59 
Total cases  22,802 1.00  21,845 1.00 
Child only  1,376 0.06  – 0.00 
Elderly only  3,627 0.16  – 0.00 
Units with adult(s) 18–59  17,801 0.78  21,845 1.00 
With children  8,759 0.38  11,787 0.54 
Without children  9,042 0.40  10,058 0.46 
“Other” units  5,653 0.25  6,221 0.28 
With AABAWD  3,930 0.17  4,759 0.22 
NOTE: “Child only,” “Elderly only,” and “Units with adult(s) 18–59” categories 
are mutually exclusive. “Other units” are the subset of “Units with adult(s) 18–59 
without children” that also do not include any elderly or disabled individuals. The 
“Elderly only” category includes a small number of cases (less than 1 percent) with 
children. AABAWD is “apparent able-bodied adults without dependents.” They are 
adults 18–49 in units with no children, no disabilities, and no elderly coresidents. 
Total adults here include some aged 50–59 individuals not subject to the ABAWD 
time limit. 
SOURCE: SNAP QC Data 2013.
orders of magnitude in discussions of the potential effect of applying 
the full ABAWD restriction. 
In Figure 3.14, the annual equivalent of the last number in the 
bottom line of Table 3.3 is plotted by year, from 2003 through 2015, 
for the United States and for the project states. As would be antici-
pated from ARRA, the number of SNAP units with AABAWDs 
jumped substantially in Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, and that pro-
portion was sustained, at least until state waivers began to expire in 
FY2015. The general pattern for the United States is replicated for 
the project states, with the project states’ estimates by the end of the 
period generally lying above the national proportion. Texas is again 
an outlier: by 2013, just 8 percent of Texas’s adults were in units that 
included ABAWDs, compared to 22 percent for the entire nation. 
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Figure 3.14  Proportion of Adult SNAP Recipients Aged 18–59 in Units 
Containing at Least One AABAWD, United States and 
Project States, FY2003–FY2015 
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NOTE: AABAWDs are “apparently able-bodied adults without dependents.” We 
define this group as adult SNAP recipients aged 18–49 in units with no children, no 
disabilities, and no elderly recipients. 
SOURCE: 2003–2015 SNAP QC data. 
Interaction with Unemployment Insurance 
There are no national UI administrative data that include infor-
mation on SNAP utilization by UI recipient households. It is pos-
sible to use the SNAP quality-control information to take the opposite 
perspective and estimate the prevalence of UI receipt among SNAP
recipient households. Here again, consideration is limited to cases 
that include adults aged 18 to 59. Table 3.2 indicates that such cases 
constitute just slightly above three-quarters of the SNAP caseload. 
Figure 3.15 indicates that the Great Recession saw a surge in UI 
receipt among SNAP recipients. Separate tabulations are reported for 
all units and for the newly certified, and within these groups for units 
without children. Across the nation, the prevalence of UI receipt was 
greatest for newly certified units that include a child. Recall that the 
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Figure 3.15 Proportion of SNAP Caseload with Recorded UI Income, 
FY 2003–2015 (Includes only units with at least 1 person 
age 18–59) 
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SOURCE: FY2003–2015 SNAP QC Data. 
recession officially ended in the second quarter of 2009. Neverthe-
less, the peak for prevalence of UI receipt, both among newly cer-
tified units and all units, occurs in the following fiscal year. After 
that, the tail-off in UI receipt among new cases pulls the overall rates 
downward. 
The SNAP-UI Households 
The SNAP quality-control data provide some justification for the 
use of a single-parent family with two children for sample calculations 
in the earlier discussion of SNAP eligibility. Table 3.4 provides more 
detail on the composition of SNAP recipient households that reported 
income from UI. In 2009, about one-third of all SNAP households 
with income from UI had a single parent with children. Thirty-one 
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Table 3.4  Proportion of SNAP Households Reporting Current Income 
from UI by Composition, Average Month, Selected Years 
2003–2015 
2003 2007 2009 2010 2015 
Households with children 
Single parent 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.31 
Married couple 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 
Other multiple adult 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 
Child only 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Households without children 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.43 
Total households receiving SNAP 281 202 697 1,227 331 
and UI (thousands)
Proportion of total SNAP households 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.01 
SOURCE: SNAP quality control samples. 
percent of such households included multiple adults, and two-thirds 
of this group were households with married or cohabiting couples. 
Two percent of SNAP-UI households were “child only,” meaning that 
the family included adult recipients of UI who had incomes that were 
included in assessment of the children’s need but who were them-
selves ineligible. The remainder were households without children. 
The total number of SNAP households with UI income more 
than quadrupled between 2003 and 2015, but thereafter the numbers 
fell precipitously, as indicated by Figure 3.15. This decline was more 
rapid among households with children than among those without, so 
that the quality-control data indicate that, by 2015, 43 percent of all 
the SNAP households that reported UI income included no children. 
The contraction of unemployment generally and of extended UI ben-
efits caused the share of SNAP cases that reported income from UI to 
fall to 1 percent. The era of program interaction was over. 
The Special Role of the Excess Shelter Cost Deduction 
The ESCD is important, especially for families receiving UI 
benefits. 
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Table 3.5 shows the prevalence of the ESCD across SNAP house-
holds, as well as the proportion of the SNAP benefit received that 
is attributable to the reduction of net income brought about by the 
ESCD. Since application of the ESCD is wide and growing—by 
2013, over 72 percent of SNAP participant units benefited from it— 
this deduction has a significant consequence. The bottom portion of 
the table reports results of a simulation of the consequence for SNAP
benefits of eliminating this deduction, all else remaining constant. By 
2013, 19 percent of SNAP benefits were attributable to the ESCD. 
There is a significant difference in prevalence and amount of 
ESCD between households with and without income from UI. By 
2013, for example, 82 percent of SNAP units with UI income reported 
excess housing costs, resulting in an increase in benefits to this sub-
group of 29 percent, compared to 19 percent for those without UI. 
This differential has persisted throughout the recession and recovery. 
It is likely that units receiving SNAP and UI have higher hous-
ing costs than do SNAP recipients without UI, since the UI group’s 
housing costs probably reflect choices, including purchase of a 
home, made before job loss when their incomes were higher. Unfor-
tunately, the quality-control data do not identify tenure, so it is not 
possible to investigate the extent to which differentials between units 
with and without UI are related to differences in the prevalence of 
homeownership. 
As sizable as the ESCD difference is between current UI recipi-
ents and others, it is important to keep things in perspective. As the 
table shows, concurrent UI recipient units are a small subset of all 
households. What the quality-control data cannot show is how many 
of the SNAP units without UI income at the time of the quality-
control (QC) snapshot have simply exhausted benefits. 
Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility 
Ostensibly, one of the most significant consequences of broad-
based categorical eligibility is the loosening and, in some cases, 
  
Table 3.5  The Importance of the Excess-Shelter Cost Deduction 
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2014 
Total units (monthly)  8,502,615 9,001,244  11,738,020 16,374,692 17,801,241 17,145,432 
Proportion wth ESCD 
All 0.691 0.704 0.697 0.717 0.722 0.714 
With no UI 0.689 0.702 0.694 0.710 0.717 0.711 
With UI 0.765 0.752 0.754 0.796 0.821 0.827 
Proportion of all units 
With no UI 0.977 0.978 0.943 0.928 0.956 0.974 
With UI 0.023 0.022 0.057 0.072 0.044 0.026 
Proportion of benefits attributable to ESCD 
All 0.180 0.208 0.179 0.192 0.195 0.210 
With no UI 0.179 0.206 0.175 0.185 0.190 0.207 
With UI 0.256 0.304 0.256 0.284 0.294 0.331 
142 
SOURCE: Calculations by author from SNAP quality control data. 
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elimination of the gross and net income tests for SNAP eligibility. 
However, the SNAP quality-control data indicate that this elimina-
tion had little significant consequence for the prevalence of (rela-
tively) high-income households in the caseload. Table 3.6 shows a 
breakdown of 2014 national caseload data for units most likely to 
be affected—those with adults aged 18 to 59 but no member who 
is disabled or elderly. Only about 4 percent of units that meet these 
requirements fail either the net or gross income tests. The same is true 
for those cases newly opened. 
Table 3.6  Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility and the Income Tests, 2014 
All units Newly opened 
Total Proportion Total Proportion 
All units in category 12,425,481 1.00  2,568,510 1.00 
Units that pass gross & 11,961,034 0.96  2,467,099 0.96 
net income tests 
Units that passed gross, 6,646 0.00  531 0.00 
failed net
Units that passed net, 336,329 0.03  76,904 0.03 
failed gross
Units that fail both net 104,473 0.01  21,581 0.01 
and gross
Units w/ net income results 16,997 0.00  2,395 0.00 
coded “missing”a
a Includes units enrolled under the Minnesota Family Investment Program. 
SOURCE: Calculations by author using 2014 SNAP QC data; see text. 
Table 3.7 carries the assessment of the proportion of SNAP
households that pass both the gross and net income tests (the second 
line in Table 3.6) backward in time and shows separate results by 
state. The table’s bottom line, for the United States, indicates that 
2012 saw the highest prevalence of (relatively) high-income cases in 
the caseload, but even this was only 6 percent of the subgroup ana-
lyzed. This national aggregate, as always, encompasses substantial 
variation across states. Georgia, a state with BBCE that retained the 
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Table 3.7  Proportion of SNAP Units Passing Both Net and Gross 
Income Tests, 2004–2015 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Florida 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.993 0.968 0.953 0.927 
Georgia 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.991 0.988 
Illinois 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.974 0.997 0.998 
Maryland 0.952 0.954 0.954 0.933 0.919 0.900 0.909 
Michigan 0.936 0.926 0.926 0.902 0.912 0.958 0.940 
Missouri 1.000 0.993 0.993 0.995 0.991 0.995 1.000 
Texas 0.968 0.948 0.960 0.924 0.930 0.946 0.906 
United States 0.984 0.982 0.981 0.967 0.940 0.963 0.953 
NOTE: All units have at least one adult aged 18–59 and no disabled or elderly persons. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on SNAP QC data. 
130 percent gross income test, includes no cases having gross income 
of more than 130 percent of the administrative poverty standard. 
Maryland and Michigan, in contrast, include the greatest proportion 
of higher gross-income cases.25 
The implication of these numbers is that if BBCE makes a differ-
ence for the caseload, the effect comes about not because of enhanc-
ing the range of earnings consistent with eligibility for SNAP benefits 
but because of elimination of assets tests and the simplicity of mak-
ing eligibility depend primarily on ascertaining that a household’s net 
income is low enough to lead to a positive SNAP payment. 
The importance of elimination of the asset tests in the BBCE-
related increase in SNAP take-up remains difficult to assess. At least 
part of the effect may arise in the ambiguities surrounding asset 
assessment. It is one thing for an applicant to report current income. 
It is another to catalog and estimate the value of assets. For newcom-
ers to SNAP, the assets language in SNAP application forms in states 
without BBCE might well be frightening. As late as 2014, the food 
stamp application (it was still called that) in Missouri asked appli-
cants to “please list any cash, money in bank accounts, stocks, bonds, 
retirement accounts, settlements from accidents, insurance claims, 
and lottery winnings” in their possession or the possession of any 
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other household member. Then the applicant was told that when he/ 
she signed the application, the applicant was “certifying . . . that you 
understand that information provided on this form and during the 
interview must be true and accurate.” The applicant then agrees to 
“authorize the Director of Family Support Division or his/her appoin-
tee to investigate my circumstances or statements.” The applicant 
certifies understanding that “it is against the law to obtain or attempt 
to obtain food stamp benefits to which I am not entitled.”26 This of 
course begs the question of how the applicant would know whether 
she was entitled before “attempting to obtain” such benefits. 
With BBCE as operated in most states, these questions go away. 
As public understanding of the increased ease of SNAP application 
grew and was confirmed by the experience of former coworkers and 
neighbors, a “tipping point” may have been reached in SNAP appli-
cations. People in need may have come to realize from the reports of 
successful applicant families that the burden and uncertainty created 
by asset disclosure requirements had eased. 
Summary 
This largely SNAP quality-control-based study of SNAP evolu-
tion during the Great Recession has the following major implications: 
• The increase in take-up was indeed remarkable, propelling 
SNAP to center stage in national income support policy. While 
take-up grew in all states, however, rates varied substantially. 
Some of this difference is plausibly due to variation in state 
policy, a matter to be investigated in subsequent chapters and 
in review of the literature. 
• Estimated participation rates among eligible households in-
creased during the Great Recession, and the increase has been 
sustained in the recession’s aftermath. This may reflect pro-
gram outreach, but to some unknown degree it is likely also a 
product of eliminating or relaxing assets tests through BBCE. 
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• ABAWDs are a major factor in the Great Recession–
related SNAP caseload expansion. A substantial proportion of 
ABAWDs were, at the time of accession, not working. 
• The prevalence of UI receipt among SNAP cases peaked after 
the Great Recession ended in 2010. It is not possible to say 
much about the pattern of interaction between receipt of the 
two benefits leading up to this peak and the falloff thereafter. 
This, too, is an important target for investigation at the state 
level. 
• The excess shelter-cost deduction is an increasingly important 
feature of SNAP operation, and it appears to play an important 
role in the interaction between SNAP and UI. 
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE STATES, AND
THE FUTURE 
Food Stamps began as a late afterthought to the Great Depression, 
aimed primarily at increasing agricultural incomes rather than sustain-
ing income, consumption, or nutrition among poor households. Over 
the next 70 years, culminating in its use during the Great Recession, 
the program effectively became a near-universally available income 
support system—thus massively increasing its potential for supple-
menting need-related benefits from other safety-net programs. The 
extent to which this potential was realized is an important issue, both 
for understanding what happened during the Great Recession and for 
finding opportunities to improve SNAP operation in the future. 
Judging SNAP success in fulfilling the safety-net supplementary 
role requires, of course, analyzing its interaction with other safety-net 
components. In the context of counter-recession assistance, UI has 
historically been the most important feature of the safety net—and 
UI expansion was a major part of the national policy response to the 
Great Recession downturn. The previous chapter in the book comple-
ments this chapter’s SNAP overview by providing an overview of 
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recession-related UI expansion. The data developed for this chapter 
confirm that families often received benefits from both the SNAP and 
UI systems. The chapters that follow use data for individual states— 
as well as state-specific perspectives on the development of SNAP
and UI policy at the state level—to take a detailed analytic look, using 
administrative data, at how these two programs interact to produce 
the overall picture painted here. 
Regarding the future, the effectiveness of SNAP as an instrument 
of counter-recessionary fiscal policy in the Great Recession is the 
product of the increase in benefits created by ARRA, the expansion 
of eligibility of ABAWDs, and promotion of extended categorical eli-
gibility, especially broad-based categorical eligibility. Repetition of 
this effectiveness in some future downturn turns on the willingness 
of Congress to again expand benefits, relax restrictions on ABAWDs, 
and sustain in some way the program changes achieved by states 
through implementation of BBCE. In many ways, BBCE seems a 
weak foundation for national policy, since the eligibility it creates 
turns in many cases on an entitlement generated via brochure. It is 
easy to imagine someone questioning this subterfuge and proposing 
reimposition of some form of assets test or income restriction as sim-
ply an enhancement of program integrity. Such a change could have 
substantial effects on access to SNAP support for working families. 
So we end with a paradox: on the one hand, BBCE has moved SNAP
to become the “universal, national welfare program”; on the other, the 
model remains heavily dependent on the artifice of BBCE rather than 
logical program design. 
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Notes 
1. Population figures are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Food stamp/SNAP
recipient estimates are based on data from the FY2000 and FY2014 
SNAP quality-control sample (discussed later in the chapter). TANF 
data are from the Office of Family Assistance, Administration for Chil-
dren and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
GDP and government consumption figures are from FRED (https://fred
.stlouisfed.org) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
2. Here, as elsewhere in the book, reference to the timing of the Great 
Recession is based on the National Bureau of Economic Research’s 
chronology, which puts the start of the downturn at December 2007 and 
the end of the contraction at June 2009. In some instances, timing is 
identified by quarter—i.e., from FY2008:Q1 to FY2009:Q3. See http:// 
www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
3. Except where otherwise noted, the summary of SNAP history that fol-
lows draws on Coppock (1947), McDonald (1977), and USDA (2014b, 
1941). 
4. The September 26, 1939, New York Times reported that the blue-stamp-
eligible surplus commodities list effective for the following month 
included butter, eggs, raisins, apples, pork lard, dried prunes, onions 
(except green onions), dry beans, fresh pears, fresh snap beans, wheat 
flour and whole wheat flour, and corn meal. Raisins, apples, pork lard, 
and snap beans appeared on the list for the first time. Foods removed 
from the surplus list effective October 1 included cabbages, fresh 
peaches, fresh tomatoes, rice, and fresh green peas. Cited in Simon 
(2010). 
5. Amendments to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 1954, Sec. 11, Pub. L. No. 86-341, 68 Stat. 454 (1959). 
6. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964). 
7. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Sec. 5(b). 
8. Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 
Stat. 2048–2052 (1971). 
9. A bit of perspective: the proposed FAP “guarantee” in updated dollars 
exceeded the 2014 TANF benefit in all states save Alaska, California, 
and New York (Cohen et al. 2016, Table II.A.4). The best reflections on 
the episode are in Burke and Burke (1974) and Moynihan (1973). 
10. The poverty “guidelines” are an administrative variant of the national 
income standard for identifying families in poverty. This measure was 
first introduced in the early 1960s and has continued, with inflation 
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adjustment and other minor adjustments, to the present. The poverty 
standard varies by family size and composition. A family is officially 
poor if its pretax, postcash assistance income falls below the standard. 
The official standard has long been criticized for, among many other 
things, failing to include food stamp benefits in the income measure. 
Unemployment benefits are included as income. 
11. 65 Fed. Reg. 70198, amending 7 C.F.R. 273.2(j) (Nov. 21, 2000). 
12. A complete listing of these reports is available at USDA (2019). 
13. “A [census] household consists of all people who occupy a housing unit 
regardless of relationship” (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). 
14. Figure 3.1 is based on data from the FNS State Options reports (see 
note 12), two separately funded studies of state policy (Laird and Trippe 
2014; Trippe and Gillooly 2010), and a recent report from the Congres-
sional Research Service (Falk and Aussenberg 2018). Where possible, 
the data are intended to describe state policy at the end of the indicated 
fiscal year, but in some cases the timing is difficult to ascertain. 
15. Of course, other compositions could be used for reference, and in the 
discussions that follow some alternatives are considered when useful. 
But the issues raised generally apply to all SNAP units with children. 
Actual household composition for SNAP recipients with income from 
UI is discussed later in the chapter. 
16. Methods for calculating utility expenses vary by state. Most states use 
a standard utility allowance (SUA), which applies for all units that pay 
at least their heating and cooling costs, instead of calculating exact util-
ity costs. For example, in Michigan in 2009, the SUA was $550 per 
month. For units that do not pay their heating and cooling costs, specific 
deductions, such as water and telephone bills, are calculated. Units that 
receive help from the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program 
(LIHEAP) are automatically eligible for the SUA, regardless of their 
utility costs. For more information, see Holleyman, Beggs, and Fox 
(2017). 
17. Technically, categorical eligibility would require that the family receive 
some TANF-funded service or simply be put on notice that the family 
was eligible for some TANF-funded service, however trivial (Falk and 
Aussenberg 2018). In the Michigan case, the “service” provided was 
information about the Domestic Violence Prevention Service, which 
was included in the SNAP application (Laird and Trippe 2014, Appen-
dix A). 
18. These numbers are from the FNS SNAP web page on eligibility (USDA
2017c). The FNS counts include Guam and the Virgin Islands as “states” 
and no longer provide details on vehicle exemption policies by state. 
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19. There is evidence that in recent years, some states have altered financial 
details for some households included in the quality-control sample to 
reduce estimated error rates. There is no indication that these actions 
have affected the demographic data, and the interventions do not appear 
sufficiently large to affect conclusions drawn later in this paper. See 
USDA (2017a). 
20. The administrative data for caseloads count only units that have 
received benefits during the month. Some of this turnover is probably 
the result of administrative “churning,” in which units that have benefits 
suspended in a month are counted as closures, even if benefit payment 
is resumed in the next month (Mills et al. 2014). Such terminations 
are generally not genuine departures from assistance in the sense that 
regaining benefits requires a full reassessment of eligibility. Given the 
definition of case opening used in constructing Figure 3.11, the exag-
geration of “real” terminations by the inventory estimation procedure 
is diminished, because in any month, temporary loss of cases through 
payment suspension is offset by the number of cases now returned to the 
count following compliance—an action not counted as an accession. 
21. The downturn in Georgia’s caseload in 2014—outside the analysis win-
dow for this book—is the result of administrative problems created by, 
among other things, flawed implementation of a major expansion of its 
social-services-management information system. Downturns in Georgia 
and other states—notably Florida—three months after the beginning of 
FY2015 reflect expiration of waivers for the three-month time limit for 
unemployed ABAWDs. 
22. See DHHS (2014), p. II–17. These participation estimates are done on 
a unit basis, not an individual basis as is done for SNAP in Figure 3.13. 
The comparable SNAP unit participation rate for 2011 is 81.8 percent, 
compared to 78.0 percent for individuals. 
23. The estimates are Bayesian in the sense that the predicted numbers of 
eligible families derived from earlier years’ and other states’ data are 
used to form a “prior” estimate of numbers of eligible units; this is com-
bined with CPS results to produce, across states, the best “posterior” fit 
for the current year. The procedure yields estimates of precision that can 
be used to judge the significance of differences in estimated outcomes 
across states. 
24. The SNAP quality-control questionnaire includes a variable for ABAWD 
designation, but it is clear from the data that states were uncertain, at 
least in prior years, about identification. 
25. Here, again, it is important to retain perspective. The quality-control 
data cover current receipt, not situation on entry. It is possible that the 
elimination of the gross income test does result in greater case in-flow, 
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but once receipt is established, units reduce earnings so that income falls 
to the point of not being counted in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. We lack data 
on situation at application. 
26. Missouri Department of Social Services, Family Support Division, 
Application for Food Stamp Benefits. Form MO 886-0460 (05/14). 
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Chapter 4 
Related Research 
about SNAP and UI 
Michael Wiseman 
George Washington University 
Several studies about the increase in Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP) receipt during the Great Recession have 
appeared, but most have not looked specifically at the interaction of 
SNAP and unemployment insurance (UI). The exceptions are papers 
by Finifter and Prell (2013) and Rothstein and Valletta (2014). Work by
Mulligan (2012), Ganong and Liebman (2013), and Ziliak (2016) 
has addressed the role of policy change in SNAP caseload expan-
sion. This work uses publicly available data to study the dynamics of 
SNAP-UI interaction during the Great Recession, but it also serves to 
identify opportunities to improve understanding among policymakers 
by developing new information, as the SNAP-UI project has done. 
FINIFTER AND PRELL 
David Finifter and Mark Prell (2013) use the Current Population 
Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) to 
study the overlap between SNAP and UI receipt among households 
before and during the Great Recession, specifically for calendar years 
2005 through 2009. Household here refers to a household as defined 
by the U.S. Census Bureau (i.e., everyone living at an address). UI 
households are households that, at the time of the ASEC, report some 
income from UI in the previous calendar year. SNAP households are 
households that, at the time of the ASEC, report some receipt of SNAP
benefits during the preceding year. The authors then define overlap 
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from SNAP and UI perspectives: they denote the share of SNAP
households that are also UI households as the SNAP joint participa-
tion rate. Similarly, the share of UI households that are also SNAP
households is the UI joint participation rate. Note that joint receipt 
need not be coincident within the calendar year. From both perspec-
tives, the overlap increased as the Great Recession progressed: the 
SNAP joint participation rate rose from 7.8 percent in 2005 to 14.4 
percent in 2009; the UI joint participation rate rose from 11.1 percent 
in 2005 to 13.4 percent in 2009. 
These joint participation rates differ from the rates reported in 
Chapter 3, for at least three reasons: 
First, the discussion of take-up in Chapter 3 concentrates on the 
subset of SNAP households that include adults aged 18–59. Had 
Finifter and Prell applied this restriction, their rates would have been 
even higher. 
Second, the rates reported in this paper are for coincident receipt; 
Finifter and Prell count as overlap any receipt of both programs at any 
time during the year. A household that received UI from January to 
March and SNAP from June to October would be counted as a joint 
participant for Finifter and Prell, for example, but not in the quality-
control-based point-in-time calculations presented in Chapter 3. 
Third, the administrative data that underlie the quality-
control calculations presented earlier avoid the CPS problems with 
underreporting. 
Nevertheless, Finifter and Prell’s longer, annual perspective is 
important, especially given the focus on annual income in most stud-
ies. Point-in-time assessment, the only thing that can be done with the 
quality-control data, will miss sequential interaction of UI exhaus-
tion with SNAP take-up. This topic is studied extensively in the state 
chapters that follow. 
Finifter and Prell find that among households receiving SNAP, 
those with householders having the lowest levels of education (i.e., 
less than high school) are less likely than others to be joint program 
participants. As might be anticipated, among households receiving 
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UI, the likelihood of SNAP participation is greatest for those with the 
lowest annual income from all sources. 
ROTHSTEIN AND VALLETTA
Jesse Rothstein and Robert Valletta (2014) use the 2001 and 2008 
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to look 
at the experience of panel adults who receive UI payments during 
spells of unemployment around the time of the 2001 “Lesser Reces-
sion” and the Great Recession of 2007–2009.1 The Lesser Recession 
panel covers the period from October 2000 through January 2004; 
the Great Recession panel covers May 2008 through April 2013. The 
authors first select all instances of reports of separation from jobs of 
at least three months’ duration that are followed by at least one week 
of unemployment. The separation period ends when the job loser 
subsequently reports at least four consecutive weeks of employment. 
Identified in this way, most such spells of unemployment (73 percent 
in the Lesser Recession sample; 70 percent in the Great Recession 
sample) do not involve UI. Of those that do, Rothstein and Valletta 
further restrict the sample to spells in which the unemployed person 
receives UI for at least four months. Within this subgroup, UI pay-
ments ceased before the end of unemployment in 19 percent of spells 
in the Lesser Recession panel and 18 percent of spells in the Great 
Recession panel. Rothstein and Valletta term this group “exhaustees.” 
Table 4.1 reproduces important Rothstein and Valletta results. The 
first set of tabulations covers all separations identified across the sev-
eral interview waves for each panel. The prevalence of SNAP receipt 
before and after the separation is tabulated, as well as a measure of 
poverty status. Job separations for both panels increase the prevalence 
of both SNAP receipt and poverty. As should be expected given the 
overall increase in SNAP take-up, job losers in the 2008 panel are 
significantly more likely to be in households receiving SNAP than is 
the case for their (approximate) counterparts in the 2001 panel. While 
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Table 4.1  SNAP Receipt and Poverty before and after Job Separation 
and UI Exhaustion 
2001 SIPP panel 2008 SIPP panel 
Obs. Pre Post Diff Obs. Pre Post Diff 
Before and after 9,341 17,663 
job separationa 
UI receipt 0.036 0.780 0.743 0.090 0.825 0.735 
(0.148) (0.225) (0.018) (0.258) (0.242) (0.015) 
SNAP receipt 0.076 0.125 0.049 0.130 0.175 0.045 
(0.256) (0.302) (0.015) (0.329) (0.355) (0.011) 
In poverty 0.074 0.239 0.165 0.079 0.209 0.130 
(0.224) (0.357) (0.022) (0.248) (0.362) (0.015) 
Before and after 504 1,098 
UI exhaustionb 
SNAP receipt 0.146 0.155 0.009 0.216 0.261 0.044 
(0.353) (0.362) (0.019) (0.412) (0.439) (0.012) 
In poverty 0.253 0.418 0.165 0.216 0.377 0.160 
(0.435) (0.494) (0.032) (0.412) (0.485) (0.021) 
NOTES: The “universe” for the first set of tabulations is all job separations reported for 
working adults over all waves of the indicated SIPP Panel. The sample is restricted to 
separations lasting at least 26 weeks. The second set of tabulations involves only the 
subset of job separations in which UI terminated before employment was regained. 
Proportions are unweighted; choice of appropriate weights, given the time frames, is 
ambiguous. Experiments with various weighting choices suggest general outcomes 
are not sensitive to weighting strategies. Differences that are statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level are bolded. 
a “Pre” columns report average values and standard deviations (in parentheses) over the 
three months prior to the month in which job separation occurred. “Post” columns 
report average values and standard deviations (in parentheses) over the period begin-
ning the month after job separation and ending six months later or in the last month 
of the nonemployment spell, whichever comes first. “Diff” columns report the differ-
ence in means and the standard error (in parentheses) of this difference. 
b “Pre” columns report average values and standard deviations (in parentheses) over the 
three months prior to the last month in which UI income was received. “Post” col-
umns report average values and standard deviations (in parentheses) over the period 
beginning the month after the last month of UI receipt and ending six months later 
or in the last month of the nonemployment spell, whichever comes first. “Diff” col-
umns report the difference in means and the standard error (in parentheses) of this 
difference. 
SOURCE: Transcribed from data in Tables 2 and 3 of Rothstein and Valletta (2014). 
Sample sizes are estimated from information in Table 1. 
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the poverty rate prior to job separation is not significantly different 
between groups, the poverty-rate increase following job loss is signif-
icantly smaller in the 2008 panel. It is tempting to view this difference 
as the product of higher SNAP receipt, but Rothstein and Valletta do 
not include SNAP benefits in the income measure used for assess-
ing poverty status. Had they done so, the difference in SNAP receipt 
post–job separation for the two episodes would almost certainly have 
increased the difference in poverty rates. 
The second set of tabulations in the table considers the subset 
of separations in which the subsequent period of joblessness extends 
beyond termination of UI benefits. These cases are assumed to be 
exhaustees. Here, “pre” and “post” are defined relative to exhaustion, 
not job loss. The outcome of exhaustion is a significant (and almost 
identical) increase in the poverty rate for both the Lesser Recession 
and Great Recession samples, but the postexhaustion increase in 
SNAP take-up is statistically significant only for the Great Recession. 
Here, too, it is likely that the difference in poverty impact is almost 
certainly understated because of failure to include SNAP benefits in 
income. 
In sum, both Finifter and Prell (2013) and Rothstein and Valletta 
(2014) confirm a substantial overlap between receipt of UI and SNAP
during the Great Recession. Both underscore the importance of inter-
temporal was well as contemporary interaction—a much higher pro-
portion of households are counted as joint recipients if that designa-
tion means experiencing both UI and SNAP receipt within a year than 
is true for when the combination is counted only if it occurs within a 
single month. Rothstein and Valletta show that the overlap increased 
compared to the recession of 2001, consistent with the substantial 
increase in SNAP access between the two recessions. Neither study 
attempts to identify any differences that can be attributed to variation 
in state policy with respect either to SNAP or to UI. 
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MULLIGAN
Surely the most provocative study of interaction between UI and 
SNAP appears in Casey Mulligan’s book The Redistribution Reces-
sion. As the title indicates, Mulligan (2012) essentially argues that the 
Great Recession was caused, or at least significantly worsened, by 
the labor market distortions created by the social safety net. For Mul-
ligan, the major distorting programs were SNAP, UI, and programs of 
mortgage modification for persons who experienced substantial loss 
of home value because of the collapse of the housing bubble. He also 
considers other policy developments—including an increase in the 
minimum wage—to have played perverse roles. 
There are micro- and macroeconomic components to Mulligan’s
argument. The microeconomic component involves estimation of 
the effect of changes in policy on benefits available to households at 
different income levels. Mulligan carefully reviews both UI exten-
sions and changes in SNAP eligibility, especially the consequences 
of broad-based categorical eligibility and elimination of the able-
bodied-adults-without-dependents (ABAWD) work test. Such changes, 
he argues, raised the probability of program take-up and reduced 
incentives for work by raising the marginal tax rate imposed on earn-
ings. His numerical estimates of these effects suggest that observed 
reduction in employment between 2007and 2009 is largely the prod-
uct of incentive effects of enhancements to the safety net. Moreover, 
in Mulligan’s judgment, the exceptional duration of the recession and 
the persistent reduction in employment rates in the recession’s wake 
are also consequences of generous safety-net policy. 
The macroeconomic side of the Mulligan story is a neoclassical 
growth model built around a simple (Cobb-Douglas) model of the 
aggregate economy. In this model, a reduction of labor supply due 
to expansion of the safety net raises the cost of labor and leads to 
substitution of nonlabor inputs for labor. In his model, even the pros-
pect of an expansion in benefits can lead to contraction. This analysis 
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leads, he writes, to “an unconventional causal interpretation of the 
sharp drops in consumption, investment, and capital market values 
during 2008: the drops were, in significant part, a reaction to, and 
an anticipation of, labor market contractions created by the expand-
ing social safety net. In this view, it is incorrect to attribute the labor 
market contraction to drops in investment and consumer spending” 
(Mulligan 2012, p. 121). 
There has been little detailed evaluation of Mulligan’s arguments. 
In his review of The Redistribution Recession for the Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, Christopher Foote (2013) notes that “most econo-
mists will find it hard to accept that the labor market fallout from this 
calamity [the Great Recession] is mostly explained by an expanded 
safety net,” but he fails to say why. Robert Moffitt (2015) argues that
Mulligan’s constructs for marginal tax rates exaggerate the actual 
impact of policy changes on incentives, and that many of his choices 
for labor supply estimates are too large. The heart of Moffitt’s argu-
ment is a series of regressions, using Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data on household income, of total transfers received on pri-
vate income, allowing splines in income over four ranges of earnings 
defined as a proportion of the poverty standard: 0–50 percent, 50–100 
percent, 100–150 percent, and above 150 percent. The estimates are 
repeated for various years before, during, and after the Great Reces-
sion. The slope of each regression combines the effects of policy 
changes on take-up of all programs and labor supply conditional 
on take-up. Moffitt writes that “[the marginal tax rates] even during 
the Great Recession were never more than 18 percent. Further, the 
increase in [the rates] from 2005 to 2010 was never greater than 8 
percentage points, which implies a reduction in the net wage rate of 
about 10 percent. At any reasonable wage elasticity, this would gener-
ate only minor reductions in labor supply” (p. 461). 
The macroeconomic source for economists’ reluctance to accept 
Mulligan’s (2012) arguments is classically Keynesian. If we suppose 
the safety net were taken away and all disincentive for work removed, 
then labor supply would increase and, in the Mulligan model, wages 
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would fall, leading to increased employment through two channels: 
one being the increased demand by firms for labor, given the lower 
price; the other being the positive effect on the real money supply of 
commodity price declines engendered by cheaper labor. Classically, 
Keynesians have questioned the flexibility of wages and have argued 
that in a recession the impact of monetary expansion is diminished 
because of hoarding and the zero-lower-limit of interest decline. 
GANONG AND LIEBMAN
Peter Ganong and Jeffrey Liebman (2018) take a long view of 
Food Stamp/SNAP development and use both policy and enroll-
ment history to provide perspective on the consequences of the Great 
Recession for SNAP.2 Like Moffitt (2015), they challenge Mulligan’s 
(2012) ascription of the surge in unemployment during the Great 
Recession to increased generosity of social assistance, especially 
SNAP and UI. 
Ganong and Liebman divide recent SNAP policy history into 
three intervals, defined by trends in caseload and the Mathematica 
estimates of participation (Cunnyngham 2017). 
The first, from 1992 through 2000, is the era of welfare reform 
and rapid economic growth. During this period the SNAP caseload 
declined, both because unemployment was low and because of wel-
fare reform (first through state waiver-based experiments and then, 
after 1996, in the transition to TANF). SNAP take-up declined, the 
authors argue, because the contraction of TANF reduced categorical 
eligibility. 
The second period extends from 2000 through 2007. During this 
period take-up grew, both as a “rebound” from the contraction engen-
dered by welfare reform and because states adopted various policies 
to improve program access. These policies included not only alter-
ing restrictions on vehicle ownership but also the adoption, by some 
states, of some form of expanded categorical eligibility. 
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The third period, 2007–2011, is the Great Recession, marked by a 
5 percentage point increase in national civilian unemployment (from 
4.6 to 9.6 percent average monthly employment for the year) and a 
73 percent increase in SNAP recipients. For this period, the ques-
tion is, how much of the nationwide increase in SNAP enrollment is 
attributable to the increase in unemployment, and how much is the 
result of policy change? Ganong and Liebman’s (2018) innovation is 
to approach this attribution problem from the bottom by first estimat-
ing a model of SNAP enrollment by county, based on estimates of 
county unemployment rates and an index of SNAP access, given state 
policies, including ECE. The national SNAP caseload is then the sum 
of county caseloads, and changes in SNAP enrollment nationwide 
occur as a result of a combination of state policies operating at the 
county level and demand generated as changes in the national eco-
nomic trends are reflected in county unemployment. To address the 
well-known problems with measures of unemployment rates at the 
county level, they develop an instrument for county unemployment 
change in response to statewide economic development that is based 
on the composition of local employment. 
Ganong and Liebman estimate their model for the period 1993– 
2015, then use it (by summing across county estimates) to predict the 
path of SNAP take-up during each subperiod. The estimated model 
implies that trends in unemployment account for most of the decline 
in SNAP take-up in the late 1990s, that state policy changes are an 
important contributor to growth in take-up during the early 2000s, 
and that unemployment explains about two-thirds of the caseload 
expansion during the Great Recession. 
Ganong and Liebman’s policy index is crude, constructed by 
calculating how many out of eight possible policies each state has 
adopted at each year and employing that ratio as a right-hand variable 
in each county’s SNAP take-up equation. This means, for example, 
that adoption of broad-based categorical eligibility is treated as hav-
ing the same incremental impact on the prevalence of SNAP receipt 
as substitution of phone interviews for in-person meetings for eli-
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gibility redetermination. Moreover, identification in the model is 
achieved because of variation across counties in unemployment rates 
and across states in the nuances of SNAP policy. But some important 
Great Recession policies, most notably elimination of the work test 
for ABAWDS and the increase in SNAP benefits, were implemented 
nationally, so no intercounty variation exists. The upshot is that 
Ganong and Liebman’s regression-based estimates of policy impact 
are suspect. 
To improve their estimate of some policy effects, Ganong and 
Liebman turn to the SNAP quality-control sample data (see Chap-
ter 3) and attempt to estimate the impact of policy change by count-
ing recipient households that in the absence of the policy would be 
ineligible. The results of this exercise on both the eve and the end 
of the Great Recession are reproduced in Table 4.2. Column 1 in the 
table, actual total enrollment for 2007, is the average monthly recipi-
ent count for the third quarter of the fiscal year (2007Q3) from the 
quality-control data.3 “Eligible under standard rules” is the Ganong 
Table 4.2 Ganong-Liebman Estimates of SNAP Enrollment Effects of 
Eligibility Changes, 2007–2011 
Enrollment
 (Millions of recipients) 
Policy-
Counter- induced 
Actual factual (2) − (3) 
2007 2011 2011 2011 
Total enrollment 26.04 45.14 
Eligible under standard rules 24.01 38.46 
Relaxed income and asset limits 
Income > standard threshold 0.42 1.68 0.67 1.01 
Assets > standard threshold 0.09 0.71 0.15 0.56 
Waiver of time limits for childless adults 1.52 4.30 2.43 1.87 
Total enrollment change, 2007–2011 19.1 3.44 
Share attributed to eligibility changes 0.18 
SOURCE: Reproduced from Ganong and Liebman (2013), Table 4. 
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and Liebman estimate of what the number of recipients would have 
been in the third quarter of 2007 in the absence of expanded cate-
gorical eligibility and waiver of the time limits in some states for 
ABAWDs. Thus, the estimated impact of these policies at the prere-
cession baseline of 2007Q3 was to increase the recipient count by 8.5 
percent—2.03 million people. The difference is allocated to relaxed 
income and asset limits or the nationwide suspension of ABAWD 
time limits. Since quality-control data do not include assets, the asset 
test estimate is derived from other sources. 
Numbers in column 2 of the table are interpreted similarly. The 
counterfactual estimate includes expansion of the numbers of recipi-
ents eligible because of waivers or ECE provisions in 2007 at the 
same rate of growth as the numbers of recipients eligible under stan-
dard rules. It incorporates no growth from waiver expansion or adop-
tion of ECE rules in other states. The difference reported in column 
4 is the change in enrollment attributed to the expansion of broad- 
based eligibility from 13 to 41 states and the waiver of the ABAWD 
time limit everywhere. The result is that an estimated 3.4 million of 
the total 19.1 million increase in enrollment from 2007 to 2011—18 
percent—is attributable to persons added to SNAP rolls as the result 
of policy changes in response to the Great Recession. 
Ganong and Liebman compare their estimates of impact to those 
of Mulligan (2012), as replicated in Table 4.3. Interpretation of this 
table is aided by understanding its connection to Table 4.2. Note that 
Table 4.3  Comparison of Ganong-Liebman and Mulligan Policy 
Impact Estimates 
% enrollment due to policy changes 
Policy GL (2011) CM (2010) 
Relaxed vehicle policies 0.0 12.0 
State BBCE adoption 3.5 5.7 
ABAWD waivers 4.1 2.3 
Total 7.6 20.0 
NOTE: “GL” = Ganong-Liebman; “CM” = Casey Mulligan. 
SOURCE: Ganong and Liebman (2013). 
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the reference point here is total enrollment on the reference date, not 
change in enrollment since some baseline. For Ganong and Liebman, 
this is 2011; Mulligan’s calculations are for 2010. Ganong and Lieb-
man’s estimate of 7.6 percent (the “Total” line in Table 4.3) is cal-
culated by dividing the estimated sum of “policy-induced” change 
in enrollment (3.44 million in Table 4.2) by total enrollment (45.14 
million).4 Two things become clear. First, neither Ganong and Lieb-
man nor Mulligan ascribes major responsibility for the level of SNAP
enrollment in 2010–2011 to policy response. For Ganong and Lieb-
man, the culprit is, of course, the recession-induced surge in unem-
ployment; for Mulligan it is the behavioral response to increases in 
benefits access and the work disincentives embedded in programs 
like UI and SNAP. The second conclusion is that the major share of 
the difference in impact stems from different treatment of the conse-
quence of eliminating or relaxing restrictions on vehicle equity value. 
For Mulligan, cars count. Ganong and Liebman assume no impact of 
vehicle policies, because most restrictions on automobile values were 
already in place by 2007. 
The Ganong and Liebman analysis is rich and thoughtful, and it 
is now regularly cited (cf. Moffitt [2015], p. 463). Disaggregation of 
the SNAP-unemployment response to the county level appears to pro-
vide significant improvement in understanding the response of SNAP
enrollment to economic distress. Ganong and Liebman’s discovery 
of a post–welfare reform rebound effect is useful in understanding 
the sources of differences in state SNAP caseload growth from early 
1999 through 2005. Their analysis of data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (included only in the 2013 version of the 
paper) provides insight into the impact of duration of unemployment 
on SNAP take-up. 
However, their analysis has significant shortcomings. One con-
cerns functional form. The Ganong and Liebman enrollment model 
treats SNAP take-up as a function of current unemployment rates and 
the unemployment rate in the two preceding years; however, the esti-
mated cumulative impact of a sustained increase in unemployment 
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substantially exceeds the short-term impact of a change. Ganong and 
Liebman then point out that their model implies that when recession 
abates and unemployment falls, enrollment decline will lag. But this 
is the product of the symmetry of functional form that is assumed: if 
there is a lag in response to the upturn, there must be a lag in response 
to the downturn. It may be true that what goes up must come down, 
but no reason is offered for assuming the same path is followed in 
both directions. 
Similarly, Ganong and Liebman’s (2018) model implies that 
when rules change, as in the adoption of broad-based categorical eli-
gibility, the full impact on caseload is achieved in the year following 
adoption. As is discussed in Chapter 3 (and in Ganong and Liebman 
[2013]), caseload growth is the outcome of relative rates of change 
in case openings and case closings. Rule changes affect these flows 
in different ways. It seems unlikely that the time pattern of response 
would be the same, and near-instantaneous, for all. 
A related issue concerns the way in which variation in eligibility 
standards affects take-up. Ganong and Liebman dismiss Mulligan’s 
(2012) assumption that changes in vehicle valuation requirements 
influenced enrollment expansion after 2007, because by 2007 most 
states had relaxed these vehicle valuation requirements from federal 
requirements. Indeed, in 2007, no state applied the federal regula-
tion (Food and Nutrition Service 2007). But Ganong and Liebman 
pay no attention to the characteristics of households that were at the 
margin of SNAP eligibility when the Great Recession hit. It seems 
likely that, given the unprecedented (in recent times) incidence of job 
loss, the recession reached further up the distribution of households as 
measured by previous income status and that, as a result, those losing 
income were more likely to own vehicles that had a value exceed-
ing what would have been applicable maximums. Thus, the change 
in vehicle policy not only changed program take-up in Ganong and 
Liebman’s second designated period, 2002–2007; it may also have 
facilitated access to SNAP for the families rendered newly needy by 
the combination of job loss and housing contraction. 
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As noted earlier, assessing the effect of broad-based categorical 
eligibility elimination of the SNAP assets test raises a larger issue con-
cerning inhibition. Valuing assets is not always easy, and the timing of 
resource measurement can make a difference—for example, whether 
bank accounts are measured on direct-deposit payday or the week 
before. In assessing the impact of removing the assets restrictions, the 
approach taken by Mulligan as well as by Ganong and Liebman is to 
presume that the Food and Nutrition Service had good-enough data 
on assets to fully evaluate the impact of the restriction. But giving a 
census interviewer a sense of one’s checking account is one thing; 
signing a certification on penalty of law is another. Again, the point 
is that elimination of the assets test may have removed an important 
psychological barrier to application for working-class families made 
SNAP-eligible because of recession-related income loss. 
ZILIAK 
Like Finifter and Prell (2013), James Ziliak (2016) uses the 
CPS-ASEC annual data to study the reported incidence across house-
holds of SNAP receipt at any time during the year. However, Ziliak’s 
focus is on the determinants of take-up, not on the overlap of SNAP
receipt with benefits such as UI. The core model is a linear probability 
function: 
(4.1) SNAPijt = α + Xijγ + Zjtδ + πj + φt + uijt . 
SNAPijt is an indicator equal to 1 if any member of household i in 
state j reports receiving SNAP in year t. Xij is a vector of demographic 
descriptors for the household, Zjt is a vector of economic and policy 
variables, πj is an indicator (fixed effect) for the household’s state of 
residence, φt is an indicator for the reference year, and uijt is a ran-
dom error term. The coefficients are estimated by least squares, and 
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standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The data cover 32 
years, 1980–2011. 
The demographic descriptors include various characteristics of 
the person designated by Census Bureau convention as household 
head, as well as measures of household composition. The economic 
descriptors include the state unemployment rate in the current as well 
as the two preceding years, median state income, and a measure of 
income dispersion. There are 20 variables measuring the state pol-
icy environment, including the level of the SNAP benefit schedule 
and the presence or absence of broad-based categorical eligibility. 
Because SNAP receipt may affect family income, family income is 
excluded from the model, but many of the demographic variables pro-
vide control for the expected economic status. 
Among other things, Ziliak finds substantial positive effects of 
the state’s unemployment rate (current and lagged) on the probability 
a household will report SNAP receipt, and various indicators of the 
level of SNAP benefits and ease of access. Notably, the presence of 
broad-based categorical eligibility is estimated to raise the prevalence 
of receipt by 0.6 percentage points in states that adopt the policy. 
Ziliak assumes no interactions among the variables included in 
Equation (4.1). The advantage of this assumption is that effects are 
additive, and the contribution of groups of variables to change over 
some interval can be calculated by comparing the change with and 
without alteration of these measures from baseline values. Ziliak 
divides variables into four groups: 
1) Measures of the state’s economy (unemployment rates, 
income distribution) 
2) Measures of nonfood policies (minimum wage, Earned 
Income Tax Credit, Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren [AFDC] /Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
[TANF] details) 
3) Measures of food policy (SNAP benefit, broad-based cat-
egorical eligibility, other state eligibility and procedural 
requirements) 
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4) Demographics (size of household, characteristics of house-
hold head, and so forth) 
He then calculates increase in the prevalence of SNAP receipt 
from a baseline year that would have been predicted to occur in the 
absence of change in the state’s values for the variables in each group, 
allowing the other variables to change as recorded. 
Ziliak performs these estimates for three periods, 2007–2011, 
2000–2011, and 1980–2011. The results for 2007–2011 are illustra-
tive: the baseline (2007) household participation rate was 6.5 per-
cent; the rate in 2011 was 11.0 percent, 69 percent higher.5 Using 
regression estimates for Equation (4.1), Ziliak calculates that had the 
economy variables been held constant for all states at 2007 levels 
and all else allowed to change, the predicted increase in SNAP take-
up would have been 35.8 percent. Hence the economy accounted for 
(68.7 − 35.8) / 68.7 = 47.9 percent of the change. Similar calculations 
attribute 1.6 percent of the increase to change in nonfood policies, 
28.5 percent to change in food policies, and −3.7 percent to demo-
graphics (i.e., average household characteristics changed in ways that 
to a small extent offset the effects of other factors). The bottom line: 
the economy was twice as important in determining the SNAP case-
load change between 2007 and 2011 as was change in food policy, 
including the expansion of broad-based categorical eligibility evident 
in Figure 3.1 from Chapter 3 of this book. The implication—indeed, 
the assumed structure of the model requires it—is that when the econ-
omy improves, should policy retreat, take-up will decline. Ziliak uses 
the regression to predict a decline of 12.2 percent following expira-
tion at the end of Fiscal Year 2013 of the benefit increase created by 
ARRA (p. 33). 
Note that the combination of estimated effects of the four variable 
groups for the change in the SNAP participation rate between 2007 
and 2011 accounts for 74.2 percent of the total increase. The residual, 
over a quarter of the entire change, is accounted for by year fixed 
effects, the φt in Equation (4.1). It is instructive to look at the pattern 
of the fixed effects estimates. In Figure 4.1, the sum of the intercept 
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Figure 4.1 Intercept plus Year Fixed Effects, SNAP Participation 
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SOURCE: Ziliak (2016). 
and the year fixed effect is plotted for each year of the entire time 
span of the Ziliak sample. The change in bar height between dates is 
the amount of the increase (or reduction in the decrease) in the par-
ticipation rate not attributed to alteration in values of other variables 
in the model. For 2007–2011, the change is 0.12. This “unexplained” 
component is slightly more than a quarter of the total take-up rate 
increase over the period. 
Years ago, the “year fixed effects” would have been termed 
“dummy variables,” and caution is in order in their interpretation. 
The important message is that there is a substantial component of the 
SNAP take-up during the Great Recession that is greater than would 
have been predicted based on changes in the various components of 
Ziliak’s variable catalog. Moreover, the effect is constant over the 
three years 2009–2011. This unidentified component of change coin-
cident to the Great Recession poses a significant problem for forecast-
ing the future. One obvious next step would be to enrich the depic-
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tion of policy (the Ziliak model includes no representation of state 
ABAWD policy and no reference to variation in other policies—nota-
bly UI—likely to affect SNAP take-up) and add years. The problem 
with extension is that the catalog of state policies developed by the 
USDA’s Economic Research Service and used by Ziliak has not at 
this writing been updated, and the data on timing and content of state 
policy collected by the Food and Nutrition Service are problematic. 
This is in part because of mysteries surrounding how TANF funds are 
used to confer categorical eligibility—in other words, the “base” in 
“broad-based categorical eligibility” is poorly defined. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions emerge from this literature review: 
• Liberalization of policy led to a steady increase in SNAP par-
ticipation from 2001 on. 
• The surge in SNAP participation as unemployment rose in 
the Great Recession was consistent with previous correlation 
evidence. 
• Change in the ABAWD rules contributed significantly to the 
increase in SNAP receipt during the Great Recession. 
• The impact of other policies associated with broad-based cat-
egorical eligibility is difficult to ascertain, in part because of 
uncertainty of timing and lack of attention to the time pattern 
of change in take-up in response to broad-based categorical 
eligibility implementation. 
• It appears, from Rothstein and Valletta (2014), that SNAP
played a greater role in income support for UI recipients dur-
ing the Great Recession than was observed in the Lesser Re-
cession, and that the importance of SNAP increased with UI 
exhaustion. 
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• Symmetry is an issue: must what went up (SNAP receipt) 
with the surge in joblessness come down with recovery, or 
did changes in SNAP policy produce a structural change in 
program take-up that will be sustained? 
We end on this point: there is much to be learned from study at 
the state level, especially if better data can be obtained on the pattern 
of receipt of UI and SNAP benefits over time. 
Notes 
1. A revised version of their paper (Rothstein and Valletta 2017) was 
released as a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 
in 2017. The revision, done for publication, combines analysis of UI 
recipient experience in the 2001 and 2007–2009 recessions because 
“reviewers generally felt that the differences in UI exhaustion effects 
between the 2001 and 2007–09 recessions were not substantial enough 
to consistently highlight them throughout the paper” (Rothstein and Val-
letta, e-mail to author). However, the difference in SNAP utilization is 
important to this chapter, and the general results from the Rothstein and 
Valletta analysis do not differ between versions. 
2. The original version of the Ganong and Liebman paper includes impor-
tant additional analyses. See Ganong and Liebman (2013). 
3. The quality-control numbers are slightly lower than official recipient 
counts because the quality-control data set excludes cases judged in the 
quality-control audit to have been granted benefits in error. 
4. Ganong and Liebman’s (2013) version of Table 4.3 includes a small 
inconsistency within the data they report in the original version of Table 
4.2 for state broad-based categorical eligibility adoption. This is cor-
rected here. 
5. We thank James P. Ziliak for providing these data and the information 
on year fixed effects presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Chapter 5 
UI and SNAP Receipt
in the Sunshine State 
The Great Recession 
and Its Aftermath in Florida 
Colleen M. Heflin 
Syracuse University 
Peter R. Mueser 
University of Missouri 
In this chapter, we examine the Unemployment Insurance (UI) par-
ticipation of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
recipients in Florida—the state with the nation’s third-largest SNAP
caseload—from 2007 to early 2012. We explore issues related to 
• patterns and timing of joint receipt; 
• the monetary value of income from earnings; and 
• UI receipt for SNAP recipients in the quarter before partici-
pation, the quarter during participation, and the quarter after 
exiting SNAP. 
We find that patterns of joint use in Florida changed dramatically 
during the recession. However, during the recovery, return to prior 
patterns was slow. Although the economic value of UI was high for 
those receiving it and the growth in the caseload was dramatic, levels 
of UI participation remained modest during the Great Recession for 
SNAP recipients in Florida. 
Entering the twenty-first century, Florida’s economy was strong 
and mirrored that of the nation. From 1996 to 2002, the state annual 
unemployment rate in Florida stayed within two-tenths of a percentage 
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point of the national average. In 2003, however, Florida’s unemploy-
ment rate began to fall sharply, ahead of the also-declining national 
unemployment rate (Figure 5.1). In 2006, as economists were debat-
ing the consequences of having a national unemployment rate under 
5 percent, the annual unemployment rate in Florida fell to below 3 
percent. Then, as the national annualized unemployment rate hovered 
between 4 and 5 percent in 2007, Florida’s unemployment rate began 
to climb. In the first half of 2008, the state’s unemployment rate over-
took the national rate. As of January 2010, Florida’s unemployment 
rate was among the highest 10 in the nation at 11.5 percent—a 5.3 
percentage point increase over the June 2008 level and a more than 
threefold increase in less than three years. In contrast to other states 
that witnessed their largest declines in employment in manufacturing, 
Florida lost over 250,000 jobs in the construction industry between 
December 2006 and December 2009 (BLS 2016). Insofar as Florida 
has a combination of a diverse labor force, a strong service-sector 
Figure 5.1  Monthly Unemployment Rate: U.S. and Florida 
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economy, and a large aging population, results from our analysis of 
Florida may well preview the coming American condition. 
The Department of Children and Families in Florida serviced 
a SNAP caseload with 3.6 million SNAP recipients in December 
2012, accounting for 7.5 percent of the 47.8 million participants in 
the United States (USDA 2013). Figure 5.2 shows that growth in the 
Florida SNAP caseload followed the national trend closely from the 
beginning of 2003 to mid-2007. However, from May 2007 to the pres-
ent the rate of growth in the SNAP caseload has been substantially 
greater than that of the nation as a whole.1 Participation rates among 
the eligible population in Florida were historically below the national 
average, but they increased dramatically over the first decade of the 
century, approaching the national figure by 2009. 
In terms of specific SNAP policies, Florida eliminated vehicles as 
countable assets2 for most families in October 2001, adopted narrow 
categorical eligibility in October 2002 (Falk and Aussenberg 2013), 
and adopted simplified reporting in 2003 (Cody, Nogales, and Sama-
Figure 5.2  SNAP Caseload, Households: U.S. and Florida 
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Martin 2008). In July 2010, Florida adopted broad-based categorical 
eligibility, which increased the number of individuals subject to less 
restrictive SNAP eligibility rules. In addition, Florida has led modern-
ization efforts by moving to an online SNAP application process and 
substituting call centers for brick-and-mortar offices. 
Turning to Florida’s UI policy, during the period of our study, 
state monetary eligibility provisions required UI-covered employ-
ment in two of the first four of the past five quarters and minimum 
total earnings of $3,200 in the previous 18 months. In addition, in 
order to qualify for UI, workers had to have separated from their 
employer for certain reasons: because they were laid off or forced 
into compulsory retirement, because they had to move with the trans-
fer of a military spouse, or because of personal illness. Florida did not 
provide a dependency allowance, and benefits ranged from a mini-
mum weekly level of $32 to a maximum of $275, among the lowest 
in the country. Thus, UI participant households without other sources 
of income were generally eligible for SNAP. On the other hand, the 
likelihood of SNAP recipients participating in UI was lower than in 
states with more generous UI eligibility provision. 
UI program participation was substantially smaller than that of 
the SNAP program during our observation period. Figure 5.3 provides 
an estimate of the number of UI recipients, identifying the cumulative 
number of benefit recipients from each of the three UI programs: 1) 
the regular UI program, 2) the Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation (EUC) program, and 3) the Extended Benefits (EB) program. 
The shaded area of Figure 5.3 indicates the maximum number of 
weeks of benefits available from these three programs over the time 
period. As expected, UI program participation was highly cyclical 
during the study period. The number of UI recipients was in the range 
of 100,000 from 2007 through Summer 2008, when it increased dra-
matically and reached a peak of approximately 500,000 near the end 
of the recession in 2009. After that, the number of recipients began to 
decline, reaching about 350,000 during 2010, then 200,000 by the end 
Regular UI Weeks 
EB Weeks 
EUC08 + Regular UI Recipients 
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Figure 5.3  Total Number of UI Recipients by Program Source (bars), 
and Maximum Weeks of UI Available (lines): Florida 
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of 2011, and declining to under 100,000 by the end of 2013—below 
prerecession levels. 
Relative to the five states considered in other chapters, Florida 
experienced a substantially larger growth in its SNAP caseload. In 
Chapter 3 (Figure 3.12), we see that from 2007 to 2013, Florida’s 
caseload increased by a multiple of more than 2.7. Maryland experi-
enced the second greatest increase (about 2.5), followed by Georgia 
(2.3). SNAP growth in the three other states was less than the growth 
in the national caseload, which did not quite double. 
In large part, this caseload growth reflects the dramatic decline in 
Florida’s economy, as indicated by the unemployment-rate increase 
in Figure 5.1. Although the unemployment rate in Michigan exceeded 
that in Florida during the Great Recession, Michigan’s increase was 
smaller given that the rate was already around 7 percent prior to the 
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onset of the recession. The rise in the participation rate among those 
eligible is an equally important explanation for Florida’s SNAP case-
load growth. Florida’s participation increase exceeded that of any of 
the other five states: from 2003 to 2011, this measure rose from 0.48 
to 0.83, an increase of over 70 percent, which substantially exceeded 
the next greatest increase (Maryland, 60 percent) and the national 
average increase of 40 percent (Chapter 3, Table 3.1). 
DATA 
Monthly data on participants in regular SNAP for the period 
from July 2007 to April 2012 come from administrative case records 
maintained by the Florida Department of Children and Families in 
computer-readable form. The information in these records includes 
monthly benefits paid and reported income, as well as demographic 
and geographic characteristics of all eligible individuals in house-
holds receiving SNAP benefits. Normally, benefits are paid on a 
monthly basis, and we count any month in which a benefit check was 
provided to the household as a month of SNAP receipt for each eli-
gible individual in the household. However, to account for adminis-
trative churn, we smoothed SNAP spells by removing interruptions 
of a single month. 
Data on employment and earnings come from quarterly wage 
records provided by covered employers in the state and maintained 
by the Florida UI system, matched at our request to the universe of 
SNAP recipients. This source of earnings reports omits earnings from 
informal and illegal employment, federal or military employment, 
and employment outside the state. Notwithstanding these omissions, 
earnings measures based on these kinds of data are comparable in 
accuracy to those obtained in surveys, and studies suggest that pro-
gram evaluations using such data do not suffer important biases 
(Wallace and Haveman 2007). We also use weekly data on UI ben-
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efit receipt obtained from the Florida Agency for Workforce Innova-
tion, again matched to the universe of SNAP recipients. We code any 
month containing the Saturday of a week in which UI payments were 
made as a month of UI receipt for the individual identified as the 
payee. These data are available for the period July 2007 to April 2012. 
Although UI benefits accrue to individuals, the unit of analysis is the 
household, and UI benefit receipt and earnings for the household are 
those accruing to SNAP-eligible individuals in the household. 
As is the case for the other state chapters, the analyses that fol-
low are limited to SNAP households with at least one eligible SNAP
recipient who was at least 18 years of age and younger than 65.3 UI 
receipt outside this age range was very low because of the structure of 
program rules. This means that SNAP “child only” cases are omitted, 
since adults in such a household are not classified as SNAP recipients. 
RESULTS 
Our discussion of the results of our study covers four topics: 
1) The overlap between UI and SNAP receipt 
2) The connection between UI and SNAP take-up and economic 
development and policy evolution 
3) Characteristics of SNAP households 
4) Support provided by UI and SNAP 
Overlap between UI Receipt and SNAP 
In this section, we present details about the dynamics of joint UI 
and SNAP receipt. Working from the universe of SNAP households in 
our study group (SNAP households with participants aged 18 to 64), 
we document the changing dynamics of the SNAP caseload as well as 
in joint participation in UI and SNAP. 
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Figure 5.4  SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Florida 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
Figure 5.4 presents the total caseload in Florida at the household 
level for our SNAP study group from October 2005 to June 2012. 
The caseload remained at about 450,000 from late 2005 to mid-2007, 
when it began to rise rapidly to the historic caseload high of 1.5 mil-
lion households during 2012. 
Figure 5.5 presents our measure of joint receipt, which is the 
percentage of SNAP households in our study group with a member 
receiving UI benefits. This measure, shown with the triangle marker, 
was quite low prior to the Great Recession, consistent with the level 
of joint receipt in other states. However, joint participation grew to a 
high of 13.1 percent in January 2010—a higher level than that expe-
rienced in most other states. After that, joint participation dropped 
steadily each month to around 5 percent by April 2012, the end of 
our observation period. Over this period, households entering SNAP
were somewhat more likely to be receiving UI (solid line in Figure 
5.5) than the average SNAP recipient (dashed line), reflecting the fact 
that economic hardship often led to entry into both UI and SNAP at 
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Figure 5.5  UI Receipt among SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 
18 to 64: Florida 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
around the same time. Before 2008, those receiving UI would almost 
surely have exhausted benefits within six months, whereas often fam-
ilies continued to receive SNAP after leaving UI. 
In addition to UI participation by new SNAP recipients, the level 
of UI participation is also a function of the variation in program entry 
and exit among continuing SNAP recipients.4 In order to examine 
these dynamics, Figure 5.6 presents the percentage entering and exit-
ing UI each month among continuing SNAP households. Among all 
SNAP households, the percentage of the SNAP caseload exiting UI 
was higher than the percentage entering UI in all but a few months, 
reflecting the movement off of UI that occurred as even extensive 
durations of benefits were exhausted. The exceptions occurred in July 
2008, November 2008, and November 2009—all points in time that 
roughly correspond with UI benefit expansions, which allowed some 
SNAP recipients who had previously exhausted their UI benefits to 
return to the UI rolls. Overall, however, it is clear that the growth in 
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Figure 5.6  Monthly UI Entries and Exits for SNAP Households 
Relative to SNAP Caseload, Households with Recipients 
Aged 18 to 64: Florida 
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UI receipt in the SNAP caseload was due to the growing number of 
entering SNAP recipients receiving UI. 
Notable, however, are the particularly high levels of UI exit 
among continuing SNAP households after January 2010. This increase 
is largely a function of the fact that many more SNAP recipients were 
receiving UI at that point, so the proportion of SNAP recipients at 
risk for exiting UI (due either to the exhaustion of UI entitlement or 
to exit because of reemployment) was much greater. To get a sense 
of the underlying mechanism, Figure 5.7 indicates the percentage 
of UI-SNAP households that exit UI in a given month. Through the 
beginning of 2008, approximately 25 percent of UI recipients dis-
continued UI each month, consistent with a normal maximum ben-
efit length of less than six months. In 2008, with the extension of UI 
eligibility, that departure rate declined dramatically, so that through 
most of 2009 it hovered between 5 and 10 percent. With the improve-
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Figure 5.7  Percentage of SNAP-UI Household That Exit UI by Month, 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Florida 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
ment in the economy and the exhaustion of benefit entitlement, the 
exit rate increased in the subsequent two years to over 10 percent. In 
fact, it ranged between 10 and 15 percent for most months during the 
remainder of our period. 
Overall, it is clear that both the SNAP and UI caseloads increased 
much more dramatically in Florida than in the United States as a 
whole. Joint participation in UI among the SNAP recipients for Flor-
ida also increased sharply during the Great Recession and greatly 
exceeded joint participation nationally. This growth was driven 
largely by high UI usage among new SNAP entrants. While levels of 
joint participation at the end of our study period remained above those 
at the beginning, the steady decline points to a likely future return to 
former (prerecession) levels. The decline in joint participation in UI 
observed during the period of recovery from the Great Recession is 
largely a function of the decline in new SNAP recipients receiving UI 
and an increase in departures from UI by SNAP recipients. 
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Connection between UI and SNAP Take-Up and Economic 
Development and Policy Evolution 
Figure 5.1 makes clear that after an extended period of growth, 
Florida was particularly hard hit by the Great Recession. By 2009, 
Florida’s unemployment rate was as much as 2 percentage points 
above the national average. By the fourth quarter of 2012, the aver-
age duration of UI benefits stood at 20.3 weeks, above the national 
average of 17.1 weeks. The percentage of recipients exhausting UI 
benefits in Florida was 70.1 percent, well above the national average 
of 47.2 percent and the highest in the country (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2013). 
Since the welfare reform of the 1990s, federal regulations have 
limited SNAP receipt to three months in any three-year period for 
individuals who are classified as able-bodied adults without depen-
dents (ABAWDs), who are at least age 18 and younger than 50, and 
who are not working. A provision in the policy explicitly waives this 
restriction in counties where high unemployment rates indicate insuf-
ficient job availability. Given Florida’s strong economy through the 
end of 2007, there were essentially no areas of the state that qualified 
for waivers prior to 2009. However, in early 2009, with implemen-
tation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the entire 
state was exempted. As a result, not only did the recession lead to a 
dramatic deterioration in the job market, but SNAP restrictions on 
participation were eased for a subset of the population. 
In Figure 5.8, we see that the percentage of ABAWD households 
among all SNAP households in our study group more than doubled 
during the Great Recession, from 20 percent in October 2005 to 42 
percent by January 2011.5 Although the growth began in 2008, it was 
particularly rapid in 2009 before leveling off in 2010. Since late 2010, 
the percentage of Florida SNAP households in this group has remained 
relatively stable at around 42 percent. Overall, ABAWDs make up a 
higher percentage of the total caseload in Florida than in the other 
states considered in this volume (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.14). Among 
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Figure 5.8  Percentage of ABAWDs in SNAP Households and SNAP
Households with UI Recipient: Florida Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
joint UI-SNAP participants, the percentage of ABAWDs was greater 
still, doubling from around 25 percent in October 2005 to 50 percent 
by the end of our observation period. 
Characteristics of SNAP Households 
The Great Recession affected segments of the population that 
in most times had found relative success in the labor market. As in 
most prior recessions, men were particularly likely to be affected, but 
the impact this time was more dramatic, causing some to dub it a 
“mancession.” The SNAP caseload became more male dominated as 
a result of the Great Recession (Figure 5.9). The percentage of SNAP
households in our study group headed by single women dropped from 
55.9 percent in October 2005 to 42.5 percent in January 2011. Among 
the SNAP households receiving UI, the drop was even steeper: from 
60 percent in November 2005 to 36.4 percent in February 2010. 
While the pattern is consistent with that found in other states, the 
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Figure 5.9  Percentage Female Headed: SNAP Households and SNAP
Households with UI: Florida Households with Recipients 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
drop is larger in Florida and can be explained by the rise in the male 
unemployment rate and the increase in the ABAWD SNAP caseload. 
Of particular interest, this change in the composition of recipients has 
endured, and it shows only the slightest hint of returning to previous 
levels during the period of economic recovery. 
Figure 5.10 presents the percentage of the Florida SNAP recipi-
ents in our study sample with multiple adults in the household. The 
percentage of multiple-adult households was 19.4 percent in October 
2005, fell slightly to 17.5 percent in July 2007, rose to 21.3 percent 
in October of 2009, and then fell again to 19.6 percent by April 2012. 
While the total change is only about 4 percentage points, the pattern 
is not consistent with that for ABAWDs. The percentage of the SNAP
recipients participating in UI made up of multiple-adult households 
is higher than that for SNAP recipients as a whole; this is in large 
part a reflection of the fact that having more adults in the households 
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Figure 5.10  Multiple Adults, SNAP Households, and SNAP Households 
with UI Recipient: Florida Households with Recipients 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
increases the number of individuals potentially eligible to receive UI 
benefits. In October of 2005, 26.5 percent of SNAP recipients on UI 
lived in multiple-adult households; that percentage rose to a high of 
35.3 percent in October 2009 and then declined to about 30 percent 
by August 2011. 
The age distribution of Florida’s SNAP recipients changed dra-
matically during our observation period, as shown in Figures 5.11 
and 5.12. While households with children made up about half of the 
SNAP caseload in our study group in October 2005, the percentage 
slowly and steadily fell to about 35 percent by June 2011, where it 
remained until April 2012 without any sign of recovery. The per-
centage of households receiving both SNAP and UI that contained 
children was even higher, at 70.4 percent in November 2005; it also 
declined fairly continuously over that time period, down to 42.9 per-
cent by 2012. The pattern for the elderly is less dramatic but similar: 
households with elderly recipients (aged 60 or older) made up about 
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Figure 5.11  Percentage with Children, SNAP Households, and SNAP
Households with UI Recipient: Florida Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
Households receiving SNAP 
Households receiving SNAP & UI 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
Figure 5.12  Percentage with Elderly Recipients, SNAP Households, and 
SNAP Households with UI Recipient: Florida Households 
with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
12 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
O
ct
-1
1 
Fe
b-
12
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
n-
12
 
Ju
n-
12
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
UI and SNAP Receipt in the Sun  193 
9 percent of the SNAP caseload in our study sample in late 2005, 
experiencing a slow decline to about 8 percent in mid-2009, where 
the level remained until April 2012. In contrast, the percentage of 
SNAP households jointly participating in UI that contained an elderly 
person rose from 3 percent in October 2005 to 5 percent in April 
2012, perhaps as a result of the rise in multiple-generation housing 
arrangements. 
As the total SNAP caseload drew in more able-bodied workers 
made jobless by the Great Recession, the percentage of the Florida 
SNAP caseload having a recipient with disabilities, shown in Fig-
ure 5.13, fell dramatically. Beginning in October 2005, around 35 
percent of SNAP households contained a recipient with disabilities. 
This percentage increased to 38.3 percent in May 2007 before falling 
steadily to 22.3 percent in January 2011. In part, the shrinking share 
is likely a result of the relative stability of the size of the population 
with disabilities. Although at a much lower level, the percentage of 
Figure 5.13  Percentage with Disabled Recipients, SNAP Households, 
and SNAP Households with UI Recipient: Florida 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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disabled SNAP recipients participating in UI follows a similar pattern 
when evaluated in proportional terms: the share of jointly participat-
ing households containing a disabled recipient was around 7.5 percent 
in October 2005, increased to 9.1 percent in December 2006, then fell 
to around 5 percent by mid-2011. 
Florida has large African American and Hispanic populations and 
is generally more ethnically diverse than the nation as a whole; His-
panics make up a much larger share of the total population of Florida 
compared to the nation. Figure 5.14 demonstrates that whites made 
up the largest share of the SNAP households in our study group, with 
the percentage increasing over the period of our study. Conversely, 
the African American share dropped by a similar amount: about 3 per-
centage points. The share of the SNAP caseload made up of Hispanics 
remained stable throughout the period. 
The racial and ethnic composition of joint UI-SNAP participants 
has a similar pattern, but the size of the shift was much greater (Fig-
Figure 5.14  Racial and Ethnic Composition, SNAP Households: Florida 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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ure 5.15). The percentage of African Americans dropped from 48.7 
percent to 30.4 percent, while the percentage of whites rose from 24.5 
percent to 41.5 percent; the share of the joint caseload made up of 
Hispanics showed little change over this period. 
In the cases of both SNAP and joint UI-SNAP participation, these 
shifts reflect the nature of the recession at the national level. In Flor-
ida, however, construction suffered a particularly dramatic contrac-
tion, which may have accentuated these patterns. Relative to other 
industries with highly cyclical employment patterns, construction is 
much less likely to employ African American workers. Although we 
do not have information on industrial sectors for the UI recipients in 
our sample, the observed patterns are consistent with large numbers 
of whites facing unemployment in construction. 
Florida has both very large urban centers (e.g., Miami, Orlando) 
and rural counties with low population density. In contrast to the dis-
Figure 5.15  Racial and Ethnic Composition, SNAP Households with UI 
Recipient: Florida Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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tribution observed in other states, Figure 5.16 shows that the rural-
urban mix of SNAP households remained stable throughout the entire 
observation period. Among those jointly participating in SNAP and 
UI, the percentage of recipient households located in nonmetropoli-
tan counties fell from about 6.5 percent in late 2007 to 4.5 percent 
in mid-2009 before fluctuating between 5 and 6 percent for the next 
several years. 
In summary, characteristics of households on SNAP and those 
jointly participating in both SNAP and UI in Florida changed dramat-
ically as a result of the Great Recession. Caseloads became increas-
ingly made up of male-headed and white households, with smaller 
shares of households with children, individuals with disabilities, and 
African Americans. While these shifts reflect the underlying eco-
nomic changes experienced by Florida over this study period, the 
shifts are also noteworthy for the way in which they reflect expanded 
participation in SNAP by less traditionally vulnerable groups, which, 
Figure 5.16  Nonmetropolitian Areas, SNAP Households, and SNAP
Households with UI Recipient: Florida Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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because of the slowness of the economic recovery, carried over long 
after the economy began to grow. 
Support Provided by UI and SNAP 
In this section, we present information on the role of SNAP and 
UI benefits in providing financial support to low-income households 
before, during, and after the Great Recession. Additionally, we pro-
vide information on the connection of SNAP households to the paid 
labor force throughout this period. Our initial discussion focuses on 
income from SNAP, UI, and employment for new entrants to SNAP, 
examining how this varies by time of entry and, in particular, in 
response to the onset of the Great Recession. We then turn to an anal-
ysis of the experience of households that exited SNAP. 
New SNAP entrants are defined as those who had not received 
SNAP in the previous two months. Since earnings information is 
available only on a calendar-quarter basis, Table 5.1 provides four 
columns of information pertaining to the calendar quarter prior to 
SNAP entry, the quarter of entry, and the first and second calendar 
quarters after the start of SNAP receipt. In order to identify the SNAP
experience, we limit the latter two categories to households receiving 
SNAP through full calendar quarters. Five panels indicate entry into 
SNAP at different times. In the earliest period (October 2005–Decem-
ber 2006), 73.9 percent of households continued to receive SNAP
through at least one quarter, and 43 percent received SNAP through 
at least two quarters. Both figures increased substantially with the 
onset of the recession as households received SNAP benefits for lon-
ger periods, although by 2011–2012 the numbers had declined to well 
below the 2005–2006 level, reflecting a return to higher levels of exit 
from SNAP. 
About two-fifths of new SNAP entrants worked during the quar-
ter before or during the same quarter in which they entered SNAP. In 
addition, comparing the panels for various periods of entry, we see 
only small differences in these measures, suggesting that the connec-
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Table 5.1  Sources of Income for New SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Florida 
Spells extending Spells extending 
All spells through at least through at least 
Quarter prior to Quarter of 1st quarter after 2nd quarter after 
SNAP entry SNAP entry entry quarter entry quarter 
SNAP spells beginning October 2005–December 2006 
# spells 471,808 471,808 348,703 202,947 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 73.9 43.0 
% with any earnings 42.3 44.1 42.7 38.4 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 3,945 3,119 3,610 3,479 
% with UI benefits 1.6 3.5 3.1 2.3 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,356 1,541 1,669 1,282 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 392 639 633 
SNAP spells beginning January 2007–December 2007 
# spells 448,911 448,911 340,196 215,585 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 75.8 48.0 
% with any earnings 40.5 40.8 41.1 38.9 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,108 3,224 3,680 3,583 
% with UI benefits 3.7 6.3 5.2 3.7 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,501 1,662 1,796 1,363 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 398 658 660 
SNAP spells beginning January 2008–December 2009 
# spells 607,960 607,960 463,141 313,118 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 76.2 51.5 
% with any earnings 46.2 45.9 42.2 37.9 
   199 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,353 3,350 3,671 3,569 
% with UI benefits 6.5 11.9 12.2 12.5 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,697 1,873 2,276 2,343 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 422 710 768 
SNAP spells beginning January 2010–December 2010 
# spells 1,813,302 1,813,302 1,489,196 1,046,901 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 82.1 57.7 
% with any earnings 41.4 39.6 36.6 34.2 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,597 3,505 3,767 3,632 
% with UI benefits 12.2 17.4 16.5 14.8 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,394 2,415 2,645 2,536 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 466 782 783 
SNAP spells beginning January 2011–June 2012 
# spells 1,467,942 1,467,942 964,596 527,885 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 65.7 36.0 
% with any earnings 40.0 39.5 38.2 35.5 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,894 3,780 4,090 3,951 
% with UI benefits 8.8 12.2 11.2 10.0 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,154 2,052 2,366 2,343 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 425 735 747 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
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tion to the labor force prior to entry remained relatively constant in 
Florida, notwithstanding the disruption of the Great Recession. How-
ever, we observe that the recession was associated with an increase 
in average prior earnings for those with earnings, amounting to about 
15 percent in 2008 relative to the first period and over 20 percent by 
the last period of our study. This indicates that an increasing num-
ber of households with higher prior earnings were drawn into SNAP
because of the recession. Interestingly, turning to Table 5.2, those 
leaving SNAP who had earnings also were likely to have had higher 
earnings after the onset of the recession. Still, a decreasing number 
of households had positive earnings in later periods, indicating clear 
growth in the number of people suffering joblessness. 
As noted above, the level of UI receipt among SNAP entrants 
increased over our observation period. Consistent with Figure 5.5, 
the percentage of those receiving UI in the quarter of entry peaks 
at between 15 and 20 percent in 2010. As expected, UI receipt was 
higher in the quarter of SNAP entry than in the quarter before or after 
SNAP entry, confirming the view that many households took up UI 
and SNAP concurrently. The average value of UI benefits at the time 
of entry also was highest in 2010, averaging around $2,400 per quar-
ter. In terms of the value of UI benefits for those receiving benefits, 
in every year, the value of UI benefits was highest after SNAP entry. 
For those households receiving UI, the value of UI dwarfed the 
value of SNAP, regardless of the period considered. In the quarter 
after SNAP entry for those receiving UI, UI payments averaged 
between $1,500 and $2,500, whereas average SNAP benefits were 
in the range of $600 to $800. While these SNAP averages are for all 
cases in our study group, if we look at SNAP recipients receiving UI, 
the average benefits were quite similar. 
In Table 5.2, the second and third columns distinguish SNAP
spells that lasted less than three calendar quarters (constituting the 
majority) from longer spells. As we might expect, among households 
with longer periods of SNAP receipt, rates of employment follow-
ing exit were lower; although for those employed, earnings were the 
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same or slightly higher. Although those with longer SNAP spells were 
appreciably less likely to continue receiving UI payments (in part 
because of exhaustion of benefits), other differences were relatively 
modest. 
In summary, we find that a large share of SNAP households in 
our study were connected to the labor market before, during, and after 
the period of SNAP receipt. UI benefits were of substantially higher 
value than SNAP benefits, despite Florida’s low maximum benefit 
amount, and joint program participation provided an important ben-
efit to SNAP-UI households. 
CONCLUSION 
The Great Recession induced important changes in patterns of 
both SNAP and UI receipt. The number of people receiving SNAP
benefits increased dramatically. For a growing share of SNAP recipi-
ents, UI and SNAP were combined, and reliance on SNAP became 
secondary for many of these households. Because UI eligibility rests 
on work history and employment separation status, many disadvan-
taged workers were not eligible for benefits. In addition, some disad-
vantaged workers who might have been eligible failed to apply for 
UI (Gould-Werth and Shaefer 2012; Shaefer and Wu 2011). That the 
growth in the number of SNAP recipients was over three times greater 
than the growth in the number of joint SNAP-UI recipients makes 
clear the significant limits to the cushion provided by UI to disadvan-
taged individuals when the economy was in distress. 
Looking forward, Florida, like a number of other states, has 
enacted legislation that reduces the number of weeks of UI eligibility 
to as little as 12 weeks during periods of low unemployment, and to 
no more than 23 weeks even during economic downturns. With this 
change, Florida has reduced UI support for those with chronically 
unstable employment and has increased the role that SNAP will play 
for these families. When the next recession occurs, the burden to aid 
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Table 5.2  Sources of Income after Completion of SNAP for Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Florida
Quarter after last quarter of SNAP 
Spells spanning Spells spanning 
3 or fewer 4 or more 
All spells calendar quarters calendar quarters 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in October 2005–December 2006 
# spells 493,361 307,413 185,948 
% of all spells 100.0 62.3 37.7 
% with any earnings 47.3 48.3 44.8 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,573 4,550 4,692 
% with UI benefits 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,315 1,417 1,227 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2007–December 2007 
# spells 377,639 242,960 134,679 
% of all spells 100.0 64.3 35.7 
% with any earnings 45.7 47.3 42.8 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,676 4,630 4,814 
% with UI benefits 2.4 2.8 2.3 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,449 1,514 1,359 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2008–December 2009 
# spells 444,644 304,199 140,445 
% of all spells 100.0 68.4 31.6 
% with any earnings 46.3 48.3 40.0 
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Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,668 4,620 4,706 
% with UI benefits 6.1 7.3 4.9 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,996 2,091 1,824 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2010–December 2010 
# spells 1,201,957 795,331 406,626 
% of all spells 100.0 66.2 33.8 
% with any earnings 42.2 43.6 38.5 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,931 4,940 4,913 
% with UI benefits 11.3 13.1 7.6 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,588 2,703 2,103 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2012–December 2012 
# spells 1,129,369 651,595 477,774 
% of all spells 100.0 57.7 42.3 
% with any earnings 43.1 44.1 40.9 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 5,312 5,329 5,261 
% with UI benefits 6.9 8.1 5.2 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,214 2,348 1,895 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Florida program administrative data. 
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
  
   
 
  
204 Heflin and Mueser 
jobless workers and stabilize consumption will increasingly lie with 
the federal government, which provides funding for SNAP. 
Despite the fact that the UI and SNAP programs were designed to 
serve different populations, the Great Recession led to a meaningful 
amount of overlap. UI was of substantial value for poor families in 
Florida, despite the low UI benefit compensation rate relative to other 
states. Nonetheless, our results also suggest important limitations on 
the role of UI in helping those at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion, most of whom weathered the recession with SNAP alone. Given 
recent legislation in Florida and other states to reduce the generosity 
of the UI system, we may not be able to look to UI to fill in gaps in 
the income safety net in the future. 
Notes 
1. Figure 5.2 presents the count of all SNAP cases. In contrast, the analyses 
below consider an analysis group to be limited to SNAP households 
having a recipient aged 18 to 64. Emergency SNAP payments are omit-
ted from Figure 5.2 and all analyses in this chapter. Although insignifi-
cant for the nation as a whole, for Florida emergency payments cause 
noticeable temporary spikes in SNAP caseloads following major hur-
ricanes, which occur every few years. The largest hurricanes also cause 
spikes in the nonemergency SNAP caseload, as was the case in 2005 
(seen in Figure 5.2) following Hurricane Katrina. 
2. The federal regulations at the time, which applied prior to Florida’s rule 
change, specified that only a vehicle’s fair market value below $4,640 
was to be exempted from a household’s asset limit calculations. The 
rules applied to one vehicle for each adult household member and 
included various exemptions (see https://www.snap-step1.usda.gov/fns/ 
tool/tutorial/vehicle_states_chart/states_chart.html). 
3. In the discussion below, we generally take age to be measured at one’s 
last birthday, making the age range 18 to 64. 
4. The proportion of departing SNAP recipients receiving UI also is a fac-
tor that influences the UI proportion in the SNAP caseload. This compo-
nent is less important, since the exit rate from SNAP is relatively low. 
5. We use an indicator constructed by the Department of Children and 
Families to identify ABAWD households. This may differ from the mea-
sure tabulated in Chapter 3 (Table 3.3 and Figures 3.14 and 3.15), which 
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constructs the ABAWD measure based on ages of household members 
and reported disabilities. Also in Chapter 3, measures are calculated 
relative to the full caseload, not limited to our study group of SNAP
households with recipients aged 18 to 64, as here. 
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Chapter 6 
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during the Great Recession 
Evidence from Georgia 
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Two groups of programs make up the backbone of the United States’
social safety net: 1) social welfare and 2) social insurance. Social 
welfare programs include Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). These programs base eligibil-
ity for benefits on means testing that requires beneficiaries to have 
income sources below a certain threshold. Social welfare programs 
provide relief to low-income households, and there is evidence that 
the pool of eligible beneficiaries increases during difficult economic 
times like the Great Recession. In contrast, social insurance pro-
grams, such as Unemployment Insurance (UI) and social security 
retirement benefits, take an individual’s contributions to the pro-
gram into account. These programs are based on earned eligibility 
and require that certain events occur, such as losing a job or reach-
ing a certain age, before one qualifies for benefits. Although social 
insurance programs are not specifically designed to shield individuals 
207 
  
 
 
 
208 Pandey et. al 
against recessions, they typically serve the populations that are the 
most vulnerable to economic downturns—primarily the elderly, the 
unemployed, and the disabled. Between 2007 and 2010, the aggre-
gate spending in the main safety-net programs rose from $1.6 trillion 
to $2.1 trillion, and caseloads grew from 276 million to 310 million 
recipients (Moffitt 2013). The largest expansion in the social safety 
net came from SNAP, EITC, and UI, which collectively accounted for 
nearly a third of the increase in spending on social programs during 
the Great Recession. 
SNAP is the largest federal assistance program, providing food 
access to a range of eligible families and individuals. Because of its 
entitlement nature, the caseload for SNAP grew tremendously nation-
wide over the past decade, with about one in every seven Americans 
receiving benefits at the height of the Great Recession. Furthermore, 
in early 2009, SNAP benefits were increased as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and states were encouraged to relax 
eligibility rules, further contributing to the growth in caseloads (Mof-
fitt 2013). Other research has found that food expenditures for low-
income families increased by about 5.4 percent from 2008 to 2009, 
while those families’ food insecurity declined by 2.2 percent (Nord 
and Prell 2011). 
Unemployment insurance provides temporary, partial earnings 
replacement to involuntarily unemployed persons with sufficient 
recent employment and earnings to qualify. The duration of regular 
UI benefits is 26 weeks in most states, although several states includ-
ing Georgia have altered the UI benefit duration cap in recent years. 
An additional 13 weeks or more may be provided under the Extended 
Benefits (EB) program if the unemployment rate in a state rises above 
certain levels. During recessions, the federal government often tem-
porarily extends the standard UI program. In response to the Great 
Recession, UI benefits were extended to 99 weeks in many states 
between 2009 and 2012 (Mazumder 2011). 
The Great Recession, which lasted from December 2007 to June 
2009, resulted in shrinking economic output and generational highs 
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in unemployment. All states felt its impact, but some, like Georgia, 
were hit particularly hard and felt lingering effects long afterward. 
Georgia’s unemployment rate more than doubled, from 5.1 percent 
in December 2007 to 10.5 percent in October 2009 (Figure 6.1), and 
the number of job seekers soared from about 250,000 to 503,000. 
At the height of the Great Recession, Georgia lost about 26,000 jobs 
every month (Tharpe 2012). Between December 2007 and June 2009, 
the state lost nearly 340,000 nonagricultural jobs, the sixth largest 
drop in the country; moreover, this job loss represented more than 8 
percent of the state’s employed workforce and was the eighth largest 
proportional decline in the country. In addition, Georgia’s recovery 
was particularly sluggish: the state lost about 62,000 jobs, the third 
most of any state, during the eight months after the Great Recession 
officially ended in June 2009. 
By 2017, the economic outlook for the state had improved con-
siderably, driven by growth in housing construction and employ-
Figure 6.1  Unemployment Rate and SNAP Caseload (relative to 
January 2005) 
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ment (Heaghney 2016). Although the unemployment rate has fallen 
steadily since the Great Recession, it has not returned to prerecession 
levels and remains above the national average. The last time the state 
had an unemployment rate below the United States’ average was in 
July 2007. 
Georgia is an ideal setting in which to study the interactions of 
SNAP and UI because the state has struggled economically in the 
wake of the Great Recession. In this chapter, we examine the individ-
ual and joint roles that SNAP and UI played in protecting Georgians 
against the full impact of the Great Recession. Our analysis provides 
insight into the relationship between SNAP and UI caseloads from 
December 2006 to December 2014, with a particular emphasis on the 
differences between the pre- and postrecession periods as well as the 
various factors that may have influenced these changes. In addition, 
the trends in reliance on these programs vary by demographic factors, 
and we examine how age, gender, and race have affected recovery. 
To help residents during future economic downturns, we also discuss 
lessons learned about SNAP and UI reliance in Georgia that can aid in 
formulating public policy targeting the groups most severely affected 
by the Great Recession. 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
The literature discusses the extent to which social safety net pro-
grams like SNAP and UI act individually and in tandem to provide 
relief during times of economic hardship. Most of the available evi-
dence comes from studies using survey data at the national level (e.g., 
Anderson, Kirlin, and Wiseman 2012; Bitler and Hoynes 2013). For 
example, Prell (2013) uses data from the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement to the Current Population Survey from 2004 to 2009 on 
households’ multiprogram or joint participation patterns in SNAP
and UI. The author finds that 14.4 percent of SNAP households also 
received UI in 2009; at the same time, 13.4 percent of UI households 
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received SNAP. The SNAP participation rate among eligible indi-
viduals rose from 56 to 69 percent from 2003 to 2007 (Andrews and 
Smallwood 2012; Miller 2013). Using panel data from the nationally 
representative Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
from 2000 to 2011, Anderson, Kirlin, and Wiseman suggest that the 
extended length of unemployment spells during the Great Recession 
was a major contributor to increased participation in both programs. 
Furthermore, Gould-Werth and Shaefer (2014) also use panel 
data from SIPP to evaluate changes in the joint participation in SNAP
and UI by job losers between 2000 and 2011. Their results show that 
more people applied for both SNAP and UI during the Great Reces-
sion and that the joint recipients came from higher income strata. Han 
(2015) uses longitudinal data from Wisconsin to define joint recipi-
ents as those who collected SNAP during a UI benefit spell as well 
as those who sought alternative social assistance options after exit-
ing the UI program. Han concludes that, before and after the Great 
Recession, a large proportion of SNAP/UI joint recipients continued 
to rely on SNAP after exiting UI. SNAP eligibility requirements were 
also relaxed during the Great Recession, indicating that the safety net 
programs were responsive to economic change. 
Several researchers have estimated the impact of UI and SNAP
on poverty and employment and evaluated the characteristics of pro-
gram recipients (Ben-Shalmon, Moffitt, and Scholz 2011; Rosenbaum 
2013; Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Gundersen 2012). Tiehen, Jolliffe, and 
Gundersen find that SNAP spending represented only 0.5 percent of 
the gross domestic product but was estimated to reduce poverty in the 
United States by 16 percent. Over the long term, the number of SNAP
families receiving benefits from multiple programs has fallen because 
of the decline in the TANF caseload, offsetting participation increases 
in programs such as Supplemental Security Insurance, Social Secu-
rity Disability Insurance, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Pro-
gram for Women, Infants, and Children (Moffitt 2014). 
Unlike much of the previous research, which relied on national 
surveys based on self-reported information, our data are drawn from 
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state administrative records, which are largely free of measurement 
or reporting error. Our analysis builds on similar work of O’Leary 
and Kline (2014) and Heflin and Mueser (2013), who provide insight 
into the roles that SNAP and UI played during the Great Recession 
in Michigan and Florida, respectively. O’Leary and Kline discover 
that SNAP participation is negatively correlated with meeting income 
and job separation eligibility requirements for UI. In contrast, Hef-
lin and Mueser find that the number of families in Florida utilizing 
SNAP and UI surged during the Great Recession, and that the share 
of UI grew in relative importance. However, the authors conclude that 
only a minority of those joining the SNAP program also collected UI 
benefits. 
The Great Recession not only affected the size of the caseloads 
for SNAP and UI but also may have altered the mix of participat-
ing individuals and households along dimensions of income, educa-
tion, and other demographic characteristics (Finifter and Prell 2013). 
For example, in a state with a sharp increase in unemployment, the
working-age population and children may be hit the hardest, whereas 
in a state with a large retired population, the effects of a recession 
would likely be different. Analyses using national data assume these 
compositional changes are uniform across states, potentially masking 
interesting patterns unique to each state. For instance, during the Great 
Recession, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, Washington, and West Virginia had significantly higher SNAP
participation rates than the national average (Cunnyngham 2011). In 
contrast, the economies of states like North Dakota and Wyoming did 
not feel the impact of the Great Recession as strongly, as measured 
through SNAP participation rates, and their participation rates were 
in the bottom third of the nation. Additionally, by virtue of the size 
of their economies and populations, some states contributed more to 
the overall economic activity in the country than others, masking the 
influence of smaller states. Understanding how individual states fared 
during the Great Recession can help state policymakers tailor pro-
grams to the specific needs of their citizens. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our data on SNAP and UI individual benefits were obtained from 
the administrative case records maintained by the respective state 
agencies in Georgia. Monthly data on SNAP recipients came from 
the Georgia Department of Human Services’ Division of Family and 
Children Services. Weekly UI benefit data were obtained from the 
Georgia Department of Labor.1 Our main analysis period for SNAP
is from October 2004 to July 2014, while the benefits data and wage 
records from the UI universe cover January 2006 to September 2015. 
Most analyses are limited to individuals between the ages of 18 and 
64. 
The SNAP data include monthly benefits and reported income as 
well as some demographic and geographic characteristics of all eligi-
ble individuals and households. Because SNAP benefits are provided 
to the household as a unit, we conduct our analyses at the household 
level under the assumption that resources—including earned income 
and SNAP and UI benefits—are pooled at the household level and 
shared by all members of the household. SNAP benefits are typi-
cally disbursed monthly; therefore, our unit of analysis is either the 
case-month or the household-month. Following the convention in the 
literature, in constructing SNAP spells—periods when individuals 
receive continuing benefits—we treat single-month interruptions in 
SNAP participation as continuous benefit coverage (Heflin and Mue-
ser 2013). If an interruption in benefits lasted for more than a month, 
we assume that a new spell had begun. 
The UI benefit data contain all covered employers in the state of 
Georgia and incorporate the amount and duration of benefits and the 
preprogram wages for up to five quarters. Unfortunately, the UI ben-
efit file does not contain the demographic characteristics of recipients. 
Note that we only have data on UI benefit recipients, not the entire 
population of those who filed UI applications. 
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RESULTS: THE EFFECTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION
ON SNAP AND UI PARTICIPATION IN GEORGIA 
In this section, we detail the results from our analysis of Geor-
gia’s SNAP and UI administrative data from January 2006 to Sep-
tember 2015. The first subsection provides an overview of the trends 
in SNAP caseload and unemployment rates for Georgia compared to 
the nation. Focusing then on the state of Georgia, the second sub-
section looks at the changes in SNAP and UI participation through 
new program spells over time. The third subsection assesses how 
substantial a role these benefits played in the overall income of Geor-
gia families and how policy changes affected benefits and, therefore, 
income sources. In the fourth subsection, SNAP entrants and leavers 
are evaluated for their sources of income and reliance on UI at the 
beginning and end of a SNAP spell. Next, in the fifth subsection, we 
consider the influence of demographic factors and break down how 
age, gender, and race affect program participation. We pull together 
the important results of our analysis in the sixth and final subsection. 
Ultimately, both programs acted as vital safety-net programs and saw 
a surge in caseloads during the Great Recession. While UI rebounded 
relatively quickly to prerecession levels for several reasons, SNAP
has struggled to reduce its caseload. 
Labor Market Context of Analysis 
When comparing Georgia to the nation, we see that the Great 
Recession had a pronounced impact on that state’s relative SNAP
caseloads and unemployment rates, pushing Georgia above the 
national averages. As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, the SNAP caseload 
and unemployment rate in Georgia began to rise more quickly than in 
the United States as a whole during the Great Recession. The period 
afterward exhibited slow recovery, especially in Georgia, as the state 
maintained a higher SNAP caseload and unemployment rate than the 
national average through the end of 2015. In contrast, prior to the 
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Great Recession, the SNAP caseload and unemployment rate in Geor-
gia closely tracked the nation’s as a whole. 
Georgia’s SNAP caseload, or participation, has remained above 
the national average since 2008, with usage peaking in January 2013 
at 2.45 times that of the January 2005 level. This peak occurred 
sooner than the national high point in March 2013 and represented a 
considerably larger increase: the United States peaked at 2.09 times 
the January 2005 nationwide level. For both Georgia and the United 
States, however, SNAP participation rates remained elevated through 
2015 at rates almost twice their 2005 levels, despite declines in the 
unemployment rates. 
At the onset of the Great Recession, Georgia’s unemployment 
rate increased faster than the U.S. average, peaking at 10.5 percent 
in October 2010 and remaining above 10 percent until October 2011. 
By comparison, the U.S. unemployment rate peaked at 9.9 percent 
in January 2010 and fell steadily thereafter. To illustrate the differ-
ence, Georgia’s last month of greater than 10 percent unemployment 
was September 2011, when the U.S. unemployment rate had already 
dropped to 8.7 percent. The unemployment rates for both continued to 
fall after the Great Recession’s official end in June 2009, and by Octo-
ber 2015, Georgia’s unemployment rate was 5.7 percent, still above 
the U.S. average of 5.0 percent. While the decline in unemployment 
was good news for the state, some of the recovery was due to lower 
labor force participation rather than increased job creation, as well 
as to changes in unemployment insurance policies, discussed below. 
Joint Receipt of SNAP and UI 
From this point on, we focus our analysis on Georgia’s programs. 
SNAP and UI play an important role as safety net programs and, as 
such, responded to the economic decline during the Great Recession 
with substantial increases in enrollment. Figure 6.2 tracks the monthly 
total number of SNAP recipients as well as those who received only 
SNAP benefits and those who jointly received SNAP and UI benefits 
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Figure 6.2  Georgia SNAP Participation: SNAP Only and Joint SNAP/UI 
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in the same month. Before the Great Recession, total SNAP participa-
tion was relatively flat, while joint SNAP/UI participation displayed 
cyclical ups and downs. When the Great Recession hit in late 2007, 
SNAP enrollment increased steadily, but joint SNAP/UI enrollment 
saw a significant jump, reaching the highest share of total SNAP
recipients during that time. After the Great Recession, total SNAP
enrollment maintained its steady incline until late 2012, and through 
to the middle of 2015 it remained more than double the 2005 partici-
pation level. In contrast, joint SNAP/UI enrollment in 2015 (7,800) 
was roughly the same as it had been in 2005 (8,300). 
Before the Great Recession, total SNAP participation in Geor-
gia hovered above 425,000, but in its wake, participation more than 
doubled, and it remained above 800,000 from April 2010 through the 
end of the study period. In November 2012, total SNAP recipients in 
the state peaked at over 1.02 million individuals; in comparison, the 
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joint SNAP/UI group reached approximately 32,000, or 3 percent of 
total SNAP recipients, in February 2013. As a share of total SNAP
recipients, though, joint enrollment peaked at 4 percent in January 
2009, due to a marked increase in UI participation during the Great 
Recession. Because joint SNAP/UI enrollment represents a small 
proportion of all SNAP recipients, SNAP-only participation closely 
mirrors total SNAP participation throughout the time line. 
Next, we break down the joint SNAP/UI group by the program 
in which recipients first enrolled. Those who enrolled in UI before 
SNAP likely had adequate work histories to be eligible for benefits. 
Those first on SNAP likely had an income low enough to qualify 
for SNAP but not UI, later becoming unemployed to qualify for UI. 
The SNAP-only group would include low-income individuals who 
remained employed as well as those who were unemployed but lacked 
the work history necessary for UI benefits. In Figure 6.3, the time line 
shows new SNAP spells per month for SNAP-only recipients and two 
groups of joint SNAP/UI recipients based on first-program enroll-
ment. New spells for SNAP-only recipients vastly outnumber those 
for joint enrollees. (Note that there were some technical irregularities 
with the SNAP data in 2013 and 2014; thus, it is likely that new spells 
for SNAP-only recipients peaked at 40,582 per month in August 
2011.) For the two groups of joint enrollees, the peaks were roughly 
the same at about 4,100 per month. Figure 6.3 also demonstrates 
that SNAP-first and UI-first spells move in a similar fashion, rising 
sharply during the Great Recession and generally declining afterward 
as UI recipients find jobs or otherwise exhaust their UI benefits. In 
contrast to SNAP-only, the new spells per month for joint enrollees 
generally returned to prerecession levels by 2015. 
We next use Georgia’s UI program data to evaluate new UI spells 
per month for UI-only, UI-first, and SNAP-first recipients (Figure 
6.4). UI-only peaked at around 42,000 new spells per month in the 
midst of the Great Recession. The UI-first and SNAP-first groups mir-
rored Figure 6.3, showing joint program recipients by the program in 
which they first enrolled. The joint recipients in Figure 6.4 more than 
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Figure 6.3  New SNAP Spells per Month (from SNAP universe) 
Joint recipients (SNAP first) Joint recipients (UI first) SNAP only recipients 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
6.5 
S
N
A
P
-o
nl
y 
re
ci
pi
en
ts
 
(0
00
s)
 
S
N
A
P
-fi
rs
t/U
I-f
ir
st
 j
oi
nt
 re
ci
pi
en
ts
 
(0
00
s)
 
Year and month 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
doubled during the Great Recession but, overall, maintained more 
stability than the joint groups in Figure 6.3 from the SNAP data set. 
UI-first and SNAP-first had a similar number of new spells per month 
before the Great Recession and maintained comparable increases 
through 2009. As recovery began, new spells for SNAP-first began to 
outpace those for UI-first. (Again, note that the February 2013 spike 
in SNAP-first may be due to technical irregularities; we disregard the 
spike in our analysis.) By mid-2015, both of the joint recipient groups 
had fallen back to prerecession levels. 
Despite the return to prerecession UI participation levels, not all 
of the improvement can be attributed to UI recipients’ finding jobs. 
Some of these declines seen in Figures 6.2 through 6.4 may be due to 
individuals leaving the labor force completely during the prolonged 
recovery, and policy changes at the federal and state levels likely 
played a significant role as well. At the federal level, the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Program of 2008 (EUC08) and the 
Extended Benefits (EB) program temporarily lengthened the maxi-
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Figure 6.4  New UI Spells per Month (from UI universe) 
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mum duration of UI benefits and shifted program costs to the fed-
eral government; EB splits the cost of unemployment compensation 
evenly between the federal government and the states, but under the 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, 100 percent of 
the burden was shifted to the federal government (Isaacs 2016). Both 
EUC08 and EB expired at the end of 2013. 
At the state level, Georgia enacted considerable unemployment 
policy changes in 2012. The legislation decreased the maximum 
potential UI benefit from 26 weeks (until 2011, all states used a limit 
of at least 26 weeks, with some setting an even higher limit) to a cap 
ranging from 14 to 20 weeks depending on the state unemployment 
rate (Isaacs 2016). This reduction would affect federal program bene-
fits as well, which use state parameters in their calculation of benefits. 
Georgia’s new policy restricts the duration of benefits to 14 weeks for 
statewide unemployment rates at 6.5 percent or less and adds another 
week of benefits for each 0.5 percent increase. The maximum benefit 
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of 20 weeks would be applicable at 9.0 percent unemployment or 
higher.2 
While these changes potentially explain the decline in new UI 
spells after the spikes of 2008 and 2009, they may also explain the 
lack of recovery (decline) in the SNAP caseload after the Great 
Recession. Georgians who exhaust their UI benefits and remain 
unemployed or underemployed may reach a point where they enroll 
in SNAP for food access. Combined with the policy changes in the 
UI landscape, this scenario may have become a reality for many indi-
viduals after 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, SNAP also saw federal 
policy changes under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act 
that broadened eligibility requirements, particularly for able-bodied 
adults without dependents, and dramatically increased the program’s 
caseload. Postrecession, the sluggish job growth and policy changes 
may help explain why SNAP and UI recovered differently. 
Comparing SNAP and UI Income Replacement Levels for
SNAP Recipients 
We next look at how SNAP and UI benefits contributed to the 
overall income of SNAP recipients and how the proportions of income 
changed with the Great Recession. We consider income replacement 
only from the perspective of SNAP recipients because we have data 
about SNAP households that includes UI benefits; the UI universe 
data, however, only offers information about employment history, 
benefit duration, and benefit amount at the individual level, which 
does not allow for the same income comparisons. In Figure 6.5, 
SNAP and UI average monthly benefits are stacked with the monthly 
household income for all Georgia SNAP recipients in 2015 dollars. 
For all SNAP recipients, SNAP benefits made up a much larger share 
of total household budgets than UI because so few SNAP recipients 
received UI benefits as well. Nonetheless, the reliance on SNAP
and UI benefits increased during the Great Recession (wide bar) as 
earned/unearned income fell. Overall, SNAP and UI benefits acted as 
intended to stabilize household incomes during the Great Recession. 
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Figure 6.5  Program Components of Monthly Budget for SNAP
Households (in 2015 dollars) 
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The full budget analysis period, 2005 to 2015, allows us to look 
at changes in income before, during, and after the Great Recession, 
including the period after the 2012 Georgia UI benefit change and 
the expiration of EUC08 and EB at the end of 2013. Before the Great 
Recession, from January 2005 to November 2007, a SNAP house-
hold’s earned/unearned income averaged $725 and represented 68 
percent of the household budget. SNAP benefits made up another 
30.4 percent, and UI 1.5 percent. During this time, UI had its low-
est share of the total budget seen over the full analysis period, 0.2 
percent in January 2005. The Great Recession brought about substan-
tial changes in budget components, as SNAP and UI reached their 
apex shares in April 2009 and January 2009, respectively, and earned/ 
unearned income had dropped to its lowest level by May 2009. On 
average during this time, SNAP accounted for 29.8 percent of the 
budget, UI 4.3 percent, and earned/unearned income the remaining 
65.9 percent. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 Pandey et. al 
In the postrecession era through the end of 2012, the SNAP share 
grew to 31.7 percent of the budget, while the share of earned/unearned 
income continued to fall, averaging 65 percent, and UI fell to 3.3 per-
cent. December 2012 saw the last UI share larger than 3 percent. As 
the impact of Georgia’s unemployment policy changes became appar-
ent in 2013, the UI share fell to 2.2 percent that year and dropped 
further to 1.1 percent in 2014. The annual averages in 2013, 2014, and 
2015 for the three income sources collectively showed a more stable 
recovery, as the share of earned/unearned income rose and SNAP and 
UI shares fell. By the end of 2015, UI benefits accounted for only 
0.8 percent of the average SNAP recipient’s household budget, SNAP
benefits 28.4 percent, and earned/unearned income 70.7 percent. 
SNAP and UI Dynamics 
Last, we narrow our attention to the time frame around an indi-
vidual entering and exiting a SNAP spell so that we may better under-
stand the circumstances of SNAP and UI usage. For those entering 
SNAP, we look at the shares that had income and UI benefits over 
three periods: 1) the quarter prior to entering SNAP (Prior Quarter), 
2) the quarter when they enter SNAP (Entry Quarter), and 3) their 
first full quarter after entering (Following Quarter). For those leaving 
SNAP, we look at two types of individuals: 1) those on SNAP for 
nine months or less (Short Duration) and 2) those on SNAP for more 
than nine months (Long Duration). Additionally, SNAP leavers are 
divided into two quarters: 1) the quarter of exit (Exit Quarter) and 2) 
the first quarter after the exiting quarter (Post-Exit Quarter). 
We first look at the characteristics of SNAP recipients around 
their entry into the program (Figure 6.6). Prerecession, all three quar-
ters had similar shares of SNAP entrants who had earnings—approxi-
mately 46 percent. As the Great Recession hit, these shares fell signif-
icantly: by the first quarter of 2009, the share of entrants with earnings 
in the quarter after entering SNAP reached only 33 percent, indicating 
that SNAP recipients were having longer periods without employ-
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Figure 6.6  Share of SNAP Entrants with Earnings 
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ment or other sources of income after enrolling in SNAP. The Entry 
Quarter contingent fared better, with 36 percent of these entrants hav-
ing earnings at the same point, whereas the share with earnings in the 
Prior Quarter fell to 41 percent. During the jobless recovery period 
directly after the Great Recession—a time when the economy was 
growing but unemployment remained high—the share of entrants 
with earnings for all three groups defined in relation to entry quarter 
(Prior, Entry, and Following) continued to drop until beginning a slow 
recovery in 2010. By the end of 2014, the shares were still below 
prerecession levels. 
Figure 6.7 incorporates UI in this picture. The share of SNAP
entrants with UI benefits surged during the Great Recession, and the 
share with UI benefits in the same quarter as their SNAP entry peaked 
at 15.6 percent in the first quarter of 2009. All quarter groups saw 
declining shares by the end of the Great Recession in June 2009; by 
2014, after the end of the jobless recovery, the percentage of SNAP
recipients who also received UI was back to prerecession levels for 
the three groups defined in relation to quarter of entry. 
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Figure 6.7 Share of SNAP Entrants with UI Benefits 
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Table 6.1 examines some of the data behind these two figures in 
greater detail and shows Prior, Entry, and Following Quarter informa-
tion over time. The time line is broken down into four groups relative 
to the Great Recession: 1) prerecession, 2) Great Recession, 3) job-
less recovery, and 4) post–jobless recovery.3 Table 6.1 was created 
using data on individual spells per month for recipients aged 18–64 
and aggregated using quarterly data, meaning there may be a quarter 
in which a SNAP recipient received benefits for a single month of the 
quarter or a single week of UI benefits. We then created a monthly 
average to compare across periods. Note that those who collected UI 
benefits received considerably more than the average SNAP recipient. 
For example, in the Following Quarter group, UI benefits were high-
est during the Great Recession at $2,617; SNAP benefits were also 
highest during this time but only averaged $889. SNAP served many 
more individuals in all time periods, and only a small percentage were 
enrolled in both SNAP and UI. However, for that small percentage, 
the amount of UI benefit was substantially larger, almost three times 
the SNAP benefit for the same period. 
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Table 6.1 Georgia SNAP Entrants: Earnings and UI Benefits by 
Relevant Time Perioda 
Post-
Prereces- Great Jobless jobless 
sion Recession recovery recovery 
SNAP average monthly entrantsb 
Prior Quarterc 
% with earnings 
Average earnings for those with 
wages ($) 
Average other earnings ($) 
% receiving UI benefits 
Average UI benefits among UI 
recipients ($) 
Entry Quarter 
% with earnings 
Average earnings for those with 
wages ($) 
Average other earnings ($) 
% receiving UI benefits 
Average UI benefits among UI 
recipients ($) 
Average SNAP benefitsd ($) 
Following Quarter 
SNAP avg. monthly entrants 
still receiving SNAP 
% SNAP entrants still receiving 
SNAP 
% with earnings 
Average earnings for those 
with wages ($) 
Average other earnings ($) 
% receiving UI benefits 
Average UI benefits ($) 
Average SNAP benefits ($) 
19,634 
47 
3,635 
1,698 
3.0 
1,785 
46 
2,636 
1,224 
7.2 
1,820 
481 
18,550 
94 
46 
3,218 
1,468 
4.1 
2,017 
782 
28,148 
43 
3,893 
1,656 
6.7 
1,913 
40 
2,762 
1,091 
13.2 
2,148 
514 
27,664 
98 
36 
3,170 
1,139 
10.6 
2,617 
889 
32,802 31,094 
39 43 
3,976 3,795 
1,552 1,625 
4.1 3.2 
1,754 1,811 
37 41 
2,843 2,794 
1,066 1,159 
9.0 7.0 
1,995 1,800 
498 470 
32,494 30,795 
99 99 
36 41 
3,328 3,335 
1,206 1,384 
6.2 4.2 
2,309 1,976 
825 756 
a Snapshot periods: Prerecession: Apr 2006–June 2007; Great Recession: Apr 2008– 
June 2009; Jobless Recovery: Apr 2010–Sept 2012; Post–Jobless Recovery: Jan 
2013–Dec 2014. 
b This table shows individual spells/month for ages 18–64, aggregated over a quarterly 
aggregate; there might be a quarter when SNAP recipients received benefits for a 
single month of the quarter or a single week of UI. 
c Prior Quarter: quarter immediately preceding entry into SNAP; Entry Quarter: first 
quarter of SNAP; Following Quarter: first quarter after entry into SNAP. 
d SNAP benefits are per person, inflation-adjusted to 2015 dollars. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
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Prerecession, Georgia saw an average of 19,634 SNAP entrants 
per month. During the Great Recession, the monthly entrants bal-
looned 43 percent to 28,148, but the peak of 32,802 entrants per month 
did not occur until the jobless recovery arrived. During the post–
jobless recovery period, SNAP enrollment did not return to prere-
cession levels, as the monthly average remained similar to that of 
the jobless recovery, at 31,094 per month. For those who entered 
SNAP in the latter two periods, few—less than 1 percent—left the 
program after the first quarter, compared to roughly 5 percent who 
left prerecession. 
Furthermore, for all three quarters, the percentage with earnings 
fell, as expected, during the Great Recession, but the shares continued 
to fall or remained stagnant during the jobless recovery. In the Fol-
lowing Quarter group, 36 percent of SNAP recipients had earnings 
during the Great Recession and jobless recovery. During the post– 
jobless recovery, this share increased to around 41 percent, still below 
the 46 percent share prerecession. Put another way, before the Great 
Recession, approximately 10,600 SNAP recipients per month had no 
income in the following quarter, and in the post–jobless recovery, 
roughly 18,000 had no income, reiterating the reliance on SNAP and 
a slow job recovery in Georgia. 
In contrast, the percentage of SNAP enrollees who also received 
UI benefits has declined from the highs of the Great Recession and 
jobless recovery. For all three quarters, the percentage of joint enroll-
ees rose quickly from the prerecession into the Great Recession. The 
jobless recovery showed a downward trend back toward prerecession 
levels, and during the post–jobless recovery, shares were in line with 
those before the Great Recession. In the Following Quarter group, the 
percentage of joint SNAP/UI recipients was 4.1 percent prior to the 
Great Recession. It jumped to 10.6 percent during the Great Reces-
sion, trended down to 6.2 percent in the jobless recovery, and finally 
returned to 4.2 percent in the post–jobless recovery. 
Thus, the SNAP program in Georgia proved not to be particu-
larly cyclical in nature. The average number of monthly entrants to 
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the program did not decline, even by the end of the jobless recovery, 
corresponding with the weak recovery in Georgia’s labor market fol-
lowing the Great Recession. For the Following Quarter group, the 
percentage with earnings increased, but not back to prerecession lev-
els. By contrast, the intersection of SNAP and UI was highly cyclical 
over the study period, as was participation in UI-only. Not until the 
post–jobless recovery period did the share of joint SNAP/UI recipi-
ents in the Following Quarter group fall back to prerecession levels 
of 4 percent, down from a Great Recession high of nearly 11 percent. 
This delayed return to prerecession levels explains why some stud-
ies examining these programs in other states have not found similar 
results: the Texas chapter, for example, did not reveal this return to 
prerecession levels because its study period did not extend beyond 
jobless recovery. 
Finally, we look at the characteristics of those leaving SNAP, first 
focusing on the percentage of SNAP leavers with earnings (Figure 
6.8) and then the percentage of SNAP leavers with UI benefits (Figure 
6.9). In Figure 6.8, SNAP leavers with earnings decreased sharply 
during the Great Recession. Recovery began quickly, though, with 
a slow upturn beginning in late 2009 and continuing through 2014. 
This figure also illustrates the differences between SNAP spell dura-
tion over the years, allowing us to compare SNAP recipients who 
collected benefits for three quarters or less (Short Duration) to those 
who relied on the program for more than three quarters (Long Dura-
tion). During the jobless recovery and the post–jobless recovery peri-
ods, the gap between Long Duration and Short Duration recipients 
became more pronounced, in contrast to the two prior periods, when 
the groups tended to be more closely connected. By the end of 2014, 
the percentage of Long Duration recipients exiting with income was 
generally below prerecession levels, while the percentage of Short 
Duration recipients exiting with income was greater than the percent-
age before the Great Recession. Looking at SNAP leavers receiving 
UI benefits in Figure 6.9, we see there was a considerable surge in the 
percentage of leavers with UI benefits during the Great Recession. 
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Figure 6.8 Share of SNAP Leavers with Earnings by Spell Duration 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
The subsequent decrease during the jobless recovery approached 
prerecession levels, and all four groups—Exit Quarter and Post–Exit 
Quarter for Long and Short Durations—maintained similar relation-
ships throughout the analysis period. By the end of 2014, the shares of 
leavers with UI benefits were comparable to those in 2006. 
In Table 6.2, we present some of the data behind Figures 6.8 and 
6.9, allowing us to make several observations about the length of 
SNAP spells and earnings upon exit. Individuals who exited SNAP
after the Great Recession tended to remain in the program longer than 
those who exited prior to the Great Recession. In the prerecession and 
Great Recession periods, the shares of total SNAP recipients were 
balanced between Short and Long Duration. In the jobless recovery, 
the balance shifted, and Long Duration recipients made up the major-
ity: the shares were 60 percent Long Duration and 40 percent Short. 
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Figure 6.9 Share of SNAP Leavers with UI Benefits by Spell Duration 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
The shares became further lopsided in the post–jobless recovery 
period, with 67 percent Long Duration and 33 percent Short Duration. 
The sustained increase in the long-term use of SNAP is indicative of 
the slow recovery because individuals on SNAP must be unemployed 
or have sufficiently low income to remain in the program. Addition-
ally, those receiving SNAP benefits for a short duration were more 
likely to have earnings upon exit than those who received them for 
a longer period. In the Post–Exit Quarter, 53 percent of Short Dura-
tion SNAP recipients had earnings during the post–jobless recovery 
period compared to only 44 percent of Long Duration recipients. The 
Short Duration SNAP leavers also had slightly higher earnings in the 
post–jobless recovery period: they earned on average $4,850, while 
Long Duration recipients earned $4,685. 
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Table 6.2 Georgia SNAP Leavers: Spell Duration, Earnings, and UI Benefits by Relevant Time Perioda 
Short Durationb Long Duration 
Great Post– Great Post– 
Prereces- Reces- Jobless jobless Prereces- Reces- Jobless jobless 
sion sion recovery recovery sion sion recovery recovery 
Average monthly SNAP leavers 4,863 5,775 8,636 9,359 5,942 5,745 13,083 18,982 
Short/Long Duration share of total 45.0 50.1 39.8 33.0 56.0 49.9 60.2 67.0 
Exiting Quarter 
Average SNAP benefitsc ($) 503 564 548 501 539 582 601 537 
% with earnings 54 47 49 56 48 41 44 45 
Average earnings for those with earnings ($) 3,843 4,137 4,461 4,350 4,155 4,289 4,566 4,338 
Average earnings ($) 2,071 1,935 2,185 2,415 1,985 1,776 2,017 1,954 
% with UI 4.8 12.2 7.7 4.9 2.2 5.7 3.8 2.2 
Average UI benefits ($) 1,692 2,489 2,000 1,663 1,064 1,657 1,364 1,171 
Post–Exit Quarter 
% with earnings 52 44 47 53 46 39 42 44 
Average earnings for those with earnings ($) 4,564 4,753 5,035 4,850 4,574 4,709 4,995 4,685 
Average earnings ($) 2,354 2,071 2,370 2,593 2,096 1,821 2,112 2,056 
% with UI 1.8 8.5 3.6 2.2 0.9 3.8 2.0 1.0 
Average UI benefits ($) 1,690 2,650 2,073 1,893 1,180 1,950 1,625 1,317 
a Snapshot periods: Prerecession: Apr 2006–June 2007; Great Recession: Apr 2008–June 2009; Jobless Recovery: Apr 2010–Sep 2012; Post– 
Jobless Recovery: Jan 2013–Dec 2014. 
b Short Duration: on SNAP three quarters or less; Long Duration: on SNAP more than three quarters. 
c SNAP benefits are per person, inflation-adjusted to 2015 dollars. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
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Only a small share of individuals who exited SNAP continued 
to receive UI benefits. However, the Short Duration leavers were 
more likely to receive UI upon exit than Long Duration leavers. In 
the Post–Exit Quarter, only 1.0 percent of Long Duration leavers col-
lected UI upon exiting SNAP, compared to 2.2 percent of Short Dura-
tion leavers. This counterintuitive finding may be due to the likeli-
hood that a SNAP entrant was employed prior to enrolling in SNAP. 
Short Duration recipients may be more likely to have been employed 
and, thus, eligible for UI. Another possibility is that UI eligibility ran 
out for Long Duration recipients. 
SUBGROUP ANALYSIS OF SNAP AND UI RECIPIENTS 
We next analyze some of the demographic characteristics of 
SNAP recipients and find meaningful trends based on age, gender, 
and race. In Table 6.3 and Figure 6.10, we present the patterns of 
Georgia SNAP participation for minors (17 and under), adults (18– 
64), and the elderly (65+) in each year between 2005 and 2015. Table 
6.3 indicates the number of individuals with at least one month of 
SNAP participation in each year. (Note that the total column is greater 
than the recipient total because of age changes and, therefore, cat-
egory changes within a given year.) Consistent with the overall trend 
in the United States, the number of SNAP recipients increased for all 
age groups between 2005 and 2012. Adults experienced the largest 
increase in caseload, with their caseloads more than doubling, but 
this may not be surprising, as these working-age individuals were the 
group most likely to experience job loss during the Great Recession. 
In terms of year-to-year changes, the sharpest increases were seen 
between 2008 and 2009, at the height of the Great Recession. The 
number of working-age adults who received SNAP benefits increased 
by 14.1 percent between 2007 and 2008 and by another 27.7 percent 
between 2008 and 2009. The Great Recession officially ended in 2009, 
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Table 6.3  Age of SNAP Recipients in Georgia, 2005–2015 
Number of SNAP recipients by age 
Minors Adults Elderly Number of 
Year (17 and under) (18–64) (65+) Totala UI recipients 
2005 718,615 651,531 54,495 1,407,082 22,004 
2006 725,895 640,098 54,242 1,401,975 30,192 
2007 734,912 644,922 54,087 1,414,648 32,066 
2008 807,517 736,094 57,005 1,578,992 56,256 
2009 954,730 939,893 65,829 1,932,740 98,422b 
2010 1,064,752 1,131,141 79,588 2,242,661 95,818 
2011 1,117,164 1,260,657 94,460 2,436,249 76,926 
2012 1,159,193b 1,352,853b 108,560 2,582,418b 79,444 
2013 1,148,663 1,327,222 115,613 2,554,257 73,377 
2014 1,131,048 1,274,255 117,667 2,487,422 50,120 
2015 1,111,494 1,218,385 122,387b 2,416,750 40,042 
NOTE: As part of ongoing data-sharing agreements, administrative data from these 
state agencies are archived in the Fiscal Research Center at Georgia State Univer-
sity, where three of the authors work as research associates. For more information 
on the administration and maintenance of these records, see dfcs.dhs.georgia.gov/
food-stamps and http://www.dol.state.ga.us. 
The actual dates were chosen to be similar to other studies of this type. They provide 
a snapshot of each period and are as follows: Prerecession: April 2006–June 2007; 
Great Recession: April 2008–June 2009; Jobless Recovery: April 2010–September 
2012; and Post–Jobless Recovery: January 2013–December 2014. 
a The total of all ages is greater than the recipient total because of age changes and, 
therefore, category changes, within a given year. 
b Maximum recipients per column. 
SOURCE: Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Child and Family Ser-
vices; Georgia Department of Labor. 
but the caseload continued to climb, reflecting the lethargic recovery 
of the labor market. Table 6.3 also lists the number of UI recipients 
between 2005 and 2015 for comparison. Just as with the rise in SNAP
caseload, UI cases grew during this period, and the sharpest increase 
overlapped the Great Recession, as shown in previous figures. The 
evidence reinforces the theory that SNAP and UI served as crucial 
safety net programs for a significant number of Georgians. 
Looking at SNAP cases by age group over time, Figure 6.10 
indexes the composition data to a January 2005 baseline. Here, the 
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Figure 6.10  SNAP Recipients by Age (relative to 2005) 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Georgia program administrative data. 
age of each countable SNAP recipient is included, not just those of the 
heads of household. Beginning in 2012 and continuing through 2015, 
the count of recipients younger than 65 began to fall, but the num-
ber of elderly has continued to rise after having been flat throughout 
2005, 2006, and 2007. Note that the elderly made up a relatively small 
share of total SNAP recipients, roughly 5 percent of the 2015 total; 
however, as Table 6.3 and Figure 6.10 show, this is the only group 
whose caseload did not drop at any point during the analysis period. 
These results are consistent with the literature, which shows that older 
workers lack the resources to retire and are therefore remaining in the 
labor force longer (Burtless 2016). The elderly may prove an inter-
esting demographic to monitor as the baby boom generation retires, 
straining the safety net and age-related entitlement programs. 
In addition, earnings and UI benefits differ by gender (figure not 
presented). Throughout the analysis period, female-headed SNAP
households received higher average SNAP and UI benefits than male-
headed households. The shares of SNAP entrants with earnings in 
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the Prior, Entry, and Following Quarters were also higher for female 
households than for male. For all three groups defined in relation 
to entrant quarter, the share with earnings in 2006 hovered around 
50 percent, well above the 35 percent average for males at the same 
time. While female households rely on SNAP benefits at higher levels 
throughout the period of the study, male households were hit harder 
by the Great Recession with regard to earned income. Both genders, 
however, follow a similar pattern of shares falling during the Great 
Recession and slowly recovering to prerecession levels by 2014. 
The share of SNAP entrant households with UI benefits shows 
less variation by gender, although higher percentages of female 
households relied on joint SNAP and UI benefits than did male ones. 
The female Entry Quarter groups mirror their male counterparts; the 
prerecession and post–jobless recovery periods have nearly identical 
numbers. During the Great Recession, the growth in shares of SNAP
entrants with UI was similar, with the female groups showing slightly 
higher percentages. For example, at the time that the share with UI 
in the Entry Quarter peaked at 14 percent for the males, the female 
group reached 16 percent. 
When looking at SNAP leaver characteristics, the results show 
that the Great Recession had more of an effect on males with Long 
Duration of SNAP benefits than on females. The percentage with 
earnings fell during the Great Recession and slowly recovered after-
ward. Echoing the SNAP entrant data, females had higher shares of 
earnings upon exit from SNAP than males throughout the analysis. 
For example, in April 2014, the share of males with earnings in the 
Exit Quarter and the Post–Exit Quarter was around 50 percent for 
Short Duration and under 40 percent for Long Duration. In contrast, 
the comparable shares for females were around 10 percentage points 
higher: Short Duration earnings were near 60 percent and Long Dura-
tion 50 percent. UI benefits in the Exit and Post–Exit Quarters looked 
similar for both genders. Ultimately, the Great Recession appears 
to have affected male-headed households more than female-headed 
households. 
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Finally, we look at race (figure not presented). The data on house-
holds by race are broken down into three categories: 1) White, 2) His-
panic, and 3) Other.4 For all three racial groups, the number of SNAP
entrants had not returned to prerecession levels by the end of 2014, 
although all three groups increased enrollment during the Great Reces-
sion and jobless recovery. Overall, looking at the joint use of SNAP
and UI, Hispanic SNAP entrants had the lowest percentage across the 
entire analysis period. In contrast, “Other” households had the largest 
percentage of joint usage of all three racial groups, regardless of the 
period. In addition, Other entrants experienced the largest increase of 
usage of both UI and SNAP during the Great Recession. 
When looking at SNAP leavers, White households exhibited a 
gap in Short and Long Duration groups throughout the time line. In 
contrast, the duration groups for Other and Hispanic households fell 
closer to each other in the prerecession period, but the duration groups 
diverged during and after the Great Recession. By 2014, the percent-
age with earnings in the Exit and Post–Exit Quarters was higher for 
Short Duration recipients for all racial groups, and the percentage 
with UI benefits was higher for Long Duration recipients, potentially 
because the Long Duration group had exhausted its UI benefits. 
SUMMARY OF LESSONS FROM ANALYSIS 
Our data allowed us to evaluate not only the immediate effects of 
the Great Recession on Georgia but also those that lingered several 
years after its official end. Georgia’s labor market has struggled to 
recover, and SNAP and UI utilization can help gauge the economic 
health of the state. Although SNAP and UI reacted differently to the 
stress of the Great Recession, both helped to stabilize incomes and 
increase Georgians’ access to necessities. Our results show that UI 
maintained a cyclical nature, with enrollment spiking during the Great 
Recession but falling relatively quickly back to prerecession levels. 
SNAP, on the other hand, is still feeling the burden from the economic 
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fallout. Unlike UI, SNAP does not have time-limited benefit restric-
tions, and many more Georgians have remained eligible for SNAP
than in the prerecession era. Also, the joint SNAP/UI recipients repre-
sented only a small portion of the total Georgia SNAP population, but 
UI provided substantially larger benefits and was able to complement 
SNAP to stabilize incomes. 
Assuming no change in federal SNAP legislation, what will the 
next recession look like in Georgia? As with what happened during 
the Great Recession, we can expect that many Georgians will return 
to UI and SNAP to lessen the economic shock. Georgia’s reduction 
of UI benefits to a cap of 14–20 weeks will likely have a considerable 
effect on both programs, with more rapid SNAP applications from 
UI recipients. If the state experiences another slow recovery after 
the next recession, we may see another boom in SNAP enrollment 
as unemployed Georgians quickly exhaust their UI benefits and shift 
to SNAP, and the program would likely struggle to recover to pre-
recession levels. Moreover, our results show that more retirement-
age Georgians are using SNAP. With this quickly growing population 
relying on SNAP benefits, the program may face further issues with 
the sustained swelling of its caseload. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we discussed how Georgia’s citizens used 
SNAP and UI benefits to ease the burdens associated with the eco-
nomic downturn of the Great Recession and maintain their house-
hold income. SNAP was used by considerably more Georgians than 
was UI, but for those who did receive UI, the benefits were generally 
larger. Trends in usage during the Great Recession were similar for 
both programs; however, while UI and joint SNAP/UI participation 
returned to prerecession levels by the post–jobless recovery period, 
SNAP participation remains elevated well above prerecession levels. 
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Several potential reasons exist for this disparity. First, UI benefits 
are available only for a limited time, while SNAP benefits are not in 
most cases. The restrictions on UI are especially relevant because of 
the changes to Georgia’s UI benefit cap, which reduce the maximum 
duration of benefits from 26 weeks to a range of between 14 and 20. 
Additionally, the two major federal UI-related programs instituted 
during the Great Recession have expired. Second, many people lost 
their jobs during the Great Recession and collected UI but became 
ineligible for the program when they regained employment. Finally, 
despite some job creation, some workers may be employed in low-
wage jobs and not receiving UI but may still be eligible for SNAP
benefits. This situation was especially likely during the jobless recov-
ery period. 
SNAP reliance remained high through 2015, but evidence sug-
gests that enrollment may be declining for some groups across the 
state. Importantly, SNAP enrollment in the elderly population has not 
shown significant declines, which may have ramifications for the pro-
gram’s caseload going forward. In the future, economic downturns 
may see a larger reliance on SNAP than UI in Georgia, but policy-
makers can leverage the interplay between SNAP and UI to allevi-
ate excessive burdens on a single program. As Georgia restricts UI 
benefits, in a move that was enacted at the same time as an increase 
in SNAP participation, federal policymakers can supplement income 
and reduce the caseload of SNAP through programs such as Emer-
gency Unemployment Compensation and Extended Benefits. SNAP
participation in Georgia varied along gender and racial lines, suggest-
ing differing impacts. The effects of the Great Recession continue to 
linger in Georgia, and the impact and interactions of social safety net 
programs like SNAP and UI will be an area of continued study. 
Notes 
1. As part of ongoing data-sharing agreements, administrative data from 
these state agencies are archived in the Fiscal Research Center at Geor-
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gia State University, where three of the authors work as research associ-
ates. For more information on the administration and maintenance of 
these records, see dfcs.dhs.georgia.gov/food-stamps and http://www.dol
.state.ga.us. 
2. Scaling up 1 week for each 0.5 percent increase from 6.5 percent at 14 
weeks would result in a 19-week duration at 9 percent unemployment, 
not a 20-week duration. Nevertheless, this is how the statute reads. One 
must assume it would be at 19 weeks for 8.51 to 8.99 percent, then rise 
to 20 weeks for 9.00 percent and above. 
3. The actual dates were chosen to be similar to other studies of this type. 
They provide a snapshot of each period and are as follows: Prerecession: 
April 2006–June 2007; Great Recession: April 2008–June 2009; Jobless 
Recovery: April 2010–September 2012; and Post–Jobless Recovery: 
January 2013–December 2014. 
4. “White” is “non-Hispanic white”; “Other” is “non-Hispanic nonwhite” 
and includes all races not part of the other two categories (e.g., African 
American, Asian, etc.). 
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Chapter 7 
SNAP, UI, and Employment 
Interactions in Maryland, 
2009–2015 
Ting Zhang 
Susan Christiansen 
Jing Li 
University of Baltimore 
This chapter presents an analysis of interactions in the use of pro-
grams in the Maryland social safety net during and since the 2007– 
2009 Great Recession. The focus is on the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
benefit program. We use administrative data from these programs 
along with UI wage record data to analyze issues relevant to the com-
position and cost of the Maryland and national SNAP caseloads, in the 
hope that this may inform future policy and program management.1 
This study spans the period from January 2009 through Decem-
ber 2015. The first six months of data for the study cover the last six 
months of the Great Recession, which lasted from December 2007 to 
June 2009. The January 2009 starting point for the data serves as a 
baseline for recession levels of SNAP and UI program benefit receipt 
and employment. This baseline facilitates the study of postrecession 
SNAP and UI benefit interactions and related employment and earn-
ings trends. 
Following are some key findings from this study: 
• Maryland was fortunate to experience a less severe recession 
than the nation at large. The SNAP and UI programs comple-
mented each other in providing a safety net for Marylanders 
who lost their jobs or experienced food insecurity during the 
recession and the ensuing recovery. 
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• Maryland SNAP caseloads plateaued at a higher level than 
prerecession levels. 
• Eight quarters after receiving their first weekly UI benefit pay-
ments, 67 percent of recipients of UI, of emergency unem-
ployment compensation (EUC), or of extended benefits (EB) 
did not have any employment reported in our Maryland UI 
employment data. 
• Those UI recipients not observed as having earnings after re-
ceiving some type of UI benefit during the study period tend-
ed to be older and had smaller household size, fewer children, 
a higher number of household members with disabilities, and 
lower education. This is the group most likely to turn to SNAP
for additional support after exhausting UI benefit eligibility, 
and there is evidence that UI exhaustees in Maryland did in-
deed turn to SNAP for help. 
• In comparing program utilization patterns (receiving SNAP
benefits first vs. receiving UI benefits first), we see that recipi-
ents who enrolled in SNAP first were younger, belonged to 
larger households, had more children, were more likely to be 
headed by a female, and were more likely to never have been 
married than recipients who enrolled in UI first. 
• Some SNAP subgroups fared better than others. SNAP re-
cipients aged 46 to 65 were often single-person households 
and therefore had a low benefit level, since SNAP benefits are 
based on household size. They also had significantly lower 
wages than those aged 31 to 45. 
• Households that entered UI first were more attached to the la-
bor market and had higher prebenefit earnings, thus higher UI 
benefit amounts. Households that either enrolled in SNAP and 
UI simultaneously or in SNAP first were worse off, as their UI 
benefits and earnings were low enough that their combined 
income left them below the SNAP eligibility ceiling. 
This chapter begins with brief descriptions of Maryland’s SNAP
and UI programs. Data sources and population definitions are then 
introduced. Descriptions of Maryland SNAP household characteris-
tics follow to aid in better understanding the study population, as well 
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as the characteristics of the joint SNAP and UI participants. Finally, 
we review the program and labor market outcomes for Maryland 
SNAP and UI. The chapter ends with a discussion of the potential 
policy implications of these findings. 
BACKGROUND
Maryland experienced a less severe recession than the United 
States as a whole, but it also experienced a more gradual recovery. 
Figure 7.1 shows the convergence in unemployment rates between 
Maryland and the national average. Maryland’s 2 percentage point 
advantage at the start of the recession was eliminated by the end of 
2015. 
Figure 7.1  Monthly Unemployment Rate, United States vs. Maryland 
(not seasonally adjusted) 
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Not Sea-
sonally Adjusted; and Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted. 
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As of 2015, Maryland was the nineteenth most populous state 
in the United States, with a population of just over six million (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2016). Women made up slightly more than half of 
Maryland’s population, and over 60 percent of the total population 
was between 20 and 64 years of age. The population was approxi-
mately 60 percent white, 30 percent African American, and 6 percent 
Asian. Nine percent of the population was Hispanic (American Fact-
Finder 2016).2 
In 2014, Maryland was the wealthiest state in the nation, with 
the highest median household income ($74,149) of any state (Ameri-
can FactFinder 2014). Since 2012, Maryland has ranked between 
sixth and eighth in the nation in terms of average weekly wage (BLS 
2016). However, despite its sustained economic success, in the past 
few years Maryland’s wage growth has slowed relative to the average 
rate of wage growth in the United States (Figure 7.1). 
Unemployment Insurance in Maryland 
As in other states, three UI programs were offered in Maryland 
during the study period examined in this chapter: 1) regular state UI, 
2) emergency unemployment compensation (EUC), and 3) extended 
benefits (EB). Of the three, the regular UI program is used most often, 
both during recessions and at other times. Like other states, Maryland 
funds this program through unemployment taxes paid to the state by 
employers. The UI benefits paid to eligible applicants are based on the 
individual’s prior earnings and compliance with other requirements 
once monetary eligibility has been confirmed. Maryland pays UI ben-
efits to applicants who are 
• unemployed through no fault of their own, 
• able to work, and 
• actively seeking work. 
The maximum duration of regular UI benefit receipt in Maryland 
is 26 weeks (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regula-
SNAP, UI, and Employment Interactions in Maryland  247 
tion 2019). Unlike some other states, which have reduced the maxi-
mum number of weeks in recent years, Maryland’s maximum has 
remained unchanged. 
The EUC program, implemented in 2008 and allowed to lapse at 
the end of 2013, provided 100 percent federally funded benefits to UI 
applicants who exhausted their state entitlement but continued to sat-
isfy other eligibility requirements. It paid benefits to individuals who 
exhausted regular UI benefits in benefit years ending on or after May 
1, 2007. No EUC benefits were paid for claims after the week ending 
December 28, 2013. EUC was enacted to help temporarily alleviate 
the household burden of sustained unemployment during and after the 
recession (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 
2014). The maximum length of EUC benefit ranged between 13 and 
47 weeks during the study period. 
Finally, the permanent EB program was modified by Congress 
during the Great Recession. Unemployed Maryland workers became 
eligible for 13 additional weeks of EB after exhausting regular state 
UI. The EB benefit amount was the same as the amount that the indi-
vidual had received through state UI benefits (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2019). Especially in Maryland, extended benefits constituted 
the smallest share among all types of UI benefits paid during the study 
period. 
Figure 7.2 shows the monthly number of Maryland beneficiaries 
in each of the three UI programs during the study period. Because 
unemployment was relatively low, regular UI recipients made up the 
largest share of the unemployment compensation caseload. The EB 
program switched on only when insured unemployment exceeded 
the threshold. Consequently, EB remained in effect in Maryland only 
from late 2011 to mid-2012—a far shorter period than in the other 
states studied for this book. 
Enrollment in UI and EUC programs increased rapidly through 
early 2010. Although it fluctuated over the following three years, 
enrollment at the end of 2012 was still at a level approximately five 
times the enrollment at the start of the study period in January 2009. 
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Figure 7.2  Monthly Individual Enrollment in Maryland UI Programs, 
by UI Program Type 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland UI/EUC/EB administrative data. 
The continued high level of UI benefit enrollment through 2012, 
illustrated in Figure 7.2, reflects the lagged recession effect and only 
moderate economic recovery in Maryland. As an automatic stabilizer, 
the number of individuals collecting UI benefits dropped close to pre-
recession levels in late 2014 as the economy recovered slowly. There 
is also a seasonal pattern, particularly for regular UI benefits, with 
the largest monthly caseload occurring each January, then reaching 
another peak in midsummer and again in December. 
A UI enrollee can receive benefits from only one UI program 
each week (UI, EUC, or EB), although that person could potentially 
receive benefits from more than one UI program in a month. The 
black line in Figure 7.2 accounts for this by showing the total number 
of individuals enrolled across all three UI programs each month. 
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SNAP in Maryland 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in Maryland is 
called the Food Supplement Program, or FSP. However, for consis-
tency with other chapters, we refer to this program as SNAP. As in 
other states, the Maryland SNAP program provides the means to pur-
chase food for households whose net income after certain expenses 
falls below a specific threshold determined by household size. The 
Maryland SNAP program defines a household as “a group of people 
who live together and buy food and prepare meals together.” The ben-
efit amount is based on both household income and household size 
and is meant to supplement the household’s food budget. The maxi-
mum benefit is stipulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
“maximum allotment,” which is based on estimates of food costs 
(Maryland Department of Human Resources 2019a). 
To be counted as a member of a SNAP household, individuals 
generally must meet four criteria: 1) be a U.S. citizen; 2) have a social 
security number; 3) not be a student half-time or more; and 4) register 
for work, accept work offers, and participate in employment train-
ing programs if able-bodied and between the ages of 16 and 60. The 
exceptions to these eligibility rules are certain categories of immi-
grants or refugees, as well as people taking care of dependents of a 
certain age (Maryland Department of Human Resources 2019c). Indi-
viduals who apply and qualify for SNAP should have access to their 
benefits within 30 days of submitting their applications (Maryland 
Department of Human Resources 2019b). Individuals can automati-
cally qualify for SNAP benefits if they receive Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
This is commonly referred to as broad-based categorical eligibility, or 
BBCE (USDA 2018). 
The number of Marylanders participating in SNAP increased 
steadily during much of the 2009–2015 period, similar to the national 
trend. Figure 7.3 shows a relatively faster increase in the number of 
SNAP-benefiting households in Maryland between early 2011 and 
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Figure 7.3  SNAP Caseload, United States vs. Maryland 
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SOURCE: Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, National and State 
Monthly/Annual Data from Fiscal Year 1969 to 2016. 
Fall 2012 compared to national numbers. Beginning in the third quar-
ter of 2013, the caseload in both Maryland and the country as a whole 
leveled off, with Maryland’s caseload settling at a figure approxi-
mately double the late-recession caseload in early 2009. 
Data Description 
There are inherent difficulties in using administrative data for 
research. These legal and ethical difficulties create challenges for 
measurement and interpretation that have been identified and exam-
ined in the literature (Connelly et al. 2016). Our analysis is further 
complicated by the fact that variables from the two programs are 
measured over different time periods. The important differences are 
described in the following overviews on data for SNAP and UI appli-
cations and benefit payments, and for UI wage records. 
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SNAP data 
The Maryland Department of Human Resources provided the 
administrative data for SNAP through a data agreement with the 
Jacob France Institute at the University of Baltimore. The Department 
of Human Resources is the data owner and approved the use of the 
data for this research study. Information used in this study includes 
recipients’ monthly benefit amounts, demographic information, and 
basic socioeconomic status. These data span the years 2009 to 2015. 
The basic unit of analysis for SNAP data is a household, because 
benefits are awarded to eligible households. As discussed in the back-
ground section above, the relevant definition of a household is any 
group of individuals who live together and purchase food and prepare 
meals together. This adds complexity to the analysis and interpreta-
tion of results, because there could be month-to-month changes in 
household composition. 
UI benefit data 
The Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 
provided the administrative data on UI benefits (UI/EUC/EB) through 
a data agreement with the Jacob France Institute. The Department 
of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is the owner of the data and 
approved the research use of the data for this study. Data fields used 
in this study include UI weekly benefit amount and payment dates. 
The time period for the data is 2009 through 2015. 
The unit of analysis for UI/EUC/EB is an individual benefit 
recipient. Most, but not all, individuals make decisions about employ-
ment (filing for unemployment insurance and/or SNAP benefits), and 
about compliance with continued eligibility requirements based in 
part on the actions of others in their household. Measurement of these 
external influences and changes in their presence, magnitude, and rel-
evance are not available from unemployment benefit or wage records. 
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UI wage record data 
The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation also pro-
vided administrative data on UI wage records, through a data agree-
ment with the Jacob France Institute, and approved the use of these 
data for this research study. Data include individual workers’ quar-
terly earnings; however, these data only include Maryland civilian 
workers who are covered under the UI law; they do not include fed-
eral government employees. There is no occupation information in 
the wage records data and no record of hours worked. The time period 
for the data is January 2009 through December 2015. 
Data Summary 
The Study Group is defined as SNAP households3 that have at 
least one member in the prime working age range of 18 through 64. 
Therefore, all UI/EUC/EB beneficiaries in the Study Group are part 
of a SNAP household during some point of the study period. We focus 
on the Study Group because this chapter addresses the interaction of 
month-to-month Maryland SNAP benefit levels with UI/EUC/EB 
benefit payments and relevant employment and earnings changes. 
By focusing on the study group with more prime-working-age adults, 
such interactions in program use are more likely to be observable and 
useful for joint program analyses. 
Table 7.1 shows a snapshot of the data, illustrating the length and 
amount of benefits and wages of SNAP and UI recipient households 
for the entire 2009–2015 study period. Consistent with the differences 
between the two types of programs, SNAP and UI/EUC/EB, the mean 
number of quarters of benefits received was higher for SNAP than 
for the UI programs, and the mean quarterly household benefit was 
much higher for the UI/EUC/EB programs than for SNAP. House-
holds receiving UI benefits were more likely to have had earnings 
in the quarter prior to UI program entry and also to have had higher 
wages. However, since some SNAP recipients included households 
with someone who was employed, but employed at wages low 
   253 
Table 7.1  Data Summary, 2009–2015 
SNAP UI/EUC/EB 
Variable All Research group All Research group 
Number of households 1,642,302 951,199 221,891 147,749 
Mean quarters of benefits received 11.5 10.3 5.0 3.5 
Mean household benefits received ($) 10,644.51 7,963.48 13,024.62 8,593.85 
Mean household benefits per quarter ($) 927.47 775.85 2,580.09 2,462.88 
Households with wages quarter prior to benefit start  439,393 140,977 
% households with wages 46.19 95.42 
Mean household wages (one quarter) ($) 4,817.14 6,508.95 
Households with wages while receiving benefits  616,174 584,568 196,961  111,465 
% households with wages 61.46 75.44 
Mean total household wages ($) 22,185.80 22,784.05 10,230.64 6,654.59 
Mean household wages per quarter ($) 1,933.09 2,219.75 2,026.62 1,907.11 
Households with wages after receiving benefits  421,320 133,347 
% households with wages 44.29 90.25 
Mean total wages ($) 44,408.18 27,445.57 
Mean wages per quarter ($) 5,306.25 2,669.57 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP, UI/EUC/EB, and UI wage record administrative data. 
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enough to qualify for SNAP, the mean household earnings per quarter 
were higher for SNAP recipients than for UI/EUC/EB recipients. In 
addition, it is not surprising that mean quarterly earnings after both 
types of programs’ benefits terminated also were higher than mean 
earnings while receiving benefits. This suggests that both SNAP and 
UI/EUC/EB recipients move back into the labor market after benefit 
receipt. Table 7.1 shows that about 420,000 households in the Study 
Group had earnings after receiving some SNAP benefits. This is about 
half the 950,000 SNAP households in the Study Group. On the other 
hand, over 90 percent of UI/EUC/EB households had earnings after 
UI benefit receipt. 
METHODS FOR CATEGORIZATION 
This study incorporates three types of data categorization: 
1) dates, 2) spells, and 3) Study Group. The three data sources are 
reported in either weekly (UI/EUC/EB), monthly (SNAP), or quar-
terly units (UI wage records). For analyses using only SNAP and UI/ 
EUC/EB data, in order to make the two sources of data consistent, 
we aggregated the weekly UI benefit data to the monthly level cor-
responding to the benefit payment date. As long as there was at least 
one record showing benefit receipt during any week of the month, 
this case was counted as having received unemployment benefits that 
month. For analyses that also included wage record data, the admin-
istrative records for both SNAP and UI/EUC/EB were further aggre-
gated to the calendar quarter. 
As discussed in other chapters, a new SNAP spell began when 
there was a positive SNAP benefit amount for a household that was 
preceded by two consecutive months of no SNAP benefit amount for 
that household. A SNAP spell ended when there was a positive SNAP
benefit amount for a household followed by two consecutive months 
of no SNAP benefits to that household. UI spells are defined similarly, 
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except with a time period of eight consecutive weeks instead of two 
months when determining the start and end of a UI spell. The data 
used in the analysis exclude all positive benefits received in the last 
eight weeks of 2015 because eight consecutive weeks (or two con-
secutive months) of no benefit receipt could not be confirmed. 
The results of our analysis can be divided into two categories: 
1) Program participation, covering benefit amounts, entry and 
exit, spell length, and participation patterns 
2) Outcomes for SNAP and UI participants regarding employ-
ment and wage results and wage percentiles 
SNAP and UI Program Participation 
This section explores specific ways the recipients participated in 
the SNAP and UI programs by discussing the findings on program 
benefit amounts, entry and exit patterns, spell length, and the sequenc-
ing of benefit receipt from SNAP and UI. 
Program benefits 
We examined the mean level of program benefits by age category 
to better understand how recipients interacted with and benefited from 
the SNAP and UI programs. In Figure 7.4, we see the mean SNAP
quarterly benefit by recipient’s age category. Interestingly, the mean 
quarterly benefits for both the 18-to-30-year-old age group and the 
31-to-45-year-old age group follow nearly identical trends and benefit 
levels (roughly $900), while the 46-to-65-year-old age group follow a 
similar trend but at a much lower benefit level (roughly $550). Across 
all ages, we see a jump in the mean quarterly benefits from the first to 
the second quarter in 2009, followed by a slow decrease in the mean 
benefit through the end of 2012. Mean benefits across all age groups 
increased temporarily in the first three quarters of 2013, after which 
the mean benefits returned to roughly the same steady level that they 
had been at from mid-2009 through the end of 2012. 
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Figure 7.4 Study Group Average Quarterly SNAP Benefit by 
Recipient’s Age Category 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP administrative data. 
Figure 7.5 mirrors Figure 7.4 except it shows the mean quarterly 
UI program benefit across all persons receiving a UI program benefit 
that quarter instead of the mean SNAP benefit. Censoring has led to 
tails on the graph that accurately reflect the study group but do not 
reflect actual UI program enrollment and benefits during the indicated 
time period. Although censoring affects our ability to draw clear con-
clusions from Figure 7.4, there appears to be a slight increase in the 
mean UI program benefit through the end of 2009, after which the 
mean benefit is largely steady until a spike in the fourth quarter of 
2011. This increase is only for that quarter, though—afterward, UI 
program benefit levels fall to roughly the same level (albeit slightly 
lower) as before the spike. This temporary increase in mean benefit 
reflects the start of the EB enrollment in Maryland. 
Figure 7.5 highlights the slight but generally decreasing trend in 
mean UI program benefit amount across all age groups over time. 
The one exception is the fourth quarter of 2011, which is when the 
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Figure 7.5 Study Group Average Quarterly UI/EUC/EB Benefit by 
Recipient’s Age Category 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland UI/EUC/EB administrative data. 
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EB benefits began (reflected in Figure 7.2), resulting in increased 
mean benefits that quarter. Because of how UI program benefits are 
calculated, this could mean that wages prior to UI program benefit 
eligibility declined over time. This could be because, as the economy 
continued to improve, people with lower real-wage jobs were dis-
proportionately affected and experienced a slower recovery. It could 
also be because mean real wages across all populations fell. The data 
available for this study cannot tease that out, though either expla-
nation could indicate a need for improved services for a seemingly 
increasingly vulnerable population. 
Figure 7.6, which shows the mean household size by age cat-
egory, helps explain much of the variation in mean quarterly SNAP
benefits by age category because SNAP benefits are based on the 
number of eligible people in the defined SNAP household. The aver-
age household sizes of SNAP recipients in the 18-to-30-year-old and 
the 31-to-45-year-old age groups were nearly constant and equal over 
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Figure 7.6  Study Group Average Number of Persons in Household, by 
Recipient’s Age Category 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP data. 
the study period—averaging about 2.75 persons per SNAP house-
hold. The average number of persons in SNAP households in the 46- 
to-65-year-old age group were also constant over the period but aver-
aged about 1.6 persons. All SNAP-recipient age groups increased in 
size slightly in the first quarter of 2013, which explains the increase in 
mean SNAP benefits starting in 2013, since SNAP benefit levels are 
determined by household size. 
Entry and exit 
Understanding how recipients entered and exited the SNAP and 
UI/EUC/EB programs can help with understanding how recipients 
interacted with the programs. Figure 7.7 shows the monthly number 
of UI/EUC/EB recipients in SNAP-recipient households entering 
and exiting the UI/EUC/EB programs, smoothed over three months. 
When there were more entries than exits, there was a net gain in the 
UI/EUC/EB program caseload that month, and vice versa. From this 
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Figure 7.7  New and Exiting UI/EUC/EB Cases, Smoothed over
Three Months 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland UI/EUC/EB administrative data. 
graph, we see that there were more entries than exits through March 
2010, after which the entries and exits trend much closer together. 
The principal exception occurred in November 2011, when there was 
a spike in UI/EUC/EB program entry due to the start of the extended 
benefit, as explained earlier and reflected in Figure 7.2. Similarly, 
because of the subsequent spike in EB program exit two months later 
in January 2012, much of this increase in November 2011 appears to 
have been from cases that only received two months of benefits. This 
is because Maryland EB was triggered on and off within these couple 
of months. 
Overall, despite the seasonality in UI/EUC/EB total enrollment 
that we saw in Figure 7.2, as the Maryland economy recovered from 
the recession and some recipients exhausted their UI program ben-
efits, the number of new UI/EUC/EB cases started to stabilize, lead-
ing to a slight increase in overall UI/EUC/EB exit. This helps explain 
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the slight decline in the total UI program caseload seen in Figure 7.2. 
As we saw in Table 7.1, the majority of UI recipients received post-
UI earnings. This is good news, because these recipients were better 
off than the UI recipients who exhausted their benefits and had no 
earnings. 
Looking at SNAP program entry and exit for households that 
were participating in both programs yields additional insights. The 
shaded area in Figure 7.8 represents new SNAP households that were 
already receiving some UI/EUC/EB program benefit at the time of 
SNAP enrollment. The bars represent exiting SNAP households that 
were still receiving some UI/EUC/EB program benefits when the 
household stopped receiving SNAP benefits. 
There was substantial seasonal fluctuation in both SNAP entry 
and exit across the study period. Meanwhile, since the number of 
Figure 7.8  Study Group SNAP and UI/EUC/EB Joint Participating 
Households, by New and Exiting SNAP Cases 
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new SNAP cases exceeded the number of exiting SNAP households, 
SNAP enrollment increased across the study period. 
The much larger number of new SNAP households versus those 
exiting signals that a substantial number of households did not receive 
enough UI/EUC/EB benefits to push those households above the 
SNAP eligibility ceiling. The fact that they still qualified for SNAP
while on UI shows that their UI/EUC/EB benefit was low and that 
SNAP provided supplemental support to this vulnerable population. 
Although the numbers of households entering and exiting SNAP
both increased across time, the difference between the two largely 
stayed the same, meaning that the rate of SNAP household exit 
roughly stayed on trend despite the growth in SNAP enrollment. In 
addition, the spike in new SNAP cases from July through Novem-
ber of 2011 was followed by a lagged spike in exits from February 
through April 2012, suggesting that many of the new recipients dur-
ing this time period had relatively short spells of unemployment. 
Again, the spike in October through December 2011 is due to the EB 
availability, shown in the peak in the gray line around the end of 2011. 
However, the later spike of January 2013 is instead driven by rising 
new SNAP caseloads among current EUC and, to a less extent, UI. 
Figure 7.9 further elucidates these interactions by showing UI 
program entrants and exiters among the Study Group households that 
continued to receive SNAP. The households that are represented by 
the solid line in this figure are those that either exhausted UI pro-
gram benefits without finding a job or found a job but with earnings 
low enough to maintain continued income eligibility to receive SNAP
benefits. The dotted line indicates those households that began receiv-
ing SNAP benefits at the same time they received UI program ben-
efits. Both lines, then, represent households that did not have a high 
enough income to exit SNAP and remain off SNAP for the long term. 
Aside from the two spikes in the fourth quarters of 2011 and 
2012, the percentage of UI program entrants who were already receiv-
ing SNAP benefits prior to enrollment in the UI programs slowly 
decreased across the study period. More importantly, the figure shows 
Percent Entering UI/EUC/EB among Continuing SNAP Households 
Percent Exiting UI/EUC/EB among Continuing SNAP Households 
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Figure 7.9  UI/EUC/EB Program Entries and Exits among Continuing 
SNAP Households 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP and UI/EUC/EB admin-
istrative data. 
a slightly increasing share of SNAP recipient households that did not 
receive UI, either because they were not attached to the workforce or 
because they had exhausted UI eligibility. 
Spell length 
While households could continue receiving SNAP benefits for 
more extended periods, households exhausted UI/EUC/EB program 
benefits relatively quickly. Because UI program spell length could 
reflect changes in program eligibility, changes in an individual’s 
employment, or a sufficient increase in an individual’s earnings to 
leave UI, it is helpful to examine how UI/EUC/EB program spell 
length changed over time. 
As seen in Figure 7.10, the mean UI program benefit spell length 
decreased across the study period. In this graph, the UI spell bars 
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represent the usual Maryland state-funded UI program benefits. Both 
EUC and EB benefits were temporarily provided by the federal gov-
ernment to extend UI program benefits because of the recession and 
the slow postrecession recovery. Since the bars represent mean pro-
gram spell length by the month in which a new claim was opened, 
the light gray EUC-spell line and the black EB-spell vertical bars 
represent individuals who, by the point at which EUC and EB ben-
efits became available, had already exhausted the Maryland-funded 
UI regular program benefit. Thus, many recipients in Maryland could 
have received some form of UI program benefit for well over a year. 
EB benefits ended in Maryland in mid-2012, and EUC benefits 
ended in December 2013. The unavailability of EUC and EB program 
benefits after these benefit end dates has a clear impact on the total 
average-benefit-spell length later in the study period. 
Figure 7.10 Study Group UI/EUC/EB Benefit Spell (in days) by New 
Claim Start Month 
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PARTICIPATION PATTERNS 
Since the type of household that applies for SNAP first and the 
type of individual who applies for UI programs first could be very 
different, we examine these groups separately to better understand the 
study population. Table 7.2 breaks down various metrics by partici-
pation pattern—whether the enrollee first participated in SNAP, first 
participated in UI programs, or entered both programs simultaneously. 
We see that recipients who enrolled in SNAP first were younger, 
belonged to households that were larger and had more children, were 
more likely to be women, and were more likely to never have been 
married. Sixty-three percent of participants who enrolled in a UI pro-
gram first had multiple adults in the household, while only 14 percent 
of participants who enrolled in SNAP first had multiple adults in the 
household. There are no substantial differences in education between 
the SNAP-first and UI-first participants. However, we would expect 
that people with the characteristics of participants who first enrolled 
in SNAP would be worse off, since they were more likely to have a 
single income and a larger household (and more dependents) to sup-
port on one income. It could be that people who enrolled in SNAP
first were working but had low enough wages to qualify for SNAP
benefits. 
Although it is relatively easy to identify differences between 
these groups, it is more challenging to know how to adapt policies or 
programs to better serve the populations in greatest need. The demo-
graphic differences between groups are not stark and do not point to 
a clear policy solution. 
Outcomes of SNAP and UI Participation 
We now examine the employment and earnings of individuals 
and households after they received benefits from the SNAP and UI 
programs. 
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Table 7.2  Household and Participant Characteristics at Quarter of 
Enrollment, by Enrollment Pattern 
SNAP UI/EUC/ Simulta-
first EB first neousa 
Household demographics 
Number of households  769,148 137,634 51,156 
Mean age of recipient 31.99 36.20 35.94 
% female 77.7 68.8 70.1 
Mean household size 2.18 1.87 1.89 
Mean children in household 1.05 0.76 0.79 
Mean adults in household 1.13 1.12 1.10 
Mean household members w/ disabilities 0.19 0.21 0.20 
Multiadult household (%) 14.2 60.6 44.2 
Mean quarterly wage of recipient ($) 3,594 4,819 4,108 
Race (%) 
Asian 0.4 0.4 0.3 
African American 65.8 67.9 68.4 
Caucasian 27.9 26.4 25.3 
Hispanic 2.1 1.0 1.4 
Native American 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Pacific Islander 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Unknown 3.6 4.3 4.4 
Education (%) 
Elementary education 4.5 3.5 3.6 
Secondary education 83.1 86.0 86.3 
Higher education 11.3 9.5 9.1 
Vocational/job training 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Marital status (%) 
Divorced 5.2 7.8 7.3 
Married 7.0 7.7 7.2 
Never married 79.0 74.5 75.1 
Separated 8.1 9.0 9.5 
Unknown 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Widowed 0.5 0.8 0.7 
aSimultaneous enrollment occurs when an individual or household enrolls in both a UI 
program and SNAP in the same month. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP, UI/EUC/EB, and UI 
wage record administrative data. 
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Employment results 
Since the goal of the UI programs is to provide temporary partial 
replacement of earnings to individuals as they actively seek reem-
ployment, and since there is significant policy interest in improving 
employment services to SNAP recipients, we present in this section 
an analysis of employment frequency and wages after receiving ben-
efits from SNAP or UI. 
Figure 7.11 shows the number of adults who are SNAP recipients, 
UI program recipients, and employed in each quarter relative to the 
start of SNAP receipt for that individual’s household. Over the eight 
quarters from the beginning of SNAP receipt, we observe dramatic 
declines in the number of SNAP beneficiaries and gradual declines in 
the numbers of UI beneficiaries and employed persons. The declines 
are somewhat misleading because of censoring—that is, the full eight 
Figure 7.11 Number of Individuals Receiving SNAP Benefits, UI/ 
EUC/EB Benefits, or Who Are Employed in the Calendar 
Quarters since the Start of SNAP Benefits, 2009–2015 
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quarters after the start of SNAP benefits are not observed for all ben-
eficiaries. Some SNAP recipients might have left the state or dropped 
out of program participation and employment. 
Figure 7.12 tracks activities of SNAP recipients during the eight 
quarters after they first received SNAP benefits. The figure shows 
the percentages receiving SNAP, UI, or earnings from employment. 
All percentage calculations in the graph have the same denomina-
tor, 955,276, representing the total number of SNAP recipient spells 
between 2009 and 2015. Since an individual or household has to 
receive SNAP in order to be in the denominator, 100 percent of peo-
ple in this graph received SNAP benefits in Quarter 0, their first quar-
ter of SNAP benefit in the SNAP spell. Note that not all those 955,276 
SNAP spells have eight quarters of data after initial SNAP receipt. 
Similar to the trend seen in Figure 7.11, we see the most rapid 
decline in the percentage of SNAP benefit recipients during the first 
Figure 7.12  Percentage SNAP Recipients Still Receiving SNAP and/or
Are Employed and/or Receiving UI/EUC/EB by Quarter
within Eight Quarters after SNAP Benefits Started, 
2009–2015 
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268 Zhang, Christiansen, and Li 
three quarters after the first SNAP benefit was received, followed by 
a steady but more modest decline through the remaining five quarters 
shown here, ending at roughly 30 percent. The very low percentage 
of individuals who are both SNAP and UI program recipients is con-
sistent with previous figures. As in Figure 7.11, Figure 7.12 shows a 
steadily declining percentage of those SNAP recipients in UI/EUC/ 
EB or employment over time after the first SNAP receipt. However, 
since the SNAP percentage falls over time, the share also receiving UI 
drops from about 10 percent of SNAP recipients to about 7 percent, 
showing a fairly steady rate of joint participation. 
Two years after the initial SNAP payment quarter, 30 percent of 
the 955,276 SNAP recipients were still in SNAP-recipient households. 
About a quarter of this 30 percent were employed with positive earn-
ings and may or may not have exited from the SNAP program, and 
2 percent of the 30 percent were in UI/EUC/EB programs. Research-
ers have noted that program-mandated employment requirements for 
SNAP recipients should be realistic because 1) SNAP serves many 
people who can’t work, such as children, the elderly, and the disabled 
(Rosenbaum 2013); and 2) SNAP as a welfare program has very few 
incentives to encourage work (Moffitt 2015). There is continued pol-
icy interest in moving more SNAP recipients toward work. 
Because employment is a goal of UI/EUC/EB programs, we 
include Figure 7.13, which follows the same approach as Figure 7.12 
but displays the quarters that have elapsed since the UI program ben-
efits began among SNAP recipient households. In Figure 7.13, the 
denominator for all calculations is 280,474, the number of all new UI 
benefit spells in SNAP recipient households starting between 2009 
and 2015. The figure shows the percentages of those employed and/ 
or continuing to receive SNAP and UI benefits in each of the eight 
quarters after the beginning of a new UI benefit spell. Note that not all 
those 280,474 new UI benefit spells had the potential to be eight cal-
endar quarters long, since less than 1 percent of Maryland UI benefi-
ciaries in the period were eligible for a total of 99 weeks of UI/EUC/ 
EB. Also note that the initial sample of UI beneficiaries in Quarter 0 
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Figure 7.13  Percentages of UI Recipients Who Were Also Employed or
Receiving SNAP by Calendar Quarter since UI/EUC/EB 
Benefit Receipt Started, 2009–2015 
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is not restricted to only those in SNAP recipient households, though 
to be in the Study Group they had to receive SNAP benefits at some 
point. At the time UI benefit spells started, about 44 percent of UI 
beneficiaries were also in SNAP recipient households. 
Similar to Figure 7.12, which shows the SNAP percentage at 
Quarter 0, Figure 7.13 shows UI program participation at 100 per-
cent in Quarter 0, the first quarter that UI benefits are received. One 
stark difference between Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13 is that the strict 
maximum time length for UI program benefits leads to a UI program 
receipt of about 0.7 percent by the eighth quarter after the initial UI 
program benefit was received (versus 30 percent SNAP program 
receipt in the eighth quarter after the initial SNAP benefit in Figure 
7.12). This difference highlights the fact that the maximum potential 
duration of UI was 99 weeks in this period. 
It is interesting that the percentage of initial UI program recipi-
ents who received SNAP started at around 44 percent and gradually 
8 
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decreased to 27 percent over eight quarters (two years) after receiv-
ing initial UI benefits. Thus, slightly more than one-fourth of the UI 
recipients who received SNAP after UI eligibility ended up having 
either no job or wages low enough to still qualify for SNAP. 
By the fourth quarter after the start of new UI benefit spells, the 
percent employment remained steady at roughly 36 percent until 
Quarter 8, when it declined to about 33 percent. Quarter 0—the 
quarter in which UI program benefits were first received—shows the 
highest percentage employed across the entire time period, at 79 per-
cent. This is most likely due to the way data are reported. Wages are 
reported quarterly and UI program benefits are disbursed weekly, so 
it is very likely that an individual received at least some wages in 
the calendar quarter during which the individual lost his or her job 
and started receiving UI program benefits. Therefore, this initial high 
percentage of UI beneficiaries being employed simply reflects the dif-
ferent time periods of the program data collection. 
Although the final percentage of people in Figure 7.13 who were 
employed and who could still be tracked after eight quarters is higher 
than in Figure 7.12 (33 percent versus 26 percent), it still means that 
67 percent of this population may have had no employment and had 
exhausted all UI program benefits. This helps explain why the SNAP
enrollment percentage remained at about 27 percent eight quarters 
after new UI benefit spells began. While SNAP receipt spells might 
have continued for many in this group after UI benefits ended, SNAP
replaced a much smaller share of income lost due to unemployment. 
Wage Results 
Because employment does not guarantee earnings that elevate 
households above poverty, especially if one considers household size, 
we present an analysis of the earnings of those SNAP and UI/EUC/ 
EB program recipients who were employed. 
Mirroring the large differences in UI/EUC/EB program benefits 
by age category seen in Figure 7.5, Figure 7.14 shows a similar trend 
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in seasonal fluctuation of wages across all age categories. Also, con-
sistent with Figure 7.5, Figure 7.14 shows the 31-to-45-year-old group 
as having had the highest wages across all time periods. Individuals in 
the 18-to-30- and 45-to-65-year-old age categories had similar wages 
for much of 2009, after which the wages for the 45-to-65-year-old 
group increased at a higher rate than for the 18-to-30-year-old group 
across the rest of the study period. Recall that in Figure 7.4, we show 
that the oldest age group (45-to-65-year-old) had the lowest amount 
of SNAP benefits, because they tended to live in smaller households. 
Figure 7.5 shows that this older age group had similarly lower UI/ 
EUC/EB benefits. Because the youngest age group also had lowest 
average wages (see Figure 7.14), this age group was hit hardest dur-
ing the 2009 recession. 
Even though the 31-to-45-year-old age group had the high-
est mean quarterly wage, their annual wages would not have been 
Figure 7.14 Average UI Recipient’s Quarterly Earnings, by Recipient’s 
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significantly above the federal poverty level for a household of two 
(approximately $4,020 per quarter). It might have been that these 
wages came from employment that was part-time, but whatever the 
source, these wages likely were not high enough to provide long-term 
self-sufficiency for these households. 
Figures 7.15 through 7.18 (pp. 272–273) examine differences in 
the income composition of the Study Group households and show 
median income by source (earnings, SNAP benefits, UI benefits, total) 
and quarter after the first SNAP benefit was received. The median was 
calculated from all nonzero income values by quarter and by each 
income source. 
Figure 7.15 shows median income by source and quarter for all 
households in the Study Group—which includes all households who 
have received at least one SNAP payment and have at least one mem-
ber of the household between the ages of 18 and 64. Sample sizes for 
this panel range from 482,097 total households represented in Quarter 
1 to 140,508 in Quarter 8. 
Figures 7.16–7.18 represent median income by source and quar-
ter for three different subgroups of Study Group households, whose 
quarterly income came exclusively from three sources: 1) SNAP and 
UI benefits (Figure 7.16, sample sizes ranging from 23,545 to 3,568 
households), 2) earnings and SNAP benefits (Figure 7.17, sample 
sizes ranging from 199,431 to 53,694 households), and 3) SNAP
benefits, UI benefits, and earnings (Figure 7.18, sample sizes rang-
ing from 35,292 to 4,920 households) in each quarter. Although a 
household could switch subgroups each quarter as its income sources 
changed, there is no overlap of households across subgroups within 
a single quarter. 
We have made the scale the same across Figures 7.15–7.18 to 
make comparisons across groups easier. Each figure contains only 
households who have each of the specified income sources each 
quarter. As a result, median total household income for those panels 
is roughly the sum of the median of each income source. However, 
because not all households in Figure 7.15  have income from all four 
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sources, median earnings, for example, are higher than median total 
household income, because only about half of Study Group house-
holds in Figure 7.15 have earnings. 
Median SNAP benefit is largely the same across all four of the 
figures on the next two pages and relatively constant from the second 
through the eighth quarter after the first SNAP payment. Since UI 
benefits have stricter time limits and thus are very likely to decrease 
over the eight-quarter period, households with income from UI ben-
efits experienced a decrease in total household income over time. 
Meanwhile, households not receiving UI benefits (Figure 7.17) had 
slightly increasing total household income over time. 
Households with income from all three sources (Figure 7.18) 
consistently have the highest median total household income. This 
wage-earning subgroup’s median UI benefit payment was lower than 
households with only SNAP and UI benefits and no earnings (Fig-
ure 7.16), but the median SNAP payments for these two groups was 
roughly the same. Even though this was the highest-income group in 
the study, these households remained at close to poverty level even 
with some government assistance, at about 150 percent of the 2017 
federal poverty guideline of an annual income of $24,000 for a two-
person household. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines use of SNAP and UI in Maryland during 
the Great Recession and the sluggish economic recovery of that state. 
Despite starting at a much lower level of unemployment, by the end 
of the recession the unemployment rate in Maryland was almost as 
high as the national average. Over the period, the Maryland SNAP
caseload increased at a higher rate than in the nation as a whole. 
Maryland experienced a milder recession but still has rates of pro-
gram benefit receipt above the national average. 
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Figure 7.15  Median Income by Source and Quarter after First SNAP
Payment: All Households 
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Figure 7.16  Median Income by Source and Quarter after First SNAP
Payment: SNAP-UI/EUC/EB Joint Recipient Households 
7.0 
UI/EUC/EB SNAP Total HH income 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.0 
5.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
0 
Quarters since 1st SNAP payment 
$0
00
s 
NOTE: “HH” = household. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP, UI/EUC/EB, and UI 
wage record administrative data. 
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Figure 7.17  Median Income by Source and Quarter after First SNAP
Payment: SNAP Recipient Household Earnings 
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Figure 7.18  Median Income by Source and Quarter after First SNAP
Payment: SNAP-UI/EUC/EB Recipient Household Earnings
0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
$0
00
s 
Earnings UI/EUC/EB SNAP Total HH income 
Quarters since 1st SNAP payment 
NOTE: “HH” = household. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Maryland SNAP, UI/EUC/EB, and UI 
wage record administrative data. 
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Program analysis in this chapter shows that Maryland’s SNAP
caseload continued to increase long after the official end of the reces-
sion in June 2009; it finally plateaued in 2015. This profile is similar 
to nationwide SNAP caseload trends and the trends in other states 
examined in this book. These trends partly reflect the increased SNAP
benefit levels, relaxed eligibility conditions, and increased state out-
reach efforts that started even before the official start of the reces-
sion in December 2007. The Department of Human Resources, which 
administers SNAP in Maryland, confirmed expanded outreach efforts 
within the state during the period analyzed.4 
Our analysis of employment and earnings during and after receiv-
ing SNAP and UI/EUC/EB benefits shows that less than half of the 
950,000 adult SNAP recipient households in the Study Group had 
earnings after receiving benefits. On the other hand, over 90 percent 
of UI/EUC/EB households had postbenefit earnings. Furthermore, 
more than one-quarter of individuals leaving UI/EUC/EB programs 
received SNAP, indicating that they had either no job or a low-wage 
job that did not disqualify them from SNAP. If both SNAP and UI/ 
EUC/EB programs are intended to create temporary assistance 
and help push individuals and households onto a long-term self-
sufficiency basis, more assistance would be needed, given the current 
economy and needs of this population. 
As explained in Chapter 3 of this book, UI/EUC/EB benefit receipt 
can affect eligibility for and amount of SNAP benefits received. UI/ 
EUC/EB benefits are considered as “other income” in SNAP eligibil-
ity guidelines and are “taxed” at 30 cents in SNAP benefit per dol-
lar in other benefits. Analysis in this chapter shows that a spike in 
UI/EUC/EB receipt for SNAP-UI concurrent recipients is associated 
with a surge in SNAP exits. 
The households simultaneously receiving both SNAP and UI 
were some of the most disadvantaged. They qualified for UI/EUC/EB 
benefits that were so low that they could still qualify for SNAP. Our 
analysis focused on SNAP households with a UI beneficiary. Adults 
in such households often were never married, had attained only a 
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secondary education, had low earnings, and were more likely to be 
minority and/or Hispanic. Among these households, average earnings 
were highest for the 31-to-45-year-old age group, but even for this 
group average earnings were still below the federal poverty level for 
a household of two. 
Among beneficiaries of both SNAP and UI, those who received 
SNAP first were younger, belonged to larger households with more 
children, and were more likely to be female and never married. On the 
other hand, those who received UI benefits first had the highest aver-
age earnings levels and did not qualify for SNAP before exhausting 
their UI benefits. Unfortunately, we did not have the data to analyze 
this population more deeply. 
Two full years after first receiving SNAP benefits, a little more 
than one-quarter of SNAP recipients had reported earnings. Note that 
SNAP served many people who were unable to work, such as chil-
dren, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities, and that SNAP as 
a welfare program has few work incentives. However, there is policy 
interest in moving more SNAP recipients toward work. As discussed 
in other chapters addressing the SNAP and UI/EUC/EB program his-
tories and their interaction, states have significant leeway to tailor 
their programs because the federal government permits states to define 
program eligibility, benefit duration, and benefit amounts. Maryland 
is relatively generous with both programs, especially SNAP benefit 
levels. Thus, any future program changes will be driven by both fed-
eral and state policy decisions. 
Eight quarters after receiving their first UI benefits payment, 
two-thirds of the UI recipients did not report any employment. They 
essentially phased out of all UI program benefits, but about one-third 
appeared as SNAP recipients. The UI exhaustee participation in SNAP
in Maryland is consistent with evidence reported for other states in 
this book: many UI exhaustees tended to draw SNAP benefits as a last 
resort. Thus, generosity of state and federal unemployment benefits 
significantly affects whether UI exhaustees will seek SNAP benefits 
and contribute to an increased SNAP caseload. Specifically, longer 
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durations of UI benefits increase the possibility that UI recipients can 
find replacement work before they exhaust their UI benefits and have 
to turn to SNAP for income supplementation. 
Our general sense is that, although this analysis shows some rea-
sons to hope for an improving economic situation for Maryland resi-
dents, there are many areas of concern in terms of moving vulnerable 
populations into steady employment at living wages. Careful evalua-
tion of the resources available for job training, employment readiness, 
and the development of government-business partnerships to increase 
job opportunities should be considered as potential ways to improve 
the economic situation for individuals and households as well as for 
the state of Maryland. 
Notes 
The authors appreciate the funding from the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture’s Economic Research Service and the data access and related assistance 
from the Maryland Department of Human Resources and the Maryland 
Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, all of which helped make 
this timely study possible. In addition, we are indebted to David Stevens, 
who has given us important guidance throughout this whole project, and to Rich-
ard Clinch, who helped edit the final draft. We also appreciate the assistance 
of Christopher J. O’Leary, Stephen A. Wandner, and Michael Wiseman and 
their highly constructive and thorough comments for helping us to enhance 
the chapter. The authors accept full and sole responsibility for its content, 
including all opinions and any errors. The views expressed here should not be 
attributed to any other person or organization. 
1. This simplified unemployment insurance benefit terminology is replaced 
throughout the chapter by three mutually exclusive and therefore more 
decision-relevant labels: state-funded regular UI benefits (UI) and the 
federally funded Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) and 
Extended Benefits (EB). 
2. Note that “Hispanic” is an ethnicity and not exclusive to a particular 
race, such as white. Therefore, the percentages here total more than 100. 
3. Since SNAP administrative records are the only data source with house-
hold identifiers, we use the household identifiers found during the study 
period from the SNAP database, matched with individuals in the UI/ 
EUC/EB and UI wage record databases to convert individual records 
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into household records, so we can generate analysis in the household 
setting. 
4. Maryland Department of Human Resources, Family Investment Admin-
istration, communication with the authors, 2012. 
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Chapter 8 
Receipt of SNAP and
UI Benefits in Michigan
around the Great Recession 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides 
financial assistance for buying food to households near or below 
the poverty level.1 Unemployment insurance (UI) provides tempo-
rary partial wage replacement to the involuntarily unemployed. Both 
programs are part of the social safety net that operates to alleviate 
hardship, but the beneficiary populations of the two programs usu-
ally differ. Unemployment insurance commonly serves middle-class 
Americans for relatively short-term lapses in income during jobless-
ness, while SNAP recipients tend to be grouped near the bottom of 
the income distribution, often with weak labor force attachment. 
Protracted periods of joblessness during and after the Great Reces-
sion of 2007–2009 raised questions about the adequacy of UI income 
replacement to prevent the descent into poverty.2 Naturally, these cir-
cumstances piqued interest in the customer flows between these two 
safety net programs. This chapter provides some evidence about the 
extent and sequencing of SNAP and UI usage in Michigan around 
the period of the Great Recession. The investigation sheds light on 
the degree to which two separate threads of the social safety net are 
woven together to support economic security. 
The analysis relies on program administrative data for people 
aged 18 to 64 in Michigan during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. That 10-year period included two severe economic reces-
sions in the state. When the Great Recession hit, producing the cata-
281 
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strophic effects felt between late 2008 and mid-2010, Michigan had 
not yet recovered from the 2001 dot-com bust. Writing about that ear-
lier decade, a Grand Rapids journalist said in December 2010 that in 
Michigan, “nearly 850,000 jobs vanished, some 440,000 in manufac-
turing. The losses all but wiped out a blue-collar way of life built on 
high wages and liberal benefits, where a high school graduate could 
walk across the street and get a job for life” (Roelofs 2010). 
Like the other state analyses in this book, this chapter was pre-
pared as part of the Administrative Data Research and Evaluation 
(ADARE) consortium supported by the Economic Research Service 
(ERS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). All state chap-
ters are based on program administrative data, but the contents of the 
data available differ from state to state. Consequently, the analysis 
and presentations in the chapters differ too. The prime distinction of 
the Michigan data is the availability of the universe of all applicants 
for UI benefits. Other states have only UI beneficiary data, and some 
states have those UI payment data only for SNAP recipients. The 
UI applicant data permit examination of two things: 1) inflows from 
SNAP to UI and 2) the degree of UI eligibility for those involved with 
SNAP or not. As with the data from other states, the Michigan data 
also include all payments made to SNAP households and all members 
of SNAP households. 
The rules for SNAP and UI eligibility in Michigan are reviewed in 
the next section. This is followed by a brief discussion of the admin-
istrative data used in this chapter. An overview of the labor market 
conditions in Michigan and the overlap in SNAP and UI recipiency 
is followed by a review of the flows from SNAP to UI and from UI 
to SNAP. Controlling for the observable characteristics of UI appli-
cants, I then examine flows from UI into SNAP. Next, I compare the 
Michigan sample design given in this chapter to the designs used in 
the other five states and suggest how the different designs influence 
the results reported. Finally, I simulate the effects of shorter potential 
UI duration in Michigan on beneficiary flows into SNAP. 
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MICHIGAN SNAP AND UI ELIGIBILITY AND
BENEFIT RULES 
Eligibility rules for SNAP are determined by federal regulations. 
As a nutritional assistance program for the economically disadvan-
taged, SNAP has eligibility criteria that concern household levels of 
gross monthly income, net monthly income, and liquid assets (USDA
2018). The federal rules for household SNAP eligibility include the 
following three: 1) gross monthly income must be below 130 percent 
of the federal poverty income level, 2) net income after allowable 
deductions must be at or below the poverty income level, and 3) liq-
uid assets must be $2,000 or less. 
Gross monthly income is the total from all sources, including 
labor earnings, UI benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), general assistance 
(GA), and child support payments. Net income is computed as the 
remainder after all allowable expenses and exemptions for depen-
dents. Liquid assets, those that can be readily accessed, like money 
in savings accounts, are limited for most households to $2,000, while 
households with an elderly or disabled member may have up to 
$3,250 in liquid assets. Assets that cannot be readily converted into 
cash are not considered in SNAP eligibility. Examples are the house-
hold’s principal residence, personal property, retirement savings, 
and one automobile. Because of differing state policies, asset limits 
vary somewhat across states. In 2013, there were 36 states with no 
asset limits whatsoever, while the limits varied between $2,000 and 
$25,000 in the states with asset limits (USDA 2018). For example, 
Michigan permits liquid assets up to $5,000 and one vehicle valued 
at up to $15,000. 
Some persons are excluded from SNAP eligibility even if they 
meet income limits, while others are categorically eligible because 
they qualify for other safety net programs. Excluded are persons sepa-
rated from work because of union actions, undocumented immigrants, 
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and some legal immigrants who have been in this country only a short 
time. Able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) are limited 
to three months of SNAP benefits every three years. Most adult ben-
eficiaries must also spend at least 20 hours a week working, engaging 
in job search, pursuing employability development, or participating in 
an approved job training program. 
“Categorical eligibility” establishes SNAP eligibility through 
benefit receipt from another means-tested program such as TANF, 
SSI, or GA. For SNAP beneficiaries who also receive income from 
another safety net program, one dollar of additional labor earnings 
usually reduces SNAP benefits by less than one dollar of program 
benefits. Hanson and Andrews (2009) show that labor earnings affect 
SNAP benefits differently across states for households also receiving 
TANF, because the TANF and SNAP earnings offsets can differ. In 
Michigan and four other states (Alabama, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
and Virginia), additional earnings below the eligibility threshold do 
not affect SNAP benefits, since the TANF earnings reduction and the 
SNAP earnings disregard are both equal to 20 percent of the benefit 
level. 
The benefit level under SNAP increases with household size. 
SNAP expects families receiving benefits to spend 30 percent of their 
net income on food. Families with no net income receive the maxi-
mum benefit, which equals the cost of the USDA Thrifty Food Plan (a 
diet plan intended to provide adequate nutrition at minimal cost). For 
all other households, the monthly SNAP benefit equals the maximum 
benefit for that household size minus the household’s expected contri-
bution. Households eligible for the maximum amount receive an extra 
$150 per month for each additional person. 
Benefits under SNAP increased in April 2009 under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The monthly increase for a 
family of four was $80, with proportionate increases for other house-
hold sizes. The benefit increases lasted until November 2013. Also 
in 2009, procedures for gaining access to SNAP benefits changed 
because of the introduction of an Internet-based application system, 
  
 
SNAP and UI Benefits in Michigan around the Great Recession  285 
called “Bridges” in Michigan.3 That same year, Michigan simplified 
procedures for certifications and beneficiary midcertification report-
ing by allowing telephone reporting instead of in-person-only reports. 
Unemployment insurance eligibility rules are set to ensure that 
those compensated had been strongly attached to the labor force but 
are now temporarily jobless through no fault of their own. Unlike 
SNAP, there is no income (means) test for UI—i.e., no disqualifying 
upper earnings threshold for UI. To initially qualify for UI, a claimant 
must have a sufficient amount of prior earnings and a sufficient dura-
tion of prior employment: those two conditions define the claimant’s 
monetary eligibility. Furthermore, the job separation must be invol-
untary. Nonmonetary eligibility rules prohibit quits and discharge for 
misconduct or other causes justifiable by an employer. UI applicants 
must also be able, available, and actively seeking full-time work. To 
obtain initial eligibility and maintain continuing eligibility, beneficia-
ries may not refuse an offer of suitable work. 
Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earn-
ings. The UI base period is normally the first four of the previous 
five completed calendar quarters before the date of claim for benefits. 
Many states permit an alternate base period for those with insufficient 
earnings in the standard base period. The alternate base period is usu-
ally the four most recently completed calendar quarters. Some states 
have a high quarterly earnings requirement. Most states also have an 
earnings dispersion requirement. Since 2009, Michigan has required 
that there be earnings in at least two quarters of the base period, that 
the high for quarterly earnings be at least $2,871, and that base period 
earnings total at least 1.5 times this threshold for the high in quarterly 
earnings, or $4,307 (UIA 2014).4 
DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
Michigan administrative data provided to the W.E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research includes the complete population of 
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all those who filed regular UI applications between January 2001 
and December 2010. These data were accumulated over several 
years in the course of research on several different projects under-
taken by the Upjohn Institute for the Michigan Unemployment Insur-
ance Agency and federal government agencies.5 Monthly Michigan 
SNAP data from January 2006 through August 2011 were obtained 
from the Michigan Department of Human Services in 2010 and 2011. 
Quarterly UI wage record data for individuals in both programs were 
matched and provided by the Michigan Department of Technology, 
Management, and Budget. The earnings data span the third quarter of 
1997 through the third quarter of 2010.6 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND PROGRAM BENEFIT RECEIPT 
The contrast in Michigan unemployment trends compared to the 
United States as a whole is illustrated in Figure 8.1. From early 2005 
through mid-2008, the Michigan unemployment rate hovered 2 per-
centage points above the national average, at around 7 percent of the 
labor force. The gap then more than doubled in the next 12 months, 
rising to 5 percentage points above that of the United States, then 
sharply declined through the end of 2011. After hitting a plateau for 
two years, it resumed falling to the current level, which is near the 
national average (BLS 2019b). 
STOCKS OF SNAP AND UI BENEFICIARIES 
Figure 8.2 shows the monthly stock of SNAP cases with at least 
one person in the 18–64 age range for our analysis sample, as well as 
the six-month moving average of monthly Michigan UI recipients.7 
The vertical lines in the graph are set at the official starting and ending 
quarters of the Great Recession.8 There were approximately 525,000 
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Figure 8.1  Unemployment Rates in Michigan and the United States, 
2005–2017 
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2019b); Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics, Series ID: LASST260000000000003; and BLS (2019a), Labor Force Sta-
tistics from the Current Population Survey, Series ID: LNS14000000. 
Figure 8.2 Stocks of Michigan SNAP Cases and UI Beneficiaries, 
2007–2011 
950 
900 
850 
800 
750 
700 
650 
SNAP cases 
UI beneficiaries 
500 0 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50
SN
A
P
 
ca
se
s 
w
ith
 a
 
re
ci
pi
en
t 1
8–
64
 (
00
0s
) 
U
I 
fi
rs
t 
pa
ym
en
ts
 p
lu
s 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
cl
ai
m
s 
(0
00
s)
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Michigan SNAP recipient cases at the start of 2007, and that number 
rose steadily to plateau at over 900,000 by late 2011 (Figure 8.3). In 
contrast, over the same period, the monthly stock of UI beneficiaries 
rose from about 150,000 to a peak of nearly 342,000 in June 2009 and 
then declined to a level below 150,000 by September 2010. 
INFLOWS TO SNAP AND UI RECEIPT 
The monthly inflow of new SNAP cases steadily increased from 
about 20,000 in early 2007 to double that rate by the end of 2009 
(Figure 8.3). The monthly inflow of new SNAP cases fluctuated 
between 30,000 and 40,000 in 2010 and declined to about 30,000 in 
2011. The steady inflow combined with the increasing stock of SNAP
cases indicates that the monthly outflow declined during the period 
observed. During the same period, monthly UI first payments started 
Figure 8.3 Michigan Average Monthly SNAP and UI Inflows, 2007–2011 
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at approximately 40,000, peaked at over 70,000, and ended at a rate 
below 30,000.9 
SEPARATE AND SIMULTANEOUS RECEIPT OF SNAP
AND UI 
The number of adults aged 18–64 receiving SNAP benefits in 
Michigan increased each year from 2006 to 2010, peaking at over 1.3 
million in 2010 (Table 8.1). Over the same period, the annual number 
of Michigan UI recipients oscillated, hitting a peak of over 778,000 
in 2009 but then significantly dropping in 2010. The number of simul-
taneous recipients of SNAP and UI also oscillated over the period, 
ranging between 79,000 and 171,000 per year, peaking in 2009. Joint 
SNAP and UI recipients as a share of all SNAP recipients ranged from 
10.4 to 15.1 percent, while joint SNAP and UI recipients as a share 
Table 8.1  SNAP and UI Recipients in Michigan by Separate Program 
and Joint Use, 2006–2010 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SNAP total recipi- 747,829 798,726 876,154 1,133,306 1,326,638 
ents in year 
UI total recipients 530,563 490,982 598,584 778,209 517,948 
in year 
SNAP and UI in 78,613 83,416 106,123 170,910 141,190 
same year 
SNAP and UI share 0.105 0.104 0.121 0.151 0.106 
of SNAP total 
SNAP and UI share 0.148 0.170 0.177 0.220 0.273 
of UI total 
NOTE: UI benefit receipt in a given year is determined relative to an individual’s UI 
benefit-year-begin (BYB) date and the total number of weeks with regular UI pay-
ments plus weeks with extended benefits (EB) and/or emergency unemployment 
compensation (EUC) payments relative to that BYB. Individual spells of joint benefit 
receipt can be counted in more than one year, and this possibility is increased in this 
period given the availability of EB and EUC. 
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from Michigan program administrative data. 
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of all UI beneficiaries ranged between 14.8 and 27.3 percent. These 
patterns over the five-year period resulted from a steadily growing 
population of SNAP recipients and an oscillating population of UI 
recipients. 
The figures in Table 8.1 indicate that at least 85 percent of SNAP
recipients in any year are not UI beneficiaries. When labor market 
conditions deteriorate and average unemployment durations get lon-
ger, many of those who normally earn lower-than-average wages are 
likely to face hardship. In the data, this is seen when the Michigan 
job market began to improve in 2010: the numbers of UI beneficiaries 
fell dramatically, but joint UI and SNAP receipt as a share of all UI 
beneficiaries rose to 27.3 percent. At the beginning of the economic 
recovery, a larger share of UI beneficiaries were in lower-income 
households having some labor force attachment. 
Some direct evidence on the composition of the Michigan popu-
lations using SNAP and UI is summarized in the demographic data 
for 2006–2010 in Table 8.2. The biggest share of SNAP-only recipi-
ents consists of the youngest group, in the age range 18–24, while the 
biggest share of UI-only recipients consists of the age groups over 
40, and the biggest SNAP-UI joint usage group is in the 30-to-39 
age range. Females have the biggest share of SNAP-only, males have 
the biggest UI-only share, and females have a slightly bigger joint 
SNAP-UI share. The Michigan population is about 80 percent white, 
and whites make up the majorities of the SNAP-only, SNAP-plus-UI, 
and UI-only beneficiary groups. The most informative rows report 
earnings in the year preceding benefits and the year after benefits. 
Earnings are lowest for the SNAP-only group, highest for the UI-only 
group, and in between for those receiving both SNAP and UI. The 
mean income for the SNAP-only population is less than $1,000 per 
calendar quarter, or less than $100 per week, on average. Noting that 
SNAP eligibility ends at 130 percent of the poverty level of income, 
the mean four-quarter earnings of $12,681 is a measure of central 
tendency for current-year income of persons receiving benefits from 
both SNAP and UI. The mean annual income in the year of applica-
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Table 8.2  Sample Proportions by Characteristics and Earnings of 
SNAP-Only, SNAP + UI, and UI-Only Recipients Aged 18–64 
in Michigan, 2006–2010 
SNAP-only SNAP + UI UI-only 
Number of individual recipients 4,452,771 429,882 1,922,284 
Age, 18–24 0.267 0.130 0.088 
Age, 25–29 0.132 0.176 0.107 
Age, 30–39 0.218 0.324 0.236 
Age, 40–49 0.197 0.246 0.289 
Age, 50–64 0.185 0.124 0.280 
Gender, male 0.427 0.470 0.680 
Gender, female 0.573 0.530 0.320 
Race, white 0.639 0.651 0.646 
Race, African American 0.334 0.328 0.100a 
Race, Asian 0.009 0.007 0.012 
Race, unknown 0.010 0.007 0.233 
Earnings in year prior to benefits ($) 3,975 19,622 35,102 
Earnings in year after benefits ($) 3,584 12,681 29,920 
a Most unknown categories for missing data are omitted, as are categories with less 
than 1 percent. However, 23.3 percent of the UI beneficiary data has unknown race. 
The SNAP+UI characteristics are based on SNAP demographic data, suggesting that 
the African American share of UI-only beneficiaries is much higher than 10 percent. 
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from Michigan program administrative data. 
tion for UI beneficiaries who avoided SNAP receipt was just below 
$30,000. 
OVERLAP IN SNAP AND UI AT INFLOW 
The overlap in SNAP and UI benefit receipt at inflow into either 
program between 2007 and 2010 is illustrated in Figure 8.4. The fig-
ure shows the shares of the new recipient inflows in either SNAP or 
UI who are receiving benefits from the other program at the time of 
entry. Both these conditional benefit recipient inflow shares reflect the 
sizes of the stocks of program participants in the denominators. Over 
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Figure 8.4 Michigan’s Shares of New SNAP Case Inflow with at Least 
One Current UI Beneficiary, and UI Beneficiary Inflow with 
a SNAP Case Member, 2007–2010 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
this period, UI recipiency rose and fell, but the share of new UI recipi-
ents who were already receiving SNAP started rising in early 2009, 
just as the inflow to UI had peaked. The share of new SNAP recipi-
ents who were already receiving UI rose dramatically in the last half 
of 2008, peaked in January 2009, and declined thereafter. Therefore, 
the pattern of UI recipients entering SNAP paralleled the pattern of 
total inflows into UI. These trends suggest that some persons who are 
normally strongly attached to the labor market turn to SNAP when the 
economy deteriorates. However, as inflows to SNAP increase in times 
of severe recession, that inflow is not coming entirely from families 
with displaced workers. 
The remainder of this chapter exploits the advantage of the Mich-
igan data in having the full population of all UI applicants. I explore 
SNAP receipt before and after UI application by the degree of UI 
eligibility and UI benefit receipt. I then examine factors influencing 
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flows into SNAP from UI while controlling for observable charac-
teristics. Chief among these factors is prior SNAP receipt after UI 
application. 
SNAP RECEIPT BEFORE UI APPLICATION 
Starting from the census of all UI applications in Michigan dur-
ing the study period, I examine the transition from labor force par-
ticipation to joblessness, to involvement with UI, and then perhaps 
to involvement with SNAP. Table 8.3 provides the background for 
this perspective by examining the extent to which UI applicants were 
involved with SNAP before job separations. 
Overall, between 2007 and 2010, an average of 20.2 percent of 
UI applicants received some SNAP benefits in the year prior to their 
UI application. However, the share with prior SNAP receipt increased 
dramatically in 2010 to 27.2 percent, up from 19.5 percent in 2009. 
There is considerable variation in prior SNAP receipt by the degree 
of UI benefit eligibility and receipt. For UI applicants between 2007 
and 2010, the rate of prior SNAP receipt tends to be lower among 
those with higher prior earnings and relatively stronger labor force 
attachments. Only 16.9 percent of monetarily eligible UI applicants 
received SNAP in the 12 months before application, whereas the rate 
was 41.0 percent for those not monetarily eligible.10 Similarly, 17.4 
percent of UI applicants involuntarily laid off from their prior jobs 
because of lack of work (nonmonetarily eligible) received SNAP in 
the prior year, while 28.7 percent of those disqualified for UI by a 
job quit or employer discharge received SNAP in the year before UI 
application. Additionally, UI exhaustees had prior SNAP receipt at 
a higher rate (18.4 percent) than did UI beneficiaries who did not 
exhaust their UI benefit entitlement (11.1 percent). This may have 
resulted from greater job search effort by those in the latter group, 
which included a smaller share of prior SNAP recipients, leading 
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Table 8.3  SNAP Receipt Rate in the 12 Months Prior to UI Application among Michigan Regular UI Applicants Aged 
18–64 by Eligibility and Benefit Receipt Group 
2007 2008 2009 2010 Overall 
All UI applicants (n) 538,712 665,960 774,753 542,546 2,521,971 
All UI applicants (share with SNAP) 0.174 0.176 0.195 0.272 0.202 
Monetarily eligible 0.150 0.151 0.161 0.227 0.169 
Monetarily ineligible 0.374 0.385 0.403 0.454 0.410 
Nonmonetarily eligible 0.142 0.147 0.170 0.242 0.174 
Separated for lack of work 
Nonmonetarily ineligible 0.255 0.258 0.289 0.354 0.287 
Separated for quit or discharge 
Fully UI-eligible 0.121 0.125 0.139 0.197 0.142 
Not a UI beneficiary 0.168 0.176 0.169 0.253 0.192 
UI beneficiarya 0.138 0.142 0.153 0.213 0.158 
Not a UI exhaustee 0.110 0.107 0.116 — 0.111 
UI exhaustee 0.188 0.176 0.189 — 0.184 
Not an EC/EB recipient 0.187 0.180 0.207 — 0.194 
EC/EB recipient 0.188 0.176 0.183 — 0.180 
NOTE: Given the timing of the data extract in February 2011, the claims data for 2010 are sufficient to measure regular UI benefit receipt with 
some downward bias, but not adequate to fully measure exhaustion and extended compensation receipt; therefore, information is not available
for those values, signified by — = not available. 
a UI applicant data for 2010 include UI claims through August. Given the timing of the data extract (February 2011), the claims data for 2010 
are sufficient to measure regular UI benefit receipt with some downward bias, but not sufficient to fully measure exhaustion and extended 
compensation receipt. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
  
 
 
 
	 	 	
 
 
SNAP and UI Benefits in Michigan around the Great Recession  295 
to more favorable labor market outcomes after UI application and 
shorter periods of UI benefit receipt. 
Figure 8.5 provides a longer look back at prior SNAP usage by UI 
applicants sorted into UI eligibility and job separation groups. As is 
shown, 35 percent of all UI applicants in 2010 received some SNAP
benefits between 2006 and the month before UI application. During 
this multiyear period, the prior SNAP receipt rate for persons without 
prior earnings sufficient to establish monetary entitlement was 53 per-
cent, compared to only 31 percent for those with sufficient prior earn-
ings. Persons who quit or were discharged from employment were 
also much more likely to have received SNAP prior to 2010 compared 
with their nonmonetarily eligible counterparts, by a margin of 46 to 
32 percent.11 These data suggest a correlation between weak labor-
force attachment, inconsistent earnings history, difficulties on the job, 
and SNAP receipt. 
Figure 8.5  Rates of SNAP Receipt between January 2006 and UI 
Application by Michigan UI Applicants in 2010, by UI 
Eligibility and Benefit Receipt 
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Finally, Figure 8.5 shows a group of UI applicants who appear 
to be fully eligible to receive unemployment benefits but did not 
become UI beneficiaries. While this is a relatively small group of UI 
applicants (an average of 2.7 percent of applicants between 2007 and 
2010), their prior SNAP receipt rate is higher than similar persons 
who became UI beneficiaries. Assuming these data are accurate, they 
may have obtained immediate reemployment or simply chosen not to 
receive benefits for other reasons. This failure to take up available UI 
benefits is investigated more deeply in the next section of this chapter. 
SNAP RECEIPT AFTER UI APPLICATION 
To investigate receipt of SNAP after UI application, I focus on 
UI applicants who had not received SNAP benefits in the year prior to 
their UI application. That is, from the top row of Table 8.3, I remove 
the UI applicants who received SNAP in the prior year, or about 20.2 
percent of all UI applicants, to yield the top row of Table 8.4. The 
remaining rows of Table 8.4 report the proportions of these UI appli-
cants who received SNAP benefits within one year after applying for 
UI benefits. The UI applicants are divided into the same categories of 
UI eligibility and benefit receipt as those listed in Table 8.3. 
Among UI applicants between January 2007 and August 2010 
who had no SNAP receipt in the year prior to filing, 13 percent entered 
SNAP within a year of UI application. Rates of failure to satisfy UI 
eligibility screens correlate strongly with entry into SNAP for those 
not having received SNAP benefits in the year prior to UI application, 
just as they do for those who received SNAP prior to entering the 
UI system. Overall, between 2007 and 2010, 25 percent of persons 
quitting or being discharged from employment entered SNAP within 
one year of applying for UI. Over that period, persons who could not 
establish monetary entitlement to UI benefits because of insufficient 
prior earnings entered SNAP at an average rate of 20.4 percent. Per-
sons fully eligible for UI who had sufficient earnings and job separa-
   
 
 
297 
Table 8.4  Rates of SNAP Receipt within One Year after UI Application among Persons Aged 18 to 64 Who Did Not 
Receive SNAP in the Year Prior to UI Application 
2007 2008 2009 2010a Overall 
UI applicants with no SNAP receipt in the prior year 444,976 548,751 623,676 394,973 2,012,376 
Overall rate of SNAP receipt w/in 1 yr of UI app. 0.099 0.132 0.141 0.152 0.130
 Monetarily eligible 0.095 0.125 0.131 0.144 0.122
 Monetarily ineligible 0.143 0.220 0.229 0.201 0.204
 Nonmonetarily eligible
 Lack of work 0.066 0.099 0.107 0.108 0.095
 Nonmonetarily ineligible
 Quit or discharge 0.198 0.243 0.291 0.289 0.251
 Fully eligible 0.062 0.092 0.098 0.098 0.088
 Not a beneficiary 0.069 0.099 0.097 0.118 0.093
 UI beneficiary 0.084 0.114 0.121 0.128 0.111
 Not a UI exhaustee 0.049 0.069 0.068 — 0.062
 UI exhaustee 0.151 0.161 0.176 — 0.165
 Not an EC/EB recipient 0.138 0.131 0.139 — 0.137
 EC/EB recipient 0.165 0.165 0.187 — 0.175 
NOTE: — = data not available. 
a With SNAP data ending in August 2011, the 2010 numbers summarize rates for UI claims through August 2010. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
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tions not resulting in disqualification entered SNAP within one year 
at a rate of 8.8 percent. This suggests that UI could be an important 
part of the safety net, supporting transitions back to employment by 
inducing less reliance on SNAP. 
Nevertheless, checking for SNAP receipt within 12 months of the 
UI benefit-year-begin (BYB) date may underestimate the reliance on 
SNAP by UI applicants in this period. Regular UI benefit years last 
52 weeks from the BYB date and usually provide a maximum entitled 
duration of 26 weeks of benefits, so checking for SNAP within 12 
months of the BYB is reasonable when other UI assistance is not 
available. However, for benefit years ending in or after May 2007, 
many UI beneficiaries had extended or emergency UI benefits avail-
able for more than the usual maximum of 26 weeks. Indeed, during 
2009 in Michigan, some applicants received UI for as much as 99 
weeks. Therefore, in the analysis presented below, I examine SNAP
receipt within both 12 and 24 months after UI application. 
SPEED OF MOVEMENT FROM UI INTO SNAP 
To assess whether people moved from UI to SNAP faster in the 
recession, I started with a sample of UI applicants who all received 
SNAP within 24 months after their UI benefit-year-begin (BYB) date, 
and I then checked the proportion in this group that actually started 
receiving SNAP within 12 months. Figure 8.6 shows that the share 
of SNAP recipients receiving SNAP within 12 months increased 
monthly starting near the official beginning of the Great Recession. 
In the sample of all UI applicants, there is a downward trend in the 
12-month SNAP recipiency share until December 2007, which is 
the month pegged by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) as the official start of the Great Recession. After that month, 
the upward trend is prominent for persons with no prior SNAP receipt 
and for those with prior SNAP receipt more than one year previous. 
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Figure 8.6  SNAP Receipt Rates for UI Applicants Receiving SNAP
within 12 Months after UI Application among Those 
Receiving SNAP within 24 Months after Their UI 
Application 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
The upward trend from that point indicates an increase in the speed 
of entry into SNAP. 
SNAP RECEIPT BY UI BENEFICIARIES BY
OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS
For UI beneficiary groups defined by observable characteristics, I 
examine SNAP receipt rates before, at the time of, and after UI benefit 
receipt starts. Over the whole sample of UI beneficiaries, average rates 
of SNAP receipt are 9.3 percent in the month of UI application, 14.2 
percent in the 12 months before UI application, 20.6 percent in the 12 
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months after UI application, and 27.3 percent in the 24 months after 
UI application. This pattern of higher SNAP receipt occurring after 
application than before application persists in all subgroup contrasts. 
The differences between the month of UI application and the contrast 
to a previous or following 12-month period is partly due to checking 
a single month rather than multiple months, but the comparison is 
informative nonetheless. Table 8.5 summarizes the differences from 
average SNAP receipt rates by demographic and geographic charac-
teristics. The SNAP receipt rates for the population of all UI appli-
cants have the same patterns as for all UI beneficiaries, but the SNAP
receipt rates are consistently higher among all applicants than among 
those who qualify for and receive UI benefits—mainly because the 
full UI applicant sample includes UI ineligibles with insufficient prior 
earnings. Conversely, UI beneficiaries are more strongly attached to 
the labor force and have steadier income streams than the full sample 
of all UI applicants. 
Subgroup SNAP receipt rates are summarized for eight charac-
teristics: 1) age, 2) gender, 3) race, 4) educational attainment, 5) prior 
job tenure, 6) income, 7) job separation reason, and 8) urban or rural 
residence. Except for two subcategories in location of residence (large 
Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs] and smaller 
municipal areas), all subgroup proportions are significantly different 
from the population means. The patterns of SNAP receipt among the 
subgroup categories of UI beneficiaries are the same for all four time 
periods for which the SNAP receipt rates were checked. For example, 
the typical pattern is seen relative to the overall mean of a 9.3 percent 
SNAP receipt rate for all UI beneficiaries in the month of UI applica-
tion. The comparable subgroup rates are as follows: 
• Higher for younger UI beneficiary groups: being 12.6 percent 
for ages 18–24 and 11.0 for ages 25–44, while the rate is only 
6.4 percent for ages 45 plus. 
• Higher for females, being 13.1 percent, compared to 7.2 per-
cent for males. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
SNAP and UI Benefits in Michigan around the Great Recession  301 
• Higher for African Americans, being 14.8 percent, but only 
7.7 percent among whites and 8.8 percent among other racial 
groups. 
• Higher for those with lower educational attainment, being 
14.2 percent for those without even a high school diploma but 
6.2 percent for those with a bachelor’s degree. 
• Higher for those with the shortest prior job tenure, being 13.0 
percent for those having worked less than 1 year at their prior 
employer but 6.6 percent for those having 6 to 10 years of 
work experience at their prior employer. 
• Higher for those in the lowest one-third of the prior earnings 
distribution, being 18.1 percent, but 5.5 percent among the 
top one-third of the prior earnings distribution. The latter is 
a surprisingly high rate for UI beneficiaries with the highest 
prior earnings. 
• Higher for those who were fired or discharged (15.5 percent) 
or quit their prior job (14.0 percent), but lower for those with 
involuntary separation due to lack of work (8.1 percent). 
• Rates of SNAP receipt among UI beneficiaries in large met-
ropolitan areas (9.2 percent) and smaller urban areas (9.3 
percent) were not different from the average rate among all 
UI beneficiaries, and the SNAP receipt rate was only slightly 
higher than the mean in rural areas (9.9 percent). 
The three geographic groupings used in the analysis were these: 
1) all metropolitan areas within Census Bureau MSAs, 2) other coun-
ties with incorporated municipal areas and high population densities 
(Census Bureau micropolitan areas), and 3) rural counties through-
out the state.12 Statistical tests yielded no differences from the overall 
group mean in the metropolitan and urban areas, and they yielded 
only a very slightly higher rate than the mean for the rural areas. 
Two descriptive characteristics of the UI beneficiary population, 
which could provide informative variation in SNAP usage, are mea-
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Table 8.5 SNAP Receipt Rates Overall and for Subgroups among UI Beneficiaries in the Month of UI Application, the 
Year before, and One and Two Years after UI Application 
Number of UI 12 months Month of UI 12 months 24 months 
beneficiaries pre–UI app application post–UI app post–UI app 
Overall mean rate 1,305,038 0.142 0.093 0.206 0.273 
Age 18–24 121,705 0.209 0.126 0.276 0.369 
Age 25–44 654,733 0.166 0.110 0.242 0.317 
Age 45+ 528,600 0.096 0.064 0.145 0.197 
Gender, male 853,738 0.116 0.072 0.171 0.235 
Gender, female 451,300 0.190 0.131 0.271 0.346 
Race, white/Caucasian 815,945 0.116 0.077 0.174 0.233 
Race, African American 150,177 0.226 0.148 0.319 0.414 
Race, other 27,257 0.130 0.088 0.194 0.256 
Race, unknown 311,659 0.168 0.108 0.235 0.312 
Education, less than high school 139,251 0.218 0.142 0.298 0.390 
Education, high school grad/GED 693,532 0.134 0.088 0.197 0.264 
Education, some college 318,122 0.146 0.096 0.214 0.280 
Education, bachelor’s degree 92,297 0.094 0.062 0.143 0.189 
Education, advanced degree 60,561 0.100 0.066 0.151 0.198 
Education, missing/unknown 1,275 0.095 0.074 0.134 0.169 
Job tenure, less than one year 379,084 0.222 0.130 0.270 0.351 
Job tenure, 1–2 years 317,856 0.152 0.102 0.235 0.309 
   303 
Job tenure, 3–5 years 180,819 0.111 0.083 0.198 0.266 
Job tenure, 6–10 years 194,747 0.089 0.066 0.160 0.222 
Job tenure, 11 years or more 232,532 0.064 0.049 0.107 0.146 
Bottom third of earnings (5 qtrs.) 334,936 0.283 0.181 0.345 0.437 
Middle third of earnings (5 qtrs.) 479,148 0.109 0.070 0.189 0.259 
Top third of earnings (5 qtrs.) 490,954 0.077 0.055 0.128 0.175 
Job separation, lack of work 1,054,409 0.122 0.081 0.170 0.231 
Job separation, fired/discharged 170,711 0.225 0.145 0.368 0.464 
Job separation, quit 74,863 0.221 0.140 0.333 0.429 
Job separation, other 5,055 0.171 0.126 0.266 0.331 
MSA, larger metro areas 1,044,062 0.139 0.092 0.205 0.273 
Micro, smaller municipal areas 137,777 0.146 0.093 0.206 0.271 
Rural area 123,199 0.155 0.099 0.214 0.281 
NOTE: All subgroup proportions are significantly different from the overall mean proportions listed in the top row at the 0.05 confidence level 
in a two-tailed test, except for those italicized. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
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sured continuously: 1) age and 2) the UI weekly benefit amount. The 
latter provides an indirect, if censored, measure of earnings prior to 
UI application. Figure 8.7 shows the rates of SNAP receipt among UI 
applicants by age before, at the time of, and after UI application. The 
figure shows that SNAP receipt rates decline with increasing age at 
the time of UI application and that the lowest observed SNAP receipt 
rates are in the month of UI application. The next-lowest SNAP
receipt rates are 12 months before UI application, followed by the 
rates for 12 months after and for 24 months after. There is a cluster-
ing of these rates of between 5 and 15 percent for the oldest workers, 
and the range for the youngest UI applicants is from 20 to 50 percent. 
All UI beneficiaries have a weekly benefit amount (WBA) that 
increases with prior earnings up to the state maximum WBA. This is 
a continuous, but truncated, indicator of UI base-period earnings.13 
Figure 8.8 shows that the rates of SNAP receipt decline as the weekly 
Figure 8.7  SNAP Receipt Rates of UI Applicants by Age in Time 
Periods, Relative to Their Age in the Month of UI 
Application 
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benefit amount (WBA) increases, and while there is a dip in the 
SNAP receipt rates at the maximum WBA, the rates are far above 
zero. More than half of all UI beneficiaries in the sample qualified 
for the Michigan maximum WBA (52.9 percent), and among UI ben-
eficiaries receiving SNAP at the time of UI application, 28.1 percent 
were at the maximum WBA.14 This is evidence that SNAP receipt in 
the Great Recession reached up above the lowest levels of the earn-
ings distribution. Among all UI beneficiaries, the proportion at the 
maximum WBA peaked at 56.6 percent in 2009 because many people 
with relatively high earnings histories found themselves out of work. 
The biggest share at the maximum WBA for UI among those also 
receiving SNAP at the time of UI benefit application was 32.2 per-
cent, also in 2009. The share of all UI beneficiaries in the sample at 
the Michigan minimum WBA was 3.6 percent, but 9.8 percent of UI 
beneficiaries who were receiving SNAP at the time of UI application 
Figure 8.8 SNAP Receipt Rates Relative to the UI Benefit Application
Date, by Weekly Benefit Amount for Regular UI Beneficiaries 
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were also receiving the minimum WBA. The shares at the minimum 
WBA peaked in 2010 at 5.5 percent among all UI beneficiaries and at 
11.6 percent among UI beneficiaries in SNAP recipient households at 
the time of UI application. Considering this trend, and also consider-
ing the drop in the share at the maximum WBA from 2009 to 2010, 
there is mild evidence that the labor market improved faster for those 
with higher earnings histories. 
EFFECTS OF PRIOR SNAP RECEIPT ON FLOWS INTO
SNAP BY UI APPLICANTS 
To describe the importance of prior SNAP receipt on flows into 
SNAP by UI applicants, I estimated regression models of future 
SNAP receipt. The regression approach controls for changes in the 
composition of UI applicants over time. I estimate linear probability 
models for the probability of receiving SNAP within one or two years 
of UI application, controlling for the time since prior SNAP receipt 
and a long list of other observable variables. The full model includes 
the following aspects: UI eligibility requirements, UI entitlement, UI 
benefit receipt, and recent prior interactions with the UI system. The 
models also include control variables for age, gender, race, education, 
industry of prior employment, and length of time spent on the job 
immediately preceding UI application. Finally, a vector of variables 
for the year and month of UI application and the county of residence 
are included. 
To permit comparison of parameter estimates from the models 
estimated on one-year and two-year outcomes, the same estimation 
sample is used for both models. The sample is based on UI applica-
tions received between January 2007 and August 2009. The model 
includes a vector of explanatory variables for the time since a client 
last received a SNAP benefit, as well as a variable for persons with no 
observed SNAP receipt prior to UI application.15 The complete set of 
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parameter estimates for the full model along with standard errors and 
t-statistics are presented in O’Leary and Kline (2014, Appendix Table 
A.1). Because the estimation sample includes 1.6 million observa-
tions, all parameters are estimated with a high degree of statistical 
significance.16 
Parameter estimates for the vector of past SNAP receipt variables 
are reported in Table 8.6. Each variable is a binary indicator for a 
range of months since the last receipt of SNAP and takes on the value 
1 if yes, 0 if no.17 There is a strong positive correlation between past 
receipt of SNAP benefits and future SNAP receipt, but the correlation 
declines rapidly as the time since prior SNAP receipt increases. UI 
applicants with no prior observable SNAP receipt are estimated to be 
much less likely to receive SNAP within one or two years after UI 
application. 
About 11.5 percent of UI applicants had a SNAP benefit in the 
month prior to entering UI. Controlling for observable characteristics, 
including UI eligibility and benefit receipt, those receiving SNAP in 
the prior month are 67 percentage points more likely than UI appli-
cants with no prior observable SNAP receipt to receive a SNAP ben-
Table 8.6  Impact of Past SNAP Receipt on the Likelihood of Receiving 
SNAP within One or Two Years of UI Application among 
Persons Entering UI between January 2007 and August 2009 
(n = 1,633,566) 
SNAP receipt after entering UI 
Months since last previous One year Two years Sample 
SNAP receipt (m = 0.251) (m = 0.321) mean 
1 0.669 0.581 0.115 
2–6 0.306 0.330 0.033 
7–12 0.207 0.254 0.028 
13–24 0.120 0.179 0.031 
25+ 0.075 0.125 0.015 
No prior SNAP −0.126 −0.119 0.778 
Last SNAP benefit ($) 60 60 236 
NOTE: All parameter estimates statistically significant at the 0.01 level. m = mean. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
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efit within one year of UI application. UI applicants who received 
SNAP benefits two to six months prior to UI application (3.3 percent 
of applicants) are estimated to be 31 percentage points more likely to 
draw SNAP within a year. Applicants who last received SNAP 7 to 12 
months before UI (2.8 percent of applicants) receipt are 21 percent-
age points more likely to receive SNAP in the year after entering UI. 
Remaining parameter estimates in the table continue the pattern of a 
lower likelihood of applicants’ returning to SNAP the longer they are 
independent from the program.18 
The monthly amount of the most recent prior SNAP benefit aver-
aged $236 for the 22 percent of applicants observed to have been 
part of the SNAP program prior to UI application.19 While changes 
to this amount have a statistically significant, positive impact on the 
likelihood of future receipt, the marginal impact is negligible. All else 
being equal, persons with a $100 higher level of prior SNAP benefits 
were just six-tenths of one percent more likely to receive SNAP after 
applying for UI. 
WAGE REPLACEMENT AND SNAP RECEIPT 
A frequent question in UI research concerns benefit adequacy 
as income replacement during spells of joblessness (O’Leary 1998). 
Many state programs define their WBA formulas to approximate 50 
percent replacement of an applicant’s average weekly wage up to a 
statutory maximum. But is actual wage replacement adequate? Table 
8.7 summarizes evidence on the effect WBA levels have on the likeli-
hood of SNAP receipt after UI application. Added to the SNAP receipt 
model described in Table 8.6 were a series of dummy variables for 
various ranges of UI wage replacement rates between the Michigan 
statutory minimum and maximum UI weekly benefit amount. Indica-
tor variables were defined for each of 10 steps in the WBA distribu-
tion. The model also includes a variable for UI applicants not eligible 
to receive UI benefits and another variable for UI applicants at the 
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Table 8.7 Weekly Benefit Amounts and the Likelihood of Receiving SNAP within One or Two Years of UI Application 
SNAP in one year SNAP in two years 
(m = 0.251) (m = 0.321) 
Parameter Parameter Regression Mean 
Variable description estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic sample mean WBA ($) 
Monetarily ineligible 0.072 77.56 0.098 90.86 0.105 n/a 
Nonmax decile, 1st 0.013 10.27 0.026 17.77 0.043 129 
Nonmax decile, 2nd 0.014 11.24 0.028 19.85 0.043 158 
Nonmax decile, 3rd 0.013 10.42 0.023 15.96 0.043 183 
Nonmax decile, 4th 0.011 9.13 0.021 14.96 0.043 207 
Nonmax decile, 5th 0.008 7.08 0.016 12.11 0.043 230 
Nonmax decile, 6th 0.003 2.90 0.009 6.83 0.043 253 
Nonmax decile, 7th −0.001 −0.59 0.004 2.73 0.043 276 
Nonmax decile, 8th −0.003 −2.54 −0.001 −0.71 0.043 300 
Nonmax decile, 9th −0.009 −7.79 −0.008 −6.24 0.043 324 
Nonmax decile, 10th −0.014 −11.55 −0.015 −10.78 0.043 349 
Maximum WBA −0.020 −51.04 −0.032 −71.20 0.461 362 
NOTE: m = mean. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
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statutory maximum. The complete set of wage replacement variables 
is included in the model for estimation under the restriction that the 
variable proportions sum to 1.20 
Results from estimating this model suggest that UI applicants 
not monetarily eligible to receive benefits are 7.2 percent more likely 
to receive SNAP within one year of UI application. Controlling for 
benefit receipt and other factors, persons with an average WBA of 
$129 are 1.3 percentage points more likely to receive SNAP. Not until 
WBA approaches $300 is there a significant reduction in the likeli-
hood of receiving SNAP within one year after UI application. In the 
model for SNAP receipt within two years, a significant reduction in 
the likelihood of SNAP receipt occurs at an average WBA of $324. 
MICHIGAN SAMPLE RESULTS COMPARED TO OTHER
SAMPLE DESIGNS 
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on Michigan 
administrative data on the full census of both SNAP recipients and all 
UI applicants. State analyses in other chapters of this book also use 
the full census of SNAP households for states around the time of the 
Great Recession. However, not all state analyses use the full census 
of all UI applications. Some use all UI beneficiaries (78.8 percent of 
Michigan UI applicants), while others are limited to only UI benefi-
ciaries who were also in SNAP recipient households (7.3 percent of 
Michigan UI applicants). To illustrate the effects of these three differ-
ent UI sample definitions, Table 8.8 summarizes the average rates of 
SNAP receipt up to 12 months before, during the month of, and 12 
and 24 months after UI application. 
The first row in Table 8.8 shows SNAP receipt among all UI 
applicants. The second row in Table 8.8, which shows SNAP receipt 
among all UI beneficiaries, combines data from the middle rows of 
Table 8.1 on various types of UI beneficiaries. The third row in Table 
8.8 shows completely new results; it presents rates of SNAP usage 
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Table 8.8 Counts of UI Applicants, UI Beneficiaries, and UI Beneficiaries on SNAP in the Month of UI Application, and 
Their Rates of SNAP Receipt Relative to UI Application 
SNAP in SNAP in SNAP in 12 SNAP in 24 
Total UI Share 12 months month of UI months after months after 
UI applicant category applicants of total prior to UI application UI app month UI app month 
All UI applicants 1,673,978 1.000 297,514 201,851 418,597 537,774 
UI beneficiaries 1,318,858 0.788 186,229 122,012 271,399 359,983 
UI beneficiaries on SNAP 122,012 0.073 115,393 122,012 119,160 120,099 
Rates of SNAP receipt 
All UI applicants 1,673,978 0.178 0.121 0.250 0.321 
UI beneficiaries 1,318,858 0.141 0.093 0.206 0.273 
UI beneficiaries on SNAP 122,012 0.946 1.000 0.977 0.984 
NOTE: The analysis in this table starts with a sample of 1,673,978 Michigan UI applicants between January 2007 and August 2009. This sample 
is smaller than the total of 2,521,971 Michigan UI applicants shown in Table 8.3 for the period from 2007 to 2010 because, as listed in Table 
1.1, Michigan SNAP data are available from January 2006 to August 2011, and the exercise in this table requires identifying SNAP receipt up 
to one year before and two years after UI application. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations based on Michigan program administrative data. 
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among all UI beneficiaries who were receiving SNAP during the 
month they applied for UI benefits. The bottom panel of Table 8.8 
reports rates of SNAP receipt. In the bottom row, we see that among 
those receiving SNAP in the month of UI application, 94.6 percent 
received SNAP sometime in the 12 months before UI application, 
97.7 percent received SNAP sometime during the 12 months after UI 
application, and 98.4 percent received SNAP within 24 months of UI 
application. 
Among all UI applicants, the SNAP receipt rate in the 12 months 
before UI application is 17.8 percent, which is 26 percent higher than 
the 14.1 percent SNAP receipt rate for all UI beneficiaries. Among 
UI beneficiaries receiving SNAP in the month of UI application, the 
SNAP receipt rate in the 12 months before UI application is more 
than six times the rate among all UI beneficiaries. For the latter sam-
ple, there is almost no difference in the SNAP receipt rates before or 
after the month of UI application. So for those receiving SNAP in the 
month of UI application, the SNAP receipt rate is nearly 100 percent 
in all four time frames. While there is almost no dynamic aspect to 
SNAP receipt for this latter group, the pattern does differ from the 
applicant and beneficiary samples. Thus, while UI beneficiaries have 
somewhat lower past SNAP recipiency (in the prior 12 months) than 
all UI applicants, including those who are found to be ineligible, UI 
beneficiaries on SNAP at the time of UI application are vastly more 
likely to have had prior SNAP recipiency. 
THE EFFECT OF SHORTER POTENTIAL UI DURATION
ON SNAP RECEIPT 
By 2010, it had been more than 50 years since all states began 
providing maximum potential UI durations of at least 26 weeks. 
However, after states accumulated big debts paying UI benefits dur-
ing the Great Recession, some states cut back on potential duration.21 
As of 2017, UI laws in eight states provide a maximum duration of 
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less than 26 weeks.22 Among the six states studied in this book, four 
cut their maximum potential UI duration: Florida, Georgia, Michigan, 
and Missouri. In Michigan, the maximum potential UI duration was 
cut to a fixed level of 20 weeks from 26. In the other three states, the 
maximum is a variable duration depending on the level of unemploy-
ment as measured by the Current Population Survey. For example, 
the maximum potential duration in Georgia is only 14 weeks when 
the state unemployment rate is below 6.5 percent, as it was in 2017. 
The formula for potential UI duration in Michigan now yields a 
number of weeks that can vary for individual applicants between 14 
and 20, depending on the level of prior earnings, but the maximum 
potential is always 20 weeks.23 The shorter UI duration in Michigan 
took effect in January 2012. That date fell after the period for the 
administrative data on SNAP and UI used for analysis in this chapter. 
Table 8.9 presents a summary of simulation estimates about how the 
shorter potential UI duration might be expected to change SNAP use 
by UI benefit recipients in Michigan.24 
The simulations summarized in Table 8.9 suggest that the shorter 
potential duration in Michigan would increase the use of SNAP by 
UI beneficiaries by 1.5 percentage points within 12 months of the 
UI benefit-year-begin date and by 2.6 percentage points within 24 
months. Given that the base levels of SNAP receipt for these two 
groups are 20.8 percent and 27.5 percent, respectively, the percent-
age increases over one and two years would be 7.2 percent and 9.5 
percent. These estimated spillover effects suggest that significantly 
higher levels of SNAP receipt could be observed in Michigan during 
the next severe recession if the maximum duration of regular UI ben-
efits remains fixed at 20 weeks. 
Naturally, these estimates assume the same degree of access to 
SNAP and the same level of SNAP benefits that were available in 
the 2007–2011 period. As noted by Heflin and Mueser in Chapter 5 
of this book about the recent change in Florida, the spillover from a 
cut in potential UI duration to increased SNAP receipt means a shift 
from state-funded UI benefits to federally funded SNAP benefits. The 
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Table 8.9 Simulated Effects of the Reduction in Regular UI Entitlement to a Maximum of 20 Weeks on the Shares of UI 
Beneficiaries Entering SNAP in Michigan UI Beneficiaries, 2007–2009 
Entitled duration (wks.) 26 21–25 LE 20 Total 
Sample size 1,051,013 138,744 115,244 1,305,001 
Weekly benefit amount ($) 323 257 232 308 
Maximum benefits payable (MBP) (mean $) 8,399 5,916 4,123 7,758 
Simulated MBP if 20 weeks maximum ($) 6,461 5,141 4,123 6,114 
Simulated change in MBP ($) −1,938 −775 0 −1,644 
Simulated change in UI duration (wks.) −6.0 −3.0 0.0 −5.2 
Share receiving SNAP within 12 mos. 0.180 0.295 0.364 0.208 
Simulated share receiving SNAP, 12 mos. 0.197 0.303 0.364 0.223 
Simulated change in share receiving SNAP, 12 mos. 0.018 0.008 0.000 0.015 
Share receiving SNAP within 24 months 0.240 0.380 0.459 0.275 
Simulated share receiving SNAP, 24 months 0.271 0.391 0.459 0.301 
Simulated change in share receiving SNAP, 24 months 0.031 0.011 0.000 0.026 
SOURCE: Based on author’s computations using Michigan program administrative data for UI beneficiaries between January 2007 and August 
2009, with monthly SNAP program data at least 24 months after the UI benefit-year-beginning date. Fewer than 40 observations were excluded 
because of missing data on characteristics in regression models used for simulations. 
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recent federal actions to trim SNAP benefit levels and increase SNAP
eligibility requirements suggest that the actual movement from UI to 
SNAP might be smaller than estimated for the cut in Michigan poten-
tial duration, meaning that unmet need will be even bigger in the next 
severe recession than in the last. 
SUMMARY 
Use of SNAP and UI changed among Michigan adults in the 
years around and during the Great Recession. SNAP normally pro-
vides food assistance to the needy, while UI provides partial income 
replacement to regular labor force members during temporary invol-
untary unemployment. However, many Michigan working households 
received both UI and SNAP around and during the Great Recession. 
To understand the interaction between the SNAP and UI programs in 
this period, I use Michigan program administrative data on all SNAP
recipients from 2006 to 2011 and on all UI applicants from 2001 to 
2011. I examine joint and separate program use and flows of benefit 
recipients between programs. The advantage of the Michigan data 
compared to other study states in this volume is that it encompasses 
the universe of all UI applicants. I made use of this broader UI cover-
age for much of the analysis in this chapter. 
In a Michigan population of nearly 10 million, the number of 
SNAP recipients among adults aged 18 to 64 was 748,829 in 2006 and 
rose to 1,326,638 in 2010. The number of UI benefit recipients was 
454,525 in 2006 and rose to 593,268 in 2009, then rapidly declined 
thereafter. Many who typically relied only on UI during unemploy-
ment in better economic times also turned to SNAP in the Great 
Recession. The number of Michigan adults simultaneously receiving 
both SNAP and UI in a year nearly doubled, from 63,690 in 2007 to 
120,880 in 2009—the year that joint receipt peaked. 
Between 2007 and 2010, an average of 15.8 percent of Michigan 
UI beneficiaries received SNAP benefits in the year prior to their UI 
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application. The rate was 20.2 percent across all Michigan UI appli-
cants, and 25.0 percent for applicants who did not get UI benefits. 
Prior SNAP receipt was highest among UI applicants who quit or got 
fired from jobs (28.7 percent) and lowest among UI beneficiaries who 
did not exhaust their entitlement (13.0 percent). Among UI exhaust-
ees, 18.4 percent had prior SNAP receipt, while among UI exhaustees 
who transitioned to extended benefits (EB) or emergency unemploy-
ment compensation (EUC), 19.4 percent had prior SNAP receipt. 
The clearest view of new SNAP receipt after UI application is 
seen by restricting the sample to all Michigan UI applicants who did 
not receive SNAP benefits in the year before UI application. Among 
all UI beneficiaries in this sample, 13.0 percent received SNAP dur-
ing the year after UI application, and only 6.2 percent of UI ben-
eficiaries who did not exhaust their UI entitlement received SNAP
within a year. Some 16.5 percent of UI exhaustees and 17.5 percent 
of exhaustees who transitioned to EB or EUC received SNAP within 
one year of UI application. Therefore, UI beneficiaries who did not 
return to work during their regular UI entitlement turned to SNAP at 
higher rates, even if their resorting to SNAP was somewhat delayed 
by federally extended UI benefits. 
The probability of receiving SNAP within one or two years after 
UI application was estimated in models controlling for UI eligibility 
requirements, UI entitlement, UI benefit receipt, recent prior interac-
tions with the UI system, and other observable variables.25 The results 
suggest that SNAP receipt after UI application was higher among 
those who 
• had job separations due to quits or employer discharge, 
• were not monetarily eligible for UI, 
• exhausted their regular UI benefit entitlement, 
• were between the ages of 25 and 44, 
• were less educated, 
• had recent prior job tenure of three to five years, or 
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• were separated from employment in the industries of retail 
trade, hospitality, or health-care services. 
There is also evidence that movement into SNAP from UI occur-
red faster as the recession deepened. 
Examination of SNAP receipt rates in each of the four years from 
2007 to 2010 showed the same general patterns within each year by 
degree of UI eligibility and UI benefit receipt, but the SNAP receipt 
rates for all categories increased each year from 2007 to 2010. During 
those four years, the SNAP receipt rates increased 50 percent in the 
12 months before UI application, about 80 percent in the month of UI 
application, and about 150 percent in the 12 months after UI applica-
tion. The biggest jump in all outcome measures was from 2009 to 
2010. 
For the same period, 2007–2010, there were no differences in 
rates of SNAP receipt across urban and rural settings, even when con-
sidering larger urban areas and counties with smaller cities. Three 
continuously measured demographic variables were associated with 
significant variations. SNAP receipt rates decreased steadily with 1) 
increasing tenure on the prior job, 2) the age of the beneficiary, and 
3) the prior earnings level as measured by the level of the UI weekly 
benefit amount. A surprising finding of the simultaneous program 
benefit receipt is that among those who received SNAP in the period 
from one year before UI application to two years after, 28.1 percent 
of UI beneficiaries in Michigan were at the maximum WBA. This 
indicates that SNAP usage among UI beneficiaries reached well up 
into the income distribution during the Great Recession. 
It is not surprising that the likelihood of SNAP receipt correlates 
positively with unemployment duration. Persons who received ben-
efits under the EUC or EB programs were 2.8 and 4.0 percentage 
points, respectively, more likely to receive SNAP within one or two 
years of UI benefit application. Regular UI beneficiaries who did not 
exhaust benefits and presumably reentered employment were 3.5 and 
4.4 percentage points less likely to receive SNAP within one or two 
years compared to EUC and EB recipients, all else being equal. 
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Simple unadjusted comparisons between UI beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries suggest that UI receipt reduces the rate of SNAP
receipt by about 6 percentage points. Controlling for differences in 
observable characteristics, the estimated effect is about half as large.26 
Simulations estimating that the cut from 26 to 20 weeks’ potential UI 
duration in Michigan would increase SNAP receipt by 2.6 percentage 
points within two years of UI application suggest that the effect of UI 
in reducing the flow into SNAP would be diminished, resulting in an 
increase in federal income replacement responsibilities relative to the 
states. However, the current federal posture signals a retreat from this 
responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
Genuine hardship was widespread in Michigan during the Great 
Recession. Families pieced together income from all available sources. 
SNAP and UI were two sources of income that responded quickly to 
ease general hardship and help replace income lost from job displace-
ment. For adults not in SNAP-recipient households at the time of UI 
application, a sizable fraction later turned to SNAP. As the recession 
progressed, a rising share of new UI applicants were in households 
already receiving SNAP. The patterns of joint program benefit receipt 
were similar throughout Michigan cities and towns large and small in 
both urban and rural areas. Households with incomes well above the 
lowest levels of the income distribution turned to SNAP in the Great 
Recession. Even as the numbers of UI recipients declined after the 
recession reached its depth in 2009, the rates of SNAP receipt con-
tinued to rise, including among UI applicants and beneficiaries. The 
Michigan data suggest a relatively higher rate of households entering 
UI from SNAP than those entering SNAP from UI. That is, among 
households using both programs, most were already in hardship and 
on SNAP before experiencing job separation. The share of all new UI 
beneficiaries that included someone from a SNAP-recipient house-
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hold continued to rise even past the official end of the recession. Thus, 
as the recession dragged on, new UI recipients included an increasing 
share of those from food-insecure Michigan households. 
In recent years, Michigan has reduced the potential duration of 
regular UI from 26 to 20 weeks, and the federal government has raised 
SNAP eligibility requirements and reduced the value of SNAP assis-
tance for all household types. The shorter regular UI duration suggests 
that a bigger flow from UI to SNAP would occur in a future recession, 
but the higher SNAP eligibility requirements and lower SNAP benefit 
levels suggest that not all such applicants will get meaningful food 
assistance. This chapter has painted a picture of SNAP and UI usage 
during a severe labor market decline and the early stages of economic 
recovery. Many questions have been answered, yet many others have 
been raised: How long did high rates of SNAP and UI overlap persist 
after 2010? How much did extended UI benefits reduce SNAP benefit 
payments from what they otherwise might have been? Will the use 
of SNAP by UI recipients be greater with shorter potential UI dura-
tions, and by how much? These and other questions can only truly be 
answered with new data for the years since 2011. 
Notes 
1. In 2011, individuals living in households with income at or below 130 
percent of the poverty level would be eligible for SNAP assistance if 
they also satisfied the asset limits. Recipients of Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
payments also qualified for SNAP. Further eligibility details and asset 
limits are listed at USDA (2018). 
2. Acs and Dahl (2010) estimate that poverty would have reached 25 per-
cent of the households experiencing unemployment, instead of the 20 
percent mark that was reached, had federal extended UI benefits not 
been provided in 2009. 
3. Bridges was named in honor of the Mackinac Bridge, a five-mile-long 
bridge connecting the lower and upper peninsulas of Michigan. The sys-
tem was rolled out in all 83 Michigan counties between August 2008 
and August 2009. 
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4. The UI monetary eligibility requirement in Michigan depends on the 
state minimum wage, which has remained at $7.40 an hour since July 
2008. 
5. Originally, UI data were used in 2002–2003 to estimate a model of regu-
lar UI benefit exhaustion for the Michigan Unemployment Insurance 
Agency (UIA) as part of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Ser-
vices (WPRS) program. This was followed, in 2004–2006, by a state 
initiative entitled the Value-Added Performance Improvement System 
(VAPIS), for which statistical models were developed by the Upjohn 
Institute to adjust performance standards of Michigan workforce agen-
cies. More recent use of Michigan UI administrative data includes 
Upjohn Institute contracts with the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), to investigate links between Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF) and UI (2005–2012). 
6. Throughout this analysis, the actual reference date used for UI appli-
cants is the “benefit year begin” (BYB) date of the UI claim, which is 
the Sunday of the week in which the UI claim was filed. The date of UI 
application was not part of the UI data extracted. In this text, all refer-
ences to “UI application,” “filing,” or “start of UI claim” actually refer 
to the BYB date. 
7. Six-month smoothing of UI beneficiary data was done to allow the visu-
al display to illuminate the important changes in activity. 
8. The business-cycle dating committee of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) says that the Great Recession started in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009 (NBER 2010). 
9. Following O’Leary and Kline (2014), the UI inflow data were adjusted 
to properly compare UI application rates over time and to assess joint UI 
and SNAP usage. A downward adjustment was necessary because of the 
availability of recession-related Extended Benefits (EB) and Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) during our period of analysis. For 
those who exhaust regular UI benefit entitlements and transition to EB 
or EUC during their original 52-week benefit year, the Michigan UI 
Agency requires reapplication for regular UI once the original benefit 
year expires. Since most of these beneficiaries had not worked since 
before the start of their prior UI application, most could not qualify for 
a new regular benefit year; they simply continued on EB or EUC. Since 
these transitional claims did not represent real economic activity but 
resulted instead mainly from a procedural requirement, I removed them 
from the sample analyzed. 
10. Among all states, Michigan has a relatively high earnings threshold for 
monetary eligibility, requiring a total of least $4,307 combined across 
the two highest earning calendar quarters of the UI base period. 
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11. This discussion is merely descriptive and assumes comparable charac-
teristics and UI application rates across different eligibility and UI ben-
efit receipt groups. For example, if persons with no prior SNAP benefits 
who quit or were discharged from employment are less likely to apply 
for UI benefits and therefore are not part of the sample we observe, 
the true difference in past SNAP receipt for persons who quit or were 
discharged from employment compared to fully UI-eligible applicants 
would be less than what is implied graphically in Figure 8.5. 
12. Metropolitan (county) areas included Detroit metro, Ann Arbor, Ponti-
ac, Wayne County, Grand Rapids (Kent), Holland (Ottawa), Muskegon, 
Kalamazoo, Battle Creek (Calhoun), Jackson, Lansing (Ingham), and 
Saginaw. Micropolitan smaller cities (counties) included Houghton-
Keweenau, Marquette-Escanaba, Sault St. Marie (Chippewa), Grand 
Traverse County, Alpena County, Big Rapids–Midland area counties, 
Allegan County, Shiawassee County, St. Joseph County, and Branch 
County. Rural areas included other counties throughout the state in both 
the lower and upper peninsulas of Michigan. 
13. As in many states, the UI earnings base period is the first four of the 
last five completed calendar quarters before the date of UI application. 
For applicants with insufficient earnings in the standard base period, 
an alternate base period of the four most recently completed calendar 
quarters is applied. 
14. The Michigan maximum UI weekly benefit amount has been fixed at 
$362 since 1983. 
15. I also estimate models that exclude persons who had received SNAP
benefits in the year prior to UI application. The models include a con-
trol variable for receipt of SNAP more than one year prior, along with
another for the dollar amount of those prior benefits. There were no 
significant differences across the models in the values of parameter 
estimates. 
16. All parameter estimates are significant at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed 
test. 
17. This vector of variables representing past SNAP receipt forms an exhaus-
tive list of possible outcomes, which results in the sum of the variables’
means equaling 1. Parameters have been estimated for each variable by 
applying a linear constraint in the estimation process, which requires 
that the weighted sum of each variable be equal to 0. The weights are 
the sample mean for each variable. Therefore, the parameter estimates 
are to be interpreted relative to the dependent variable mean rather than 
relative to an omitted category, as is often used in ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation. For the amount of the last SNAP payment, persons 
who did not receive a prior SNAP benefit were assigned the mean value 
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for those that did receive SNAP prior to UI application. This enables 
the parameter estimate of the amount of the last SNAP benefit to better 
reflect deviations from its mean rather than be more of a yes/no indica-
tor of whether SNAP was received in the past. 
18. With the estimation starting in 2007, I can reliably measure the first 
three variables. Beginning in 2008, the variable for the last SNAP ben-
efit occurring 13 to 24 months prior can be measured reliably; how-
ever, it is likely that someone entering UI in 2007, whom I have classi-
fied as having no prior SNAP receipt, actually received SNAP in 2005 
(unobserved) and should be classified as having last received SNAP
13–24 months prior. This “censoring” of data means that the parameter 
estimates are biased despite showing the expected pattern. Parameter 
estimates for the full model are reported in O’Leary and Kline (2014, 
Appendix Table A.1). Results for other parameter estimates are consis-
tent with results presented earlier in this chapter for demographic, loca-
tion, and UI-eligibility variables. 
19. There is a censoring issue here. SNAP participation prior to UI applica-
tion is based on the SNAP grant amount data, which began in January 
2006. For persons applying for UI benefits in January 2007, I have 12 
months of data with which to observe prior SNAP benefits. For persons 
applying for UI in January 2008, that window increases to 24 months. 
20. A full set of dummy variables (zero, one) defining an exhaustive par-
tition of categories for an independent variable (e.g., the categories 
“male” and “female” exhaustively partition the independent variable 
“sex”) can be included in a regression model if a linear restriction is 
imposed to force the weighted sum of means of categories within the 
independent variable equal to 1. The weights are the share of each cat-
egory within the sample. Parameter estimates on such categorical vari-
ables are interpreted relative to the mean effect of the independent vari-
able on the dependent variable. 
21. States may have chosen to cut durations rather than benefit levels 
because the latter action was prohibited under the 2008 Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation law if states were to continue to receive 
federal money, while the former was not. 
22. The states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. 
23. The duration of UI benefits in Michigan is determined as follows: Base 
period earnings (BPE) must occur in at least two calendar quarters, 
with the high quarter earnings (HQE) being at least 388.06 × (Michi-
gan minimum wage) (MCL [Michigan Compiled Laws] 421.46). The 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) = (0.041 × HQE). The duration of ben-
efits is (BPE × 0.4) / (WBA), with the result rounded down to the nearest 
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half-week. The maximum duration is 20 weeks and the minimum is 14 
weeks, except for benefits based on family employment, in which case 
benefits are limited to 7 weeks. 
24. The simulations required models of the probability of SNAP receipt 
within 12 or 24 months after the UI benefit-year-beginning date on 
samples of UI beneficiaries. The models estimated are similar to those 
yielding the parameter estimates presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7. Mod-
els had all the same covariates, except the UI beneficiary variables were 
replaced by variables for the dollar amount of benefit entitlement (WBA
× maximum weeks payable) and for that dollar amount squared. Addi-
tionally, variables for the amount of earnings in the five relevant base-
period quarters plus that amount squared were also included. The latter 
were intended to control for the fact that the higher level of base-period 
earnings reduced the likelihood of future SNAP receipt. The models 
were estimated separately on beneficiaries eligible for 26 weeks and 
beneficiaries eligible for 21 to 25 weeks, and for dependent variables 
indicating SNAP receipt within 12 months and 24 months. That is, four 
regression models formed the basis for simulations, assuming benefi-
ciaries eligible for 20 or fewer weeks would not change behavior. The 
regression models were then evaluated on individual characteristics, 
with the individual maximum amount of entitled dollars of benefits 
adjusted downward to be no more than 20 times the WBA. 
25. The models also controlled for age, gender, race, education, industry of 
prior employment, length of time spent on the job immediately preced-
ing UI application, a vector of variables for the year and month of UI 
application, and county of residence. 
26. However, this might be a partial equilibrium result. Leung and O’Leary 
(2015) find no evidence that UI receipt reduces inflow into SNAP when 
other elements of the social safety net are included in the analysis. 
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Chapter 9 
Program Participation 
in the Show Me State 
Missouri Responds to the Great Recession 
Colleen M. Heflin 
Syracuse University 
Peter R. Mueser 
University of Missouri 
In this chapter, we examine the overlap between Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) participation in Missouri using data that include the full 
universe of the state’s participants in both programs. Despite the 
conservative political swing of the state in recent years, historically 
Missouri has pursued a policy of facilitating SNAP participation. In 
the first decade of the century, participation rates were reported to be 
among the highest in the nation. Even when participation estimates of 
over 100 percent were revealed as being the result of a programming 
error, it was clear that the state maintained relatively client-friendly 
administrative structures, despite the slow adoption of modernized 
application processes. In many respects, the economy of Missouri is 
quite representative of the United States as a whole. The timing and 
extent of the Great Recession there corresponded closely to that of 
the United States, as did the growth in both SNAP and UI participa-
tion. Within this context, we explore issues related to the patterns and 
timing of joint receipt, the connection between program participation 
and state economic and political conditions, the characteristics of the 
recipients, and the effectiveness of the safety net to buffer the impact 
of the Great Recession. 
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In Fiscal Year 2012, the Department of Social Services (DSS) in 
Missouri serviced the fifteenth-largest SNAP caseload in the coun-
try—948,000 individuals—accounting for 2.0 percent of the national 
caseload of 46.6 million participants (USDA 2013). Over the period 
from 2004 to 2014, the growth in the Missouri SNAP caseload was 
slower than the growth of the national caseload (which nearly doubled 
in the period from 2007 to 2013). It was also somewhat slower than 
in the other five states examined in this volume. Still, the caseload 
growth was substantial, increasing by just under 50 percent between 
2007 and 2011 before experiencing a modest decline. Below, we 
explore the changing caseload composition, dynamics, and joint par-
ticipation of UI with SNAP. 
In terms of state-specific SNAP policies, Missouri removed the 
vehicle tests for most families in October 2001,1 and narrow categori-
cal eligibility became effective in May 2000 (Trippe and Gillooly
2010). Simplified reporting for both expenses and resources was 
implemented in 2001 (Trippe et al. 2004). However, unlike most 
states, as of 2012 Missouri had no waiver of the face-to-face inter-
view, did not use call centers, and did not accept online applications. 
Furthermore, Missouri did not adopt broad-based categorical eligi-
bility, which increased the population eligible for SNAP benefits in 
states that did adopt the policy. 
In contrast to SNAP, during the period of our study, 2007–2011, 
UI was a less generous program in Missouri than in most other states. 
In Missouri, monetary eligibility for UI required one of three things: 
1) Employment in the first four of the past five quarters (the 
“base period”) 
2) A total minimum earnings of $2,250 over this period, with 
no more than two-fifths of earnings in a single quarter 
3) Wages received in at least two quarters of the base period 
and exceeding 1.5 times the Missouri maximum taxable 
wage base for the year 
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Workers had to have separated from their employers through no fault 
of their own or to have moved with military spouses. In contrast to 
many states, separations were not acceptable if they were due to per-
sonal or family illness, if they were made because of an unreason-
able commute, or for comparable reasons. Missouri did not provide a 
dependency allowance, and benefits ranged from a minimum weekly 
level of $35 to a maximum of $320—among the bottom fifth of states 
and the second-lowest outside the states of the old Confederacy. As 
in most states, the maximum number of weeks of benefits available 
through the state-funded program was 26 during most of the period of 
our study, but with federal additions it was extended to a maximum of 
nearly two years.2 Thus, in terms of the SNAP income requirements, 
UI participants without other sources of income would generally have 
been eligible for SNAP, although Missouri’s SNAP asset limit—cor-
responding to the federal default allowing a maximum of $2,000 in 
liquid funds for most families—would have reduced the number of 
people eligible. 
Figure 9.1 provides information on the maximum weeks of UI 
benefits available to Missouri UI recipients over the time of our study, 
as well as an estimate of the number of recipients by month for each 
program. We see that there was a two-year period when the maximum 
number of eligible weeks is close to the 99-week maximum and when 
eligibility exceeded the prior 26-week maximum by a substantial 
margin for most of our study period. Federal EUC and EB legislation 
played an important role in increasing the UI caseload, given that 
more than half of the caseload can be traced to these programs during 
the period of the study. 
DATA 
Data used for this project were produced by Missouri’s Depart-
ment of Economic Development as part of the Workforce Data Qual-
EB Weeks 
EUC08 Weeks 
Regular UI Weeks 
EB Recipients 
EUC08 Recipients 
Regular UI Recipients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328 Heflin and Mueser 
Figure 9.1  Total Number of UI Recipients by Program Source and 
Maximum Weeks of UI Available: Missouri 
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ity Initiative, pursuant to funding by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
The ultimate source for each data set was the Missouri agency charged 
with maintaining the data for the purpose of administering programs 
focused on serving residents in the state. 
Wage record data, which provide information on quarterly earn-
ings for employees within the state who work for firms covered by 
UI legislation, were provided by the Missouri Department of Labor 
and Industrial Relations. The Department of Labor and Industrial 
Relations also provided comprehensive claims information as well as 
weekly payment information for the period of our study. Missouri’s 
Department of Social Services, Family Support Division, provided 
information on SNAP recipients for each month, identifying both 
household units and eligible individuals receiving benefits. Benefits 
were paid on a monthly basis, and any month in which a benefit check 
was provided to the household is counted as a month of SNAP receipt 
for each eligible individual in the household. 
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As in the analyses reported in the other state chapters, core analy-
ses focusing on SNAP use the household as the unit, and the study 
group is limited to households with eligible recipients aged 18 to 64 at 
their last birthday. Households are identified as receiving UI based on 
UI receipt by SNAP-eligible members. However, analyses that con-
sider the universe of UI recipients are based on individuals aged 18 to 
64, and, in this case, joint receipt is defined as occurring when an indi-
vidual is an eligible UI recipient in a SNAP household.3 Our analysis 
focuses on the period from July 2007 through December 2011. 
RESULTS 
The discussion of this study’s results is divided into four sections: 
1) The overlap between UI and SNAP receipt 
2) The connection between UI and SNAP take-up and economic 
development and policy evolution 
3) Demographic characteristics of SNAP households 
4) The labor market, UI, and SNAP benefits 
Overlap between UI Receipt and SNAP 
In this section, we present detailed information about joint SNAP-
UI use for the state of Missouri and describe the dynamics of joint 
receipt. We discuss changes in the characteristics of the SNAP and 
joint SNAP-UI caseloads over time. With data for the full universe of 
UI participants in the state, we are able to present statistics on joint 
participation using the UI caseload as the denominator, providing a 
picture of joint participation from the viewpoint of the UI system. 
As a reference, we begin by presenting in Figure 9.2 the total 
monthly household SNAP and UI recipients for Missouri from July 
2007 to December 2011.4 In each month, the SNAP caseload (solid 
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Figure 9.2  SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 and UI 
Recipients: Missouri 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
line) was much larger than the UI caseload (dashed line); however, 
both caseloads show a growth of about 150,000 cases to their maxi-
mum levels during the observation period. As a consequence, given 
the much lower base for UI, the caseload growth as a percentage 
change was much larger for UI than for SNAP. The two programs 
have very different patterns of growth as well over this period. There 
was little growth in either program during 2007 and into early 2008. 
The UI caseload sharply increased in late 2008, reflecting the job loss 
associated with the financial crisis and federal UI program exten-
sions, while SNAP slowly drifted upward and remained at 2010 levels 
through 2011. The UI caseload, in contrast, fell nearly continuously 
from its peak in January 2010. 
Among all SNAP households in our sample, joint receipt with UI 
in Missouri—shown in triangles in Figure 9.3—was very low (3 to 5 
percent) through most of 2008. With the onset of the Great Recession, 
joint participation doubled, peaking at over 10 percent in 2010 before 
slowly dropping. However, even by the end of 2011, joint partici-
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Figure 9.3  UI Receipt among SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 
18 to 64: Missouri 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
pation remained substantially above the original level. Joint receipt 
with UI among new entrants to SNAP (solid line) was 3 to 5 percent-
age points higher before the Great Recession than joint receipt for all 
SNAP households (dashed line), reflecting the fact that many of those 
who enter SNAP while receiving UI soon exhaust benefits. Although 
consistently higher than that of the full SNAP caseload, joint partici-
pation among new SNAP entrants generally followed a similar pat-
tern to that for all SNAP households, notwithstanding greater noise 
(Figure 9.3). 
Of course, changes in joint participation levels can reflect both 
the extent to which new SNAP recipients receive UI benefits and 
the rates of UI entry or exit for SNAP recipients. Figure 9.4 presents 
the percentage entering and exiting UI each month among continu-
ing SNAP households. Interestingly, for the first year of the study 
period, exits from UI exceeded entries, reflecting the fact that almost 
all UI recipients exhausted their available benefits after six months. 
The percentage of the SNAP caseload receiving UI benefits therefore 
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Figure 9.4  UI Entries and Exits for Continuing SNAP Households 
Relative to Total SNAP Caseload: Missouri Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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Monthly UI exit rate among continuing SNAP households 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
remained constant due to the replenishment of UI, which stemmed 
from the high levels of UI receipt among new SNAP entries. Despite 
some month-to-month variation, entries and exits from UI among 
continuing SNAP recipients were basically in balance from late 2008 
through 2009. Hence, the dramatic growth in UI use observed in Fig-
ure 9.3 is due to the high percentage of new SNAP recipients receiv-
ing UI. After 2010, the percentage of the SNAP caseload leaving UI 
was higher than the percentage entering UI among continuing SNAP
households. Thus, the mechanism behind the falling joint receipt lev-
els among SNAP households after 2010 was the higher levels of UI 
exits combined with a decline in the UI receipt of new SNAP entrants. 
The statistics presented above suggest that, despite its substantial 
increase during the Great Recession, joint SNAP-UI receipt was of 
only modest importance in Missouri. However, viewed in terms of 
the universe of UI recipients, a different pattern emerges. Figure 9.5 
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Figure 9.5  SNAP Receipt among Individuals Receiving UI: Missouri 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
shows that SNAP receipt among UI recipients was relatively com-
mon, with one in five UI recipients receiving SNAP before the Great 
Recession. This percentage remained at a constant level as the number 
of UI recipients tripled between the middle of 2008 and early 2010. 
In 2010, when the number of UI recipients peaked, the proportion 
of SNAP recipients among UI recipients began to increase, reaching 
about one in four by the end of 2010 and remaining near that level to 
the end of our observation period in December 2011. SNAP receipt 
among new entrants to UI was a few percentage points below that for 
all UI recipients, since UI recipients often turn to SNAP following 
extended unemployment. The percentage of new entrants receiving 
SNAP increased very modestly over our period of observation. 
Given that the percentage of new UI recipients receiving SNAP
changed relatively little, the primary determinant of growth identi-
fied in the upper line in Figure 9.5 would be the relative number of 
entrants to and exiters from the SNAP program among continuing UI 
recipients. Figure 9.6 plots the percentage of continuing UI recipi-
ents entering and exiting SNAP each month. Among continuing UI 
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Figure 9.6  SNAP Entries and Exits Each Month for Continuing 
UI Recipients Relative to Total UI Caseload: Missouri 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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Percentage entering SNAP among continuing UI recipients 
Percentage leaving SNAP among continuing SNAP recipients 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
recipients in Missouri, fewer than 1 percent left SNAP each month 
while still on UI, a number that actually increased over the period 
of our observation. The initially low level reflects the fact that, prior 
to the recession, very few UI recipients received UI for more than 
six months, so most SNAP recipients would have left UI before exit-
ing SNAP. As the recession hit, the length of spells of UI increased 
dramatically, due partly to the recession but also due largely to fed-
eral legislation, which extended UI eligibility to nearly two years. 
Interestingly, the percentage of UI recipients entering SNAP declined
slightly over the period. 
Taken together, the exit and entry changes do not suggest the rea-
son for the increase in SNAP receipt among UI recipients, since they 
show that entries exceeded exits prior to the recession but then con-
verged as the recession hit. In fact, the reason for the increase stems 
from the length of UI spells. When the recession hit, the lengthening 
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of UI spells meant that a larger proportion of UI recipients experi-
enced extended periods during which they could enter SNAP, and 
given that entry rates exceeded exit rates, this caused the proportion 
jointly participating in SNAP and UI to grow. The longer UI spells 
were a joint result of increased difficulties in obtaining reemployment 
and the federal extensions in UI eligibility. Given that UI benefits 
replaced only about two-fifths of prior earnings for a UI recipient 
in Missouri, an extended period of unemployment would very likely 
deplete family resources, leading the family to seek SNAP support.5 
Connection between UI and SNAP Take-Up and Economic 
Development and Policy Evolution 
In Missouri, according to data for 2012, the average duration of 
UI benefits was 14.9 weeks, which was below the national average 
of 17.1 weeks. The proportion of recipients exhausting UI benefits in 
Missouri was almost half (48.7 percent)—very similar to the national 
average of 47.2 percent (Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial 
Relations 2014). On the other hand, the unemployment rate in Mis-
souri declined somewhat faster during 2011 than that in the United 
States, falling to a level of about 7.5 percent, nearly a percentage 
point below the U.S. average at that point. The return to economic 
growth has been slower in some states, and, assuming the process of 
recovery is similar, Missouri’s pattern may correspond to what these 
states will experience as their recoveries blossom. 
SNAP participation is directly tied to the economic condition of 
the state for the able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) 
population, who may be required to obtain employment or engage in 
job search activities as a condition for continued receipt beyond three 
months in a three-year period. Such restrictions are waived in coun-
ties with higher unemployment rates, and states may also choose to 
exempt a portion of their caseloads from these rules. 
The entire state of Missouri qualified for ABAWD waivers 
beginning in Fiscal Year 2010 and continuing through the end of our 
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research window. Prior to that time, in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, 
28 out of the 114 counties and one independent city qualified as labor 
surplus areas (USDA 2013). In Figure 9.7, we see that the ABAWD 
caseload increased during the Great Recession, as one might expect, 
from a low of 19.8 percent in October 2007 to 26.4 percent in Janu-
ary 2010.6 However, the portion of the Missouri SNAP caseload with 
recipients aged 18 to 64 accounted for by this group remained rela-
tively stable at approximately 26 percent throughout 2010 and 2011. 
Notably, the increased percentage of SNAP recipients who were 
ABAWD came after the full-state expansion of the employment and 
training waivers. 
Demographic Characteristics of SNAP Households 
In this section, we focus on changes in the characteristics of 
SNAP recipients in Missouri. Large changes in their composition 
were clearly visible over the period from July 2007 to December 
Figure 9.7  Percentage ABAWD Households, for SNAP Households and 
SNAP Households with UI Recipients: Missouri Households 
with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
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2011. Whereas the characteristics changed in predictable ways in 
response to the Great Recession, demographic patterns varied greatly 
in response to the economic recovery. Below, we present SNAP char-
acteristics by household structure (female-headed versus multiple 
adults), age of recipients (presence of children or, in a separate analy-
sis, elderly recipients), disability, race, and residence in a nonmetro-
politan county. As above, all analyses use a study group limited to 
households with SNAP recipients aged 18 to 64. 
As shown in Figure 9.8, the percentage of all SNAP households 
with a female head fell by approximately 6 percentage points during 
the early part of the recession, from around 55 percent in July 2007 to 
49 percent in 2010, and remained at that level through 2011. Among 
the SNAP recipients receiving UI, the decline in the percentage of 
all households with a female head decreased by somewhat more— 
approximately 10 to 15 percentage points—although the trend is 
partly obscured by seasonal effects. Starting at a level of 58 percent 
Figure 9.8  Percentage Female-Headed, for SNAP Households and 
SNAP Households with UI Recipients: Missouri Households 
with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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in July 2007, it declined to 42 percent in February 2009. From there, 
it increased, though only to a below-prerecession level of 49 percent 
in August 2011. This pattern is consistent with the rise in the male 
unemployment rate in Missouri and the increase in the SNAP caseload 
for ABAWDs. The annual pattern reflects gender differences in unem-
ployment and layoffs across seasons. 
In contrast, as shown in Figure 9.9, the percentage of SNAP
households in Missouri with multiple adults rose from about 23 per-
cent in 2007 to nearly 26 percent in March 2010. It then began an 
unsteady decline, though not to its earlier level. While the magni-
tude of the change overall was quite small (only 3 percentage points), 
interestingly, this change did not mirror the change in female-headed 
households during the recovery period. The pattern is slightly dif-
ferent among households receiving both SNAP and UI in that the 
Figure 9.9  Multiple Adults, for SNAP Households and SNAP
Households with UI Recipients: Missouri Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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increase was somewhat greater, starting at 26 percent in July 2007 
and increasing, although not steadily, to more than 30 percent by Feb-
ruary 2009. There was little change during the recovery period. 
The age distribution of households with recipients aged 18 to 
64 in the Missouri SNAP caseload changed dramatically during our 
observation period, as shown in Figures 9.10 and 9.11. While 55 per-
cent of SNAP households had children in July 2007, the percentage 
fell at a nearly constant rate to 48 percent in December 2011 (Figure 
9.10). SNAP households with UI fell from 67 percent in July 2007 
to just over 58 percent in July 2010, and the decline was particularly 
steep during 2008. In contrast, the percentage of households with an 
elderly recipient showed a very slight U-shape (Figure 9.11), with 
less than half a percentage point change over the observation period. 
The percentage of SNAP households with an elderly recipient receiv-
ing UI was quite small and increased slightly over this period, from 
1.8 percent in July 2007 to 2.5 percent in December 2011.7 
Figure 9.10  Percentage with Children, for SNAP Households and SNAP
Households with UI Recipients: Missouri Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 w
ith
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
With children receiving SNAP 
With children receiving SNAP & UI 
Ju
l-0
7 
O
ct
-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
A
pr
-0
8 
Ju
l-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
A
pr
-0
9 
Ju
l-0
9 
O
ct
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
A
pr
-1
0 
Ju
l-1
0 
O
ct
-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
A
pr
-1
1 
Ju
l-1
1 
O
ct
-1
1 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
340 Heflin and Mueser 
Figure 9.11  Percentage with Elderly Recipients, for SNAP Households 
and SNAP Households with UI Recipients: Missouri 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
The percentage of SNAP households with a disabled recipient, 
shown in Figure 9.12, fluctuated around 25 percent over the obser-
vation period, with a small and noisy downward trend until 2010, 
approaching a lower bound of 23 percent in 2009–2010. During the 
beginning of Missouri’s economic recovery in 2011, this percentage 
gradually moved upward to just above 25 percent. The growth in the 
number of disabled recipients as a percentage of the SNAP caseload 
may be the result of able-bodied recipients leaving SNAP at higher 
rates during the recovery. In contrast, among the SNAP recipients with 
UI, the percentage of households with a disabled recipient remained 
fairly close to 7 percent over most of the observation period. 
Missouri has a large African American population but is generally 
less ethnically diverse than the nation as a whole; Hispanics make up 
a smaller portion of the total population in Missouri than in the United 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
Program Participation in the Show Me State 341 
Figure 9.12  Percentage with Disabled Recipients, for SNAP Households 
and SNAP Households with UI Recipients: Missouri 
Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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With disabled recipients receiving SNAP & UI 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
States overall. Figure 9.13 demonstrates that there was little change 
in the racial composition of SNAP recipients, with only a very slight 
displacement of African Americans by whites, reflecting the relative 
increase in white joblessness during the recession. The percentage of 
SNAP households coded as Hispanic continued a long-term trend, 
increasing by about 0.75 percentage points—small in absolute terms 
but substantial relative to an initial value of about 2 percent. Among 
the SNAP recipients receiving UI (Figure 9.14), the basic long-term 
patterns were the same, although we observe an important seasonal 
effect, as the percentage of African American recipients increases 
during the spring and reaches an annual peak in the summer. 
Figure 9.15 shows the percentage of SNAP households living 
in nonmetropolitan counties. Missouri has two large metropolitan 
areas—St. Louis and Kansas City—as well as several smaller metro-
politan areas, with the rest of the state population living in nonmet-
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Figure 9.13  Racial and Ethnic Composition, SNAP Households in 
Missouri with Recipients Aged 18–64, July 2007–December
2012 
70% 
White African American Hispanic 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
Figure 9.14  Racial and Ethnic Composition of SNAP Households with 
UI Recipient in Missouri with Recipients Aged 18 to 64, 
July 2007–December 2011 
70% 
White African American Hispanic 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
Ju
l-0
7 
O
ct
-0
7 
O
ct
-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
Ja
n-
08
 
A
pr
-0
8 
A
pr
-0
8 
Ju
l-0
8 
Ju
l-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
Ja
n-
09
 
A
pr
-0
9 
A
pr
-0
9 
Ju
l-0
9 
Ju
l-0
9 
O
ct
-0
9 
O
ct
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ja
n-
10
 
A
pr
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
0 
Ju
l-1
0 
Ju
l-1
0 
O
ct
-1
0 
O
ct
-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
Ja
n-
11
 
A
pr
-1
1 
A
pr
-1
1 
Ju
l-1
1 
Ju
l-1
1 
O
ct
-1
1 
O
ct
-1
1 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
    
Program Participation in the Show Me State 343 
Figure 9.15  Nonmetropolitian Areas, for SNAP Households and SNAP
Households with UI Recipients: Missouri Households with 
Recipients Aged 18 to 64 
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SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
ropolitan counties. In Missouri in 2007, approximately one in three 
SNAP recipients lived in a nonmetropolitan area. The percentage of 
the total SNAP population living in rural areas declined by approxi-
mately 1.5 percentage points from 2008 to 2010 and then remained 
relatively stable through 2011. Looking at SNAP households with 
members receiving UI, we see a similar decline, although seasonal 
cycles (with the nonmetropolitan recipients 4 to 8 percentage points 
higher in the winter) make the trend harder to identify. 
Overall, the characteristics of SNAP recipients in Missouri 
changed in expected ways due to the recession and the recovery. In 
some areas, we see responses to the recession and do not observe 
a return to the prior level in the period of recovery. For example, 
the percentage of households with female heads, the percentage with 
children, and the percentage in nonmetropolitan counties declined 
with the recession, and, in each case, these percentages continue at or 
below those seen during the recession. In contrast, the decline in per-
centage of SNAP households with elderly or disabled recipients that 
occurred when the recession hit reversed itself during the recovery. 
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Given the dramatic increase in the number of SNAP households 
that occurred over the period of our study, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that their characteristics changed as well. The decline in female-
headed households reflects the fact that the men were disproportion-
ately more likely to experience job loss during the Great Recession. 
The increase in the share of ABAWDs was partly a response to the 
suspension of rules limiting ABAWD participation in SNAP. Not only 
did the Great Recession increase the number of SNAP households, 
but it clearly changed their composition as well. 
The Labor Market, UI, and SNAP Benefits 
In this section, we present information to evaluate the relative 
effectiveness of SNAP and UI in terms of providing financial support 
to low-income households before, during, and after the Great Reces-
sion. Additionally, we provide information about how the connection 
of SNAP recipients to the paid labor force changed throughout this 
period. In particular, we present income from earnings, SNAP, and 
UI by time period, both for the new entrants to SNAP and for those 
exiting SNAP during the period of our study. 
Table 9.1 provides information on income for all new SNAP
entrants. This information is organized by calendar quarter, reflecting 
the structure of our earnings data. New SNAP entrants are defined as 
those who have not received SNAP in the previous two months. In 
the earliest time period, September–December 2007 (prior to onset 
of the recession), 76.5 percent of SNAP entrants continued to receive 
SNAP benefits through at least the following calendar quarter, and 
50.1 percent received SNAP benefits through at least two quarters. 
The percentage of new entrants receiving SNAP through at least one 
quarter remained relatively constant over our observation period, 
implying that very short SNAP spells are not much affected by the 
recession. In contrast, the percentage receiving SNAP for two or more 
quarters increased throughout the time period, growing steadily from 
50 percent in the first period and reaching 57 percent for those enter-
ing SNAP in 2011. 
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Over half (56 percent) of new SNAP entrants in 2007 were 
employed (i.e., received some earnings) during the quarter prior to 
entering SNAP, and this same percentage of entrants were employed 
in the quarter of SNAP entry. While the percentage of SNAP recipi-
ents attached to the labor market declined, approaching 50 percent 
during the Great Recession, the fact that more than half of entrants 
had jobs even in the worst period of recession speaks to the strong 
prior connection of SNAP recipients to the labor market. In fact, the 
last two columns of Table 9.1 show that positive earnings were quite 
common among SNAP recipients during the first and second calendar 
quarters after SNAP entry. Even during the worst period of the reces-
sion (2009 and 2010), more than two out of five SNAP recipients 
were receiving earnings at some point in the quarter. 
Comparison of employment and earnings before and after SNAP
entry illustrates the decline in labor market prospects for these indi-
viduals. Employment rates declined by less than 10 percentage points. 
But, conditional on employment, earnings declined by much more— 
approximately one quarter—from an average of around $4,000 before 
SNAP entry to around $3,000 in the quarter of SNAP entry and sub-
sequent quarters. This pattern is similar across the five periods over 
2007–2011, underscoring our observation that the recession’s primary 
impact was on the number of households entering SNAP (compare 
the first line for each period in Table 9.1). Given that SNAP is avail-
able only for those with low incomes, it is not surprising that average 
earnings for program entrants were not much altered. 
As noted above, the level of UI receipt among SNAP entrants 
increased over our observation period, peaking in 2010 at 17.4 percent 
in the quarter of SNAP entry (Table 9.1, column 2, panel 4). Addition-
ally, within each year, UI receipt was highest in the quarter of SNAP
entry (rather than the quarter before or after SNAP entry), implying 
that many households took up UI and SNAP in the same quarter. The 
average value of UI benefits for those households receiving benefits 
was also highest in 2010, averaging over $2,000 per quarter. In terms 
of the value of UI benefits relative to time of SNAP entry, with the 
  
   
346 
Table 9.1  Sources of Income for New SNAP Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Missouri 
Spells extending Spells extending 
through at least through at least 
1st quarter after 2nd quarter after 
All spells entry quarter entry quarter 
Quarter prior Quarter of 1st quarter 2nd quarter 
to SNAP entry SNAP entry after entry after entry 
SNAP spells beginning September 2007–December 2007 
No. spells 60,357 60,357 46,179 30,225 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 76.5 50.1 
% with any earnings 56.0 56.5 51.1 46.8 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,014 3,057 3,159 3,015 
% with UI benefits 5.0 8.7 8.5 6.8 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,592 1,303 1,831 1,374 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 303 660 644 
SNAP spells beginning January 2008–December 2008 
No. spells 195,381 195,381 148,257 100,855 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 75.9 51.6 
% with any earnings 55.7 55.4 49.4 43.5 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,141 3,018 3,315 3,066 
% with UI benefits 5.8 11.4 11.5 11.2 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,538 1,582 2,071 2,127 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 363 701 732 
   
SNAP spells beginning January 2009–December 2009 
No. spells 230,555 230,555 182,038 126,581 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 79.0 54.9 
% with any earnings 53.9 51.7 46.2 42.3 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,313 3,141 3,276 3,107 
% with UI benefits 9.5 16.5 16.1 14.8 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,964 2,128 2,534 2,442 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 439 835 813 
SNAP spells beginning January 2010–December 2010 
No. spells 222,178 222,178 169,223 122,880 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 76.2 55.3 
% with any earnings 51.2 50.7 45.9 42.6 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,210 3,091 3,285 3,207 
% with UI benefits 12.5 17.4 15.7 14.0 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,452 2,235 2,339 2,205 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 441 814 812 
SNAP spells beginning January 2011–December 2011 
No. spells 220,966 220,966 165,133 125,923 
% of all spells 100.0 100.0 74.7 57.0 
% with any earnings 51.3 50.5 46.4 43.9 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,187 3,079 3,335 3,408 
% with UI benefits 10.4 14.7 12.8 11.8 
(continued) 
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Spells extending Spells extending 
through at least through at least 
1st quarter after 2nd quarter after 
All spells entry quarter entry quarter 
Quarter prior Quarter of 1st quarter 2nd quarter 
to SNAP entry SNAP entry after entry after entry 
SNAP spells beginning January 2011–December 2011 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,959 1,834 2,111 2,063 
Average SNAP benefit ($) 446 808 815 
SNAP spells beginning January 2012–March 2012 
No. spells 51,234 
% of all spells 100.0 
% with any earnings 52.4 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,269 
% with UI benefits 9.2 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,867 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
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exception of 2007, the value of UI benefits increased until the first 
quarter after SNAP entry and remained at about that level, reflecting 
continuing receipt of UI. In 2007, when few recipients were eligible 
to receive UI benefits for more than 26 weeks, the drop-off in average 
UI benefits in the second quarter after beginning SNAP receipt very 
likely reflects payments that ended during the quarter. 
The bottom line in each panel of Table 9.1 indicates SNAP ben-
efits received by households during the quarter. The average value of 
SNAP benefits was in the range of $600 to $800 in each quarter with 
increases over time, partially reflecting increases in benefit size due to 
federal legislation. This SNAP benefit average is much smaller than 
the value of UI benefits (which average around $2,000) for house-
holds who receive UI benefits. We also separated out households 
receiving both SNAP and UI; their SNAP benefits were similar to 
those not receiving UI. Hence, UI is much more valuable than SNAP
for the families receiving both. 
Next, Table 9.2 presents sources of income after completion of 
SNAP spells. Here, the universe consists of all SNAP spells that end 
in the given period. Earnings and UI information are provided for the 
quarter after the quarter in which the SNAP exit occurred. In 2008, 
54.2 percent of all SNAP exiters had positive earnings in the quar-
ter following the exit. If SNAP spells are split by duration into short 
term (three or fewer quarters of receipt) and long term (four or more 
quarters of receipt), positive earnings are more common among those 
receiving short-term benefits (55.8 percent) than those receiving long-
term benefits (47.2 percent). While the specific levels vary across our 
observation period, the general pattern is quite consistent, with 2009 
standing out as the year when employment was lowest. In contrast, 
households leaving SNAP who were employed had higher earnings 
in 2009 than in the other years. Interestingly, for those employed, 
average earnings were similar for short-term and long-term SNAP
recipients. 
A surprisingly high percentage of SNAP spells ended while the 
household continued to receive UI income in the quarter after SNAP
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Table 9.2  Sources of Income after Completion of SNAP for Households with Recipients Aged 18 to 64: Missouri 
Quarter after last quarter of SNAP 
Spells spanning 3 Spells spanning 4 
or fewer calendar or more calendar 
All spells quarters quarters 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in July 2007–December 2007 
No. spells 82,039 
% of all spells 100.0 
% with any earnings 55.6 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,301 
% with UI benefits 4.4 
Average UI benefit ($) 59 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,348 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2008–December 2008 
No. spells 166,469 121,376 45,093 
% of all spells 100.0 72.9 27.1 
% with any earnings 54.2 55.8 47.2 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,399 4,365 4,359 
% with UI benefits 6.4 7.1 6.7 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,742 1,838 1,624 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2009–December 2009 
No. spells 173,998 109,277 64,721 
% of all spells 100.0 62.8 37.2 
   351 
% with any earnings 50.8 52.7 45.6 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,395 4,452 4,255 
% with UI benefits 12.5 14.9 8.8 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,473 2,621 1,991 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2010–December 2010 
No. spells 206,646 115,508 91,138 
% of all spells 100.0 55.9 44.1 
% with any earnings 52.0 54.3 47.2 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,559 4,624 4,451 
% with UI benefits 10.8 13.1 8.1 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 2,218 2,398 1,686 
SNAP spells with last SNAP in January 2011–December 2011 
No. spells 206,555 105,208 101,347 
% of all spells 100.0 50.9 49.1 
% with any earnings 52.6 55.2 46.9 
Average earnings for households with earnings ($) 4,766 4,756 4,699 
% with UI benefits 8.9 10.8 7.3 
Average UI benefit for households with benefits ($) 1,969 2,116 1,632 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on Missouri program administrative data. 
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exit: 12.5 percent in 2009. As might be expected, UI receipt was much 
higher among short-term SNAP recipients compared to longer-term 
recipients in each of the years observed. The value of UI benefits 
received after SNAP exit (for those receiving UI) peaked at $2,473 
per quarter in 2009. While the value of earnings does not vary con-
sistently between short-term and longer-term SNAP recipients, the 
value of UI benefits was consistently lower among the longer-term 
SNAP recipients. 
In summary, these tabulations confirm that, in Missouri, SNAP
recipients were generally strongly connected to the labor market: 
changes due to the recession in the patterns of earnings for those 
entering or exiting SNAP are relatively minor. The level of UI receipt 
and the average benefit contingent on receipt increased during 2009 
and 2010, as did the value of SNAP. However, since UI is a much 
more generous program than SNAP, UI provided a much greater buf-
fer for those households that received it. The overwhelming majority 
of the SNAP households, however, did not receive any UI benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The economy of Missouri largely mirrors the country as a whole 
in terms of industrial structure, demographic composition, and aver-
age income, as well as in the timing of the Great Recession. Patterns 
of UI and SNAP receipt also correspond to those of the country as a 
whole, although Missouri’s relatively permissive approach to SNAP
means participation was somewhat higher than might be expected. 
In common with most programs, Missouri’s UI program experienced 
substantial strain in the face of the Great Recession, and, following 
the recession, Missouri joined a handful of states that chose to reduce 
the number of weeks of eligibility, as it cut the maximum period of 
benefits to 20 weeks from the previous level of 26 weeks, a level that 
had been all but universal. Within Missouri’s political and economic 
context, we have documented the changing patterns in joint participa-
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tion in UI and SNAP, the changing characteristics of the caseloads, 
and the relative importance of program benefits and earnings around 
the point of household participation in these safety net programs. 
Notes 
1. The federal regulations at the time, which applied prior to passage of 
Missouri’s rules, specified that a vehicle’s fair market value below 
$4,640 was to be exempted from a household’s asset-limit calculations. 
The rules applied to one vehicle for each adult household member and 
included various exemptions (see USDA [2002]). 
2. In 2011, Missouri reduced the number of regular weeks of benefits from 
a maximum of 26 to a maximum of 20 (see Figure 9.1). 
3. Conventions for coding dates of program participation correspond to 
those used in other state chapters in this volume. 
4. Note that the UI caseload reported in Figure 9.1 differs from that in Fig-
ure 9.2 because the former is based on federal figures as well as several 
approximations (Rockey 2015). Figure 9.2 is based on weekly numbers 
of UI recipients aged 18 to 64, translated into monthly totals. 
5. The U.S. Department of Labor publishes two measures of the replace-
ment ratio. For Missouri, these varied from 35 percent to 43 percent dur-
ing the period of our study. The replacement rate measures are several 
percentage points below the U.S. average. 
6. ABAWDs are explicitly identified for administrative purposes on the 
data file we received, and we used this indicator for the tabulations in 
Table 9.7. 
7. Elderly recipients are those aged 60 or older. To be included in our anal-
ysis sample, a household must have had at least one eligible recipient 
aged 18 to 64. Hence, a household would be in our sample and counted 
as including an elderly recipient if there was at least one individual aged 
60 to 64. A household with an individual aged 65 or older would be in 
our sample only if there were also an eligible individual aged 18 to 64. 
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Chapter 10 
SNAP and UI as Components 
of a Joint Safety Net in Texas 
Daniel Schroeder 
Ashweeta Patnaik 
University of Texas at Austin 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the operation of a two-
program safety net for workers in Texas that consists of the combina-
tion of unemployment insurance (UI) and the Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp 
Program. We try to understand the operation of this joint safety net 
in part by examining very large data sets consisting of all persons 
in Texas supported by one or both of these programs over a 12-year 
period. The goal of discerning the joint safety net’s operation can be 
daunting, but it can be understood as a series of simplifying assump-
tions. As we progress through the topics in this chapter, it is in some 
sense a walk through a series of assumptions toward an application at 
the end, with the hope that we learn a number of things along the way. 
We begin this chapter with an overview of the Great Recession’s 
impact on the two safety net programs in Texas. We then convert data 
on individuals’ receipt of program benefits over time into spells. We 
broaden the definition of spells to include periods of time in which 
benefits were received from either UI or SNAP, or both; we refer to 
these periods as joint safety-net spells. Next, we classify the volumi-
nous spells in two ways. First, we collapse all joint spells into one of 
four broad patterns determined by whether the recipients accessed 
one or both programs, and in what order. Next, we classify spells 
by looking at the macroeconomic environment in the time period in 
which the spells occurred. Here we divide our study into three broad 
periods: 1) prerecession, 2) recession, and 3) jobless recovery. The 
355 
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first two are likely familiar to most people. The third period, jobless 
recovery, we define to refer to the period of time between when the 
recession officially ended and nominal growth began, and continuing 
as long as the policy of making UI benefits available for extended 
durations was kept in place. Finally, we illustrate the data by plotting 
income flows over time for joint safety-net beneficiaries, before, dur-
ing, and after their use of these programs. We then conclude the chap-
ter by applying these tools to a policy question that Texas is uniquely 
positioned to answer: what happens to able-bodied adults without 
dependents (ABAWDs) when they are subjected to varying policies 
on exemptions from the general rule placing strict time limits on their 
receipt of SNAP benefits? 
THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON THE LONE
STAR STATE
Texas is the second largest of the 50 U.S. states (after Alaska), 
with a land area of 261,232 square miles, and the second most popu-
lous (after California), with 28,701,845 residents (U.S. Census Bureau 
2018). Texas shares an international border with Mexico and has unique 
geographic and demographic characteristics that in recent years have 
helped lift its economy. Four factors have driven the growth of jobs in 
Texas since the late 1980s: 1) rapid population growth resulting from 
a high birth rate and international immigration; 2) low housing costs 
and population density due to land availability and lending regulations;
3) abundant oil and gas resources; and 4) its prime location along the 
Mexican border, which encourages trade and job growth (McNichol 
and Johnson 2012). 
Unemployment in Texas 
While the Great Recession officially began in December of 2007 
and ended in June of 2009, its impact varied across states, both in 
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timing and in magnitude (see Figure 10.1). During the Great Reces-
sion, the U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled, from an aver-
age of 4.6 percent in prerecession 2007 to a peak of 10.0 percent in 
postrecession 2010. However, increases in the Texas unemployment 
rate, reflecting a shorter recession and stronger job growth during the 
recovery, were somewhat subdued relative to those of the nation as a 
whole. From prerecession rates of as low as 4.2 percent in 2007, the 
Texas seasonally adjusted unemployment rate doubled to a high of 
8.4 percent in 2009 (BLS 2019). 
During the recovery, the unemployment rate decreased slowly 
but steadily in the state and the nation. The Texas seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate declined 4.2 percentage points from its peak of 
8.4 percent in 2009 and stood at 4.2 percent in April 2015, just below 
its prerecession average of 4.3 percent in 2007 (BLS 2019). Texas had 
Figure 10.1  Monthly Unemployment Rates (seasonally adjusted), 
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the second-highest over-the-year job increase (287,000) in the United 
States during the period from April 2014 to April 2015 (BLS 2015). 
Unemployment Insurance in Texas 
Prior to the recession in 2007, about 7.6 million U.S. workers 
who lost their jobs started receiving UI benefits. During the reces-
sion, this number increased substantially and peaked at about 14.1 
million in 2009 but declined to about 7.8 million workers in 2013. 
Similarly in Texas, the number of workers who lost their jobs and 
started receiving UI benefits increased from a seasonally adjusted 
average of about 280,000 workers in prerecession 2007 to a peak of 
about 714,000 workers during the recession in 2009, then declined to 
about 450,000 workers in 2013 (USDOL 2017). 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the total number of UI recipi-
ents each year went up during the recession not just because of the 
increase in the number of new recipients, but also because unem-
ployed workers received those benefits for longer periods. Eligible 
workers received benefits for longer periods for two reasons: 1) find-
ing work became more difficult and 2) they could receive UI benefits 
for an extended period (CBO 2012). The share of UI recipients in the 
United States who exhausted their regular benefits, which in most 
states lasted for 26 weeks, increased from about 36 percent in pre-
recession 2007 to a peak of about 55 percent during the recession in 
2009, and it subsequently fell to 45 percent by 2013. In Texas, the 
share of UI recipients who exhausted their regular benefits grew from 
37 percent in prerecession 2007 to a peak of 60 percent during the 
recession in 2009 and fell to 49 percent by 2013 (USDOL 2017). 
In Texas, three factors influenced the flow of UI recipients: 1) the 
maximum number of weeks available under the regular UI program 
remained consistent throughout the time period at 26 weeks, 2) the 
Extended Benefits program was in place between May 2009 and May 
2012, and 3) the EUC program was in place between July 2008 and 
December 2013. Figure 10.2 presents smoothed estimates of total UI 
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recipients in Texas with stacked line graphs broken down by program 
(using data from the Employment and Training Administration’s 
5159 Report), along with the stacked bar graphs showing the number 
of benefit weeks available from each of the three UI programs. The 
periods during which EUC08 and EB were available overlap closely 
with the periods in which the 5159 data record recipients in each of 
those programs.1 
SNAP in Texas 
Food security for a household means access by all members at all 
times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Food-insecure house-
holds are those that at times during the year are uncertain of hav-
ing, or unable to acquire, enough food to meet the needs of all their 
Figure 10.2  Texas UI Recipients by Source and Total Maximum Weeks 
of UI Available 
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members because they have insufficient money or other resources 
for food (USDA 2018b). Nationwide, the prevalence of household 
food insecurity increased from a prerecession rate of 11.0 percent in 
2005–2007 to a rate of 14.6 percent during the recession in 2008– 
2010 (USDA 2018a). In Texas, the household-level food insecurity 
rate also increased significantly from a prerecession rate of 14.8 per-
cent in 2005–2007 to a rate of 18.8 percent during the recession in 
2008–2010 (Coleman-Jensen, Gregory, and Singh 2011). Despite a 
better economic outlook, the Texas household food insecurity rate 
was also significantly higher than the U.S. rate during the recession 
(Coleman-Jensen et al. 2011). And despite the economic recovery, 
both the Texas and the nationwide household-level food insecurity 
rates stayed steady in 2011–2013 at recession levels of 18.0 percent 
and 14.6 percent, respectively (Coleman-Jensen, Gregory, and Singh 
2014). 
The USDA’s food and nutrition assistance programs increase 
food security by providing low-income households access to food, 
a healthful diet, and nutrition education. SNAP is the largest of these 
programs and is a central component of American policy to alleviate 
hunger and poverty (Cunnyngham 2016). The program’s primary pur-
pose is to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income 
households to improve their nutrition and alleviate hunger and mal-
nutrition (Rosenbaum 2013). As a means-tested program, SNAP is 
one of the federal government’s primary countercyclical programs, 
expanding during economic downturns and contracting during peri-
ods of economic growth. In general, the percentage of the population 
on SNAP closely tracks the poverty rate and, to a lesser degree, the 
unemployment rate (Oliveira 2015). 
The onset of the Great Recession in Texas in early 2008 (slightly 
later than in other states) brought a fall in SNAP case closings but no 
large increase in case openings (see Figure 10.3). On the other hand, 
late 2009 saw both an increase in openings and a decline in closures, 
with a consequent surge in the caseload. Again, despite the nominal 
economic recovery starting in late 2009, SNAP caseloads in Texas 
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Figure 10.3  Texas SNAP Openings, Closings, and Caseload 
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continued to increase well after it had formally been declared that the 
recession had ended. The number of caseloads finally peaked in late 
2011. 
SAFETY NET SPELLS 
In studying the operation of these two safety net programs, the 
concept of individual spells of receipt is an important simplifying 
assumption. We define safety net spells in order to characterize indi-
viduals’ receipt of benefits over time. A spell consists of a relatively 
continuous period of consecutive months of benefit receipt, with the 
provision that single months of nonreceipt within a larger spell are 
smoothed over and counted as a continuing spell. 
To test the operation of the joint safety net, we define spells in 
such a way that they reflect benefit receipt from either program in any 
given month. Thus, receipt of either SNAP benefits or unemployment 
benefits in a month is regarded as evidence of spell continuation. We 
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also smooth over one-month gaps as described above, which effec-
tively means that a spell ends only when one experiences two full 
calendar months of benefit nonreceipt from both programs. 
Patterns of Participation in Joint Spells 
When one defines spells based on participation in one program 
or another, or both, on a monthly basis, looking for patterns can be 
potentially overwhelming, given that there are tens of thousands of 
possible combinations of paths taken. We (Schroeder 2011) and our 
research partners (Heflin and Mueser 2013) have had some success 
in creating categorization schemes for analyzing such spells, and we 
have found some interesting patterns in the resulting outcomes data.
In retrospect, however, the schemes we used tended to yield too many 
categories whose usefulness for describing outcomes did not seem 
to extend much beyond two factors: 1) how the spells started and 2) 
which components were accessed. Thus, in the interest of parsimony, 
we have simplified our scheme for categorizing joint participation in 
SNAP and UI into four patterns: 
1) The UI-only group received only unemployment insurance 
benefits during the spell. 
2) The UI-first group received both UI and SNAP benefits dur-
ing the spell, but it received only UI in the first month. 
3) The SNAP-first group received both SNAP and UI benefits 
during the spell, but it received SNAP in the first month. 
Members of this group may or may not also have received 
UI in the first month. 
4) The SNAP-only group received only SNAP benefits during 
the spell. 
Note that the order in which we have described these patterns of 
joint safety-net use roughly corresponds with the expected relative 
affluence levels of those likely to exhibit the patterns. Thus, those 
making use of UI-only benefits were expected to have had the stron-
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gest work histories with the highest preprogram earnings. Among 
those receiving UI first, we expected to see strong workforce attach-
ment and, perhaps for some, a reluctance to apply for food benefits 
right away that eventually gave way to need. Among those receiving 
SNAP first, there were likely many working poor, whose earnings are 
chronically too low to disqualify them from long-term use of SNAP
but who at some point lost their jobs and had to access UI as well. 
Among SNAP-only recipients, most would have been expected to be 
unemployed or earning too little, too sporadically, to have qualified 
for UI. Of course, one expects significant variation in income as well 
as other characteristics in all four of these groups, but the general 
trends noted here may prove useful in interpreting outcomes based on 
this classification. 
Moving forward, we use this scheme to organize the description 
of joint safety-net users’ characteristics as well as outcomes. While 
one might expect that the primary interesting results to follow will 
be those involving recipients in one of the two groups who receive 
benefits from both programs, UI-first or SNAP-first, it is worth noting 
that the UI-only and SNAP-only groups also represent little-studied 
populations. Whereas most studies done on SNAP or UI separately 
will, knowingly or not, include in their samples recipients of the other 
program, here we focus on groups that received one benefit to the 
exclusion of the other. 
Characteristics of Joint Safety-Net Recipients 
In this section, we present characteristics of joint safety-net recip-
ients broken out by their participation patterns, as defined in the previ-
ous section (Table 10.1). We do not attempt to describe the character-
istics of joint safety-net participants as a whole, in part because of the 
heterogeneity among these groups, and in part to facilitate compari-
son across states, since some states in our group do not have data on 
the UI-only group. In examining recipient characteristics, we exclude 
censored spells in order to better frame the work done on spell dura-
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Table 10.1  Characteristics of Joint Safety-Net Participants, by 
Participation Pattern 
Demographics 
Age (yrs.) 
Male (%) 
Female (%) 
Black (%) 
White (%) 
Hispanic (%) 
Other race (%) 
ABAWD in current or prior 
spell (%) 
Earnings history 
Employed 4–6 months prior (%) 
Monthly earnings 4–6 months 
prior ($) 
Experienced an earnings dip of 
at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters (%) 
Delay between earnings dip and 
spell begin (in quarters) 
Dollar amount of earnings dip 
(in quarterly earnings) ($) 
Earnings dip as a percentage of 
prior income (%) 
UI UI SNAP SNAP
only first first only 
34.9 39.7 36.9 36.0 
58.9 49.9 39.4 45.3 
41.1 50.1 60.6 54.7 
29.5 32.6 27.2 34.3 
26.3 29.2 30.9 22.2 
41.5 35.0 39.3 39.0 
2.6 3.3 2.6 4.5 
30.6 30.9 33.0 28.2 
75.1 90.3 82.1 37.7 
2,039.50 2,335.80 1,200.10 484.20 
41.0 39.0 41.0 29.4 
3.6 3.3 4.0 4.6 
4,718.10 5,364.10 3,755.50 2,597.00 
72.5 74.9 72.2 80.2 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
tions later. We also restrict our examination to the last spell for each 
recipient during the time period of the study to ensure that recipients 
with multiple spells during the time period are counted only once. 
The average age of recipients in all four groups was similar, rang-
ing from 35 years in the UI-only group to 40 years in the UI-first 
group. While the UI-only group comprises mostly men, the distribu-
tion of men and women in the UI-first group is even. In contrast, the 
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SNAP-first and SNAP-only groups are made up mostly of women. 
The distribution of race across all four groups was similar, with a 
few notable differences: the proportion of white recipients was lowest 
and the proportion of black recipients was highest in the SNAP-only 
group. The proportion of Hispanic recipients was highest in the UI-
only group. 
We examined whether recipients had ever been an able-bodied 
adult without dependents (ABAWD) in the current spell or any prior 
spells and found that the proportion was notably high across all the 
groups. In the UI-only, UI-first, and SNAP-first groups, about a third 
of recipients had at one time been classified as an ABAWD; the pro-
portion was slightly lower, at 28 percent, in the SNAP-only group. 
The experiences of ABAWDs in Texas are examined in greater detail 
in the final section of this chapter. 
We also examined the preprogram employment and earnings 
history of recipients. A vast majority of recipients in the UI-only, 
UI-first, and SNAP-first groups were employed in the prior quarter, 
compared to only a little over a third of recipients in the SNAP-only 
group. Looking at the average earnings in the prior quarter, we found 
that recipients in the UI-only and UI-first groups had the highest pre-
program earnings, followed by recipients in the SNAP-first group, 
while recipients in the SNAP-only group had the lowest preprogram 
earnings. About 41 percent of recipients in the UI-only, UI-first, and 
SNAP-first groups had experienced an earnings dip (defined as being 
a dip of at least 20 percent) within the prior eight quarters, whereas 
only 30 percent of recipients in the SNAP-only group had experi-
enced an earnings dip. 
These findings about the earnings histories of recipients sup-
port our conjecture that the patterns of joint safety-net use would 
correspond to the relative affluence levels of recipients. That is, UI-
only recipients were likely to have had the strongest work histories, 
UI-first recipients were likely to have had strong workforce attach-
ment, SNAP-first recipients were likely working poor, and SNAP-
only recipients were likely unemployed or earning too little or too 
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sporadically to qualify for UI. Of course, the patterns discussed here 
are collapsed across all economic conditions experienced during the 
study period. In the next section, we dig further to see how patterns of 
pre- and postspell incomes vary by the macroeconomic conditions in 
which their spells started. 
The Joint Safety Net and the Economy 
In this section, we examine joint safety-net spells in terms of the 
macroeconomic environment in the time period during which the 
spells occurred. Here we divide our study into three broad periods: 
• Prerecession, including spells starting between January 2003 
and November 2007 
• Recession, including spells starting between December 2007 
and June 2009 
• Jobless recovery, including spells starting between July 2009 
and April 20122 
We defined jobless recovery to refer to the period of time between 
when the recession officially ended and when nominal growth had 
begun, and continuing as long as the policy of making UI benefits 
available for extended durations was kept in place. For Texas, this 
included either EB or EUC08 benefits, the availability of which 
finally ceased in December 2013. Although we know of no precedent 
for treating this final time period separately from other nonrecession-
ary periods, or periods when the economy is technically growing, this 
recovery in the face of high unemployment was a relatively new phe-
nomenon, which we felt justified its inclusion as a separate group. 
Using this classification, we could examine basic descriptive 
information on joint safety-net spells of the four types of participa-
tion patterns. We then illustrated the data by plotting income flows 
over time for joint safety-net beneficiaries before, during, and after 
their use of these programs. 
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Spell trends 
We start by looking at trends in the distribution of new safety-net 
spells across participation patterns under differing economic condi-
tions. Table 10.2 shows, for each combination, the average number 
of new spells per month, counting only completed, uncensored spells. 
As expected, all four types of safety-net spells became more frequent 
during the recession, as compared to the prerecession period. On the 
whole, spell starts were 27 percent more frequent during the recession. 
Somewhat surprisingly, spells overall were even more frequent in the 
jobless recovery period; however, most of this was due to increased 
frequency of SNAP-only spells. UI-only spells represented the only 
Table 10.2  Spell Counts by Participation Pattern and Economic 
Conditions 
Number of new spells per month 
UI only UI first SNAP first SNAP only 
Prerecession 9,097 2,991 2,688 61,558 
Recession 15,096 7,213 4,380 70,411 
Jobless recovery 13,432 7,294 4,354 85,119 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
type that substantially declined in frequency subsequent to the reces-
sion. Finally, in confirmation of patterns seen in studies by Schroeder 
(2007) and Gould-Werth and Shaefer (2014), spells that combined UI 
and SNAP were more common during the recession (11.9 percent of 
new spells) than in the prerecession period (7.4 percent). Combined 
SNAP and UI spells continued to be more common (10.6 percent of 
new spells) during the jobless recovery period. Thus, the finding that 
recipients were more likely to combine SNAP and UI benefits during 
recessionary periods appears to be robust, and the tendency extends 
to the jobless recovery period as well. 
Next, we examine the durations of joint safety-net spells. Table 
10.3 shows average spell durations occurring in each of the four 
participation patterns, broken out by the macroeconomic conditions 
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Table 10.3  Spell Durations (in months) by Participation Pattern and 
Economic Conditions 
UI only UI first SNAP first SNAP only 
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Prerecession 3.6 21% 12.8 28% 27.6 45% 10.8 29% 
Recession 6.0 32% 17.3 33% 24.0 50% 10.0 36% 
Jobless recovery 5.7 28% 14.0 31% 17.3 47% 8.7 38% 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
under which the spell started. Note first of all that UI-only spells were 
by far the shortest. Averaging 3.6 months prior to the recession, these 
spells nearly doubled in length during the recession, then remained 
nearly as long during the jobless recovery period. UI-first spells fol-
lowed a similar pattern. Recall that people in this group received UI 
only in the first month, then also received SNAP later during the same 
spell, so their spells were understandably longer than UI-only spells. 
Safety-net spells among those receiving UI first averaged nearly 13 
months prior to the recession, rose to over 17 months during the reces-
sion, and dropped back to 14 months in the jobless recovery period. 
Whereas the UI-only and UI-first patterns followed standard 
economic expectations of safety-net utilization by workers over a 
recession-and-recovery cycle, spell durations among those receiving 
SNAP first were more peculiar. In this group, the longest spells, aver-
aging over 27 months, occurred during the prerecession period, while 
SNAP-first spells during the recession were shorter at 24 months, 
and jobless recovery spells were shortest at 17 months. SNAP-only 
spells were considerably shorter than SNAP-first, but they followed a 
similar pattern, getting progressively shorter—from the prerecession, 
to the recession, to the jobless recovery period. While these patterns 
might seem to make little sense given the macroeconomic condi-
tions, we may see in the next section how these could be interpreted 
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in terms of changes in the characteristics of the population utilizing 
the benefits. 
Income flows 
Next we examined income flows over time by plotting average 
monthly income totals from three sources, beginning six months prior 
to the beginning of the joint safety-net spell and continuing for 18 
months subsequent to the begin date. This type of chart stacks the 
income totals so one can readily grasp the relative contributions from 
each source, as well as the total across income sources, at each point 
in time. Incomes plotted include unemployment insurance benefits, 
summed across weekly payments to the calendar-month level; SNAP
benefits provided; and monthly earnings as estimated from quarterly 
UI-reported income. In interpreting these charts, it is important to 
keep in mind that, for example, at any given point beyond the spell 
begin date, some safety-net spells are still ongoing and some have 
ended, and we are looking at the average across all of them. Moving 
still farther to the right on the chart, one finds that some have even 
restarted new spells. By taking the average across individuals, we can 
get an idea of the group tendency of continuing reliance on benefits 
and potentially increasing earnings as time progresses. 
UI only. Figure 10.4 shows income flows over time for UI-only 
safety-net participants prior to the recession. This shows the unem-
ployment insurance program as it operates in normal, expansionary 
economic times. Note how earnings levels, which earlier had aver-
aged around $1,600 per month, began to dip several months before 
the safety net was accessed. This is a clear illustration of the earnings 
dip phenomenon first noted by Ashenfelter (1978). From Table 10.3, 
we know that the average duration of safety-net spells is 3.6 months 
among UI-only recipients in the prerecession period. And from Fig-
ure 10.4, it is evident that average earnings reached a nadir relatively 
quickly, about two months after the spells started, then began recover-
ing toward prior levels. 
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Figure 10.4 Income by Source, UI Only, Prerecession 
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SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
As an aid to better quantifying the earnings patterns we observe 
in these charts, Table 10.4 displays the average earnings for selected 
pre- and postspell intervals. This table estimates baseline earnings 
from four to six months prior to the safety-net spell beginning, for 
the most part omitting the earnings dip from this estimate. Follow-
up earnings are estimated 16 to 18 months after the spell started, 
regardless of whether the spells had been completed or not, as a way 
to compare outcomes across categories with spells of varying dura-
tions. Thus, we see that UI-only recipients in the prerecession period 
managed to regain 78 percent of their former earnings levels after 
one-and-a-half years. Again, this illustrates the UI program operating 
as designed during economic expansion, helping workers with short-
term cash flow after they lose their jobs, until they can get back on 
their feet. 
Next, we examine the joint safety-net spells of UI-only recipients 
that started during the recession. Recall that their spells averaged six 
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Table 10.4 Earnings Trends, UI-Only Group 
Monthly earnings Monthly earnings % of 
4 to 6 months prior 16 to 18 months earnings 
($) post ($) regained 
Prerecession 1,605 1,253 78 
Recession 2,099 1,217 58 
Jobless recovery 1,991 1,465 74 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
months in duration, substantially longer than prior to the recession. 
Figure 10.5 illustrates the income flows over time. While the general 
trends were similar to those in the prerecession chart, two important 
differences emerge. First, the average prespell earnings were sig-
nificantly higher, averaging almost $500 a month more than those 
of prerecession UI-only spells. This strongly suggests that a shift in 
the population accessing these benefits occurred in response to the 
Figure 10.5 Income by Source, UI Only, during Recession 
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recession, so that UI-only recipients during the recession come from 
higher-earning backgrounds. 
Second, we find that a year and a half after their spells started, 
recipients regained a smaller share of their prior income (58 percent) 
compared to those recovering from prerecession spells (78 percent). 
Since these figures reflect unconditional earnings, they represent a 
combination of employment and earnings effects. Thus, we may con-
clude that UI-only recipients during the recession either were less 
likely to have regained employment or did so at reduced earnings 
rates subsequent to their safety-net spells. 
Next, we examine joint safety-net spells of UI-only recipients that 
started during the jobless recovery period, the income flows for which 
are illustrated in Figure 10.6. One has to look carefully to confirm that 
Figure 10.6 is different from Figure 10.5. In fact, the statistics reveal 
them to be quite similar. Jobless recovery UI-only spells averaged 
Figure 10.6 Income by Source, UI Only, Jobless Recovery 
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5.7 months in duration, as compared to 6.0 months for recessionary 
spells, and their prespell earnings were similarly high, suggesting 
that the trend of previously higher-earning recipients continued into 
the jobless recovery period. One difference, however, is that jobless 
recovery UI-only recipients did manage to regain a higher percentage 
of their former incomes, which, at 74 percent, is more in line with the 
78 percent seen for prerecession spells. 
UI first. Having explored UI-only recipients’ experiences under 
all macroeconomic conditions, we now turn our attention to the joint 
safety-net spells of those who receive UI first. Recall that recipients 
in this group receive UI exclusively in the first month but later receive 
SNAP as well during the same spell. We saw earlier (Table 10.3) that 
UI-first recipients had safety-net spells that were three to four times 
longer in duration than their UI-only counterparts. Indeed, UI-first 
recipients in the prerecession period received benefits for an aver-
age of 12.8 months, as compared to 3.6 months for similar UI-only 
spells. Figure 10.7 shows income flows for UI-first recipients among 
spells starting before the recession. Note that, despite the longer dura-
tions, the pattern generally resembles the income flow charts for the 
UI-only group, with the strong earnings dip that is reasonably well 
filled with unemployment compensation benefits. One clear differ-
ence is that SNAP benefits make a substantial contribution to income 
throughout the recovery period. 
Table 10.5 lists measures of pre- and postspell earnings for those 
experiencing UI-first safety-net spells. The pattern generally fol-
lows that of UI-only recipients. UI-first recipients in the prerecession 
period averaged $1,560 per month, and despite their longer spells, 
they had recovered 76 percent of the prior earnings a year and a half 
after their spells started. 
Next, in Figure 10.8 we examine the income flows for UI-first 
recipients in spells starting during the recession. Again we see the 
familiar pattern of a large earnings dip, with earnings reaching a nadir 
several months after the spells began. As before, we also see higher 
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Figure 10.7 Income by Source, UI First, Prerecession 
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SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
average prior earnings, as compared to prerecession spells, again con-
firming that the recession brought higher earners into contact with the 
safety net. A major difference this time is the large and continuing 
contribution of UI compensation to income over time, which contin-
ues at a high level to the edge of the chart. At month 18, this is near 
the limit of UI benefit durations for one spell (see Figure 10.2), so it is 
Table 10.5 Earnings Trends, UI-First Group 
Monthly Monthly % 
earnings 4 to 6 earnings 16 to 18 of earnings 
months prior ($) months post ($) regained 
Prerecession 1,560 1,179 76 
Recession 2,246 1,144 51 
Jobless recovery 2,174 1,305 60 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
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Figure 10.8 Income by Source, UI First, during Recession 
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likely that this high usage of UI benefits so long after the spells began 
reflects a combination of both long UI spells and recipients cycling 
back into UI from another job loss. Table 10.5 confirms that members 
of this group had regained only 51 percent of their prior earnings after 
one-and-a-half years. 
Next, we examine those using UI first whose safety-net spells 
started during the jobless recovery. Recall that safety-net spells 
among those receiving UI first average nearly 13 months prior to the 
recession, over 17 months during the recession (Figure 10.8), and 14 
months in the jobless recovery period. Thus, the UI-first recipients in 
Figure 10.9, whose spells started in the jobless recovery, continued 
to rely on the safety net for most of the follow-up period displayed. 
And again, the income-flow patterns strongly resembled those who 
received UI first during the recession, with UI compensation mak-
ing a large and continuing contribution toward closing the income 
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Figure 10.9 Income by Source, UI First, Jobless Recovery 
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SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
gap, even a year and a half after the spell started. Visual examination 
suggests that earnings recovery may have been swifter in the jobless 
recovery period, but ultimately those receiving UI first in the jobless 
recovery regained only 60 percent of their prior income levels. 
SNAP first. Next, we turn our attention to the third joint safety-
net participation pattern, SNAP first. Recall that this group consists of 
those receiving SNAP in the first month of their safety-net spell while 
also receiving UI benefits either in the first month or later in the spell. 
As noted earlier in Table 10.3, spell durations among those receiving 
SNAP first were the longest of all groups, and they took on a pecu-
liar pattern. The longest spells among SNAP-first recipients, averag-
ing over 27 months, occurred during the prerecession period, while 
SNAP-first spells during the recession were shorter at 24 months and 
jobless recovery spells were shortest at 17 months. 
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Figure 10.10 shows income flows for those receiving SNAP first 
whose safety-net spells began prior to the recession. Note first of all 
that all the income flow charts are scaled the same, so that differences 
in average income levels are readily apparent. One striking feature of 
Figure 10.10 is that prespell earnings were quite low, averaging under 
$900 per month, well below any seen for those spell patterns starting 
with UI. The other striking feature is that the earnings dip was pres-
ent but shallow and quite gradual in comparison to UI-only and UI-
first spells, and the same was true for the recovery period. Recall that 
safety-net spells for this group averaged more than 27 months in dura-
tion, so most were still ongoing beyond the time covered by the chart. 
Table 10.6 shows earnings trend statistics for those experienc-
ing SNAP-first safety-net spells. Here we see that for the SNAP-first 
group utilizing the joint safety net prior to the recession, the combina-
tion of a gentle earnings dip and slow but steady earnings recovery 
Figure 10.10 Income by Source, SNAP First, Prerecession 
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Table 10.6 Earnings Trends, SNAP-First Group 
Monthly Monthly % 
earnings 4 to 6 earnings 16 to 18 of earnings
months prior ($) months post ($) regained 
Prerecession 875 828 95 
Recession 1,238 865 70 
Jobless recovery 1,156 961 83 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
resulted in their regaining 95 percent of their prior earnings. This sta-
tistic would be more impressive if their earnings had not been so low 
to begin with. Altogether, this pattern suggests that prior to the reces-
sion, those receiving SNAP first tended to be working but poor, whose 
low earnings made them chronically eligible for SNAP assistance. 
Figure 10.11 shows income flows for those receiving SNAP first 
whose safety-net spells started during the recession. The average 
Figure 10.11 Income by Source, SNAP First, during Recession 
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safety-net spell for this group was over 24 months, so most spells 
persisted beyond the period covered by the chart. The fact that those 
receiving SNAP first during the recession had shorter spells (24 
months) than those receiving SNAP first prior to the recession (27 
months) is probably best explained by a shift in the composition of 
this group in the direction of more income. Indeed, prior earnings 
averaged over $1,200 per month among those receiving SNAP first 
during the recession, 40 percent higher than their prerecession coun-
terparts. Despite their higher prior earnings, the income flows suggest 
little or no income recovery over the safety-net spell, combined with 
a continuing high reliance on both SNAP and UI for replacing lost 
income. 
Income flows for those receiving SNAP first in the jobless recov-
ery period are illustrated in Figure 10.12. Continuing a theme from 
recipients of UI-only and UI-first spells, we find once again that 
Figure 10.12 Income by Source, SNAP First, Jobless Recovery 
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income flows among SNAP-first recipients in the jobless recovery 
period are almost indistinguishable from recipients whose SNAP-first 
spells started during the recession. The jobless-recovery SNAP-first 
recipients did manage to end their spells sooner than other SNAP-
first spells, averaging 17 months, but this was still at least as long as 
any other group we studied. 
Overall, the differences we observed between those receiving 
UI first and those receiving SNAP first are quite dramatic for two 
groups whose members made use of the same benefits. Consider that 
the major difference between these two groups was timing. The UI-
first group started with UI and for whatever reason delayed their use 
of SNAP benefits by a month or more. In contrast, those using SNAP
first sought these benefits at least as early as they sought UI ben-
efits, if not earlier. That we observe such major differences in their 
spell durations and eventual outcomes makes a strong argument for 
the classification system presented here and maintaining a distinction 
between SNAP first and UI first. Consider the alternative: one large 
group of those who combine SNAP and UI benefits, regardless of 
order, would be quite a heterogeneous group. Such a classification 
system would not offer much predictive value. 
SNAP only. Finally, we consider the group of safety-net partici-
pants who made use of SNAP benefits exclusively during their spell, 
a group we refer to as SNAP only. While a small subset of this group 
may have had experience with UI benefits during the interval over 
which we followed them, they did not utilize UI during the spell on 
which we focus here. As noted in the discussion of Table 10.3, SNAP-
only spells are considerably shorter than SNAP-first spells, but they 
follow a similar pattern, getting progressively shorter in duration 
from the prerecession (10.8 months) to the recession (10.0 months) to 
the jobless recovery period (8.7 months). 
Figure 10.13 illustrates income flows among those using SNAP-
only prior to the recession. In comparison to all the income flow 
charts seen thus far, the striking features here are very low earnings 
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Figure 10.13 Income by Source, SNAP Only, Prerecession 
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SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
throughout the period, with little or no detectable earnings dip prior to 
the start of the safety-net spell. In fact, it is difficult to tell from these 
data what the precipitating event for the safety-net spell may have 
been. It is possible that some utilizing the SNAP-only safety net were 
employed in ways not observable to the UI system, such as uncov-
ered industries or informal work arrangements. In any case, there was 
apparently little documentable income in this group. 
Table 10.7 shows earnings statistics among those receiving SNAP
only. Among those receiving SNAP only before the recession, prior 
earnings were so low ($383 per month) that there was almost no way 
to go but up. Thus, they regained 146 percent of their earnings but still 
earned a paltry $560 per month a year and a half later. 
Next, we examine income flows among those using SNAP only 
with a spell starting during the recession. Figure 10.14 shows this 
group to have had slightly higher earnings, consistent with ear-
i i l ti  t t t        T me n months (re a ve o safe y ne spelll begin date)
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Table 10.7 Earnings Trends, SNAP-Only Group 
Monthly earnings Monthly earnings 
4 to 6 months 16 to 18 months % of earnings 
prior ($) post ($) regained 
Prerecession 383 560 146 
Recession 585 659 113 
Jobless recovery 507 718 142 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
lier findings showing those with higher historical earnings utilizing 
safety-net programs during the recession, but this effect was more 
muted among SNAP-only recipients. Arguably the effect in this group 
was limited because of the additional UI eligibility that accrued to 
those with higher earnings, which would tend to make them more 
likely to utilize benefits in the SNAP-first pattern instead. 
Figure 10.14 Income by Source, SNAP Only, during Recession 
0 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
2,500 
M
on
th
ly
 in
co
m
e 
($
) 
UI compensation
SNAP
Earnings
I ti  
 
r i  
-6 -4 -2 Spell 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 
begin 
i e i  t s (relati e t  s f t -- t s  l i  t ) 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
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Finally, looking at the income-flow patterns among SNAP-only 
participants in the jobless recovery period, shown in Figure 10.15, 
it becomes evident that the earnings and benefit histories of those 
using SNAP varied only a little with differing macroeconomic cir-
cumstances. Regardless of the period in which their safety-net spells 
started, they showed low prior earnings, very little evidence of earn-
ings dips, but steady use of SNAP and steadily growing earnings to 
the point that all showed gains in earnings. It almost appears as if 
some members of the SNAP-only group were reflected at a low point 
in their economic lives, in which case their histories shown here might 
reveal little more than their earnings regressing toward the mean. For 
most, it likely reflected their low earning potential, which tended to 
make them eligible or near-eligible for SNAP, along with the occa-
sional income shock like a job loss that precipitated a new spell. 
Figure 10.15 Income by Source, SNAP Only, Jobless Recovery 
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In this section, we have seen how patterns of joint UI and SNAP
safety-net utilization can be characterized in one of four patterns 
that prove useful for organizing their outcomes. We have found, for 
example, that small differences in timing among groups who combine 
SNAP and UI benefits can presage large differences in later outcomes. 
Of course, we are not in a position to draw causal inferences from 
these differences, but the patterns observed here could lead to rigor-
ous tests of potential interventions that could link these two safety-net 
programs more closely. 
We also have seen how program participation patterns and out-
comes for safety-net recipients during the period we refer to as job-
less recovery more strongly resemble those of recipients during the 
Great Recession than those of the prerecession period. Despite the 
fact that the economy was technically regarded as having grown from 
late 2009 onward, some of the worst effects of the recession had yet 
to occur, including the peak SNAP caseloads in Texas, and arguably 
peak food insecurity as well. This pattern of findings provides con-
firmation that treating this period as distinct from the expansionary 
prerecession period should prove useful to future research. Many 
researchers, present authors included, in their prior study of program 
dynamics have aggregated postrecession spells together with prere-
cession spells on the assumption that the common factor among the 
two, a growing economy, made such aggregation logical. They may 
not have understood the heterogeneity of the resulting groups, nor the 
extent of the inflated error variance they invited into their models by 
failing to treat these groups separately. Whatever factors led to the 
jobless recovery, the first instance of which arguably appeared after 
the 2001 recession but on a smaller scale, it is clear that it is a different 
animal, the effects of which we may need new policy tools to address. 
Next, we turn our attention to a policy question that, in part 
because of questionable policy choices made in the face of the Great 
Recession, Texas is uniquely positioned to answer: what was the 
experience of nonworking ABAWDs in areas that were exempt from 
time limits, as opposed to the vast majority of nonworking ABAWD 
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recipients who were subjected to strict time limits on their receipt of 
SNAP benefits? 
A FOCUS ON ABAWDS IN TEXAS 
ABAWDS and SNAP 
Since 2008, the fastest-growing group in the national SNAP case-
load has been able-bodied adults without dependents, or ABAWDs 
(Zedlewski, Waxman, and Gundersen 2012). The Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
limits the receipt of SNAP benefits to three months in a three-year 
period for ABAWDs who are not working and are not participating in 
and complying with the requirements of a work or workfare program 
for 20 hours or more each week (USDA 2018c). But the provision 
neither required states to offer workfare programs or job training to 
people who were unable to find a job nor provided funds to states for 
that purpose. Most states do not offer these programs, in part because 
operating a work program with enough slots for everyone at risk of 
hitting the three-month time limit is regarded as too expensive (Bolen 
et al. 2015). As a result, what was initially labeled a “work require-
ment” has essentially become an austere time limit of three months 
of assistance for poor unemployed workers, many of whom want to 
work but cannot find a job (Rosenbaum 2013). 
Most of those affected by the three-month limit are very poor, 
with average monthly income of approximately 19 percent of the 
poverty line (about $2,200 per year for a household of one in 2014). 
Many have little or no income other than SNAP and qualify for no 
other benefits because they are not raising minor children. In most 
of the United States, SNAP is the only safety net available to unem-
ployed childless adults with little recent work history. ABAWDs are 
more likely than other SNAP participants to lack basic job skills like 
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reading, writing, and basic mathematics (Bolen et al. 2015; Rosen-
baum 2013). 
ABAWDS and Time Limit Exemption Waivers 
States have the authority to exempt individuals using a federal 
15 percent exemption authorized by the Balanced Budget Act. The 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) sus-
pended the ABAWD time limit nationwide beginning April 1, 2009, 
and continuing through FY 2010. States may also request a waiver of 
this provision for people in areas with an unemployment rate above 
10 percent or for those in an area with insufficient jobs; many states 
qualified because of the Great Recession and its aftermath and waived 
the time limit statewide (USDA 2018c). 
From April 2009 until September 2010, the three-month limit 
was temporarily suspended in most of the United States. In FY 2008, 
about 1.1 million able-bodied adults without dependents received 
SNAP benefits. In FY 2009, when the time limits were first sus-
pended, the caseload for this group rose 60 percent to 1.7 million 
adults. The next year, the caseload shot up another 233 percent to 3.9 
million adults (Zedlewski, Waxman, and Gundersen 2012). 
All project states except Texas sought and received approval 
for statewide suspension for the fiscal years following the period 
authorized by ARRA. Texas chose to continue its policy of annually 
requesting waivers for a short list of counties meeting the high unem-
ployment thresholds. We will discuss Texas’s waiver policy in more 
detail in the analysis section, below. 
To get a sense of the prevalence of ABAWDs, the share of SNAP
cases that are ABAWDS was tabulated for the years 2002 through 
2013 for all project states and for the country as a whole, using the 
SNAP Quality Control (QC) data assembled by Mathematica Policy 
Research.3 Despite the shortcomings of these data for state-level 
comparisons, a clear pattern emerges in comparing Texas to the other 
project states. The ABAWD share of the SNAP caseload increased 
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dramatically for most project states during the recession, but it stayed 
relatively steady in Texas at under 5 percent throughout the recession. 
In the United States as a whole, by comparison, over 15 percent of the 
SNAP caseload consisted of ABAWDs by 2013, nearly doubling the 
caseload share from 2008. 
ABAWDS in Texas 
Here we ask the question, “Why did Texas’s ABAWD caseload 
not show growth in line with other states in response to the Great 
Recession?” We will test the hypothesis that Texas’s peculiar imple-
mentation of its ABAWD waiver policy resulted in hardship for some 
recipients, who were cut off from benefits despite not finding suitable 
employment. If this proves to be a plausible account, the hardship 
they suffered could have been avoided, as Texas left significant fed-
eral money on the table by failing to apply for statewide ABAWD 
exemptions. 
In order to answer these questions, we assembled data to allow us 
to study the Texas ABAWD population in detail. These data include 
the SNAP, UI earnings, and UI benefits administrative records data 
used throughout this chapter, as well as policy data collected for this 
purpose. Texas’s SNAP records readily identify ABAWDs who are 
or are not meeting work requirements on a monthly basis. And Texas 
files a SNAP Employment and Training state plan every year, set-
ting out parameters of program operations, including a list of high-
unemployment counties for which waivers to the ABAWD time limits 
are requested for the coming year.4 We located and utilized copies of 
state plans covering 12 years from federal fiscal years (FFY) 2003 
through 2014. Note that the FFY 2015 state plan ended the practice of 
requesting ABAWD waivers for counties, so as of this writing there 
are no high-unemployment-county ABAWD exemptions in place in 
Texas. 
Texas is composed of 254 counties. Ten counties were exempted 
from ABAWD time limits in FFY 2003, and 12 were exempted in 
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FFY 2014. Counties tend to cycle on and off the list, but typically half 
or more of the counties exempted in one year tend to be exempted the 
next. The number of exempted counties reached a maximum in FFY
2012 at 27, and a minimum in FFYs 2009 and 2010 at 4. The counties 
in which exempted ABAWDs reside tend not to be heavily populated. 
The unduplicated number of individual ABAWDs receiving SNAP in 
exempted counties reached a maximum in FFY 2005 at 17,954 and 
a minimum in FFY 2014 of 12.5 Approved waiver counties by fiscal 
year are listed in Appendix Table 10A.1. 
The Texas SNAP Employment and Training state plans also con-
tain a list of counties to be regarded as “minimum service” counties 
for the coming year. These counties tend to be sparsely populated, 
and thus different rules apply in them, including frequent use of the 
15 percent exemptions, because training opportunities are not made 
available in the area. To eliminate this unnecessary added complex-
ity, we removed from our analysis ABAWDs in counties regarded 
as minimum service, including a small number of counties that are 
both ABAWD exempt and minimum service. This leaves us with two 
groups of counties for each FFY, which we utilized in our statistical 
models: 
1) Waiver counties, including ABAWD waiver counties but 
not minimum service counties, and 
2) Typical counties, including all nonwaiver, nonminimum 
service counties 
In composing an analysis of ABAWDs, we thought it would be 
helpful to select a comparison group to provide some context for 
the statistics. We selected, from the SNAP caseload in the same two 
groups of counties, adults who met the same age and nondisability cri-
teria as ABAWDs, but who differed only in that they have dependents 
under the age of 18 in their households and on their SNAP cases. Note 
that there was no matching involved, and thus the comparison group 
is not intended to allow causal inferences of any kind. Instead, the 
group provides context in which to view ABAWDs’ outcomes. 
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ABAWD characteristics 
In this section we present the characteristics of ABAWDs in Texas 
following the same methods we used in examining the characteristics 
of joint safety-net recipients earlier in this chapter (see Table 10.8). 
We excluded censored spells, and we restricted our examination to 
the last spell for each recipient during the study period. We found 
that the average age of ABAWDS in Texas during the study period 
was 33. The gender distribution was nearly even among ABAWDs, 
and the race distribution was also even among the three main groups 
(white, black, and Hispanic). A little less than half of ABAWDs had 
been employed from four to six months before the start of the spell, 
with very low average monthly earnings of $483. About 40 percent 
of ABAWDs had experienced an earnings dip (of at least 20 percent) 
within the prior eight quarters. 
Table 10.8  Characteristics of ABAWDs in Texas during the Study Period 
Demographics ABAWDs 
Age (yrs.) 32.7 
Male (%) 52.7 
Female (%) 47.3 
Black (%) 33.7 
White (%) 30.9 
Hispanic (%) 32.7 
Other race (%) 2.8 
Employment and earnings history ABAWDs 
Employed 4–6 months prior (%) 48.4 
Monthly earnings 4–6 months prior ($) 482.50 
Experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 39.0 
quarters (%) 
Delay between earnings dip and spell begin (in quarters) 4.6 
Amount of earnings dip (in quarterly earnings) ($) 2,472.70 
Earnings dip as % of prior income 78.9 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
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ABAWD SNAP spells 
The obvious first question to ask regarding the SNAP receipt 
dynamics of ABAWDs, given that some are exempted from time lim-
its and some are not, is how long their SNAP spells last. Note that we 
confined our analysis here to spells of SNAP receipt, without regard 
to any receipt of unemployment insurance benefits that might have 
occurred. Analysis of ABAWDs’ joint SNAP/UI safety-net spells, as 
done earlier in this chapter for all SNAP or UI recipients, must be 
deferred for future work. 
Table 10.9 shows SNAP spell durations for ABAWDs and adults 
with dependents whose spells started in either waiver counties or typi-
cal counties, as described above. First we note that adults with depen-
dents have far longer spells than ABAWDS—more than three times 
longer in typical counties. Adults with dependents were found to have 
far higher six-month recidivism rates as well, indicating that their 
SNAP spells also are more frequent than those of ABAWDs. Next, 
we note that SNAP spells starting in waiver counties were longer than 
those in typical counties, as expected, because of the high unemploy-
ment and poor local economic conditions that earned these counties 
their spots on the waiver list. 
Most interesting, perhaps, was the half-month difference in 
SNAP spell duration between ABAWDs in typical counties and 
ABAWDs in waiver counties. Anyone who understands the ABAWD 
waiver exemption policy might be forgiven for expecting something 
resembling the opening of a floodgate in the contrast between these 
two cells. Instead, they would see a mere one-half month of additional 
SNAP receipt among ABAWDs, who should, according to policy, be 
exempted from the time limits. Is it possible that the unmet financial 
needs of ABAWDs in these economically depressed counties were 
being quenched with an extra half-month of SNAP benefits? We shall 
see. Perhaps a better question is, how exactly are time-limit exemp-
tions awarded in ABAWD waiver counties? 
In the next two tables, we examine the extent to which the SNAP
spells of ABAWDs and adults with children living in typical (Table 
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Table 10.9  Spell Durations, ABAWDs vs. Comparison, Typical vs. 
Waiver Counties 
ABAWDs Adults with dependents 
SNAP spell SNAP SNAP spell SNAP
duration recidivism, duration recidivism, 
(mos.) 6-month (%) (mos.) 6-month (%) 
Typical county spells 3.2 11 10.9 34 
Spells in waiver counties 3.7 14 13.4 31 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
10.10) and waiver (Table 10.11) counties responded to macroeco-
nomic conditions. In a sense, this is another way of examining the 
interaction of SNAP spells with the economy. As spells beginning 
in waiver counties themselves represent locally depressed economies 
based on geographic distinctions, so the spells beginning under dif-
ferent macroeconomic conditions represent temporally depressed 
economies based on the time period in which the spells began. 
Table 10.10 illustrates how the typical SNAP spells of ABAWDs, 
subjected to time limits (but free of the influence of the waiver 
policy), interact with the macro economy. The patterns shown here 
reveal that ABAWDs received SNAP for slightly longer during the 
recession (3.3 months) and jobless recovery (3.4 months) than during 
the prerecession period (3.0 months). By contrast, the spells of adults 
with dependents grew shorter with the worsening economy, similar to 
the pattern found earlier for SNAP-first spells, and likely reflecting 
similar factors. 
Table 10.11, on the other hand, shows SNAP spells starting within 
waiver counties, and thus nominally free of the time-limit policy, and 
how they interacted with the macro economy. ABAWD SNAP spells 
starting in waiver counties also were found to grow longer in response 
to the recession and jobless recovery, but not as long as one might 
expect if the time limit were truly being relaxed for these recipients. 
So if the ABAWDs’ SNAP spell durations did not increase much 
in response to waiver policy, nor were very responsive to bad eco-
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Table 10.10  Typical County Spell Durations, ABAWDs vs Comparison, 
Varying Economic Conditions 
ABAWDs Adults with dependents 
SNAP spell SNAP SNAP spell SNAP
duration recidivism, duration recidivism, 
(mos.) 6-month (%) (mos.) 6-month (%) 
Typical prerecession 3.0 9 12.1 31 
spells 
Typical recession 3.3 10 11.3 37 
spells 
Typical jobless 3.4 14 9.4 37 
recovery spells 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
nomic conditions, is it possible that their incomes were buffered in 
other ways? Figure 10.16 illustrates known income flows for ABAWD 
SNAP spells in waiver counties. The pattern looks remarkably like 
those seen for SNAP-only participants earlier, with persistently low 
earnings, little perceptible earnings dip, and slowly growing earnings 
moving forward, except in this case, with little in the way of benefits 
to fill gaps between their income and expenses. As noted earlier, mean 
SNAP spell duration for this group was 3.7 months, and—not coinci-
Table 10.11  Waiver County Spell Durations, ABAWDs vs. Comparison, 
Varying Economic Conditions 
ABAWDs Adults with dependents 
SNAP spell SNAP SNAP spell SNAP
duration recidivism, duration recidivism, 
(mos.) 6-month (%) (mos.) 6-month (%) 
Waiver prerecession 3.6 14 13.9 31 
spells 
Waiver recession 5.0 13 12.9 32 
spells 
Waiver jobless 4.0 13 9.7 32 
recovery spells 
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources analysis of Texas 
SNAP and UI benefits and earnings administrative records data. 
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Figure 10.16 Income by Source, ABAWDs in Waiver Counties 
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dentally—the point of highest cash flow on this chart was in the first 
few months after spells began. If these ABAWDs in waiver counties 
had other sources of income that would improve this dire situation, 
they were not visible to us. 
Figure 10.17 shows income flows for adults with dependents 
starting SNAP spells in the same economically depressed waiver 
counties. Recall from Table 10.9 that this group’s SNAP spells aver-
aged 13.4 months in waiver counties, nearly 10 months longer than 
those of ABAWDs in these counties. Thus, it should not be surpris-
ing that their income flows as represented in these charts have a nice 
healthy layer of SNAP benefits in the middle (the light gray area in 
the figure) spanning almost the entire period. Underneath is an unim-
pressive earnings layer (dark gray) that looks remarkably like the 
earnings layer for ABAWDs in the same counties (Figure 10.16). The 
primary difference between Figure 10.16 and Figure 10.17, in fact, is 
that one group received SNAP benefits according to its level of need, 
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Figure 10.17 Income by Source, Adults with Dependents in Waiver 
Counties 
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and the other received benefits for a few months at most, then these 
benefits ceased, regardless of continuing need. 
We could insert many more income flow charts here: we have 
countless charts that allowed us to compare the SNAP spells of 
ABAWDs and adults with dependents under varying conditions. 
But none of them tell a different story from what we see above: two 
groups had similar earnings histories. One was determined to be eli-
gible to receive continuing food assistance to meet the need, and the 
other was not. 
On paper, the Texas ABAWD time-limit exemption waiver 
policy was supposed to allow some flexibility for leniency in deal-
ing with ABAWDs living in areas without sufficient job opportuni-
ties. Though we have not seen extensive policy guidance on this, 
the spell duration data indicate that the manner in which the policy 
was implemented resulted in very little leniency in practice. SNAP
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benefits for ABAWDs appeared to run out well before the need was 
extinguished. It was not even necessary for Texas to be so restrictive 
with ABAWDs, as the statewide exemptions were there for the taking 
starting in 2009. It is difficult to imagine a universe in which it is good 
policy, in the face of the worst recession in decades, to turn away free 
money for the state’s neediest citizens, who were actually the most 
likely to recycle it directly back into the economy. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how spells of joint UI and 
SNAP safety-net utilization can be characterized in one of four pat-
terns. We further show that these patterns prove useful for understand-
ing and predicting outcomes for those utilizing one or both of these 
safety-net programs. Importantly, we find that small differences in 
timing among groups who combine SNAP and UI benefits can pres-
age large differences in later outcomes. The pattern of results here 
strongly suggests that programs or policies should be designed to link 
these two safety-net programs more closely. Considering this along 
with the finding that recipients tend to combine the two programs 
more under recessionary conditions suggests a clear hypothesis for 
the next study: that safety-net recipients may recover prior earnings 
levels faster when receiving timely benefits from both programs upon 
experiencing job loss or other economic stress. Interventions should 
be designed to link the programs more closely, and such programs 
should be subjected to rigorous tests to determine whether recipients 
get back to work and recover a substantial share or their prior earn-
ings levels sooner. 
In studying the interaction of the joint safety net with macroeco-
nomic conditions, we found that even though the economy was offi-
cially determined to be recovering, safety-net utilization patterns and 
outcomes during the period we refer to as the jobless recovery were 
in many ways more similar to the recession than to the prerecession 
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period. The economy was officially growing again as of late 2009, yet 
some of the worst effects of the recession had yet to occur, including 
the peak SNAP caseloads in Texas and, arguably, peak food insecu-
rity as well. This pattern of findings provides confirmation that treat-
ing this jobless recovery period as distinct from other expansionary 
periods, including prerecession periods, should prove useful to future 
research. Whatever factors led to the jobless recovery, a lighter ver-
sion of which appeared after the 2001 recession, it is clear that new 
policy tools are needed to address its effects on those who may be left 
behind by the eventual recovery. This task of developing new tools is 
urgent, as the next recession will inevitably come, and the eventual 
recovery that follows may be as jobless as the last. 
Because of questionable policy choices made in the face of the 
Great Recession, Texas data reveal what happens to able-bodied 
adults without dependents (ABAWDs) when they receive little protec-
tion from strict time limits on their receipt of SNAP benefits. In com-
parison to other project states or the United States as a whole, while 
ABAWDs’ share of the nationwide SNAP caseload swelled dramati-
cally, Texas’s ABAWD caseload share remained low, at well under 5 
percent. We found that Texas did not actually have fewer ABAWDs 
than other states; rather, the very short durations of SNAP receipt in 
that state caused Texas to be underrepresented in the caseload count at 
any given point in time. As a result of this peculiar implementation of 
its ABAWD waiver policy, Texas likely worsened hardship for some 
recipients, who were cut off from benefits despite their inability to 
find suitable employment. Worse, the hardship they suffered seems 
to have been unnecessary, as Texas left significant federal money on 
the table by failing to apply for statewide ABAWD exemptions at 
any point during the recession. We are aware of no other state that so 
thoroughly bypassed this opportunity to provide for its lowest-income 
citizens during the worst recession in modern history. 
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Notes 
1. Because earlier temporary emergency UI programs had also gone by the 
name Emergency Unemployment Compensation, the program lasting 
from 2008 to 2013 is frequently called EUCO8. 
2. Although we defined the jobless recovery period to extend over a longer 
interval, we exclude spells starting after April 2012 from our analysis so 
that we have at least 24 months of follow-up for all spells. 
3. The Mathematica Policy Research QC documentation cautions against 
use of Maryland QC data for state-level tabulations. 
4. See, for example, the State of Texas’s SNAP Employment and Training 
Plan: Federal Fiscal Year 2018 (Texas Workforce Commission 2018). 
5. Yes, this number is correct: 12 ABAWDs residing in 1 of 12 counties 
received SNAP at some point in FFY 2014. Note that we are unable to 
count ABAWDs who were not receiving SNAP. ABAWDs in the SNAP
population may be severely undercounted by caseload statistics because 
of strict application of time limits. 
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Appendix 10A 
Table 10A.1  Approved Waiver Counties by Fiscal Year 
Federal 
fiscal year Approved waiver counties 
FFY2003 Dimmit, Hidalgo, Loving, Matagorda, Maverick, Newton, 
Presidio, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2004 Hidalgo, Jasper, Matagorda, Maverick, Newton, Presidio, Red 
River, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2005 Cameron, Cochran, Dimmit, Hidalgo, Jasper, Liberty, 
Matagorda, Maverick, Newton, Orange, Presidio, Reeves, 
Sabine, Somervell, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2006 Dimmit, Hidalgo, Jasper, Liberty, Matagorda, Maverick, 
Newton, Orange, Presidio, Sabine, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2007 Dimmit, Hidalgo, Jasper, Liberty, Matagorda, Maverick, 
Newton, Orange, Presidio, Sabine, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2008 Loving, Presidio, Maverick, Starr, Zavala 
FFY2009 Loving, Maverick, Starr, Zavala 
FFY2010 Maverick, Presidio, Starr, Zavala 
FFY2011 Cameron, Cass, Dimmit, Duval, Hidalgo, Jasper, Liberty, 
Marion, Matagorda, Maverick, Milam, Morris, Newton, 
Orange, Presidio, Reeves, Sabine, San Augustine, Starr, 
Willacy, Zapata, Zavala 
FFY2012 Cameron, Cass, Dickens, Duval, Hidalgo, Jasper, Jefferson, 
Liberty, Marion, Matagorda, Maverick, Milam, Morris, 
Newton, Orange, Presidio, Red River, Reeves, Sabine, San 
Augustine, San Jacinto, San Patricio, Starr, Tyler, Willacy, 
Zapata, Zavala 
FFY2013 Cameron, Cass, Dickens, El Paso, Hidalgo, Houston, Jasper, 
Jefferson, Liberty, Matagorda, Maverick, Morris, Newton, 
Orange, Presidio, Red River, Reeves, Sabine, San Augustine, 
Starr, Tyler, Willacy, Zavala 
FFY2014 Cameron, Hidalgo, Jefferson, Maverick, Newton, Presidio, 
Red River, Sabine, San Augustine, Starr, Willacy, Zavala 
SOURCE: RMC analysis of state of Texas SNAP Employment and Training Plan,
Federal Fiscal Years 2003 through 2014. 
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